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THEISM 

IN  THE  LIGHT  OF  PRESENT  SCIENCE 
AND  PHILOSOPHY 


BY 


JAMES   IVERACH,   M.A.,  D.D. 

AUTHOR  OF  "IS  GOD   KNOWABLE  ?  "   "EVOLUTION  AND 
CHRISTIANITY,"   ETC. 


PUBLISHED    FOR 

THE   NEW  YORK    UNIVERSITY 

BY 

THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 
1899 


Copyright,  1899, 
By  the  MACMILLAN  COMPANY. 


Novioooti  IPress 

J.  S.  Cushiiig  &  Co.  -  Berwick  &  Smith 
Norwood  Mass.  U.S.A. 


THE   CHARLES   F.    DEEMS    LECTURESHIP 
OF   PHILOSOPHY 

The  University  accepted,  April  15,  1895,  from  the 
American  Institute  of  Christian  Philosophy  an  en- 
dowment of  Fifteen  Thousand  Dollars  for  the  sup- 
port of  a  lectureship  to  be  called  the  Charles  F. 
Deems  Lectureship  of  Philosophy,  under  the  follow- 
ing rules :  — 

The  University  agrees  to  maintain  said  lectureship 
by  securing  for  each  year,  or  each  alternate  year,  a 
Lecturer,  eminent  in  Science  and  Philosophy,  who 
shall  treat  in  not  less  than  six  lectures  some  one  of 
the  most  important  questions  of  Science  and  Philoso- 
phy, with  a  special  reference  to  its  relation  to  the 
revealed  truths  of  the  Holy  Scriptures  and  to  the 
fundamental  principles  of  Theistic  Philosophy. 

The  Lecturer  shall  be  chosen  by  the  University's 
Committee  upon  the  Charles  F.  Deems  Lectureship, 
which  shall  consist  of  the  Chancellor  and  two  mem- 
bers of  the  Faculty  of  Arts  and  Science  and  two 
members  of  the  University  Council,  to  be  named  as 
the  Council  may  direct.  The  subject  for  each  year's 
lectures  shall  be  agreed  upon  between  this  Committee 
and  the  Lecturer. 

vii 


Vlll  THE  DEEMS  LECTURESHIP 

The  University  shall  provide,  free  of  charge,  a 
room  for  the  lectures,  and  shall,  at  its  own  expense, 
make  due  public  announcement  of  the  time  and 
place  of  each  lecture.  The  University  shall  also 
publish,  in  book  form,  each  series  of  lectures,  and 
put  the  same  on  sale  with  one  or  more  reputable 
book  firms,  provided  this  can  be  done  without  fur- 
ther expense  than  can  be  met  by  the  accumulation 
of  income  over  and  above  the  expense  of  maintaining 
the  annual  or  biennial  series  of  lectures. 

The  University's  Committee  at  present  is  consti- 
tuted as  follows:  Chancellor  MacCracken,  Dean 
Baird,  Dean  Prince,  Mr.  WilUam  S.  Opdyke,  and 
Rev.  Dr.  George  Alexander. 

The  inaugural  course  upon  this  foundation  was  given 
in  April,  1899,  by  Professor  James  Iverach,  D.D.,  of 
the  Free  Church  College,  Aberdeen,  Scotland. 

These  lectures  are  now  published  by  the  Uni- 
versity. 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER   I 

PAGE 

The  scientific  view  of  the  world,  and  its  bearing  on  Theism         i 

CHAPTER   II 

The  inorganic  world  a  preparation    for  life :    the  physical 

characteristics  of  life  ......       34 

CHAPTER   III 

Life  :  its  genesis,  growth,  and  meaning       ....       66 

CHAPTER   IV 
Rational  life  and  its  implications 98 

CHAPTER   V 
The  Making  of  man ,        .     131 

CHAPTER  VI 

Is  a  rational  religion  possible?     Mr.  Benjamin  Kidd  and 

Mr.  Arthur  Balfour .163 

CHAPTER   VII 
Personality  :  its  character  and  its  meaning  ,         .         .     195 

CHAPTER   VIII 
Religion  :  its  nature,  history,  and  demands         .         .         .     227 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER   IX 


Philosophy  in  its  agnostic  aspect :  its  postulates,  its  char- 
acter, and  its  truth 260 

CHAPTER  X 

Idealistic  philosophy :  its  merits  and  its  defects ;  the  con- 
ception of  God ;  how  shall  we  conceive  the  synthetic 
unity  of  God,  man,  and  the  world?  —  the  kingdom  of 
God 293 


THEISM 

IN   THE   LIGHT   OF   PRESENT   SCIENCE 
AND    PHILOSOPHY 


THE  SCIENTIFIC  VIEW   OF  THE  WORLD, 
AND   ITS   BEARING   ON   THEISM 

My  first  duty  in  connection  with  this  lectureship 
is  to  express  my  warmest  thanks  to  the  authorities 
of  the  New  York  University  for  the  high  honour  they 
have  conferred  upon  me  in  choosing  me  to  be  the 
first  Deems  lecturer.  It  is  the  greatest  honour  of 
my  life,  and  it  bears  with  it  a  corresponding  respon- 
sibility. It  came  on  me  with  surprise,  and  I  accepted 
it  with  fear  and  anxiety ;  for  I  had  some  idea  of  the 
work  done  in  America  in  theology  and  philosophy. 
I  do  not  mention  the  achievements  of  America  in 
other  fields ;  I  speak  only  of  those  with  which  I  am 
familiar.  It  was  surprising  to  me  that  I  should  be 
asked  to  speak  to  this  University,  and  to  this  pubUc, 
on  topics  with  regard  to  which  they  had  so  many 
workers  of  renown  on  this  side  of  the  water.  I  had 
read  many  of  the  works  of  American  writers  on 
theology  and  philosophy ;  I  had  learned  much  from 
them ;  I  had  striven  to  follow  the  evolution  of  Amer- 
ican thought  and  life,  from  the  epoch-making  work 
of  Jonathan  Edwards  onward  to  the  present  time; 
and  I  had  come  to  have  a  high  appreciation  of  the 

B  I 


2  THEISM 

value  of  that  work.  So  numerous  are  the  works  of 
American  writers  on  the  subjects  connected  with  the 
topic  I  have  to  discuss  that  I  shall  not  mention  any 
names.  It  you  find  in  my  lectures  traces  of  the 
influence  which  your  own  writers  have  exerted  on 
my  mind,  I  hope  you  will  not  find  fault  with  me  on 
that  account ;  I  hope  you  will  take  it  as  a  tribute  to 
the  value  of  American  work. 

The  subject  of  my  lecture  is  Theism,  in  the  light 
of  present  science  and  philosophy.  I  shall  endeavour 
to  look  at  the  world  with  the  eyes  of  science,  as 
science  sets  forth  for  us  the  story  of  the  world  in  the 
ages  of  the  past,  and  unfolds  for  us  the  magnificence 
of  the  world  as  it  now  is.  I  desire  to  learn  from  the 
masters  of  science  what  kind  of  world  I  live  in,  what 
has  been  its  past  history,  and  what  is  its  probable 
outlook.  Having  learned  from  science  all  that  I  can 
grasp,  I  may  have  to  ask  questions  which  science  can- 
not answer,  ultimate  questions  which  science  leaves  to 
philosophy  and  theology,  and  we  shall  ask  what  is  the 
present  attitude  of  philosophy  toward  these  questions 
which  science  has  left  unsettled.  It  looks  Hke  a  large 
order,  and,  on  the  face  of  it,  it  seems  rather  presumptu- 
ous for  any  man  to  profess  to  deal  with  so  large  a 
theme.  It  would  be  presumptuous  were  I  to  profess 
to  teach  all  that  science  has  to  say  on  every  topic,  or 
even  profess  to  have  mastered  all  the  sciences.  I  am 
not  so  presumptuous  as  to  profess  anything  of  the 
kind.     A  man  may  understand  something  of  physics. 


SCIENTIFIC    VIEW  OF  THE    WORLD  3 

although  he  has  not  read  the  "Principia"  of  Newton, 
and  he  may  have  a  general  knowledge  of  mathematics, 
though  he  is  unfit  to  read  all  the  works  of  Cayley  or 
Sylvester.  The  scope  and  range  of  geological  work 
he  may  understand,  though  he  may  not  be  famihar 
with  all  the  details  of  the  successive  epochs  of  geo- 
logical evolution.  At  all  events,  a  man  may  study 
science  for  the  purpose  of  seeing  for  himself  that 
system  of  the  universe  which  science  may  disclose 
to  his  mind,  and  may  inquire  what  elements  require 
to  be  added  to  the  scientific  view  in  order  to  obtain 
a  rational  view  of  the  world  as  a  whole.  The  pre- 
supposition of  science  is  that  the  world  has  a  mean- 
ing, is  intelligible,  and  that  the  world  is  a  whole,  and 
forms  a  system.  We  presume  that  we  are  in  a 
rational  world,  that  things  have  a  meaning,  that  they 
work  together,  and  that  the  method  of  their  working 
may  be  found  and  expressed.  Acting  on  this  presup- 
position men  have  gone  to  work,  and  in  the  several 
departments  of  science  have  formulated  a  number  of 
rules  or  laws  which  have  been  verified  as  true,  and 
when  acted  on  have  turned  out  to  be  adequate  and 
accurate.  Science,  so  far  as  it  goes,  is  the  record  of 
man's  understanding  of  the  world  in  which  he  lives, 
and  his  mastery  over  it.  I  say  so  far  as  it  goes ;  for 
great  as  have  been  its  achievements,  and  vast  as 
have  been  its  conquests,  it  only  stands  on  the  thresh- 
old of  the  world  it  has  to  conquer.  The  world  is  one, 
and  the  sciences  are  many.     The  world   moves  to- 


4  THEISM 

gether,  and  the  sweep  of  its  movement  is  always  real, 
concrete,  and  complete.  Our  abstract  sciences  toil 
after  it  in  vain.  We  break  up  the  world  into  aspects, 
and  we  suffer  for  it;  as  each  aspect  tends  to  substi- 
tute itself  in  the  place  of  the  whole  reality.  The 
world  thinks  things  together,  we  think  them  apart; 
and  we  are  apt  to  put  the  aspect  we  see  in  the  place 
of  the  whole. 

It  is  our  lot,  as  finite  beings,  to  be  able  to  attend  to 
few  things  at  a  time.  We  have  our  ways  of  neglect- 
ing many  aspects  of  reality,  in  order  to  attend  only 
to  that  which  attracts  us,  and  to  the  understanding  of 
which  we  bend  all  our  strength.  We  have  fallen 
on  many  methods  by  the  use  of  which  we  seek  to 
simplify  the  multiplicity  of  the  problems  set  to  us  in 
life,  and  to  make  them  such  as  we  may  grasp.  We 
are  baflfied  by  the  complex  problems  set  to  us  by  the 
simplest  particle  of  matter.  Even  if  we  can  picture 
to  ourselves  a  particle  of  matter,  it  is  impossible  for 
us  to  grasp  in  one  thought  all  that  is  involved  in  the 
notion.  For  there  is  in  it,  first,  the  notion  of  matter, 
which,  simple  as  it  appears  to  unreflective  common 
sense,  is  yet  one  of  the  most  complex  notions  which 
a  long  process  of  abstraction  has  bequeathed  to  us. 
Then  it  is  by  no  means  easy  to  grasp  the  notion  of 
a  particle,  and  the  larger  our  knowledge  is  the  more 
difficult  is  it  to  give  a  satisfactory  account  of  a 
material  particle.  Suppose  that  we  have  come  to 
some  satisfactory  definition  of  a  particle  of  matter, 


SCIENTIFIC    VIEW   OF  THE    WORLD  5 

such  as  we  may  find  in  our  text-books  of  physics  or 
chemistry,  it  is  still  too  large  for  us  to  deal  with  it  as 
a  whole.  In  our  statics  we  proceed  to  deal  with  it  as 
it  is  at  rest  in  its  present  position,  whatever  it  may 
be,  but  in  order  to  do  so  we  must  neglect  all  that  is 
characteristic  of  it  save  only  the  one  feature  of  it 
to  which  we  attend.  Then  conceive  it  in  motion,  and 
we  may  deal  with  it  under  the  title  of  the  dynamics 
of  a  particle.  Only  those  who  have  studied  the 
mathematical  complexities  contained  in  a  text-book 
with  such  a  title  can  have  any  adequate  conception  of 
the  intricate  analysis  and  mathematical  difficulty  in- 
volved in  a  satisfactory  treatment  of  the  subject.  In 
order  to  deal  with  it  at  all  we  have  neglected  all 
those  aspects  of  the  particle  which  do  not  lend  them- 
selves to  our  treatment.  We  simply  treat  it  as  a 
something  which  occupies  space,  and  can  be  moved 
under  certain  forces  from  place  to  place.  We  do 
not  think  of  it  as  having  bulk,  weight,  resistance ;  nor 
do  we  think  of  it  as  being  matter  in  a  certain  state. 
Temperature,  chemical  properties,  electric  condition, 
and  a  thousand  other  properties  are  non-existent  for 
us,  or,  at  all  events,  are  neglected  by  us.  In  reahty 
every  particle  of  matter  has  physical,  chemical,  and 
other  properties,  and  has  them  all  at  the  same  time. 
Every  particle  of  matter  has  a  certain  weight,  a  cer- 
tain chemical  property,  is  at  a  certain  temperature, 
and  is  in  a  certain  electric  state,  but  to  grasp  these 
all  at  once  lies  beyond  our  power.     We  need  some- 


6  THEISM 

times  to  remind  ourselves  of  these  most  obvious 
truths.  Amid  the  many  and  varied  sciences  that 
claim  our  attention,  physics,  —  chemistry,  biology, 
psychology,  and  so  on,  we  are  apt  to  think  that  the 
world  of  nature  and  of  men  is  split  up  into  so  many 
compartments,  which  have  little  or  no  connection 
with  one  another.  The  separate  sciences  are  apt  to 
make  us  lose  sight  of  the  fact  that  we  are  dealing 
with  one  world.  To  limit  our  view  at  present  to 
the  inorganic  world,  let  us  think  for  a  moment  of 
the  way  in  which  we  break  up  the  unity  of  the 
world  into  aspects  and  fragments.  I  come  to  one 
of  your  great  universities  to  study  physics,  and 
I  put  myself  under  the  guidance  of  one  of  your 
great  teachers.  I  am  told  that  a  certain  amount 
of  mathematical  training  is  needed  for  the  proper 
study  of  physics.  I  am  told  that  all  that  has  mag- 
nitude admits  of  measurement,  and  all  that  can  be 
measured  is  subject  to  mathematics.  I  am  taught 
mathematics,  rising  in  time  to  its  higher  branches. 
The  result  is  that  I  am  led  to  look  at  the  world  as 
a  great  mechanism,  working  and  being  wrought  in  a 
way  that  can  be  calculated.  It  is  a  magnitude  exist- 
ing in  space  and  time,  and  it  works  in  a  measurable 
fashion.  That  is  the  kind  of  notion  given  me  by  my 
study  of  mathematics. 

Prepared  thus,  I  go  to  a  master  in  physics,  and  I 
find  myself  still  in  a  world  of  mechanism,  only  now  it 
is  a  world  of  a  more  intricate  sort.     There  are  bodies 


SCIENTIFIC   VIEW   OF   THE    WORLD  7 

in  it  which  I  am  told  are  real  bodies.  There  are  laws 
at  work  which  I  am  told  are  real  laws,  and  these  I 
have  to  investigate  and  learn.  I  am  taught  that  there 
are  laws  of  motion,  and  I  learn  them  as  set  forth  by- 
Newton,  with  whatever  modifications  of  them  have 
been  made  since  his  time.  Properties  of  matter  are 
set  forth  to  me,  and  I  am  told  of  the  various  states 
which  matter  may  assume ;  and  I  am  told  that  what- 
ever may  be  its  state,  it  attracts  all  other  matter  in 
the  universe  inversely  as  the  square  of  the  distance. 
I  learn  something  of  the  kinetic  theory  of  gases,  of 
the  laws  which  govern  matter  in  the  gaseous,  the 
liquid,  and  the  solid  state.  But  these  states  depend 
largely  on  temperature,  and  I  must  learn  of  heat  and 
its  laws,  so  the  whole  subject  of  thermo-dynamics 
opens  up  before  me.  This  in  turn  is  connected  with 
electricity,  and  the  subject  of  electricity  next  en- 
gages my  attention.  Suppose  a  man  to  be  thus  led 
around  the  whole  round  of  physics  as  it  is  presented 
to  him  in  any  of  our  well-equipped  universities,  and 
to  have  acquired  a  well-grounded  knowledge  of  the 
field  of  physics,  what  is  his  impression  of  it }  It 
seems  to  me  that  the  first  thing  he  ought  to  do  would 
be  to  touch  mother  earth  once  more.  The  unity  of 
the  physical  world  has  been  attenuated  in  his  mind 
into  a  number  of  separate  aspects.  He  has  concep- 
tions of  a  number  of  separate  sciences,  and  of  a  world 
which  so  far  corresponds  to  each  abstract  science, 
but  not  of  a  world  which  corresponds  to  the  unity 


8  THEISM 

which  underlies  them  all.  Light,  heat,  electricity, 
gravitation,  properties  of  matter,  all  the  separate 
sciences  which  make  up  the  whole  conception  of 
physics,  lie  as  separate  sciences  in  the  mind,  and 
the  need  of  a  concrete  universal  is  great.  Even 
the  great  doctrine  of  the  conservation  of  energy  is 
insufficient  to  bring  our  physicist  back  to  concrete 
reality,  for  it,  too,  is  an  abstraction. 

We  are  so  proud,  too,  of  our  abstractions,  and  of 
those  general  laws  which  we  have  been  able  to 
express.  We  grow  eloquent  about  the  law  of  grav- 
itation, of  the  conservation  of  energy,  and  other 
great  generalizations  which  mark  the  greatness  of 
the  human  mind.  Men  talk  grandly  of  the  persist- 
ence of  force,  and  think  they  can  explain  the  universe 
in  terms  of  matter  and  motion,  and  their  distribution 
and  redistribution.  I  do  not  find  fault;  but  I  seek 
to  remember  that  the  explanations  which  I  read  are 
not  in  terms  of  the  reality  of  the  world,  but  in  terms 
of  the  abstractions  which  have  been  made  by  finite 
intelligence,  and  that  they  may  have  only  a  finite 
reference.  The  process  of  abstraction  and  general- 
ization, by  means  of  which  we  seek  to  pass  from  the 
particular  to  the  universal,  lead  us  farther  and  farther 
from  reality.  Certain  aspects  are  isolated.  We  take 
those  qualities  in  which  particular  things  resemble 
each  other,  and  we  neglect  the  differences,  and  we 
invent  general  names  for  those  qualities  they  have 
in  common.     When  the  process  is  so  far  complete, 


SCIENTIFIC  VIEW  OF  THE    WO  RID  9 

we    are    apt    to   substitute    the    qualities   we    have 
abstracted  for  the  complex  reality  of  which  they  are 
only  aspects.     It  helps  us  to  call  green,  violet,  red, 
by  the  general  name  of  colour,  it  helps  our  thinking 
to  have  a  general  name  for  plants,  animals,  men,  and 
so  on,  if  we  remember  that  the  unity  thus  manufac- 
tured is  only  formal,  made  by  us  for  our  convenience, 
and  does  not  represent  a  real  unity.     It  is  no  real 
bond  of  union  that  we  reach  by  a  process  of  general- 
ization.    In  fact,  the  more  we  generalize,  the  farther 
do  we  remove  ourselves  from  reality ;  and  the  objec- 
tive truth  of  things  cannot  be  reached  by  that  process. 
Our  books  on  logical  and  scientific  method  teach 
with  sufficient  fulness  and  clearness  the  process  by 
which  we  rise  to  the  recognition  of  wider  and  wider 
laws.     Here  they  leave  nothing  to  be  desired.     Our 
university   lectures    also    teach    the    theory   of    the 
process  of   generalization    adequately  and   fully.     I 
do  not  find  in  our  books  descriptive  of  scientific  and 
logical  method  what  I  find  in  the  practical  teaching 
of  science.     There  I  am  taught  not  only  to  rise  to 
higher  and    higher  generalizations,  I  am   taught  to 
recognize   that   synthesis  of   particulars  which   con- 
stitute  the   thinghood    of   the   thing.     This   reverse 
process  is  in  fact  always  going  on.     The  process  of 
science  depends  not  only  on  the  recognition  of  wider 
generalizations,  but  also  on   the  discovery  of   those 
unities  which  have  features  peculiar  to  themselves. 
It  was  a  great  discovery  to  find  out  the  mechanical 


lO  THEISM 

equivalent  of  heat,  and  to  be  able  to  say  that  heat  is 
a  mode  of  motion  ;  it  was  also  a  discovery  quite  as 
great  to  find  out  Argon,  with  its  unique  characteristics. 
General  laws  are,  after  all,  not  the  greatest  part  of 
human  knowledge,  nor  the  most  important.  While 
we  speak  about  them  and  use  them,  we  always  do  so 
with  a  kind  of  unconscious  caution,  and  with  the 
reserve  that  they  must  conform  to  the  objective 
reality.  Our  practical  teachers,  who  have  always 
before  them  the  tremendous  criticism  which  nature 
passes  on  our  abstractions,  insist  that  their  students 
shall  have,  not  only  a  knowledge  of  abstract  mathe- 
matics and  physics,  but  they  also  insist  that  students 
shall  make  themselves  acquainted  with  the  qualities 
and  characteristics  of  those  materials  with  which  they 
will  have  to  deal  in  the  active  business  of  their  profes- 
sion. Thus  the  concrete  particularity  of  each  kind  of 
thing  is  of  the  utmost  importance  ;  and  the  method  of 
ascertaining  these  is  not  recognized  in  our  text-books. 
Still,  it  may  be  admitted  that  the  attainment  of 
universality  is  eminently  desirable.  To  be  able  to 
make  universal  judgments  is  indeed  indispensable. 
How  shall  they  be  made }  Generalization,  or  the 
method  which  arrives  at  a  kind  of  universality  by 
leaving  out  differences,  does  not  seem  a  hopeful 
method.  True,  we  may  thus  arrive  at  a  certain  kind 
of  universality,  but  when  we  have  done  so,  it  is  a 
kind  which  has  no  objective  reference,  and  is  not 
true  save  of  our  subjective  notions.     That  there  are 


SCIENTIFIC    VIEW   OF   THE    WORLD  II 

a  unity  and  universality  in  things  is  a  conviction  as 
deep  as  any  to  be  found  in  the  human  mind ;  but  how 
shall  we  attain  to  that  unity  ?     May  we  hope  to  find 
a   universality    which    will   not   express   merely   the 
invention  of  the  observing  and  classifying  mind,  but 
a   unity    and    universality    immanent   in    the   things 
themselves,    and    expressive    of   their   very   nature  ? 
May  we  hope  to  find  a  method  which  shall  take  up 
particular  things  in  all  their  particularity,  and  yet  see 
them,  not  in  isolation,   but  in  their  relation  to  the 
system  of  which  they  form  a  part  ?     It  were  a  con- 
summation devoutly  to  be  wished.     Certainly  there 
is  such  a  system,  and  the  intelligible  universe  is  such 
a  system.     There,  in  concrete  reality,  are  the  things, 
beings,  persons,  actually  subsisting  in  one  space  and 
in  one  time,  each  in  its  concrete  reality,  with  all  its 
peculiarities  and  characteristics  ;  and  without  suppres- 
sion of  difference  they  take  their  place  and  perform 
their  functions  in  the  ongoing  of  the  universe.     We 
shall  never  reach  any  nearer  to  an  apprehension  of 
the  real  universe  by  running  upward  to  the  highest 
abstraction  we  can  express,  — call  it  substance,  being, 
or  force,  or  by  any  other  name,  —  and  then  reverse  the 
process    and    descend   downward,  adding    difference 
to  difference  as  we  need  them,  till  we  arrive  at  the 
concrete  world.     We  are  in  an  unreal  world  all  the 
time,  and  our  abstractions  simply  delude  us.     Worlds 
are  not  made  in  that  way,  nor  can  they  by  that  way 
be  understood. 


12  THEISM 

In  our  descriptions  and  definitions  we  take  what 
we  conceive  to  be  essential,  positive,  and  sufficient, 
and  we  are  ready  to  forget  those  quaUties  which  we 
have  left  out  of  account  By  simply  taking  those 
properties  which  we  have  abstracted  from  the  con- 
crete reality,  we  have  not  caused  the  other  relations 
to  disappear.  They  remain  as  a  disturbing  element, 
to  remind  us  again  of  their  neglected  existence. 
Those  which  we  have  regarded  as  essential  proper- 
ties, fixed  in  a  definition,  and  marked  by  a  common 
name,  are  real;  but  the  neglected  are  also  real. 
Matter  may  be  described  as  a  set  of  individual  units, 
or  as  a  set  of  things  bound  together  in  chemical 
relations,  but  neither  conception  expresses  all  that  we 
mean  by  matter.  Each  expresses  one  aspect  of  real 
existence,  and  we  may  use  it  without  error,  so  long 
as  we  remember  that  it  represents  only  an  aspect, 
and  that  aspect  the  one  we  are  most  interested  in  for 
the  time. 

We  do  injustice  to  the  actual  procedure  of  scientific 
men  when  we  formulate  it  as  we  have  done  in  our 
text-books  of  logic.  Conceptions,  general  names, 
notions,  are  set  forth  as  if  they  are  the  results  of  a 
process  of  abstraction,  in  which  specific  differences 
are  neglected  and  left  out  of  account.  The  real 
process  of  science,  as  exemplified  by  the  practice  of 
scientific  men,  is  something  very  different.  It  is  the 
attempt  to  recognize  in  things  the  concrete  relations 
to  each  other  which  they  involve.     I  do  not  think  I 


SCIENTIFIC    VIEW   OF  THE    WORLD  1 3 

can  describe  it  better  than  by  a  description  of  the 
process  of  an  actual  discovery.  Professor  Ramsay, 
in  the  conclusion  of  an  article  on  ''  The  Kinetic 
Theory  of  Gases,"  in  the  Contemporary  Review,  says: 
**  We  have  seen  that  the  discovery  by  Lord  Rayleigh 
of  a  discrepancy  in  the  density  of  atmospheric  nitro- 
gen has  resulted  in  the  discovery  of  a  new  constituent 
of  air,  argon ;  its  discovery  has  led  to  that  of  a 
constituent  of  the  solar  atmosphere,  helium ;  specu- 
lations on  the  ultimate  nature  and  motion  of  the 
particles  of  which  it  is  believed  that  gases  consist 
has  provoked  the  consideration  of  the  conditions 
necessary  in  order  that  planets  and  satellites  may 
retain  an  atmosphere,  and  of  the  nature  of  that 
atmosphere ;  the  necessary  existence  of  an  undis- 
covered element  was  foreseen,  owing  to  the  usual 
regularity  in  the  distribution  of  the  atomic  weights 
of  elements  not  being  attained  in  the  case  of  helium 
and  argon,  and  the  source  of  neon  was  therefore 
indicated.  This  source,  atmospheric  air,  was  investi- 
gated, and  the  missing  element  was  discovered.  A 
new  fact  has  been  added  to  science,  and  one  not 
disconnected  from  others,  but  one  resulting  from  the 
convergence  of  many  speculations,  observations,  and 
theories,  brought  to  bear  on  one  another."  {Con- 
temporary Reviezv,  November,  1898,  p.  691.) 

Here  we  have  a  telling  illustration  of  the  difference 
between  the  universal  as  a  law  of  nature  and  the 
universal  which   is   merely  an    abstract  conception. 


14 


THEISM 


In  the  wonderful  story  of  scientific  success  recorded 
by  Professor  Ramsay,  we  never  touch  the  region  of 
mere  abstract  conceptions.  There  is  first  the  recog- 
nition of  the  difference  of  density  between  nitrogen 
from  one  source  and  another,  and  there  is  the  in- 
telhgent  search  for  the  cause  of  this  difference.  The 
result  is  the  discovery  of  an  element  having  prop- 
erties distinct  from  all  other  elements.  Here  is  the 
search  for  a  concrete  thing  successfully  conducted, 
and  there  is  no  parade  of  abstract  formulae  employed 
in  the  search.  At  the  basis  there  is  a  magnificent 
conception ;  but  it  is  one  not  reached  by  a  process  of 
mere  generalization  arrived  at  by  leaving  out  specific 
differences.  It  is  reached  by  recognizing  the  specific 
differences  of  all  the  elements  known,  their  mutual 
relations,  and  the  laws  of  their  distribution,  and  thus 
a  new  element  is  added  to  the  family  of  chemical 
elements.  It  is  to  be  observed,  also,  that  a  regard  to 
the  law  of  periodicity  of  the  weights  of  the  elements 
led  on  to  the  further  discovery  of  neon.  The  beauty 
of  the  real  process  of  discovery,  whether  it  be  the 
discovery  of  a  new  element,  or  of  a  wide  law  like 
that  known  as  the  ''  periodic  arrangement  of  ele- 
ments," is  that  it  is  no  abstract  conception  that  is 
reached,  but  a  conception  which  strives  to  set  forth 
clearly,  fully,  adequately,  the  concrete  relations  of 
the  objects  in  view.  A  conception  which  correctly 
formulates  the  actual  relations  of  things  has  thus 
real    objective  value.     Taken  by  itself  it  is  a  mere 


SCIENTIFIC    VIEW   OF   THE    WORLD  15 

abstraction,  and  is  only  a  symbol,  which  may  mislead 
the  mind  by  a  false  appearance  of  reality. 

The  difference  here  emphasized  between  a  scien- 
tific conception  and  a  mere  abstract  conception  is 
dwelt  upon  because  it  will  greatly  help  us  in  the 
course  of  our  discussion.  To  take  an  illustration 
which  may  anticipate  what  will  be  more  fully  dis- 
cussed later  on,  but  is  used  here  to  show  why  we 
have  insisted  on  the  distinction.  Spinoza  says, 
*'  Omnis  determinatio  est  negatio  "  ;  and  this  has  been 
made  the  basis  of  much  argumentation  of  the  nega- 
tive sort.  It  has  been  applied  to  the  theistic  argu- 
ment ;  it  has  been  used  to  show  that  the  absolute  and 
infinite  are  only  negative  notions.  If  we  are  perched 
on  the  ladder  of  generalization  as  it  is  described 
in  a  book  of  pure  logic,  it  is  true  that  every  definition 
limits.  We  mark  this  object  out  from  others  by  its 
positive  qualities  and  its  specific  difference.  But 
when  we  pass  on  to  the  consideration  of  a  concrete 
being  in  all  its  manifoldness  of  concrete  qualities, 
we  simply  reverse  the  maxim  of  Spinoza,  and  say, 
"Omnis  determinatio  est  affirmatio."  We  go  on  to 
add  quality  to  quality  until  we  have  summed  up  the 
whole  of  the  qualities  of  this  being  in  its  concrete 
unity  and  reality.  The  larger  the  number  of  quali- 
ties, and  the  higher  the  rank  of  qualities  sphered 
in  any  one  being,  the  greater  we  reckon  that  being 
to  be.  Every  attribute  we  see  in  that  being,  and 
express  in  our  notion  of  it,  is  not  a  negation  of  any 


1 6  THEISM 

quality  which  it  may  be  supposed  to  possess,  but  an 
affirmation  of  the  truth  that  the  being  has  this  partic- 
ular excellence  in  addition  to  all  the  others  we  have 
spoken  of,  and  possesses  them  in  the  harmony  of 
one  existence.  Conceptions  which  have  real  worth, 
that  is,  those  conceptions  which  express  the  imma- 
nent nature  and  relations  of  the  concrete  world, 
are  set  free  from  the  merely  negative  limitation  set 
by  the  maxim  of  Spinoza,  and  rejoice  in  the  freedom 
of  doing  real  positive  work,  and  of  building  up  a 
world  of  real  knowledge  which  will  approximate 
closer  and  closer  to  the  world  of  real  existence. 
But  this  is  the  real  method  and  work  of  science 
when  we  regard  it  in  the  practice  of  the  masters 
of  science,  who  have  widened  the  boundaries  of 
knowledge.  No  doubt,  Spinoza  tells  us  ('*  Ethics," 
Book  I.,  Prop.  IX.),  that  "the  more  reality  or  being 
a  thing  has,  the  greater  the  number  of  its  attributes," 
but  that  is  only  to  say  that  Spinoza  sometimes  forgot 
his  axiom,  "  Omnis  determinatio  est  negatio,"  for  by 
this  axiom  we  can  reach  nothing  save  the  most  general 
and  empty  abstraction,  being  without  attributes,  a 
mere  indeterminate  something.  It  was  not  the  pur- 
pose of  Spinoza  to  start  from  being  in  general,  or  to 
reach  that  conception  as  the  outcome  of  his  reason- 
ing. He  desired  to  attain  to  the  knowledge  of  the 
absolute  totality  of  things,  conceived  as  a  unity  in 
which  all  particular  existences  might  find  a  place  and 
serve  as  elements  in  an  intelligible  whole.     He  has 


SCIENTIFIC    VIEW   OF  THE    WORLD  1/ 

a  real  apprehension  of  the  unreal  and  imaginary 
character  of  mere  conceptions,  and  he  warns  his 
readers  against  them.  Straightway  he  himself  falls 
under  their  yoke,  and  actually  proceeds  according 
to  the  method  of  abstraction.  Being  with  no  attri- 
butes at  all  gives  place  to  the  most  determinate 
being  conceivable,  namely,  being  constituted  by  an 
infinite  number  of  attributes.  What  he  did  accom- 
plish was  to  dissolve  all  into  the  ultimate  abstraction 
of  being  from  which  there  was  no  way  of  return  to 
an  actual  world ;  what  he  meant  to  do  was  to  relate 
all  the  parts  to  that  absolute  being  which  he  con- 
ceived to  be  the  presupposition  of  thought  and 
being,  and  the  unity  of  all  existence.  His  is  a  con- 
spicuous instance  of  the  fate  which  befalls  great 
thinkers  and  great  systems,  when  they  depart  from 
a  method  which  alone  can  conserve  the  manifold  re- 
lations of  reality  with  a  regard  to  the  necessity 
of  thinking  them  as  related  parts  of  a  system. 

Being  attenuated  till  it  is  altogether  without  attri- 
butes, substance,  without  any  determination  or  char- 
acterization, force,  or  the  persistence  of  force,  gives 
no  intelligible  starting-point  for  the  knowledge  of 
reality.  These  are  merely  abstractions,  easy  to  reach, 
and  worthless  when  we  have  reached  them.  Leav- 
ing them  on  one  side  and  following  in  the  steps  of 
the  masters  of  science  who  have  striven  to  see  the 
world  in  its  actual  movement,  let  us  see  what  kind 
of  world  is  revealed  to  us  through   their  guidance. 


1 8  THEISM 

It  is  an  intelligible  world,  a  world  existing  in  one 
space  and  in  one  time,  a  world  which  moves  under 
law.  No  doubt  our  masters  present  that  world  to 
us  under  aspects,  and  each  presents  it  under  that 
aspect  in  which  he  is  most  interested,  and  with  which 
he  is  most  familiar.  It  takes  many  sciences  to  bring 
us  near  to  the  real  world,  but  by  bringing  the  sci- 
ences together  we  may  come  to  some  apprehension 
of  the  magnificence  of  the  world.  At  least  we  may 
have  some  notion  of  the  complexity  and  simplicity 
of  the  world,  and  that  it  looks  like  a  work  worthy 
of  an  infinite  intelligence.  It  is  a  greater  world  than 
our  fathers  dreamt  of,  it  has  lengthened  in  time, 
broadened  in  space,  and  has  a  wider  sweep  of  order 
and  a  vaster  rhythm  than  men  thought  of  till  recent 
thoughts  were  apprehended  by  the  human  mind. 
The  story  of  the  making  of  the  worlds  is  written 
on  the  wastes  of  space,  and  carried  on  the  waves  of 
light  to  the  remotest  stars.  When  we  go  out  on  a 
clear  starlight  night  and  look  up  to  the  Milky  Way, 
or  gaze  on  the  bands  of  Orion,  at  first  we  think  that 
we  are  reading  a  contemporary  story.  We  are  soon 
told,  and  it  is  difficult  to  reahze  it,  that  we  are  read- 
ing pages  of  the  history  of  the  universe,  some  written 
a  thousand  years  ago  and  some  yesterday.  I  am  not 
to  trouble  with  figures,  which  might  be  easily  given, 
but  it  may  be  said  that  the  light  which  falls  on  our 
eyes  tells  us  of  the  state  of  the  star  from  which  it 
comes  as  that  star  was  when   the    light   started    on 


SCIENTIFIC    VIEW   OF  THE    WORLD  19 

its  tremulous  way.  It  tells  us  of  the  state  of  that 
star  when  Marathon  was  fought,  so  long  it  has  taken 
to  reach  us  across  the  depths  of  space.  Inconceiv- 
able magnitudes,  distances  unimaginable,  yet  across 
them  light  can  travel,  and  the  ether,  the  undulations 
of  which  are  light,  stretches  all  the  way.  Had  we 
eyes  to  read  the  story  of  what  we  see  on  any  evening 
on  which  we  look  up  to  the  starry  heavens,  what 
a  story  it  would  be.  The  drama  of  the  separate 
worlds  which  make  up  the  universe  of  matter  might 
be  read  there.  There  are  worlds  in  the  making, 
some  of  them  only  in  their  infancy,  not  yet  arrived 
at  definite  form.  There  are  masses  of  glowing  gas, 
the  raw  material  of  ordered  worlds,  masses  gathered 
into  something  like  form,  worlds  in  the  full  maturity 
of  worldhood,  and  worlds  that  seemingly  have  had 
their  day,  and  have  passed  into  the  ways  of  decay. 

Everywhere,  too,  as  these  worlds  and  systems  exist 
in  one  space  and  one  time,  so  they  seem  to  be  built 
up  of  the  same  kind  of  stuff,  and  to  be  ruled  by  the 
same  laws  that  obtain  on  this  earth.  The  light  that 
reaches  us  from  the  most  distant  star  may  be  broken 
up  and  dispersed  on  its  arrival  here,  and  on  being 
wisely  asked  will  tell  us  what  were  the  conditions 
of  its  source,  and  what  were  the  elements  of  matter 
that  sent  it  forth.  The  main  thing  for  me  is  that 
there  is  a  story  to  tell,  and  a  story  which  we  have  so 
far  read,  so  far  at  least  as  to  give  us  reason  to  be- 
lieve that  it  is  an  intelligible  story.      Written  in  the 


20  THEISM 

light  that  speeds  across  space,  told  by  the  light  itself 
as  it  reaches  us,  do  you  not  think  that  if  our  intelli- 
gence can  read  it,  some  intelligence  akin  to  ours 
instructed  the  light  to  record  it  ?  At  all  events  we 
may  rest  in  the  belief  that  we  are  in  one  universe 
with  the  most  distant  body  in  space,  that  hght  there 
and  here  is  constituted  the  same  way,  and  that  there 
is  one  medium  which  makes  the  transmission  of  light 
possible.  Nor  is  this  the  only  universal  statement 
we  can  make  about  the  universe.  The  stuff  which 
makes  up  our  world  is  the  same  stuff  made  up  in  the 
same  kinds  as  we  know  on  the  earth  and  in  the  solar 
system.  Hydrogen  is  hydrogen,  vibrating  in  the 
same  time,  emitting  or  absorbing  the  same  light  as 
it  does  here.  The  same  attractions  and  repulsions 
characterize  the  matter  of  the  stars,  and  the  particles 
of  matter  attract  each  other  directly  as  the  masses 
and  inversely  as  the  square  of  the  distance.  This 
seems  true  of  all  material  worlds,  that  they  are  made 
of  the  same  stuff,  and  are  ruled  by  the  same  laws. 
Along  with  the  sameness  which  unites  them,  there 
seems  to  be  endless  variety  in  the  systems  which 
occur  in  the  sidereal  heavens.  Systems  of  binary 
stars  revolving  round  a  common  centre  of  gravity, 
systems  like  our  solar  system  only  more  complex, 
and  systems  so  varied  and  complex  that  they  pass 
our  understanding.  Nay,  science  is  dreaming  of 
an  earlier  evolution,  lying  beyond  the  stage  of  atoms 
and  molecules,  as  these  are  known  to  us.     It  dreams 


SCIENTIFIC    VIEW   OF  THE    WORLD  21 

of  a  pre-atomic  state  of  matter,  in  which  the  so-called 
atoms  of  the  chemist  represent  not  the  origin  of 
things,  but  only  early  stages  of  the  evolutionary 
process.  Science  deems  that  at  present  in  the  atmos- 
pheres of  the  suns  and  stars  there  are  forces  at  work 
which  prevent  the  formation  of  atoms  and  molecules, 
such  as  are  aggregated  at  the  temperature  of  the 
earth.  However  that  may  be,  and  we  may  wish  our 
scientific  friends  success  in  every  attempt  to  widen 
the  bounds  of  human  knowledge,  certain  it  is  that  in 
the  systems  that  make  up  the  material  universe  we 
know  of  matter  in  all  the  stages  of  evolution.  There 
are  stars  which  are  growing  hotter,  stars  at  their 
maximum  of  heat,  stars  and  systems  that  are  growing 
cooler.  Worlds  in  the  making,  worlds  made,  and 
worlds  passing  into  decay;  we  are  bewildered  with 
the  magnificence  of  the  world  disclosed  to  us  by 
science.  It  is  an  ordered  world  which  we  are  called 
on  to  contemplate.  If  there  is  a  pre-atomic  state 
of  matter,  it  exists  under  other  conditions  than  those 
which  obtain  on  the  earth,  and  our  means  of  dissoci- 
ation are  too  limited  to  enable  us  to  reproduce  that 
condition  of  matter.  For  us,  atoms  are  ultimate  and 
cannot  be  brought  to  a  finer  shape.  This,  also,  has 
a  bearing  on  the  intelligibility  of  the  world  which 
is  a  postulate  of  theism.  The  original  stuff  is  made 
with  a  bias,  and  has  an  invincible  tendency  to  aggre- 
gate itself  into  certain  irreversible  patterns.  Chemi- 
cal   elements     are    formed    which     maintain    their 


22  THEISM 

identity  and  continuity  in  all  circumstances,  and  no 
amount  of  work  which  we  can  bring  to  bear  on  them 
can  break  them  up  into  simpler  forms.  One  stuff 
which  at  certain  temperatures  passes  into  irreversible 
forms ;  forms  which  abide  amid  all  changes  as  the 
elementary  atoms  out  of  which  ordered  systems  are 
built  up ;  this  simply  gives  us  a  wider,  grander  pur- 
pose than  we  were  wont  to  think  of.  In  that  primi- 
tive state  of  matter  there  is  an  inherent  tendency 
to  aggregate  itself  into  certain  abiding  forms,  and 
these  forms  have  certain  properties  and  relations 
which  enable  them  to  build  up  a  stable  system,  and 
on  that  stable  system  there  have  been  built  other 
systems,  such  as  Hfe,  intelligence,  a  mind  capable 
of  reading  the  whole  story.  Such  is  the  kind  of 
universe  we  live  in. 

When  we  pass  from  astronomical  physics  to  the 
world  which  chemistry  discloses  to  our  view  we  come 
to  a  story  equally  wonderful,  and  equally  inteUigible. 
These  atoms  which  to  us  are  ultimate  have  proper- 
ties which  can  be  understood.  They  are  of  various 
kinds,  each  perfect  in  its  kind,  and  are  related  to  each 
other  in  such  a  way  as  to  form  a  system.  To  de- 
scribe them  would  simply  be  to  transcribe  what  is 
within  the  reach  of  every  one.  Their  w^eights,  their 
combining  properties,  their  preference  for  one  combi- 
nation rather  than  another,  their  periodicity,  which  is 
so  remarkable  that  elements  were  predicted,  their 
properties    described    before    they   were    discovered, 


SCIENTIFIC    VIEW   OF   THE    WORLD  23 

reveal  to  us  an  ordered  world  which  may  well  arouse 
our  admiration,  and  reward  our  investigation.  Tak- 
ing for  granted  the  facts  disclosed  to  us  by  chemistry 
and  the  theoretic  conclusions  established  by  chem- 
ists, we  observe  that  we  have  made  an  advance  and 
have  become  acquainted  with  a  new  set  of  properties 
and  laws.  Gravitation  is  still  with  us,  and  matter 
still  attracts  matter  according  to  a  certain  law,  tem- 
perature abides,  force,  as  we  knew  it  in  physics,  re- 
mains, but  we  become  acquainted  with  other  forces 
and  other  laws  than  those  we  knew  in  physics.  Two 
elementary  bodies  combine  together  on  certain  con- 
ditions, and  stick  together  until  work  is  done  on 
them  to  make  them  part.  Each  atom  of  matter  has 
its  own  way  of  action,  and  insists  on  combining  with 
others,  only  on  its  own  conditions.  Many  other 
things  might  be  said  had  we  time.  These  are  said, 
however,  for  the  purpose  of  showing  that  chemistry 
is  compelled  to  make  its  own  assumptions,  and  it  cer- 
tainly has  the  right  to  do  so.  You  may  say  that  here 
we  are  still  in  the  domain  of  mechanism,  and  are 
working  under  the  dominion  of  mechanical  law.  I 
am  not  disposed  to  quarrel  about  terms,  but  if  you 
insist  on  calhng  this  mechanical,  you  must  recognize 
a  difference  in  the  physical  and  chemical  mechanical 
assumptions.  In  physics  you  deal  only  with  the  rela- 
tions which  can  be  subsumed  under  gravitation,  heat, 
and  so  on ;  in  chemistry  you  deal  with  attractions  and 
repulsions  of  another  order.     Oxygen  and  hydrogen 


24  THEISM 

do  not  obey  the  law  of  inverse  squares,  nor  can  you 
calculate  the  law  of  repulsion  of  atoms  in  an  explo- 
sive mixture.  Or  if  you  can  make  the  calculation,  you 
must  use  a  calculus  other  than  that  which  you  use  in 
mere  physics.  I  make  this  observation  for  the  pur- 
pose of  showing  that  each  science  has  its  own  method, 
makes  its  own  assumptions,  and  deals  with  its  own 
subject  in  its  own  way.  I  shall  have  occasion  to  say 
this  frequently  as  we  pass  on,  and  I  make  it  broadly 
now.  A  physical  problem  is  one  thing,  a  chemical 
problem  is  another ;  physical  dynamics  is  approached 
in  one  way,  a  problem  in  chemical  dynamics  is  solved 
only  by  a  chemical  method.  These  observations  are 
necessary  in  view  of  the  vast  generalizations  in  some 
of  the  great  systems  in  vogue  at  the  present  hour,  in 
which  it  is  assumed  that  the  method  and  the  assump- 
tions of  physics  are  sufficient  for  the  explanation  of 
the  universe.  It  is  assumed  that  mechanical  law  is 
sufficient  for  the  explanation  of  all  phenomena.  On 
the  contrary,  we  find  that  this  is  insufficient,  even  for 
the  explanation  of  the  simplest  problem  in  chemistry. 
For  physics  deals  only  with  ponderable  matter,  while 
chemistry  deals  with  its  own  conception  of  energies 
arising  from  intrinsic  differences  of  matter,  and  con- 
sequently it  penetrates  into  a  region  inaccessible  to 
physics.  It  may  be  possible  to  arrive  at  a  dynamic 
of  the  energy  set  up  by  the  interaction  of  chemical 
elements,  but  this  will  be  a  mechanism  of  a  finer 
order.     The   contention  is  that   the   method  of   the 


SCIENTIFIC    VIEW  OF  THE    WORLD  2$ 

simpler,  more  abstract,  science  is  inadequate  to  deal 
with  problems  of  another  order.  No  doubt  physics 
is  helpful  to  chemistry,  as  both  are  helpful  in  biology, 
and  all  three  are  helpful  in  psychology,  but  the  help- 
fulness would  cease,  or  become  hurtfulness,  if  they 
attempted  to  rule  out  all  they  could  not  grasp.  As  we 
shall  see,  this  is  constantly  being  done,  to  the  injury 
of  clear  thinking ;  and  fruitful  progress  in  our  attempt 
to  understand  the  world  in  its  concrete  reality  is  hin- 
dered by  over-generalization,  and  by  the  extension  of 
a  method  beyond  its  limits. 

When  we  unite  the  results  of  physics  and  chem- 
istry, we  reach  a  fuller  view  of  reality  than  when  we 
look  at  the  world  with  the  eyes  of  each  separately. 
We  recognize  that  matter  is  one,  and  that  matter  is 
made  up  of  parts  ;  that  there  is  an  energy  of  mass 
and  position,  and  also  an  energy  arising  out  of  the 
relations  of  different  kinds  of  matter  each  to  each. 
The  uniformity  of  mechanical  law  which  has  regard 
only  to  impressed  force  is  supplemented  by  the  law 
of  attraction  known  as  chemical  affinity,  and  the 
compounds  arising  out  of  chemical  combination. 
Masses  count,  but  atoms  count  also ;  and  there  is 
the  unity  of  many  elements  in  one  system. 

Ere  we  leave  the  vision  of  the  world  disclosed  to 
us  by  physics  and  chemistry,  let  us  take  a  glance 
at  another  aspect  of  their  work.  These  sciences 
deal  not  only  with  those  aspects  of  reality  which 
have   already  been   mentioned,  they  strive   to   deal 


26  THEISM 

with  the  unseen  agent  or  medium  which  has  been 
postulated  to  account  for  the  phenomena  of  Hght,  and 
other  related  phenomena.  Assumed  to  account  for 
the  phenomena  of  light,  it  has  been  found  necessary 
for  the  understanding  of  other  phenomena.  The 
characteristics  of  the  ether  are  thus  set  forth  by- 
Clerk  Maxwell :  "  It  appears,  therefore,  that  certain 
phenomena  in  electricity  and  magnetism  lead  to 
the  same  conclusion  as  those  of  optics;  namely, 
that  there  is  an  aetherial  medium  pervading  all 
bodies,  and  modified  only  in  degree  by  their  pres- 
ence ;  that  the  parts  of  this  medium  are  capable 
of  being  set  in  motion  by  electric  currents  and 
magnets ;  that  this  motion  is  communicated  from 
one  part  of  the  medium  to  another  by  forces  aris- 
ing from  the  connection  of  these  parts ;  that  under 
the  action  of  these  forces  there  is  a  certain  yielding 
depending  on  the  elasticity  of  these  connections  ;  and 
that,  therefore,  energy  in  two  different  forms  may 
exist  in  the  medium,  the  one  form  being  the  actual 
energy  of  motion  of  its  parts,  the  other  being  the 
potential  energy  stored  up  in  the  connections  in 
virtue  of  their  elasticity.  Thus,  then,  we  are  led  to 
the  conception  of  a  compHcated  mechanism  capable 
of  a  vast  variety  of  motion,  but  at  the  same  time  so 
connected  that  the  motion  of  one  part  depends,  ac- 
cording to  definite  relations,  on  the  motion  of  other 
parts,  these  motions  being  communicated  by  forces 
arising   from  the  relative   displacement  of   the  con- 


SCIENTIFIC    VIEW   OF   THE    WORLD  2 J 

nected  parts,  in  virtue  of  their  elasticity.  Such  a 
mechanism  must  be  subject  to  the  general  laws  of 
dynamics,  and  we  ought  to  be  able  to  work  out  all 
the  consequences  of  its  motion,  provided  we  know 
the  form  of  the  relation  between  the  motions  of  the 
parts."  (Quoted  in  Glazebrook's  "James  Clerk  Max- 
well and  Modern  Physics,"  p.   179.) 

Maxwell  was  able  to  deduce  the  mechanical 
and  electric  actions  which  take  place,  and  these 
have  been  verified  by  subsequent  experiment.  Wire- 
less telegraphy  and  other  wonderful  phenomena 
illustrate  the  insight  of  Maxwell,  and  bear  witness 
to  the  existence  of  the  mechanism  of  the  ether,  the 
stresses  of  which  seem  equally  related  to  the  phe- 
nomena and  electricity  and  light,  if  these  are  not 
at  bottom  one  and  the  same,  as  they  are  certainly 
most  intimately  related.  I  mention  these  things 
without  dwelling  on  them,  as  I  desire  to  call  at- 
tention to  the  boldness  of  the  conception  and  the 
magnificence  of  the  results  worked  out  by  means  of 
it.  To  suppose  a  medium  filling  all  space,  pervad- 
ing all  forms  of  matter  in  every  state  of  matter, 
stresses  in  which  can  be  propagated  with  the  speed 
of  light  across  the  spaces  of  the  universe,  which 
could  be  a  means  of  communication  between  the 
worlds  which  make  up  the  universe,  and  to  be  able 
to  say  what  must  be  the  properties,  or,  at  least, 
what  some  of  its  properties  must  be,  was  certainly 
a  bold  conception,  and  a  great   achievement  of  the 


28  THEISM 

human  mind.  If  to  discover  such  a  medium  and 
to  investigate  its  properties  is  a  great  triumph  of 
intelligence,  what  must  the  reality  be?  Suppose 
the  ether  to  exist  in  the  form  and  with  the  quali- 
ties and  functions  described  by  Clerk  Maxwell,  and 
with  other  properties  and  functions  unrecognized  as 
yet,  are  we  simply  to  recognize  the  fact,  accept  it 
as  ultimate,  and  pass  on  ?  Is  that  all  ?  Are  we  to 
recognize  the  functions  of  the  ether,  to  see  clearly 
enough  that  the  existence  of  some  such  medium 
and  of  such  work  as  is  done  by  means  of  it  is  the 
condition  of  light  and  heat  in  a  world  otherwise 
dark,  cold,  and  lifeless,  and  are  we  not  to  be  allowed 
to  think  of  a  purpose  and  meaning  in  connection 
with  its  function  and  work  ?  It  took  intelligence  of 
a  high  order  to  discover  the  existence  and  mean- 
ing of  the  ether :  has  the  existence  of  it  no  rela- 
tion to  inteUigence  ?  Are  we  simply  to  accept  it 
as  a  fact  and  think  no  more  about  it  ?  That  is  the 
attitude  which  many  assume,  while  some  go  further 
and  say  to  us  with  more  or  less  authority,  that 
order,  law,  and  mechanism  are  ultimate,  and  when 
we  find  these  we  can  dispense  with  intelligence. 
That  raises  the  question  of  the  relation  of  order 
and  intelligence,  and  as  to  whether  the  human 
mind  can  ever  rest  in  any  explanation  of  the  order 
of  the  world  which  leaves  it  unrelated  to  intelli- 
gence. Leaving  aside  all  questions  as  to  the  seat 
of    the    intelligence,    whether     immanent    or    tran- 


SCIENTIFIC   VIEW   OF   THE    WORLD  29 

scendent,  within  or  without  the  world,  surely  on  the 
general  question  there  can  be  no  manner  of  hesi- 
tation as  to  the  answer  of  a  rational  being,  con- 
scious that  he  is  in  a  rational  universe.  We  know 
that  the  world,  as  it  appears  to  science,  has  a  most 
definite  relation  to  intelligence.  Science  is  the  work 
of  mind,  of  the  intelligence  of  a  succession  of 
thinkers,  who  received  the  work  from  them  who 
went  before  and  handed  it  down  to  those  who 
bore  the  torch  onward  to  ever  larger  results.  If 
we  bow  in  reverence  before  those  who  made  science, 
and  gratefully  recognize  the  worth  and  greatness 
of  their  intelligence,  what  is  to  be  our  attitude  in 
presence  of  the  great  reality  of  the  universe,  so 
much  greater  than  the  mind  of  the  wisest,  ablest, 
and  greatest  of  men  can  conceive  t  Is  there  not 
in  the  phenomena  of  the  universe,  roughly  out- 
lined, traces  of  an  intelligence  akin  to  the  intelli- 
gence of  Newton  and  Maxwell .''  Of  the  character 
of  that  intelligent  power  manifest  in  the  universe, 
disclosed  to  us  by  physics  and  chemistry,  we  are 
able  to  say  nothing  further  at  present,  save  that 
the  intelligence  is  of  an  order  equal  to  the  pro- 
duction of  the  phenomena.  Look  at  it  from  the 
mechanical  point  of  view,  consider  the  phenomena 
of  the  ether,  its  relations  to  ponderable  matter,  and 
the  functions  it  performs  in  the  universe  ;  and  can 
we  not  say  that  as  it  has  a  meaning,  so  it  must 
have   a   purpose  "i     Think   of    the    vastness   of    the 


30 


THEISM 


movement  of  the  universe,  of  its  interrelations,  of 
its  sweep  through  time,  everchanging  but  chang- 
ing in  a  way  that  can  be  understood,  working  out 
coordinated  harmonies  of  the  most  magnificent 
kind,  some  of  which  we  can  read,  and  shall  we 
not  say  that  the  grandest  thing  we  know  is  pres- 
ent here  ? 

At  all  events,  whether  our  men  of  science  allow 
us  to  say  that  mind  is  here  or  whether  they  do  not 
allow  us,  we  may  feel  grateful  to  them  for  the  con- 
ception they  have  enabled  us  to  form  of  the  mag- 
nificence of  the  universe.  They  have  enabled  us  to 
look  out  at  the  wonder  of  the  universe  as  it  seems 
to  exist  now ;  they  have  taught  us  to  look  back  on 
an  illimitable  past,  and  to  see  the  evolving  worlds 
on  their  way  to  something,  and  they  show  us  that 
everywhere  there  are  method,  order,  law.  If  they 
insist  that  we  shall  simply  rest  content  in  the  gran- 
deur they  enable  us  to  see,  and  constrain  us  to 
regard  it  as  an  ultimate  fact,  well,  we  must  part 
company  with  them  at  this  point,  and  respectfully 
say  that  we  must  take  up  our  burden  without  them, 
and  seek  to  interpret  the  facts  for  ourselves.  A 
system  that  at  this  end  needs  an  intelligence  to 
understand  it  must  have  something  to  do  with  in- 
telUgence  at  the  other  end.  Such  a  one-sided  refer- 
ence as  is  presented  to  us  by  them  is,  to  speak  with 
all  respect,  scarcely  intelligible.  At  present  we  are 
content  to  rest  our  case  on  the  fact  of  order,  and  to 


SCIENTIFIC    VIEW   OF   THE    WORLD  3 1 

say  that  order  implies  intelligence.  The  greatness 
of  the  order,  the  vastness  of  the  rhythm  of  the  uni- 
verse, may  increase  our  wonder  and  deepen  our 
apprehension  of  the  greatness  of  the  intelligence 
which  caused  and  made  the  order,  but  it  does  not 
increase  the  strength  of  the  argument. 

We  then  go  on,  whether  science  accompanies  us 
or  no.  We  cannot  rest  in  the  mere  discovery  of 
the  order,  law,  method  of  procedure,  of  the  uni- 
verse. This,  for  us,  can  never  be  ultimate.  We 
know  of  one  kind  of  cause  which  can  account  for 
an  order  that  can  be  understood,  and  we  know  of 
only  one.  We  know  intelligence  as  it  has  produced 
the  works  of  artists,  poets,  philosophers,  men  of 
science,  and  we  do  not  know  enough  to  put  any 
limit  on  the  extent  and  kind  of  work  which  intelli- 
gence may  produce.  True,  the  intelligence  which 
we  know  is  not  quite  of  the  creative  kind,  it  works 
within  the  limits  of  human  experience,  and  in  most 
cases  it  is  striving  to  read  a  meaning  already  given 
in  the  facts  of  nature.  But  the  intelligence  that  we 
know — limited,  conditioned,  receptive  though  it  be  — 
is  yet  sufficient  to  give  us  the  idea  of  an  intelligence 
which  has  no  limits,  to  which  we  can  set  no  bounds, 
which  can  set  the  bounds  to  the  material  on  which 
it  acts  and  prescribe  its  nature,  and  the  method  of 
its  working. 

I  have  made  no  remark  about  the  fact  that  there 
is  power  at  work  in  the  universe,  because  that  fact 


32  THEISM 

is  not  disputed.  Nor  is  it  questioned  that  the  power 
at  work  in  the  universe  is  a  regulated  power  that 
works  according  to  a  plan,  and  produces  intelligible 
results.  Even  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer  asserts  as  much 
as  this.  He  can  speak  of  "  an  infinite  and  eternal 
energy  from  which  all  things  proceed."  He  will 
not,  indeed,  allow  us  to  say  anything  regarding  it 
save  that  it  is.  It  is,  he  says,  absolutely  unknow- 
able, and  yet  he  can  speak  of  it  as  energy,  as  infinite 
and  as  eternal.  It  works  in  the  universe,  and  the 
method  of  its  working  Mr.  Spencer  claims  to  have 
traced  and  described  in  the  synthetic  philosophy, 
and  yet  he  says  that  it  is  unknowable.  If  it  has 
manifested  itself,  it  surely  can  be  known,  at  least 
as  far  as  it  has  manifested  itself.  But  we  do  not 
deal  with  Mr.  Spencer's  argument  at  present.  I 
cite  his  view,  that  there  is  power  in  the  universe. 
I  call  it  an  intelligible  power  because  it  works  by 
methods  which  I  can  partially  understand,  to  results 
which  are  orderly  and  intelligible.  As  has  been 
often  observed,  I  have  no  other  ground  than  this  for 
the  inference  that  the  moving  bodies  I  see  in  the 
street  are  men  and  women  with  an  inteUigence  like 
my  own.  The  grounds  of  inference  are  the  same, 
and  the  inference  from  intelligible  results  to  an  in- 
telligence are  precisely  the  same. 

True,  the  intelligence  which  informs  the  universe 
is  as  much  greater  than  mine  as  the  universe  is 
greater  than  my  thought  of  it.     What  then }      The 


SCIENTIFIC    VIEW   OF  THE    WORLD  33 

power  at  work  in  the  universe  is  greater  than  any 
which  I  can  exert,  but  that  has  not  hindered  men 
from  speaking  of  an  infinite  and  eternal  energy. 
It  is  as  legitimate  to  speak  of  an  eternal  intelligence 
as  to  speak  of  an  eternal  energy. 

So  far  then  we  have  come  as  to  have  good  grounds 
for  saying  that  the  power  at  work  in  the  world  is 
an  intelhgent  power ;  we  proceed  to  ask  whether  we 
can  fairly  say  anything  more  about  that  power. 


II 


THE  INORGANIC  WORLD  A  PREPARATION 
FOR  LIFE:  THE  PHYSICAL  CHARACTER- 
ISTICS OF  LIFE 

Taking  the  universe  as  a  whole,  as  disclosed  to 
us  by  science,  we  have  learned  that  it  can  be  under- 
stood. We  infer,  also,  that  it  has  a  meaning  wider 
far  than  the  meaning  we  have  been  able  to  grasp. 
Our  reading  of  it  is  somewhat  vague  and  indefinite, 
and  we  see  that  it  comes  far  short  of  the  fulness  of 
meaning  in  the  concrete  reality.  So  far  we  have 
seen  only  aspects  of  the  reality,  but  these  aspects 
are  set  in  relation  to  intelligence.  Narrowing  our 
sphere  of  operations,  and  coming  to  those  modes  of 
existence  nearer  to  us  than  the  fixed  stars,  limiting 
our  view  to  the  system  of  which  our  own  planet 
forms  an  integral  part,  let  us  ask  here,  too,  the 
guidance  of  science.  I  again  take  from  science 
simply  what  I  need.  Following  the  lead  of  science 
I  read  a  wondrous  story.  I  am  led  back  into  a  past 
that  begins  long  ago.  The  story  of  our  system  that 
is  told  began  some  fifty  million  years  ago.  That 
beginning   is    not  absolute,  it   is   only  the    stage   at 

34 


INORGANIC    WO  RID  A   PREPARATION  FOR  II FE       35 

which  science  takes  up  the  story  of  the  solar  system. 
It  does  not  pretend  to  speak  of  the  stages  of  the 
history  of  the  solar  system,  before  the  material  of 
it  lay  as  an  attenuated  cloud  of  nebulous  matter 
stretching  from  the  centre,  out  on  all  sides  to  the 
utmost  bounds  of  the  orbit  of  the  most  distant 
planet.  That  mass  of  nebulous  matter  being  given, 
subject  to  the  ordinary  attractions  and  repulsions, 
and  other  properties  characteristic  of  matter,  it 
has  been  thought  that  the  evolution  of  the  solar 
system  may  be  explained.  Difficulties  of  various 
kinds  may  be  raised,  but  I  do  not  raise  them  now. 
For  whatever  may  be  made  of  them,  and  however 
perplexing  they  may  be,  there  is  no  doubt  that  some 
form  of  the  nebular  theory  is  true.  At  all  events 
we  may  have  a  clear  vision  of  our  planet  existing  as 
a  molten  globe,  moving  in  an  orbit  not  widely  dif- 
ferent from  the  orbit  traced  out  by  it  at  present,  in 
its  annual  circuit  around  the  sun.  The  double  revo- 
lution round  its  own  axis  and  round  the  sun  are 
there,  and  the  consequences  of  these  movements 
can  be  traced  on  the  shape  and  form  of  the  earth. 
The  form  of  the  earth  is  precisely  that  which  a 
molten  body,  moving  under  such  conditions,  would 
assume. 

Starting  afresh  from  that  position,  and  tracing 
out  the  results  of  it,  science  reads  for  us  the  life 
history  of  the  earth  so  far  as  it  can.  A  body  slowly 
cooling  in  the  same  way  as  bodies  do  cool,  with  the 


36  THEISM 

regulated   changes    of    form,    which    ensue   on    the 
process   of   coohng,  with   the   chemical   changes   of 
material  form,  which  arise  when  a  lowered  tempera- 
ture   allows   chemical    affinity    to    have   freedom   of 
action.     There  comes  a  time  when  the  earth  obtains 
a  solid  crust.     A  series  of  changes  worked  out  under 
law  leads  on  to  an  earth  with  a  diversified  surface. 
Into  the  details    of   geology  it   is    not   necessary  to 
enter.       They   are    famihar    and    easily   accessible. 
The  stately  procession  of  orderly  facts  may  be  read 
in  any  text-book  of  value.     As  we  read  we  see  that 
we  are  led  on  from   the  more  simple   to   the   more 
complex,  from  a  state  of  matter  comparatively  simple 
to  a  state  of   the  utmost  complexity,  from  a   stuff 
comparatively   homogeneous  to   one    highly   hetero- 
geneous; and  we  are  constrained  to  think  not  of  a 
unity  made  up  of  one  property,  but  of  a  unity  con- 
stituted out  of  many  elements  held  together  in  virtue 
of  their  relations  each  to  each  and  each  to  the  whole. 
The   differentiations    become    more   numerous    and 
more  decisive,  while  the  unity  becomes  more  distinct. 
The  story  of  the  evolution  of  the  inorganic  world  is 
long,  and  full  of  interest,  and,  whether  they  mean  to 
do  so  or  not,  our  scientific  guides  have  told  it  —  have, 
in  fact,  been  constrained  to  tell  it  —  as  a  preparation 
for  the  introduction  of  life.       I  do   not  think  they 
meant  to  tell  the  story  so,  but  they  have  told  it,  and 
have  shown  us  a  world  actually  being  prepared  for 
the  introduction  of  life.    What  a  series  of  converging 


INORGANIC    WORLD  A   PREPARATION  FOR  LIFE       37 

conditions  was  needed  in  order  to  make  life  possible, 
as  life  exists  on  the  earth.  Apart  from  the  question 
of  whether  this  convergence  of  conditions  was  in- 
tended or  no,  we  lay  stress  on  the  fact  that  the  con- 
vergence is  there,  and  the  result  is  the  same  as  if  they 
were  meant.  To  enumerate  some  of  these  conditions  : 
The  distance  of  the  earth  from  the  sun  ;  the  revolu- 
tion of  the  earth  round  its  own  axis,  which  makes  the 
succession  of  day  and  night  possible ;  the  circuit  of 
the  earth  round  the  sun,  which  gives  the  succession 
of  seedtime  and  harvest,  summer  and  winter;  the 
distribution  of  the  surface  of  the  earth  into  land 
and  water,  elevations  and  depressions ;  the  great  fact 
that  the  earth  was  enabled  somehow  to  keep  those 
chemical  elements  which  are  indispensable  to  life,  so 
that  even  the  most  volatile  of  them  should  not  escape 
into  the  wastes  of  space ;  the  capacity  of  these  ele- 
ments to  be  worked  up  to  higher  levels  and  to  more 
complex  forms  under  the  touch  of  life;  the  relations 
of  the  atmosphere  and  the  qualities  of  it,  and  the 
seemingly  exact  calculation  of  the  range  of  tempera- 
ture within  which  life  would  be  possible,  —  these  are 
some  of  the  conditions  which  have  converged  in  order 
to  make  Hfe  possible  on  the  earth. 

These  are  not,  however,  all  the  conditions  which 
might  be  set  forth  in  this  connection,  but  they  are  suf- 
ficient for  our  purpose.  Observe  the  story  is  told  by 
science  and  told  in  its  own  way.  It  is  dealing,  ac- 
cording to  its  wont,  with  a  system  of  efficient  causes. 


38  THEISM 

It  has  not  gone  beyond  its  own  sphere,  and  has  made 
no  assumptions  beyond  what  it  can  verify.  It  has 
called  on  no  forces  save  those  which  are  at  work  now. 
It  told  us  of  the  molten  earth,  of  its  gradual  cooling, 
of  its  consolidation,  of  the  slow  differentiation  into  air, 
water,  land  ;  it  told  of  igneous  rocks,  of  their  denuda- 
tion, of  the  wearing  down  of  rocks  and  the  building 
of  rocks,  and  of  many  other  processes,  all  told  in  the 
way  of  science ;  and  then  it  told  us  of  the  introduction 
of  life,  and  showed  to  us  the  first  trace  of  life  at  a 
certain  geological  epoch.  We  find  on  reading  the 
story  that  it  has  been  telling  us  a  story  of  prepa- 
rations for  the  introduction  of  life.  We  are  inclined 
to  say  there  is  a  Divinity  that  shapes  our  ends,  rough- 
hew  them  as  we  will. 

I  do  not  expect  them  to  draw  the  inference  that  I 
draw.  Indeed,  many  of  the  men  of  science  expressly 
repudiate  such  an  inference,  and  get  quite  angry  and 
say  hard  things  of  the  capacity  of  those  who  venture 
to  draw  such  an  inference.  Well,  if  I  were  to  tell 
the  story  of  the  introduction  of  life  from  the  point  of 
view  of  purpose,  I  would  tell  it  in  precisely  the  same 
way  and  in  the  same  terms  as  it  has  been  told  by 
science.  Long  preparations  stretching  to  the  bounds 
of  conceivable  time,  reaching  to  the  farthest  world, 
ether  with  its  undulations,  matter  in  all  its  quaUties, 
all  set  in  certain  relations,  and  made  to  take  a  certain 
course  through  millions  of  years,  and  life  becomes 
possible,  and  Hfe  is.     I  call  it  a  purposive  line  of 


INORGANIC    WORLD  A   PREPARATION  FOR  LIFE       39 

action,  and  who  has  the  right  to  gainsay  me  ?  I  have 
followed  the  leading  of  science,  and  as  I  followed  I 
saw  that  it  used  its  own  method,  and  no  other.  The 
conception  of  causality,  nay,  the  conception  of  me- 
chanical causation,  was  the  main  conception  through 
which  science  looked  at  the  changes  of  the  history  of 
the  world,  and  we  find  that  even  that  conception  led 
us  on  to  this  result,  that  mechanical  law  was  a  prepa- 
ration for  the  introduction  of  life.  The  conception  of 
causality  as  employed  in  the  physical  sciences  does 
not  require  a  scientist  to  say  more  than  that  there 
are  certain  fixed  conditions  under  which  all  the 
changes  in  the  world  take  place.  It  is  certainly  a 
great  gain  to  know  the  fixed  conditions  under  which 
changes  take  place,  and  we  rejoice  to  know  these. 
When,  however,  following  out  the  changes  that  take 
place  under  these  fixed  conditions,  and  tracing  out 
these  changes  themselves,  we  find  that  they  converge 
toward  a  fixed  point,  what  are  we  to  say  }  May  we 
not  go  back  and  read  the  story  again  with  a  fresh 
light,  and  from  a  new  point  of  view }  The  fixed  con- 
ditions under  which  all  changes  take  place  are  them- 
selves indicative  of  intelligence,  all  we  do  when  we 
regard  the  changes  from  the  new  point  of  view  is 
simply  to  enhance  our  idea  of  the  character  of  the 
intelligence  that  causes  these  fixed  conditions  to  con- 
verge toward  a  predetermined  end. 

The  question  of  a  predetermined  end  might  have 
been  raised  at  almost  any  point  in  the  story  which 


40  THEISM 

science  tells  of  the  making  of  the  worlds,  but  to  raise 
it  then  and  there  would  not  have  added  to  the  clear- 
ness of  the  issue.  It  seems  best  to  raise  it  at  the 
point  where,  in  the  history  of  time  and  time's  changes, 
the  great  transition  from  non-living  to  living  matter 
took  place.  For  with  the  introduction  of  life  the 
terminology  of  science,  and  the  conceptions  with 
which  science  works,  necessarily  change.  From  this 
time  onwards  purpose  is  in  evidence,  and  the  lan- 
guage descriptive  of  changes  in  living  matter,  even 
when  used  by  those  who  profess  to  think  that  such 
changes  are  ultimately  mechanical,  is  full  of  indica- 
tions of  purpose.  Now  it  is  not  well  to  split  nature 
up  into  compartments,  or  to  fill  it  with  distinctions 
which  seem  to  shut  one  part  out  from  relation  to 
another  part,  and  therefore  we  take  our  stand  on 
the  conception  that  even,  in  that  part  of  nature 
which  seems  under  the  domain  of  mechanical  law, 
purpose  is  not  excluded.  Mechanical  law  is  the  way 
whereby  purpose  realizes  its  end.  In  our  own  ex- 
perience necessity  is  the  presupposition  of  freedom. 
Assuming  at  this  stage  of  our  argument  that  free- 
dom is  possible,  then  we  say  that  it  is  possible  only 
in  a  world  ruled  according  to  fixed  laws,  and  which 
changes  under  fixed  conditions.  Speech  is  possible 
because  of  the  fact  that  words  have  definite  meanings, 
and  because  language  has  determined  laws  of  con- 
struction. I  say  nothing  of  other  fixed  conditions, 
such  as  the  laws  of  acoustics  and  so  on,  which  are  also 


INORGANIC    WORLD  A   PREPARATION  FOR   LIFE       4 1 

necessary  conditions  for  the  possibility  of  communica- 
tion from  man  to  man.  To  this  I  may  return  later  on, 
and  in  other  connections ;  I  make  the  remark  here  to 
show  that  the  fixed  necessities  which  can  be  expressed 
in  mechanical  law  are  both  the  presupposition  of  pur- 
pose and  the  means  by  which  purpose  is  realized. 

Thus  we  do  not  interfere,  in  any  way,  with  the 
work  or  the  method  of  mechanical  science,  when  we 
take  their  results  and  show  that  they  may  be  read  in 
another  fashion.  Nor  do  we  bring  to  the  reading  of 
their  results  any  new  or  unheard-of  principle.  We 
are  simply  doing  what,  in  other  spheres  of  thought, 
we  do  every  day.  Nor  is  it  contended  that  it  would 
be  wise  or  safe  to  take  the  idea  of  purpose  as  a  clew 
to  guide  us  in  the  investigation  of  physical  phenom- 
ena. There  are  many  considerations  which  warn  us 
that  such  a  clew  might  lead  astray,  and  be  unfruitful. 
The  main  reason  is  our  ignorance,  and  our  tendency 
to  see  purpose  where  we  cannot  give  any  satisfactory 
reason  for  its  existence.  But  surely  that  is  no  reason 
why  we  should  refuse  to  recognize  purpose,  when  it 
is  almost  forced  on  us  by  science  itself.  The  very 
fact  that  we  are  suspicious  of  final  causes,  and  that 
we  rigidly  exclude  the  thought  of  them  in  physical 
investigation,  ought  to  enable  us  to  recognize  them 
with  all  promptness,  when  they  present  themselves 
to  us  as  the  outcome  of  a  series  of  physical  inves- 
tigations conducted  without  regard  to  them,  from 
which  they  were  altogether  excluded. 


42 


THEISM 


Such  seems  to  be  the  case  with  the  convergence 
of  causes,  which  brought  about  the  introduction  of 
life  on  this  globe.  We  are  driven  to  the  conclusion 
that  this  was  no  accident,  but  the  outcome  of  a  long 
series  of  preparations,  and  that  it  was  meant.  There 
can  be  no  controversy  as  to  the  convergence  of  con- 
ditions. No  one  lays  more  stress  on  this  than  the 
evolutionist,  or  even  the  mechanical  evolutionist,  who 
attempts  to  set  forth  evolution  as  a  distribution  of 
matter  and  motion.  Accepting  the  accounts  of  the 
distribution  and  redistribution  of  matter  and  motion, 
we  see  that  the  process  of  distribution  had  proceeded 
very  far,  and  differentiation  and  integration  had  run 
their  course  for  a  very  lengthened  period  before  things 
were  ripe  for  the  advent  of  life. 

I  do  not  lay  stress  here  on  the  mere  fact  of  this 
fresh  departure.  I  do  not  ask  science  to  account  for 
the  origin  of  life,  for  I  should  be  told  that  science 
has  nothing  to  do  with  origins.  Nor  do  I  care  to 
rest  the  theistic  argument  on  origins  alone.  For  if 
I  cannot  find  the  Divine  Being  in  what  is  fixed, 
stated,  settled,  I  fear  I  shall  not  find  Him  any- 
where. Clearly,  however,  he  who  believes  in  intelli- 
gence and  power,  as  being  at  the  basis  of  things,  is 
not  in  the  same  position,  in  the  presence  of  new  de- 
partures, as  he  is  who  has  undertaken  to  account  for 
all  things  by  means  of  principles,  which  he  has  known 
only  in  connection  with  the  world  as  it  was  before 
the  new  departure  was  taken.     It  means  that  up  to 


INORGANIC    WORLD   A   PREPARATION  FOR  LIFE      43 

the  point  at  which  Hfe  entered  into  the  world,  science 
had  no  reason  to  widen  its  conception  of  the  world 
so  as  to  recognize  the  conception  of  life.  It  did  not 
need  to  recognize  organization,  or  organic  relations 
in  its  conception  of  being.  Being  as  conservative  as 
are  all  the  attitudes  of  the  human  mind,  science  is 
unwilling  to  widen  its  conceptions,  or  recognize  the 
need  of  coordinating  its  notions  —  with  conservative 
energy  it  has  clung  to  the  desire  to  make  its  old 
machinery  cope  with  the  new  problem.  Hence  the 
efforts,  which  we  make  free  to  call  despairing  efforts, 
to  reduce  the  facts  of  life  to  such  a  minimum  as 
would  make  methods  of  physics  and  chemistry  ade- 
quate to  their  explanation.  The  phenomena  of  life,  it 
is  contended,  must  be  explicable  by  the  principles  of 
physics  and  chemistry.  Did  not  inorganic  exist- 
ence precede  organic  existence }  was  there  not  a 
time  when  life  was  not }  Now  Uf e  is  ;  and  must  not 
life  be  the  product  of  inorganic  existence  t 

It  is  not  necessary  to  enter  deeply  into  the  dead 
controversy  about  the  origin  of  life.  I  am  old  enough 
to  remember  the  shout  of  triumph  which  arose  when 
an  experimenter  declared  that  he  had  seen  the  rise 
of  living  from  non-living  matter,  and  the  consequent 
gladness  of  those  who  desired  to  exclude  the  recogni- 
tion of  forces  other  than  those  which  were  physical 
and  chemical.  Nor  can  one  remember,  without  a 
smile,  the  short-lived  Bathybius.  Speedily  it  turned 
out  that  the  spontaneous  generation  of  Dr.  Bastian's 


44  THEISM 

bacteria  arose,  not  from  non-living  matter,  but  from 
infusions  imperfectly  sterilized,  and  nowadays  it  is 
the  sure  conviction  of  science  that  life  comes  only 
from  life.  Still  the  longing  to  believe  the  opposite 
lingers,  and  now  the  wish  to  believe  takes  the  form  of 
an  inverted  prediction,  that  is  a  prediction  not  with 
respect  to  the  future,  but  with  respect  to  the  past, 
that  if  the  gentleman,  who  wishes  to  believe,  had 
lived  at  the  time  when  life  appeared,  he  would  ex- 
pect to  see  it  evolve  from  non-living  matter.  At  all 
events,  the  transition  of  non-living  into  living  matter, 
without  the  intervention  of  life,  does  not  belong  to 
our  era. 

*'  What  is  implied  in  the  origination  of  life  is  not 
that  inorganic  nature  produced  life,  but  that  a  new 
form  of  existence  presented  itself  at  a  certain  period 
of  time  in  the  history  of  the  earth.  But  this  life, 
although  it  has  for  the  first  time  presented  itself,  is 
not  something  that  has  come  into  being  by  a  power 
belonging  to  inorganic  things.  And  no  one  would 
be  so  absurd  as  to  say  that  it  originated  from  itself. 
Its  origination  can  be  explained  only  on  the  supposi- 
tion that  it  was  implicit  in  the  nature  of  existence  as 
a  whole.  Outside  of  the  unity  that  comprehends  all 
possible  existence,  there  is  nothing ;  and  therefore  life, 
when  it  appears,  merely  manifests  in  an  explicit  form 
what  was  already  wrapped  up  in  the  one  single  exist- 
ence that  is  manifested  in  all  modes  of  existence.  But, 
if  this  one  all-inclusive  unity  is  now  seen  to  involve 


INORGANIC    WORLD  A   PREPARATION  FOR  LIFE      45 

within  itself  organic  as  well  as  inorganic  existence, 
its  nature  cannot  be  comprehended  by  looking  at 
either  apart  from  the  other.  It  is  neither  inorganic 
nor  organic,  but  both.  Further,  it  implies  that  or- 
ganic existence  is  of  this  nature  that,  while  it  con- 
tains all  that  is  implied  in  inorganic  nature,  it  also 
manifests  characteristics  that  are  pecuhar  to  itself." 
(''Outline  of  Philosophy,"  by  Professor  Watson,  p. 
181.)  The  paragraph  from  Dr.  Watson  expressed 
my  meaning  so  exactly  that  I  could  not  help  appro- 
priating it.  Yet  I  do  not  commit  myself  to  all  that 
is  implied  in  it,  for  the  passage  quoted  is  organically 
related  to  a  whole  system  of  philosophy,  which  I  do 
not  hold  in  all  its  implications.  I  quote  it,  therefore, 
without  prejudice.  I  agree  with  it  in  saying  that  life 
cannot  be  derived  from  inorganic  matter,  and  also  in 
the  implication  that  the  intelligent  ground  of  the 
world  must  be  a  living  power ;  what  further  is  to  be 
said  will  appear  in  due  time. 

Meanwhile  let  us  look  at  the  world  as  it  appears 
under  the  light  shed  on  it  by  this  fresh  appearance. 
From  the  scientific  point  of  view  the  contrast  be- 
tween living  and  non-living  matter  has  been  made  the 
ground  for  the  division  of  the  natural  sciences  into 
two  great  groups,  known  as  the  biological  and  the 
physical  sciences.  Here  we  have  to  do  with  matter 
which  has  entered  into  a  peculiar  state  or  condition. 
Without  entering  into  the  vexed  question  of  the  exist- 
ence of  vital  force,  or  claiming  a  distinctive  existence 


46  THEISM 

of  vitalism,  we  may  at  least  point  out  that  matter 
takes  on  new  forms  and  peculiar  properties  which 
are  not  found  in  inorganic  matter.  These  properties 
are  still  properties  of  matter,  and  many  claim  that 
they  can  be  explained  mechanically.  Professor  Hux- 
ley said  in  his  Belfast  address  (1874),  "  In  the  seven- 
teenth century  the  idea  that  the  physical  processes 
of  life  are  capable  of  being  explained  in  the  same 
way  as  other  physical  phenomena,  and,  therefore, 
that  the  living  body  is  a  mechanism,  was  proved  to  be 
true  for  certain  classes  of  vital  action;  and,  having 
thus  taken  firm  root  in  irrefragable  fact,  this  concep- 
tion has  not  only  successfully  repelled  every  assault 
which  has  been  made  upon  it,  but  has  steadily  grown 
in  force  and  extent  of  application  until  it  is  now  the 
expressed  or  implied  fundamental  proposition  of  the 
whole  doctrine  of  scientific  physiology."  It  is  evident 
that  Professor  Huxley  uses  the  word  "mechanism" 
in  a  wider  sense  than  that  which  the  word  has  in 
physics.  If  it  be  a  mechanism,  it  is  one  of  a  peculiar 
kind.  For  Huxley,  speaking  when  he  was  not  on  the 
war-path,  uses  words  which  concede  all  that  we  need 
for  the  great  distinction  between  living  and  lifeless 
matter.  Speaking  of  the  distinctive  properties  of 
living  matter,  he  says,  "  Its  chemical  composition 
containing,  as  it  invariably  does,  one  or  more  forms 
of  a  complex  compound  of  carbon,  hydrogen,  oxygen, 
and  nitrogen,  the  so-called  protein  (which  has  never 
yet   been   obtained    except   as   a   product   of    living 


INORGANIC    WORLD  A   PREPARATION  FOR  LIFE      47 

bodies)  united  with  a  large  proportion  of  water,  and 
forming  the  chief  constituent  of  a  substance  which, 
in  its  primary  unmodified  state  is  known  as  proto- 
plasm." ("  Encyclopaedia  Britannica,"  art.  Biology^ 
All  that  is  needed  is  contained  in  the  statement  with- 
in brackets,  in  the  foregoing  quotation,  namely,  that 
protein  has  never  been  obtained  except  as  a  product 
of  living  bodies.  It  is  open  to  the  inorganic  chemist 
to  insist  on  the  properties  of  the  various  elements 
which  are  found  in  protein ;  he  may  point  out  the 
vigorous  combining  power  of  oxygen,  the  inertia  of 
nitrogen,  the  great  molecular  mobility  of  hydrogen, 
and  the  allotropic  properties  of  carbon,  sulphur, 
and  phosphorus,  as  has  been  done  by  Mr.  Herbert 
Spencer  is  his  "Principles  of  Biology,"  and  it  may 
be  shown  that  all  these  are  of  significance  when  con- 
sidered as  properties  of  living  matter;  but  the  fact 
remains  that  these  properties  remained  hidden  until 
they  were  revealed  by  the  touch  of  life. 

Taking  at  present  only  that  feature  of  life  which 
deals  with  the  chemical  composition  of  living  matter, 
we  see  that  life  has  revealed  to  chemists  a  new  do- 
main. It  is  easily  understood  how  reluctant  they 
would  be  to  recognize  something  involving  facts  and 
principles  which  they  had  not  seen  while  dealing  with 
inorganic  matter.  We  can  sympathize  with  them  in 
their  efforts  to  build  up  without  the  aid  of  life  those 
compounds  which  are  the  usual  products  of  living 
bodies.     In  some  respects  they  appear  to  have  been 


48  THEISM 

successful,  but  they  accomplish  at  great  cost  and 
labour  and  with  many  appliances  what  life  is  doing 
easily  every  moment.  The  success  has  not  as  yet 
been  very  great.  Even  were  it  more  successful  the 
result  would  have  little  bearing  on  the  controversy 
between  vitalism  and  non-vitalism.  It  is  well  to  be 
assured  that  life  has  no  substance  peculiar  to  itself, 
and  that  every  element  found  in  living  matter  is 
found  also  in  lifeless  matter.  It  is  well  to  know  that 
living  matter  is  subject  to  all  the  physical  conditions 
which  obtain  in  body  as  such.  It  is  subject  to  gravi- 
tation, it  exists  only  within  certain  limits  of  tempera- 
ture, it  breathes,  when  it  does  breathe,  in  accordance 
with  laws  of  gaseous  diffusion,  and  in  fact  the  laws  of 
physics  and  chemistry  are  operative  on  the  matter 
which  is  living  as  on  matter  which  is  dead.  For  all 
these  facts  assure  us  that  we  are  in  one  world,  and 
that  the  organic  and  inorganic  are  most  intimately 
related  to  one  another. 

It  is  not  to  be  denied  that  the  advent  of  life  re- 
vealed within  the  world  of  matter  new  possibilities, 
and  achieved  positive  results  of  the  most  wonderful 
kind.  Without  the  introduction  of  anything  new  in 
the  way  of  chemical  elements,  or  without  drawing  on 
any  physical  force  unknown,  or  unused  in  physics,  it 
has  seized  the  elements  and  transformed  them,  lifted 
them  to  a  higher  level,  and  sent  them  forth  to  new 
issues.  How  it  has  done  it  we  may  faintly  guess,  but 
we  do  not  know.    Certainly  we  shall  never  know  if  we 


INORGANIC    WORLD  A  PREPARATION  FOR  LIFE      49 

stubbornly  refuse  to  recognize  that  we  are  unable 
to  explain  them  by  the  methods  and  assumptions 
which  we  found  adequate  in  other  spheres. 

Life  enters  into  the  world  and  suddenly  the  world 
takes  on  a  new  meaning.  The  elements  seem  to 
recognize  the  hand  of  a  master  and  quietly  assume 
new  combinations,  enter  on  new  forms,  obey  new 
laws,  and  begin  a  new  course  of  evolution.  Not  only 
does  it  teach  to  chemistry  a  new  series  of  lessons, 
and  give  to  physics  new  meanings,  it  opens  to  us  a 
new  world  for  the  understanding  of  which  we  must 
learn  a  number  of  new  conceptions.  Living  matter 
does  not  only  contain  those  peculiar  bodies  which  we 
call  proteids,  it  has  the  power  of  manufacturing  them 
out  of  other  substances.  Every  living  organism  is  a 
stream  into  which  a  number  of  elements  of  matter 
constantly  flow  in,  and  a  number  as  constantly  flow 
out.  But  the  inflow  and  outflow  are  arranged  so  as 
to  be  kept  from  any  interference  with  the  identity  of 
the  organism.  The  material  particles  of  the  organism 
are  never  the  same  at  any  two  moments ;  the  organ- 
ism is  one  and  the  same  throughout  all  its  history. 
Moment  by  moment  it  is  being  disintegrated,  and 
moment  by  moment  it  is  renewed  by  the  taking  in  of 
new  matter  which  it  raises  to  a  level  fit  for  its  use. 
Thus  in  a  constant  series  of  changes  it  maintains  its 
identity,  and  keeps  up  its  correspondence  with  its 
environment.  Clearly  here  we  have  to  do  not  with 
the  composition  of  forces  and  a  resultant.     Pressure 


50  THEISM 

from  behind  and  movement  in  the  Hne  of  least  re- 
sistance will  not  avail  toward  the  compHcated  move- 
ment of  a  living  organism,  however  simple  it  may  be. 
Nor  will  it  help  us  to  call  to  our  aid  the  behaviour  of 
crystals,  however  beautiful  and  wonderful  they  may 
be.  For  crystals  grow,  if  growth  be  a  proper  descrip- 
tion of  the  process,  by  accretion  from  without,  and 
the  matter  of  crystals  undergoes  no  modification  as 
it  is  laid  down  according  to  the  pattern  of  each 
kind  of  crystal.  In  an  organism  the  matter  is  not 
added  from  without,  but  taken  within,  and  made  to 
undergo  a  process  of  union  and  differentiation  until 
it  becomes  like  the  molecules  it  replaces. 

When  we  read  the  description  of  the  behaviour  of 
living  bodies  by  those  who  know,  and  specially  when 
they  are  simply  describing  them  without  a  controver- 
sial aim,  we  see  that  they  describe  them  as  if  the 
chemical  elements  obeyed  a  new  law,  and  were  con- 
strained to  a  new  service.  Sometimes  it  is  said,  as 
by  Huxley,  that  "oxygen  seizes  on  those  organic 
molecules  that  are  disposable,  lays  hold  on  their  ele- 
ments, and  combines  with  them  into  the  new  and 
stabler  forms,  carbonic  acid,  water,  and  urea."  This 
was  only  a  way  of  putting  the  matter  which  has  been 
departed  from  by  more  recent  science  which  has  seen 
it  to  be  far  from  a  real  description  of  what  happens. 
The  relations  between  oxidation  and  life  seem  to  be 
more  compUcated.  Oxygen  does  not  lay  hold,  but  is 
itself  laid  hold  of,  and  is  disposed  according  to  the 


INORGANIC    WORLD  A   PREPARATION  FOR  LIFE       51 

needs  of  the  organism.  It  may  be  simply  handed  or 
forced  onwards  by  the  living  cells  which  grasp  it. 
The  living  cell,  and  not  the  amount  of  oxygen  in  the 
blood,  regulates  the  consumption  of  oxygen.  As 
with  oxygen  so  with  all  other  elements  that  enter 
into  the  structure  of  living  bodies.  As  soon  as  they 
enter  into  the  service  of  life,  they  are  acted  on  in 
new  ways,  made  part  of  the  organic  system,  and  are 
kept  in  that  service  while  they  form  part  of  the 
organism.  The  freedom  of  the  molecules  and  their 
return  to  their  simplicity  and  relative  independence 
come  with  the  dissolution  of  the  organism,  or  with 
the  release  of  the  molecule  from  any  connection  with 
the  organism. 

For  any  proper  understanding  of  the  organism  we 
must  accept  the  assumption  of  the  unity  of  the 
organism.  We  start  not  from  physics,  nor  from 
chemistry,  but  from  a  conception  that  recognizes 
the  unity  of  the  organism  as  a  whole  made  up  of 
many  related  parts,  each  of  which  has  meaning  only 
in  relation  to  all  the  others  and  to  the  whole.  Any 
description  of  life  involves  this,  and  we  must  just 
accept  life  as  given,  and  be  content  though  we  are 
unable  to  derive  it  from  non-living  matter.  Spencer 
has  said,  "We  find  it  impossible  to  think  of  life  as 
imported  into  the  unit  of  protoplasm  from  without; 
and  yet  we  find  it  impossible  to  conceive  it  as  emerg- 
ing from  the  cooperation  of  the  elements."  ("  Princi- 
ples of  Biology,"  Vol.  I.,  p.  122,  edition  1898.) 


52  THEISM 

We  may  accept  his  testimony  to  the  conckision 
that  we  are  unable  to  conceive  life  as  a  resultant  of 
the  components,  and  we  may  find  it  difficult  to  think 
of  life  as  an  addition  from  without,  and  yet  dissent 
from  his  pecuHar  theory  of  metaphysics,  and  his 
frequent  reference  to  "alternate  impossibilities  of 
thought."  It  is  scarcely  open  to  any  one  but  him- 
self to  keep  the  unknowable  as  a  convenient  store- 
house for  the  warehousing  of  difficult  problems.  His 
followers  have  ever  sought  to  reduce  the  number  of 
unknowables  which  he  has  laid  up  in  store,  and  some 
of  them  are  impatient  with  the  great  "unknowable," 
the  father  of  all  the  smaller  unknowables  which  ap- 
pear in  the  Synthetic  Philosophy.  In  the  present 
instance,  however,  we  can  agree  with  him  that  we 
cannot  conceive  the  unity  of  the  organism  as  emerging 
from  the  cooperation  of  the  elements.  Nor  can  we 
conceive  it  as  the  result  of  any  action  of  the  parts. 
It  is  curious  to  find  how  many  of  the  teachers  of 
biological  science  are  unwilling  frankly  to  accept  the 
unity  of  the  organism  as  ultimate. 

To  discuss  all  the  questions  that  arise  in  connec- 
tion with  the  conception  of  the  unity  of  the  organism 
would  lead  us  very  far  afield.  The  metaphysics  of 
biology  is  something  wonderful,  equalled  only  by  the 
metaphysics  of  physical  science.  Wc  cannot  discuss 
it  here.  Biologists  seem  always  to  strive  after  a  deri- 
vation of  the  unity  of  a  living  organism.  Research 
seems  to  give  us  an  organism  that  works  together, 


INORGANIC  WORLD  A  PREPARATION  FOR  LIFE       53 

that  holds  many  qualities  together  in  the  doing  of 
work,  and  biology  strives  to  account  for  the  origin  of 
the  unity.  Biologists  reduce  it  to  a  unity  of  quality, 
or  they  postulate  some  agent  to  the  working  of  which 
they  ascribe  the  unity  which  is  present  to  their  obser- 
vation, or  they  split  up  the  unity  of  the  organism  and 
place  a  number  of  elements  in  mere  external  relation 
to  the  organism,  and  wander  about  in  hopeless  at- 
tempts to  restore  the  lost  unity. 

It  would  seem,  therefore,  that  in  presence  of  the 
phenomena  of  life  we  ought  to  widen  our  concep- 
tions, or,  rather,  we  ought  to  form  new  conceptions 
applicable  to  a  new  form  of  experience.  We  ought 
to  learn  that  there  is  a  wider  sense  of  unity  than  that 
which  we  learned  in  connection  with  our  experience 
of  the  world  without  life.  An  abstract  unity  was, 
for  the  most  part,  quite  sufficient  for  our  purpose  in 
dealing  with  problems  of  physics  or  chemistry.  No 
doubt  in  chemistry  we  had  to  learn  that  two  and  two 
did  not  always  make  four,  sometimes  they  made  one. 
We  learned  also  that  a  number  of  separate  elements, 
sometimes  a  large  number,  come  together  to  make 
one.  But  it  was  still  possible  to  consider  that  the 
unity  was  constituted  by  the  cooperation  of  the  parts. 
It  did  tax  our  power  of  conception  to  think  them  so, 
and  it  was  difficult  to  think  of  the  chemical  fact  that 
a  number  of  elements  present  in  the  compound  in 
exactly  the  same  proportions,  and  in  the  same  quanti- 
ties, should  produce  bodies  so  unlike  as  they  some- 


54  THEISM 

times  do.  The  facts  of  isomerism  show  that  this  is  so. 
Thus  gradually  we  came  to  attach  a  wider  meaning 
to  unity.  Then  came  life  to  give  us  a  still  wider  con- 
ception to  unity,  that  is,  if  we  are  to  be  true  to  the 
facts  of  the  case.  Now  we  have  to  learn  to  think  of 
a  unity  holding  together  many  elements  in  a  system, 
maintaining  that  unity  while  the  materials  compos- 
ing it  come  and  go,  maintaining  that  unity  in  the 
midst  of  changes  within  itself  and  in  relation  to  its 
environment,  and  able  not  only  to  maintain  itself  but 
to  reproduce  other  organisms  after  its  likeness. 

To  take  into  our  minds  the  possibility  of  such  a 
unity  as  we  have  described  indicated  a  great  advance 
in  our  power  of  thought.  And  I  for  one  do  not 
wonder  that  men  have  found  it  difficult  to  make  the 
advance.  There  were  difficulties  from  the  side  of 
science,  and  difficulties  from  the  side  of  metaphysics. 
Science  was  unwilHng  to  widen  its  terms,  and  meta- 
physics was  unwilling  to  admit  the  possibility  of  a 
unity  that  was  not  absolute,  or  rather  to  admit  any 
unity  save  that  of  the  absolute.  The  metaphysical 
difficulties  have  found  expression  in  Mr.  Bradley's 
"Appearance  and  Reality."  Without  entering  into 
the  metaphysical  difficulties  at  this  time,  we  may  say 
that,  so  far  at  least  as  biology  is  concerned,  we  must 
learn  to  think  in  conceptions  which,  as  far  as  possi- 
ble, will  grasp  the  real  ongoing  of  that  about  which 
we  think.  We  must  think  of  a  unity,  the  parts  of 
which   are  what   they  are    only  in   relation   to    one 


INORGANIC    WORLD  A   PREPARATION  FOR  LIFE       55 

another  and  to  the  whole.  It  is  not  allowable  to 
take  one  in  abstraction  from  another,  or  to  think 
of  it  as  if  independent.  We  may  try  to  do  so  if 
we  please,  but  at  the  cost  of  moving  away  from  the 
concrete  reality  which  we  seek  to  understand.  We 
may  speak,  if  we  choose,  of  an  environment  and  of 
an  organism,  and  speak  of  them  as  brought  together, 
but  we  must  constantly  remind  ourselves  that  this 
is  only  our  way  of  speaking,  for  these  are  only  given 
in  relation  to  one  another.  We  may  also  speak  of 
parts  of  the  organism,  and  break  it  up  into  aspects, 
but  that  again  is  only  our  way  of  speaking,  and  we 
have  to  strive  to  think  things  together,  as  we  find 
them  exist  together  in  our  experience. 

When  we  have  won  this  new  experience,  and  have 
widened  our  notions  to  correspond,  we  go  back  to 
look  at  the  universe  in  a  new  light.  It  is  a  universe 
of  a  new  kind  containing  in  it  a  kind  of  existence  not 
recognized  before.  It  is  also  a  universe  that  has 
made  a  greater  demand  on  our  intelligence,  and 
called  for  a  greater  intellectual  effort  to  understand 
it.  The  ongoing  of  it  is  more  complex,  and  the 
wonder  of  it  infinitely  greater.  Also  the  relative 
independence  of  what  is  in  the  world  is  greater. 
Here  is  something  that  lives,  maintains  itself,  sub- 
dues aUen  matter,  and  turns  it  to  its  own  uses,  that 
grows,  and  produces  other  things  that  live  and  grow, 
which  is  so  made  that  it  is  made  to  make  itself.  Its 
maintenance  depends  on  its  own  activity.     Shall  we 


56  THEISM 

not  say  that  this  is  a  greater  world  than  that  dis- 
closed to  us  in  the  worlds  revealed  to  us  in  all  the 
sidereal  heavens  ?  If  quality  rather  than  bulk  is 
to  be  our  criterion,  then  the  smallest  speck  of  life 
may  have  more  significance  than  a  world  of  Hfeless 
matter.  It  was  customary  not  long  ago  to  speak  of 
the  structureless  cell  as  the  characteristic  of  living 
matter.  All  living  animals,  it  was  found,  could  be 
traced  back  to  a  single  cell,  and  from  this  cell  by 
repeated  division  all  the  component  cells  are  derived. 
It  was  also  found  that  certain  animals  remain  single 
cells  all  their  lives,  and  others  became  multicellular, 
and  this  evidently  is  one  of  the  most  important  dis- 
tinctions in  zoology.  It  was  thought  that  it  was 
easier  to  bring  zoological  phenomena  under  the 
general  conception  of  evolution  if  a  beginning  was 
made  from  the  simplicity  of  a  structureless  cell,  and 
by  successive  differentiations  and  integrations  follow 
its  growth  until  it  arrived  at  the  adult  stage.  But  a 
change  has  come  over  the  spirit  of  that  dream.  The 
structureless  cell  has  vanished,  and  recent  investiga- 
tion reveals  innumerable  complexities  even  within 
the  single-celled  animal. 

Our  present  interest  in  the  cell  theory  is  not  to 
describe  it,  even  in  the  most  general  terms,  but  to 
take  that  which  lies  at  the  very  beginning  of  life, 
the  single  cell,  and  to  see  what  a  problem  it  is  to 
think  it.  We  may  take  from  a  master  in  this  depart- 
ment of   science  the  following :    "  It  would   appear 


INORGANIC    WORLD  A   PREPARATION  FOR  LIFE       57 

from  these  more  recent  researches,  of  which  time 
has  only  permitted  me  to  give  a  brief  and  most 
imperfect  summary,  that  the  cell  theory,  great  and 
important  as  it  is  most  undoubtedly,  is  rather  the 
commencement  of  a  great  movement,  a  fresh 
starting-point  from  which  to  begin  investigations 
anew,  than  a  complete  scheme,  or  final  explanation ; 
and  the  one  great  lesson  for  us  to  learn  is  that  pro- 
cesses of  apparently  the  simplest  kind  are  really  of  an 
extremely  complicated  nature,  and  will  well  repay  the 
most  minute  and  attentive  study ;  for  a  right  under- 
standing of  the  changes  that  occur  during  the  act 
of  division  of  an  ordinary  epithelial  cell,  and  of  the 
causes  determining  those  changes,  would  throw  most 
welcome  light  on  the  more  complicated  processes  ac- 
companying the  ripening  and  fertilization  of  the  ^g^,^ 
which  microscopists  of  all  nationalities  are  at  present 
studying  with  such  intense  earnestness."  (**  Biological 
Lectures,"  by  Arthur  Milnes  Marshall,  pp.  190-1.) 
Thus  if  we  look  at  the  simple  cell  as  it  is  in  itself 
at  the  earliest  moment,  we  see  a  most  complicated 
structure,  and  the  structure  is  held  together  in  a 
unity.  When  we  have  regard  to  its  life  history  and 
to  the  changes  through  which  it  passes  in  the  course 
of  its  growth,  —  and  all  these  changes  have  also  to 
be  regarded  as  a  unity, — then  we  would  do  well  to 
revise  our  conception  of  a  unity  and  its  possibilities. 
These  qualities,  relations,  processes,  are  there  as 
one,  and  it  would  be  well  for  us  to  recognize  them 


58  THEISM 

as  one.  If  our  thinking  is  to  have  a  relation  to 
reality,  we  must  not  substitute  a  mere  aspect  of  the 
whole  for  the  complicated  process  which  actually 
goes  on.  The  mere  word  "cell"  must  not  take  the 
place  of  the  fact,  nor  ought  we  to  break  up  the  fact 
into  a  number  of  separate  processes,  select  one  of 
these  as  cause,  and  make  the  other  results  of  that 
one  we  perhaps  selected  in  a  somewhat  arbitrary 
way;  for  the  cell  is  there  with  so  many  relations, 
quaUties,  properties,  all  belonging  together,  and  form- 
ing a  real  unity.  We  shall  find  as  we  proceed  that 
we  are  under  the  necessity  of  enlarging  our  concep- 
tions of  a  unity,  and  we  shall  be  under  the  necessity 
of  thinking,  or  trying  to  think,  of  the  many  in  the 
light  of  one.  That  is  actually  what  nature  is  doing, 
and  we  must  remind  ourselves  of  the  fact,  if  we  are 
to  understand  nature.  Thus  we  dwell  on  the  sim- 
plest form  of  life,  and  speak  of  it  even  to  weariness, 
just  to  make  ourselves  realize  how  great  is  the 
problem  that  it  represents  to  our  thought. 

If  we  have  been  able  to  think  a  single  cell  in 
its  isolation,  its  simplicity,  and  complexity,  we  must 
remember  that  we  have  done  so  by  a  process  of 
abstraction.  We  neglected  everything,  and  fixed  our 
attention  on  the  single  cell.  That  is  to  say,  we  neg- 
lected its  relation  to  the  environment,  the  conditions 
of  the  world  which  made  its  existence  possible  as  a 
living  cell,  the  past  history  of  time  and  its  changes, 
and  before  our  thinking  could  represent  the  reality 


INORGANIC    WO  RID  A   PREPARATION  FOR  II FE       59 

these  relations  should  be  restored.  But  things  are 
so  in  their  reaHty,  they  are  placed  so  in  time  and 
space,  and  are  so  related  to  all  else  that  the  history 
of  a  single  cell  implies  the  former  history  of  the  uni- 
verse. We  toil  after  this  in  vain,  but  even  the  dis- 
tant glimpses  we  obtain  of  reality  suggest  that  there 
is  a  thinker  whose  intellectual  processes  are  adequate 
to  the  perfect  understanding  of  the  universe  as  it  is, 
and  as  it  works. 

Looking  at  the  universe  from  the  point  of  view  we 
have  now  attained,  we  see  it  is  a  unity  which  has  life 
in  it.  We  see  also  that,  while  we  may  think  of  the 
cell  in  abstraction,  we  are  immediately  reminded  that 
the  abstraction  is  ours.  The  life  of  the  cell  is  in 
relation  to  the  whole,  and  is  one  phase  of  the  life  that 
is  in  existence.  And  the  world  as  a  whole  is  some- 
thing more  than  a  system  of  mechanical  forces,  it 
has  in  it  the  principle  of  life.  As  our  argument 
unfolds  itself  we  shall  see  how  much  is  implied  in  this 
great  fact.  We  shall  find  in  connection  with  life  as 
it  unfolds  itself  within  the  world,  there  are  many  new 
qualities  brought  within  our  view,  which  will  help  us 
to  know  something  of  the  nature  of  the  living  power 
which,  so  far,  we  have  already  come  to  know.  We 
have  seen  that  the  world  is  both  organic  and  inor- 
ganic, and  that  these  are  one  world,  not  tied  together 
merely  as  cause  and  effect,  but  standing  in  recipro- 
cal relation  to  one  another.  The  advent  of  life  is  an 
unveiling  of  the  power  that  is  at  work  in  the  world, 


6o  THEISM 

and  if  in  its  simplest  form  life  presents  so  grave  a 
problem  to  our  intelligence,  what  will  the  fulness  of 
life  present  to  our  view  ?  We  may  not  answer  that 
question  at  this  stage,  but  we  may  again  lay  stress 
on  the  fact  that  the  advent  of  life  has  made  known 
to  us  a  new  world,  and  a  world  that  has  brought  with 
it  its  own  method  and  action,  and  calls  on  us  to  meet 
it  with  a  widening  of  our  methods  and  actions  if 
our  intelligence  is  to  keep  pace  with  the  working  of 
the  world. 

The  one  cell  which  remains  a  single  cell  through 
its  life  history  has  already  presented  us  with  prob- 
lems sufficiently  hard  and  perplexing.  What  shall 
we  then  say  of  the  advance  from  unicellular  to  multi- 
cellular being,  which  has  been  called  one  of  the  most 
important  and  significant  steps  taken  by  living  being  } 
The  single  cell  which,  be  its  origin  what  it  may, 
proceeds  on  its  course,  passes  beyond  the  stage  of 
selfhood,  and  becomes  a  being  of  many  cells.  By 
modifications  of  itself,  by  splitting  up  into  many  cells, 
it  grows  ever  more  and  more  complex.  It  sets  par- 
ticular cells  to  specific  work.  It  differentiates  the 
structure  so  as  to  make  each  structure  fit  for  certain 
functions.  Some  become  bone  cells,  some  muscles ; 
some  assume  one  form,  some  another,  for  the  division 
is  endless.  I  do  not  enumerate  them,  as  they  are 
accessible  to  every  one,  and  my  purpose  is  not  to  set 
forth  the  details,  but  to  look  at  them  in  the  light 
they  cast  on  our  thesis.     As  we  pass  from  the  being 


INORGANIC    WORLD  A   PREPARATION  FOR  LIFE       6 1 

of  one  cell  to  the  being  formed  of  many  cells,  differ- 
entiated and  integrated  to  meet  a  larger  purpose,  we 
pass  from  the  thought  of  a  unity  of  comparatively 
simple  functions  to  one  of  a  very  great  complexity. 
It  is  as  if  we  passed  from  the  study  of  a  single  indi- 
vidual to  the  study  of  a  community  made  up  of  many 
individuals.  All  the  individuals  are  of  the  same  kind, 
and  arise  in  the  same  way  from  modifications  of  the 
original  cell,  but  they  become  most  diverse  in  kind, 
and  perform  functions  of  the  most  unUke  order. 
While  each  one  of  the  number  becomes  what  it  is, 
and  sets  itself  to  its  own  individual  work,  it  lives  and 
acts  in  harmony  with  all  the  others,  and  in  subor- 
dination to  the  whole  organism.  There  is  no  com- 
munity so  well-ordered,  so  law-abiding,  as  is  the 
community  of  cells  which  makes  up  the  substance  of 
a  healthy  organism. 

As  we  follow  on  in  our  thought  the  history  of  the 
organism,  we  see  other  facts  quite  as  striking.  It  is 
not  merely  a  community  of  cells  working  together 
that  we  see,  it  is  a  community  the  individual  mem- 
bers of  which  are  ever  changing.  The  cells,  or  the 
matter  of  which  they  are  composed,  pass  and  a  new 
set  takes  their  place.  The  organism  is  ever  prepar- 
ing, out  of  matter  which  it  assimilates,  the  new  cells 
which  take  the  place  of  the  old  whose  energy  has 
been  expended  in  doing  the  work  of  the  organism, 
and  the  new  cells  seem  to  serve  themselves  heirs  to 
the  experience  of  the  old,   and  the  work  goes  on. 


62  THEISM 

The  process  of  training  seems  to  be  very  speedily 
accomplished,  for  in  this  institution  there  seem  to 
be  no  dull  or  self-willed  pupils. 

Not  only  has  the  organism  the  property  of  making 
alien  matter  a  part  of  itself,  and  of  making  it  serve 
the  purposes  of  the  organism,  but  there  are  even 
more  surprising  transformations  still.  Hitherto  we 
have  looked  at  the  organism  as  a  unity  that  maintains 
itself,  sustains  itself,  and  holds  itself  together  during 
the  time  of  its  life  history.  We  must  look  at  it  from 
another  side.  For  we  find  that  it  has  established 
certain  fixed  ways  of  communication  with  the  envi- 
ronment, and  these  ways  are  made  by  a  specializa- 
tion of  its  own  substance.  One  of  these  ways  was 
implied  in  what  was  said  when  we  spoke  of  its  power 
of  taking  in  alien  matter  and  transforming  it  to  its 
own  uses.  There  are  ways  of  which  we  have  not 
yet  spoken  which  enhance  our  conception  of  the  vast 
complexity  of  an  organism.  It  lays  hold  of  the  rays 
of  light  and  transforms  the  undulations  of  the  ether 
into  a  subjective  state  which  we  call  vision.  It  seizes 
the  vibrations  of  the  atmosphere,  and  they,  also,  take 
a  subjective  form,  and  sound  becomes  hearing.  It 
recognizes  tastes,  smells,  resistance,  and  these  exter- 
nal movements  are  turned  into  something  altogether 
different,  and  yet  related  to  the  qualities  of  the  envi- 
ronment so  that  these  subjective  states  are  a  guide 
to  the  action  which  the  organism  should  take  for  its 
own  maintenance.      Still  further  these  inner  states 


INORGANIC    WORLD  A   PREPARATION  FOR  LIFE       63 

of  the  organism,  related  to  states  of  the  environment, 
give  rise  to  something  which  seems  to  have  no  cor- 
respondence to  anything  outside  of  the  organism. 
Sensations  which  are  related  to  particular  states  of 
certain  definite  organs  can  be  understood  by  refer- 
ence to  a  definite  organ  of  sense.  But  there  is  feel- 
ing which  seems  to  need  no  definite  organ  for  its 
existence ;  it  is  neither  sight,  taste,  touch,  smell,  nor 
hearing,  it  is  localized  nowhere  ;  as  Sir  William  Ham- 
ilton said,  it  is  subjectively  subjective. 

Without  entering  into  the  psychology  of  feeling 
here, — confessedly  the  most  difificult  question  in  psy- 
chology, —  it  is  sufficient  for  me  at  present  to  call 
attention  to  the  fact  that  feeling  seems  to  be  the 
accompaniment  of  life,  if  not  universally,  at  least  of 
life  which  has  attained  a  certain  measure  of  organiza- 
tion. We  have  therefore  to  add  to  our  view  of  or- 
ganization this  subjective  side  in  order  to  have  a  view 
of  the  manifoldness  of  this  unity.  It  cannot  be  un- 
derstood ;  it  cannot,  even,  be  stated,  without  a  refer- 
ence to  purpose.  For  the  biologist  always  speaks  of 
the  organism  as  adapted  to  the  end  of  living,  as  sur- 
viving in  the  struggle  for  existence,  and  in  so  doing 
he  has  given  it  a  meaning  other  than  that  which  be- 
longs to  a  series  of  physical  processes.  Such  tele- 
ological  references  imply  feeling,  and  effort,  and 
impulse  as  the  result  of  feeHng.  It  may  be  that  the 
explanation  of  the  maintenance  and  striving  of  the 
organism  does  not  admit  of  explanation  without  a 


64  THEISM 

reference  to  the  subjective  state  of  feeling,  which  is 
the  source  of  all  its  effort.  At  all  events  there  must 
be  a  centre  to  which  all  the  states  of  the  organism 
must  be  referred,  and  from  which  all  its  actions  go 
forth. 

We  have  come  thus  far  under  the  guidance  of 
science.  We  see  an  organism  at  work,  we  see  it 
making  use  of  the  environment  for  its  own  purpose, 
we  see  it  holding  together  the  various  elements  of 
matter  of  which  materially  it  is  composed,  keeping 
them  under  its  control  while  they  are  in  its  service, 
and  as  we  turn  to  the  inward  condition  of  the  or- 
ganism itself,  we  see  a  new,  subjective  world  of  sensa- 
tion and  feeling  unlike  anything  which  we  found  in 
the  world  of  matter  or  even  in  the  lower  forms  of  life. 
At  all  events  if  feeling  is  in  the  lower  forms  of  Hfe  it 
is  so  feebly  manifested  that  we  are  unable  to  recognize 
it.  So  we  come  to  the  conclusion  that  this  is  a  uni- 
verse in  which  there  is  not  only  power,  intelligence, 
life,  but  we  are  able  to  recognize  that  there  is  feeling 
in  the  universe.  Again,  we  must  widen  our  concep- 
tion of  reality,  and  call  on  thought  for  a  greater  effort 
than  before,  if  our  thought  is  to  grasp  reality.  As 
yet  we  may  not  be  able  to  interpret  rightly  the  phe- 
nomena of  power,  intelligence,  life,  or  feeling  which 
have  met  our  view  as  we  ascended  the  stream  of  a 
developing  universe.  We  may  need  a  principle  of 
interpretation  which  has  not  yet  been  manifested, 
but  at  all  events  we  see  so  far  the  facts  which  need 


INORGANIC    WORLD  A   PREPARATION  FOR  LIFE       65 

explanation.  We  may  not  understand  feeling  till 
we  see  it  as  it  exists  in  a  self-conscious  being,  or  any 
principle  of  the  lower  world  until  we  see  it  in  its 
highest  relations.  The  source  of  explanation  and  the 
principle  of  explanation  may  not  lie  in  the  beginnings 
of  things,  but  in  the  end.  However  that  may  be,  let 
us  recognize  what  has  been  found  by  us  up  to  this 
point,  and  follow  on  to  the  larger  issues  yet  to  come. 


Ill 

LIFE:    ITS   GENESIS,    GROWTH,   AND 
MEANING 

To  enable  us  to  realize  the  complexity  of  an  organ- 
ism, we  have  only  to  recall  the  fact  that  naturahsts 
are  constrained  not  only  to  speak  of  the  whole  system 
of  a  living  being,  but  also  of  a  number  of  systems 
within  that  system.  They  speak  of  the  alimentary, 
the  circulatory,  the  nervous,  the  motor,  the  sensitive, 
and  the  reproductive  systems.  Each  of  these  is  suffi- 
ciently definite  to  demand  a  separate  treatment.  Each, 
also,  has  a  distinctive  character,  and  as  set  forth  in 
the  text-books  one  is  apt  to  forget  its  relation  to 
the  other  systems  with  which  it  is  coordinated  in  the 
unity  of  the  organism.  At  the  conclusion  of  the 
section  on  the  structure  of  living  things  Messrs. 
Sedgwick  and  Wilson  say :  "  Up  to  this  point  we 
have  considered  Uving  organisms  from  an  anatomical 
and  analytical  standpoint,  and  have  observed  their 
natural  subdivisions  into  organs,  tissues,  and  cells. 
We  have  now  only  to  remark  that  these  parts  are 
mutually  interdependent,  and  that  the  organism  as  a 
whole  is  greater  than  any  of  its  parts.  Precisely  as 
a  chronometer  is  superior  to  an  aggregate  of  wheels 

66 


LIFE  67 

and  springs,  so  a  living  organism  is  superior  in  the 
solidarity  of  its  parts  to  a  mere  aggregate  of  organs, 
tissues,  and  cells."  (Sedgwick  and  Wilson's  *'  Intro- 
duction to  General  Biology,"  2d  edition,  p.  19.) 
Again:  ''The  process  of  cell  division  does  not  in  this 
case  go  so  far  as  complete  cell  separation,  and  the 
cells  do  not  acquire  a  complete  individuality.  They 
do,  it  is  true,  acquire  a  certain  independence  of  struc- 
ture and  function  ;  and  their  individual  characteristics 
may  even  depart  widely  from  those  of  neighbouring 
cells.  Nevertheless  they  remain  closely  united  by 
either  material  or  physiological  bonds  to  form  one 
body.  The  body  is  not,  however,  to  be  regarded  as 
merely  an  assemblage  of  independent,  individual  cells. 
The  Body  is  the  Individual;  its  more  or  less  per- 
fect division  into  cells  is  only  a  basis  for  the  physio- 
logical division  of  labour,  of  which  cell  differentiation 
is  the  outward  expression."     (p.  156.) 

In  this  singularly  able  and  instructive  book  we 
find  stress  laid  on  the  unity  of  the  organism,  and 
those  who  study  biology  from  a  wider  view  than  the 
biological  find  themselves  greatly  helped  by  the  dis- 
tinguished authors.  At  all  events  my  own  debt  of 
gratitude  to  them  is  great.  I  needed  help  to  think 
the  organism,  and  help  was  sought  by  me  from  all 
sources,  and  I  was  not  able  to  see  the  manifold  re- 
flected into  unity  till  I  read  the  book  to  which  I  refer. 
They  enabled  me  to  see  that  the  body  is  the  individ- 
ual, and  the  unity  of  the  body  is  not  to  be  lost  sight 


68  THEISM 

of  in  the  multiplicity  of  details.  It  is  not  explained 
by  the  cooperation  of  the  parts,  rather  it  is  the  ex- 
planation of  them.  The  meaning  of  a  unity  is  thus 
growing  on  our  hands,  and  the  end  is  not  yet ;  it  will 
grow  to  larger  issues  still.  Meanwhile  we  look  at  it 
once  more,  and  we  see  not  merely  a  series  of  cells 
in  constant  movement  and  change,  but  we  see  system 
within  system,  or  system  beside  system,  all  working 
together  in  harmonious  order,  and  all  the  systems 
have  a  meaning  only  in  relation  to  the  system  of  the 
whole  of  which  they  form  a  part,  and  which  is  more 
than  the  sum  of  them  all.  The  adequate  way  of 
treating  the  organism  would  be  to  think  it  together, 
even  as,  in  fact,  it  is  held  together  in  actual  existence. 
This  may  be  too  great  a  task  for  our  power  of  think- 
ing, but  it  is  a  task  which  has  been  done.  A  thought, 
an  idea,  is  in  the  organism,  for  the  organism  is  there, 
exists  in  its  manifoldness  and  unity,  as  an  actual  fact 
in  this  world  of  space  and  time.  If  we  cannot  grasp 
it  in  its  greatness,  at  least  let  us  acknowledge  it  as 
a  goal  to  our  thought,  and  seek  to  grasp  it  at  least 
in  outline. 

One  does  not  find  much  help  from  the  authorities 
on  biology  in  the  attempt  to  think  the  organism  in 
its  unity,  nor  much  practical  recognition  of  the  unity 
of  the  organism.  Rather  we  find  a  constant  attempt 
to  evade  the  difficulty  of  the  problem  and  a  tendency 
to  substitute  something  more  easily  grasped.  Huxley 
calls   the   body    "  an    aggregation  of   quasi-indepen- 


LIFE 


69 

dent  cells,"  and  Virchow  says  "the  organism  is 
not  a  unity,  but  is  a  company  or  rather  a  society." 
And  Professor  Geddes  says,  *' For  actual  biological 
purposes  the  life  of  an  organism  is  the  sum  of 
its  functions,  internal  and  external."  ("Chambers's 
Encyclopcedia,"  art.  Biology.)  The  problem  of  life 
is  attacked  now  from  the  side  of  the  cell,  now  from 
the  tissue,  and  again  from  the  protoplasm,  and  the 
point  of  view  varies  according  to  the  aspect  in  which 
it  is  viewed.  But  from  biologists  generally  we  get 
but  little  help  in  our  desire  to  study  the  individual 
as  a  unity.  Every  theory  seems  to  move  by  the 
disintegration  of  the  individual  into  self-efficient  and 
unrelated  parts.  Sometimes  these  are  physical  or 
chemical  elements,  sometimes  a  company  of  cells,  and 
sometimes  physiological  units.  So  much  stress  is 
laid  on  the  similarity,  and  on  the  independence  of 
cells,  that  the  individual  disappears.  The  true  indi- 
viduals appear  to  be  the  cells,  and  the  organism 
seems  to  be  explained  as  a  result  of  the  behaviour 
of  the  cells  as  they  grow,  reproduce,  and  differ- 
entiate themselves.  But  the  relation  of  whole  and 
part  cannot  be  studied  by  the  microscope.  If  we 
are  to  get  at  the  secret  of  the  organism,  we  must 
study  it  in  relation  to  the  organism,  and  look  at  all 
the  qualities  as  properties  of  the  organism.  "Of  this 
organization  itself  as  such  —  that  is,  of  the  mechanical 
apparatus  it  presents  to  us  —  the  microscope  tells  us 
nothing  whatever.     The  microscope  only  enables  us 


70 


THEISM 


to  see  a  single  cell,  a  single  germinal  particle  in  con- 
nection with  more  or  less  of  its  own  formed  material 
—  a  single  coral,  so  to  speak,  and  the  polype  that 
died  into  it ;  it  tells  us  nothing  whatever  of  the  vast 
machine  which  these  polypes  have  all  unconsciously 
built  up  with  their  coral.  The  mighty  and  complex 
frame  of  man  is,  after  all,  despite  its  innumerable 
parts,  a  unity ;  all  these  parts  but  go  toward  that  unity, 
are  sublated  into  it.  Now,  what  of  all  that  does  mi- 
croscopic observation  tell  us  .?  Why,  simply  nothing. 
Myriads  of  miserable  Egyptians  carried  stones  to 
the  pyramid,  but  no  microscopic  watching  of  any  of 
these,  stone  and  all,  would  ever  explain  the  pyramid 
itself  —  its  many  to  a  one."  (Hutchison  Stirling, 
''As  Regards  Protoplasm,"  p.  75.) 

The  substitution  of  the  idea  of  a  community  for 
that  of  a  unity  seems  to  give  an  easier  problem  for 
solution,  because  a  community  is  thought  of  as  a 
loose  and  apparently  fortuitous  concourse  of  individ- 
uals, each  independent  of  all  the  others.  Whether 
society  can  be  regarded  as  a  crowd  and  not  as  a  real 
unity  is  another  question  on  which  something  may  be 
said  later,  but  from  a  certain  standpoint  society  may 
be  looked  at  as  a  crowd  of  independent  or  quasi- 
independent  units.  If  this  is  the  sense  attached  to 
the  term,  it  is  a  term  quite  inadequate  to  express  the 
unity  of  the  body,  and  can  only  mislead.  For  biology 
it  may  suffice  to  say  that  the  life  of  an  organism  is 
the  sum  of  its  functions,  but  for  real   thought   the 


LIFE 


71 


organism  is  more  than  a  sum.  It  is  something  that 
holds  together  the  whole  ongoing  of  the  organic  quali- 
ties, functions,  etc.,  and  makes  them  work  together 
for  the  aims  and  purposes  of  the  organism.  Every 
cell,  while  it  is  within  the  body,  is  in  the  service  of 
the  organism,  and  its  modifications,  its  changes,  its 
food,  its  waste,  its  very  form,  are  determined  for  it  by 
the  whole.  It  is  maintained  only  while  it  is  within 
the  body,  when  removed  from  the  organism  it  perishes 
and  passes  to  a  lower  chemical  condition. 

Thus,  also,  we  must  think  of  the  variations  to  which 
the  organism  is  subject.  They  cannot  be  arbitrary 
nor  can  they  be  unlimited.  For  the  organism  is  so 
tied  together  that  a  variation  in  one  part  gives  rise  to 
a  number  of  correlated  variations  so  great  as  to  be 
beyond  reckoning.  The  supposition  of  innumerable 
variations  is  a  hypothesis  that  has  bulked  largely  in 
the  theory  of  evolution,  and  it  seems  to  me  to  be 
greatly  exaggerated.  Confining  our  view  to  a  single 
organism,  it  certainly  does  not  admit  of  indefinite 
variation.  It  is  not  my  intention,  however,  to  criticise 
the  adequacy  of  the  multitudinous  machinery  which 
has  been  invented  to  make  the  theory  of  evolution 
inteUigible.  For  from  my  point  of  view,  at  present, 
I  have  no  interest  in  such  criticism.  I  am  willing  to 
accept  the  fact  of  evolution,  though  I  do  not  think 
the  factors  of  evolution  have  been  discovered  as  yet. 
We  know  that  life  appeared  on  the  earth  in  a  simple 
form,  that  it  proceeded  in  forms   which  grew  from 


72 


THEISM 


more  to  more,  that  there  is  a  gradation  and  a  se- 
quence in  the  appearance  of  hfe  on  the  earth,  and 
that  the  latest  form  of  Hfe  is  the  highest  form  that 
has  yet  appeared.  So  far  agreement  reigns;  further 
agreement  may  be  attained  if  we  say  that  each  lower 
form  of  life  precedes  the  higher  in  point  of  time,  in 
order  of  organization,  and,  perhaps,  also  in  causal 
preparation.  It  may  be  that  each  form  was  evolved 
from  a  lower  by  successive  modifications,  and  that  all 
forms  of  life  are  organically  and  causally  connected 
with  the  first  forms  which  appeared.  Species  may 
be  not  fixed  and  unchangeable,  but  subject  to  a  law 
of  progress  and  change.  If  this  be  so,  all  the  refer- 
ence it  has  to  my  argument  is  to  make  me  widen  my 
view  of  unity,  and  to  call  on  me  to  grasp,  if  I  can,  a 
larger  manifold  in  a  single  unity.  It  has  been  diffi- 
cult enough  to  grasp  the  conception  of  a  single 
organism,  so  complex  have  we  found  it  to  be.  We 
have  found  also  that  we  were  ever  trying  to  substitute 
an  abstract  conception  for  the  concrete  reality.  To 
what  straits  shall  we  be  driven  when  we  find  ourselves 
in  the  presence  of  a  vast  reality  persisting  through 
the  ages,  growing,  changing,  ever  in  adaptation  with 
its  environment,  yet  ever  fixing  itself  in  relatively 
permanent  forms,  and  always  in  active  movement. 
We  might  predict  that  we  shall  have  a  larger  crop  of 
abstractions  than  before,  since  the  phenomena  are 
more  complex.  And  so  we  have.  Heredity,  varia- 
tion, the  struggle  for  existence,  natural  selection,  the 


LIFE  73 

survival  of  the  fittest,  and  a  number  of  other  phrases 
appear,  some  of  which  have  passed  into  common  speech. 

As  I  said,  I  am  not  concerned  to  criticise  these 
terms  and  what  they  stand  for,  except  so  far  as  they 
have  become  the  symbols  of  a  mechanical  evolution ; 
and  thus  tend  to  make  mind  derivative  and  second- 
ary. Some  of  them  seem  to  be  without  meaning  and 
some  seem  to  be  mere  expressions.  Take  the  sur- 
vival of  the  fittest,  and,  looking  at  the  world  of  life 
as  it  is  to-day,  ask  what  it  means.  It  really  tells 
us  nothing,  affords  us  no  criterion  of  life,  gives  no 
intimation  of  progress.  Everything  that  survives  is 
the  fittest  whether  it  be  a  unicellular  being,  or  multi- 
cellular; whether  it  be  a  degraded  form,  or  a  form 
that  is  in  the  exercise  of  all  its  functions,  with  all 
its  structures  perfect.  It  adds  nothing  to  our  know- 
ledge, nor  does  it  give  us  any  insight  into  the  mean- 
ing of  the  changes  that  life  has  passed  through. 

Natural  selection  seems  to  be  a  name  for  a  vast 
complexity  of  conditions  to  which  life  is  subject,  and 
now  one  and  again  another  is  to  the  front  as  it  is 
most  needed.  It  has  sometimes  to  become  more 
particular,  and  becomes  cell  selection,  physiological 
selection,  sexual  selection,  germinal  selection,  as  the 
more  general  formula  becomes  clearly  inadequate 
for  its  purpose.  It  is  applied,  too,  for  the  purpose 
of  explaining  the  advance  of  life  into  higher  forms. 
It  cannot,  at  the  same  time,  and  with  the  same 
machinery,  explain  the  persistency  of  the  lower  and 


74  THEISM 

the  advent  of  the  higher  forms  of  Hfe.  If  there  is  a 
struggle  for  existence  among  the  lower  forms  of  life, 
how  is  it  that  they  remained  the  same  for  all  time, 
made  no  change,  and  have  had  no  variation  so  far 
as  we  know?  If  there  is  no  struggle  for  existence 
among  the  lower  organisms,  there  is  an  utter  absence 
of  the  motive  for  change  which  underlies  the  Dar- 
winian hypothesis.  It  does  not  seem  possible  to 
find  occasion  for  any  advance  from  the  simplicity 
of  the  immortal  single  celled  beings  to  the  danger- 
ous struggle  for  existence  that,  according  to  Darwin, 
awaits  the  higher  organisms.  The  single  cell  has 
every  advantage;  it  is  first  in  the  field,  and  it  per- 
sists still.  Why  did  some  cells  become  multicellu- 
lar.?    The  Darwinian  machinery  is  silent. 

Many  other  things  might  be  said  of  the  inade- 
quacy of  natural  selection.  Indeed,  many  things 
have  been  said,  and  these  have,  for  the  most  part, 
been  ignored  by  the  thorough-going  advocates  of 
natural  selection.  Though  it  has  been  clearly 
shown  that  natural  selection  cannot  originate  any- 
thing, yet  men  continue  to  speak  as  if  natural  selec- 
tion could  do  this,  that,  and  the  other  thing.  Though 
it  appears  that  its  function  is  negative,  the  killing 
off  of  the  unfit,  yet  positive  functions  of  the  most 
productive  sort  are  ascribed  to  it.  At  one  time,  it  is 
said,  natural  selection  does  produce  species,  and  with 
the  next  breath  it  has  to  wait  for  the  appearance  of 
a  variation  on  which  it  may  work. 


LIFE  75 

Some  contend  that  natural  selection  is  sufficient 
to  account  for  the  origin  of  species ;  some,  that  it 
has  a  place  along  with  other  factors  in  the  develop- 
ment of  new  forms  of  life ;  and  some  say  that  its 
function  is  mainly  negative,  inhibiting  certain 
departures  from  the  type,  and  so  it  is  a  some- 
thing that  makes  for  the  stability  of  species.  But 
underlying  all  the  variations  of  the  meaning  of 
natural  selection  is  the  conception  of  the  struggle 
for  existence  and  fortuitous  variation  in  all  direc- 
tions. It  is  a  grewsome  picture  that  they  present 
to  us  under  the  name  "the  struggle  for  existence," 
and  the  demand  for  variation  is  so  extensive  that  to 
comply  with  it  would  land  us  in  a  world  governed 
only  by  chance.  To  speak  first  of  the  struggle  for 
existence,  and  to  speak  with  all  brevity.  It  is  most 
extensive.  It  is  a  struggle  between  organism  and 
organism,  between  species  and  species,  and  between 
species  and  environment  in  all  cases.  The  parts  of 
a  creature  are  also  represented  as  struggling  with  one 
another,  one  set  of  cells  struggling  against  another 
set,  and  food  for  brain  cells  may  mean  lack  of  food 
for  motor  cells,  and  so  on.  The  idea  of  struggle  has 
been  followed  out  in  all  directions,  and  there  is  no 
possible  relation  between  one  part  of  the  body  and 
another  part,  between  one  organism  and  another, 
between  one  species  and  another,  but  may  easily 
be  presented  as  a  struggle.  Struggle  thus  presented 
tends  to  become  an  empty  form. 


J6  THEISM 

Of  course  it  is  quite  easy  to  present  things  so, 
and  it  is  as  useless  as  it  is  easy.  But  the  presenta- 
tion of  the  struggle  is  possible  because  we  first  take 
out  of  their  relations  the  beings  which  struggle, 
look  at  them  abstractly,  and  then  seek  to  conceive 
of  them  as  struggling  to  get  back  into  relations. 
But  we  do  not  find  any  being  subsisting  out  of  rela- 
tion to  other  beings.  Relations  and  conditions  may 
be  set  forth  as  if  they  were  a  struggle,  and,  indeed, 
a  goodly  number  of  the  pictures  of  struggle  are 
just  the  relations  in  which  the  creature  stands,  and 
the  conditions  of  its  existence  without  which  it  could 
not  be.  Neglecting  the  other  aspects  of  struggle, 
let  us  look  at  the  main  picture.  It  has  never  yet 
been  shown  that  a  species  is  more  numerous  than 
can  be  supported  by  its  means  of  subsistence,  and 
in  fact  it  does  not  seem  ever  to  approach  the  limit 
of  its  subsistence.  Many  imaginary  features  have 
been  introduced  into  the  picture.  The  life  of  a 
species  is  looked  at  as  something  that  strives  to 
expand  in  all  directions,  and  this  tendency  to  expan- 
sion tends  to  bring  it  into  collision  with  other  beings, 
and  being  brought  into  collision  they  strive  for 
advantage,  and  the  one  that  obtains  the  mastery 
obtains  the  prize.  Every  organism  is  thus  on  the 
watch  for  any  modification  which  may  give  it  the 
mastery,  and  having  found  the  modification  it  per- 
petuates it.     Such  is  the  picture  presented  to  us. 

Of  the  struggle  we  shall  only  say  that  it  is  universal. 


LIFE 


77 


at  least  it  is  represented  as  if  it  were.  But  general 
laws  do  not  account  for  particular  effects.  What  is 
needed  is  a  knowledge  of  the  specific  causes  which 
here  or  there  place  a  check  on  the  expansion  of 
a  species,  and  this  is  what  is  never  forthcoming. 
There  must  be  limits  to  the  increase  of  a  species, 
and  Mr.  Darwin  in  this  relation  says,  "  If  asked 
how  this  is,  one  immediately  replies  that  it  is  deter- 
mined by  some  slight  difference  in  climate,  food,  or 
the  number  of  the  enemies;  yet  how  rarely,  if  ever, 
we  can  point  out  the  precise  cause  or  manner  of  the 
check."  It  reminds  us  of  the  favourite  argument 
of  another  evolutionist  who  when  he  is  confronted 
with  a  change  which  he  cannot  particularly  explain, 
says  what  has  happened  must  have  happened,  other- 
wise force  would  have  ceased  to  persist.  Such  an 
explanation  is  purely  formal.  If  the  struggle  were  a 
fact  of  natural  history,  it  would  be  quite  easy  to  point 
to  the  struggle,  and  to  indicate  in  detail  the  precise 
cause  or  manner  of  the  check. 

Apart  from  its  environment  and  the  conditions  of 
its  existence  a  living  creature  is  for  us  inconceivable. 
By  turning  the  creature  into  an  abstraction  it  is  pos- 
sible to  represent  it  as  struggling  with  its  environ- 
ment, but  the  relation  to  its  environment  is  simply 
that  which  makes  its  life  possible.  Similarly  we  may 
make  every  relation  in  which  it  stands  to  other  beings, 
and  every  quality  it  has,  a  symbol  of  the  struggle. 
But  these  relations,  conditions,  qualities,  may  be  pre- 


yS  THEISM 

sented,  and  more  truly,  from  another  point  of  view. 
All  other  existence  is  needed  in  order  that  this  par- 
ticular being  should  exist  in  this  time,  place,  and  in 
this  particular  form.  For  this  end  the  sun  must 
shine,  the  rain  must  fall,  seedtime  and  harvest,  sum- 
mer and  winter,  must  come  and  go,  the  tides  ebb  and 
flow,  the  grass  grow,  and  other  living  things  labour 
that  this  form  of  being  may  have  a  Hfe  of  its  own. 
So  easy  is  it  to  turn  the  struggle  inside  out,  and  turn 
it  into  a  set  of  enabling  conditions  without  which  this 
form  of  life  would  not  be  possible. 

As  to  the  demand  for  indefinite  variation  which  is 
necessary  to  provide  the  material  on  which  natural 
selection  may  work,  we  need  not  say  much  about  it. 
The  time  of  such  indefinite  variation,  if  it  ever  was, 
is  long  past.  Living  matter  has  been  sorted  into 
definite  lots,  and  species  has  been  pretty  well  fixed 
for  a  long  time.  The  limits  of  the  variation  are  very 
definite  as  far  as  present  species  are  concerned. 
Whales  do  not  vary  in  the  direction  of  feathers,  nor 
do  birds  tend  to  vary  in  the  direction  of  fins.  Varia- 
tion might  have  been  somewhat  indefinite  long  ago, 
but  species  vary  now  only  within  very  definite  limits. 
In  fact,  variable  life  is  in  the  same  condition  as  the  pre- 
chemical  matter  of  Sir  Norman  Lockyer  —  it  has  all 
been  worked  up  into  definite  forms.  Indeed,  if  it 
were  not  for  the  desire  to  avoid  the  introduction  of 
anything  like  guidance  into  the  conception  of  the 
causes  which  account  for  the  phenomena  of  Hfe,  it 


LIFE 


79 


would  have  been  a  more  likely  account  of  the  facts 
to  suppose  that  the  variations  were  definite  and  not 
indefinite.  That  something  like  guidance  is  needed 
is  very  evident,  and  from  one  point  of  view  natural 
selection  gives  that  guidance ;  while,  on  the  other 
hand,  natural  selection  is  itself  nothing  but  a  set  of 
conditions  which  may  be  dealt  with  quantitatively 
and  mechanically.  It  keeps  the  word  of  promise  to 
the  ear,  by  showing  us  a  principle  at  work  which 
seems  to  lead  life  on  to  greater  and  greater  issues ;  it 
breaks  the  word  of  promise  by  showing  us  that  any 
kind  of  guidance  is  altogether  absent.  Professor 
Poulton,  in  criticism  of  the  hypothesis  of  physiological 
selection  of  the  late  Mr.  Romanes,  says  (he  is  speaking 
of  fertility  and  infertility) :  "  Mutual  infertility  is  due 
to  a  single  and  uniform  constitution  rigidly  kept  within 
the  narrowest  limits,  while  a  minute  change  of  consti- 
tution in  any  direction  means  infertility.  Mutual  infer- 
tility is,  in  fact,  but  the  single  external  indication  of 
numberless  changes  of  constitution.  The  necessary 
precision  of  adjustment  of  the  male  to  the  female  germ- 
substance  is  only  kept  up  in  the  species  by  unremitting 
selection,  and  there  is  no  cause  for  surprise  that  it 
should  cease  when  selection  is  no  longer  forthcoming 
for  its  support."  Again,  ''  Mutual  fertility  depends 
upon  the  exact  relationship  of  two  extraordinarily 
complex  bodies,  the  germ  cells  of  male  and  female ;  it 
depends  upon  a  reciprocal  adjustment  of  almost  infi- 
nite precision."    ("Nature,"  Decembers,  1898, p.  122.) 


8o  THEISM 

This  is  quoted  in  order  that  we  may  have  a  con- 
ception of  the  marvellous  things  done  by  natural 
selection.  Adjustments  are  kept  up  by  unremitting 
selection,  and  under  that  selection  a  "reciprocal 
adjustment  of  almost  infinite  precision "  is  accom- 
pHshed.  Yet  there  is  no  sufficient  agency  set  forth 
by  which  this  work  of  infinite  precision  can  be  done. 
When  we  ask  what  it  is,  we  are  presented  with  a 
bewildering  variety  of  conditions,  some  of  which  are 
highly  problematical,  and  most  of  them  vague  and 
indefinite.  At  one  time  the  struggle  is  set  forth  as 
universal,  and  again  it  is  intermittent,  for  Professor 
Poulton  speaks  of  a  state  in  which  "  selection  is  no 
longer  forthcoming."  An  agency  so  vague,  and  so 
indefinite,  which  at  one  time  acts,  and  at  another 
time  ceases  to  act,  which  is  now  set  forth  as  a  con- 
servative agent,  and  again  as  the  most  active  power 
in  revolution,  ought  at  any  rate  to  be  sufficiently 
described.  And  this,  we  submit,  has  never  been 
done. 

There  is,  indeed,  a  selective  power  in  life,  there  is 
a  power  at  work  of  almost  infinite  precision,  there 
is  unremitting  selection  in  the  maintenance  of  what 
is  gained  so  that  there  may  not  be  retrogression,  and 
also  unremitting  attention  to  the  movement  of  life 
in  relation  to  wider  unities  and  large  meanings ; 
but  the  question  is,  can  you  rationally  predicate  such 
qualities  of  a  series  or  congeries  of  varying  agencies 
hypostatized   under  the  name  of   natural  selection  t 


LIFE  8 I 

At  no  time  in  the  history  of  thought,  or  in  the  history 
of  science,  has  there  been  so  much  attention  given  to 
the  magnificent  adjustments  of  Hfe  and  the  infinite 
precision  of  every  one  of  them.  We  may  gratefully 
acknowledge  our  indebtedness  to  the  advocates  of 
organic  evolution  for  the  wonderful  light  they  have 
cast  on  the  unity  of  Hfe  and  on  its  endless  diversity. 
We  gratefully  acknowledge  that  they  have  enabled 
us  to  see  a  much  more  wonderful  variety  of  adjust- 
ments than  the  older  teleology  ever  dreamed  of. 
They  have  constrained  the  older  teleologists  to  admit 
that  the  notion  of  an  external  artificer  is  no  longer 
adequate.  We  cannot  now  think  of  an  organism 
being  put  together  as  a  watch  is.  On  the  other 
hand,  they  must  also  admit  the  consequences  of  their 
own  work.  When  they  call  attention  to  the  infinite 
precision  of  the  adjustments  of  life,  and  dwell  on  the 
unremitting  selection  they  find  at  work,  they  cannot 
dwell  to  any  purpose,  as  in  other  relations  they  do, 
on  the  wastefulness  of  life,  nor  compare  the  steps 
that  led  to  an  adjustment,  to  the  process  of  firing 
a  thousand  shots  at  an  object,  and  hitting  it  only 
once.  Infinite  precision  in  one  point  is  scarcely 
consistent  with  such  bad  shooting. 

It  does  not  yet  appear  what  mode  of  speech  they 
ought  to  depart  from.  From  one  point  of  view  such 
aimless  shooting  is  essential  to  their  theory.  For 
on  their  view  such  profusion  of  experiments  is 
necessary  to  afford  them  an  occasion  for  hitting  on 


82  THEISM 

that  happy  accident  which  has  a  chance  of  per- 
manence. Nature  tries  and  tries  again,  and  after 
innumerable  failures,  hits  on  a  success,  and  then  she 
buries  her  failures  and  goes  on  her  way  rejoicing. 
We  prefer  to  follow  them  as  they  point  out  the 
infinite  precision  of  these  adjustments ;  we  decline 
to  beheve  them  when  they  say  that  these  have 
emerged  as  the  outcome  of  an  infinite  series  of 
trials  and  errors.  If  these  adjustments  are  there 
now  in  almost  infinite  precision,  we  naturally  think 
that  the  steps  which  led  up  to  them  were  not  lack- 
ing in  precision.  If  the  outcome  of  the  process  is 
full  of  such  wonderful  interrelations  as  are  de- 
scribed in  every  book  that  treats  of  evolution,  surely 
we  may  infer  that  the  processes  are  also  intelligible. 
At  all  events  we  are  justified  in  withholding  our 
assent  to  the  production  of  a  world  of  life,  out  of 
processes  in  which  no  intelligible  process  can  be 
discovered,  at  least  until  we  have  overwhelming 
evidence  for  such  a  conception.  Evidence  is  not 
likely  to  be  forthcoming,  for  nature  has  buried  her 
failures.  Meanwhile,  we  follow  the  guidance  of 
those  who  unfold  for  us  the  history  of  life,  and 
we  leave  on  one  side  all  the  machinery  which  they 
have  manufactured  for  the  purpose  of  explaining 
the  progress  of  life  and  the  origin  of  species. 
These  two  things  are  by  no  means  organically 
united,  and  that  hypothesis  is  not  the  only,  or  the 
best  one,  for  the  explanation  of  the  facts. 


LIFE  83 

Historically,  then,  life  appears  as  a  simple  cell, 
and  in  that  form  it  is  recognized  in  those  geological 
strata  in  which  it  first  appeared.  Life  goes  on 
and  appears  in  more  and  more  complex  forms. 
It  is  not  necessary  to  enumerate  these.  Nor  is 
it  needful  to  enumerate  the  systems  of  classifica- 
tion, nor  the  species  which  have  appeared  in  the 
history  of  the  earth.  Soon  living  things  appear  in 
various  forms  which  have  a  relative  permanence, 
for  some  of  the  earlier  forms  are  here  at  this  hour. 
The  persistence  of  the  earlier  species  goes  on  side 
by  side  with  the  introduction  of  newer  and  more 
highly  evolved  species,  until  the  tree  of  life  puts 
forth  its  greatest  and  most  evolved  fruit.  There  is 
permanence,  there  is  gradation,  there  is  progress ; 
and  all  these  are  combined  in  the  view  of  life 
disclosed  to  us  by  evolution.  As  to  the  kinds  of 
living  beings  recognized  by  zoologists,  we  do  not 
find  agreement  among  them.  "  They  all  recognize," 
says  Professor  MacBride,  "  a  certain  number  of 
phyla.  Each  phylum  includes  a  group  of  animals 
about  whose  relation  to  one  another  no  one  enter- 
tains a  doubt.  Each  zoologist,  however,  has  his 
own  idea  as  to  the  relationship  which  the  various 
phyla  bear  to  one  another."  (Professor  MacBride 
in  Spencer's  "Biology,"  Vol.  I.,  p.  386,  edition  1898.) 
He  enumerates  seventeen  phyla  from  the  protozoa 
up  to  the  chordata,  which  last  includes  the  verte- 
brata. 


84  THEISM 

As  we  follow  the  description  of  the  various  phyla 
from  the  protozoa,  both  with  regard  to  their  peculiar 
characteristics,  and  with  regard  to  the  order  of 
their  appearance  in  time,  we  are  struck  with  the 
contrast  between  the  clear,  sharp  discrimination  of 
each  from  each,  and  with  the  definiteness  of  this 
work ;  and  on  the  other  hand,  with  the  vague 
speculative  account  of  the  manner  of  the  origin  of 
each  phylum,  and  the  causes  of  their  modifications 
into  the  form  they  now  have.  In  the  one  case 
we  have  to  do  with  the  intelligible  marks  and  con- 
ditions of  a  definite  existence,  distinguished  from  all 
other  indefinite  modes  of  life ;  in  the  other  with  the 
attempt  to  derive  conditioned  existence  from  a  con- 
geries of  accidents,  which  makes  any  ordered  out- 
come unintelligible.  One  cannot  make  such  a 
transition.  From  intelligible  results  one  can  argue 
only  to  intelHgible  causes  and  processes.  But  this 
is  not  the  only  sphere  in  which  men  strive  to  make 
non-intelligence  do  the  work  of  intelligence. 

Each  order  of  being  is  presented  to  us  as  being 
with  a  determinate  kind  of  existence,  conditioned 
in  time  and  place,  definitely  related  to  other  beings 
of  the  same  kind  and  of  other  kinds.  There  is 
nothing  uncertain  or  indeterminate  in  their  quali- 
ties, nor  anything  to  indicate  that  they  are  the  prod- 
uct of  accidental  combinations.  It  would  require 
an  extension  of  the  calculus  of  probabilities,  hope- 
lessly beyond    our    reach,  to  calculate    the    chances 


LIFE 


85 


of  a  transition  from  a  sphere  of  accidental  com- 
binations to  a  sphere  of  definite  determinate  exist- 
ence. That  calculation  has  not  been  made,  nor 
can  it  be  made. 

As  we  follow  the  stream  of  life,  we  pass  from 
the  relatively  simple  to  the  complex,  and  the  greater 
the  complexity  the  greater  becomes  the  depen- 
dence of  the  parts  each  on  each.  Certain  forms  of 
life  seem  to  have  in  every  part  the  power  to  re- 
produce the  whole,  but  the  higher  organisms  have 
lost  that  power.  A  highly  organized  nation  knows 
when  it  is  beaten,  a  nation  loosely  held  together 
may  keep  up  a  partisan  warfare  for  years.  Unicel- 
lular life  is  almost  indestructible,  organized  life 
may  be  extinguished  by  a  breath.  Still,  we  do  not 
obtain  an  adequate  conception  of  life  until  we 
look  at  its  highest  development,  and  obtain  some 
idea  of  how  it  came  to  be.  With  this  thought 
there  opens  out  before  us  a  great  and  luminous 
conception  which  we  may  regard  apart  from  the 
external  machinery  of  evolution.  The  conception  is 
that  the  history  of  each  individual  is  the  history  of 
Ufe  up  to  the  point  at  which  the  form  of  life  to 
which  it  belonged  appeared.  There  is  sufficient 
truth  in  this  conception  for  us  to  use  it,  though  it 
has  been  stated  far  too  absolutely.  Recapitulation 
is  a  fact  so  far  at  least  as  regards  all  creatures  that 
have  an  embryonic  life.  Whether  it  is  true  of 
larvae    is    questioned.      No    doubt    there    are    some 


S6  THEISM 

omissions,  and  many  steps  seem  to  be  shortened, 
and  yet  there  is  enough  to  enable  us  to  say  that 
life  seems  to  remember  the  steps  by  which  it 
climbed  upwards  to  higher  and  higher  ends.  If 
the  recapitulation  has  nothing  accidental  or  tenta- 
tive about  it,  have  we  any  good  reason  to  think 
that  the  steps  recapitulated  were  accidental? 

In  the  recapitulation,  too,  the  organism  outruns  the 
original  method.  It  sets  to  work  prophetically,  and 
forms  organs  to  fit  a  medium  with  which  it  is  to  be 
in  relation  only  in  the  future.  It  forms  eyes  for  the 
light  that  they  have  never  seen,  and  ears  adapted  to 
the  vibrations  which  they  have  never  heard.  This 
fact,  which  Mr.  Spencer  calls  preadaptation,  reveals 
to  us  a  striking  peculiarity  of  life,  however  we  may 
explain  it.  We  referred  to  eyes  and  ears  as  instances 
of  preadaptation,  but  the  whole  organism  of  all  crea- 
tures that  pass  through  an  embryonic  stage  of  life  is 
formed  and  adapted  to  a  medium  in  which  they  do 
not  live  at  the  time  of  their  formation.  There  can 
be  no  thought  of  chance  combinations  producing  so 
wonderful  a  relation. 

Life,  then,  whether  we  look  at  it  as  manifested  in 
the  individual,  or  as  manifested  in  all  living  things, 
presents  us  with  a  vast  and  wonderful  system  of 
thought.  It  presents  definite  qualities  as  it  appears 
in  its  simplest  form  ;  it  seems  to  proceed  in  orderly 
progression  from  stage  to  stage;  and  wherever  we 
find  it,  it  is  in  exact  relation  with  preceding  and  sue- 


LIFE  87 

ceeding  forms  of  life ;  and  in  exact  relation  also,  not 
with  an  abstract  environment,  but  with  surroundings 
as  definite  and  conditioned  as  it  is  itself.  Here  is  no 
abstract  organism  to  be  thrust  into  an  abstract  envi- 
ronment, to  which  it  must  respond  by  some  variation 
which  will  enable  the  one  to  correspond  to  the  other ; 
what  we  everywhere  have  is  a  real  and  definite  cor- 
respondence, estabhshed  as  the  very  condition  of  the 
existence  of  the  creature.  There  are  changes  in 
both,  and  larger  correspondences  arise  as  life  be- 
comes wider  and  more  definite.  May  we  not  postu- 
late in  life  this  power  to  adapt  itself  to  the  changing 
conditions  of  its  existence,  and  postulate  also  that 
this  power  acts  in  a  regular  and  orderly  fashion .'' 
Why  should  we  postulate  a  blind  thrusting  out  of 
life  in  all  directions,  and  leave  the  result  to  accident } 
That  is  not  the  way  of  the  Hfe  we  see  around  us  on 
all  sides.  We  see  economy,  thrift,  ends  accomplished 
at  the  smallest  cost  of  matter  and  energy ;  and  an  ex- 
act and  infinite  precision  in  the  adjustment  of  means 
to  ends.  If  the  life  we  see  is  so  wise  and  provident, 
shall  we  suppose  it  to  be  ignorant  and  wasteful  in 
those  processes  which  we  hardly  know  at  all .'' 

As  my  purpose  is  not  to  follow  the  growth  of  life 
as  it  has  appeared  in  the  history  of  time,  but  to  learn 
what  is  the  meaning  of  that  history,  I  shall  not  enter 
into  details.  It  has  many  riddles,  and  many  myste- 
ries, yet  we  may  safely  say  that,  looking  to  the  record 
of   it,  there  have  been  method,   advance,   progress. 


THEISM 


It  has  grown,  developed,  and  advanced  as  if  it  had 
been  guided  by  a  power,  who  foresaw  the  end  from 
the  beginning  and  took  steps  to  accomplish  that  end. 
We  may  never  be  able  to  say  definitely  what  were 
the  ends  of  life,  but  we  may  say  that  there  are  ends. 
We  may  never  know  why  life  seems  to  lead  up  to  a 
cul-de-sac  as  in  the  case  of  mollusca,  insecta,  arachni- 
dse,  and  Crustacea,  and  apparently  in  other  branches 
of  the  tree  of  life.  Taking  the  tree  in  Spencer's  ''  Bi- 
ology," it  looks  as  if  Hfe  had  set  forth  on  an  explor- 
ing voyage,  and  had  come  to  a  position  from  which 
there  was  no  further  advance.  While  advancing  in 
part  on  the  right  and  left,  it  also  advanced  on  the 
central  Hne,  and  through  the  ascending  line  of  the 
vertebrata  came  at  last  to  a  form,  in  which  it  became 
conscious  of  itself  and  of  its  meaning. 

This  is  a  difficulty  to  any  theory  of  life,  as  much 
to  the  evolutionist  as  to  any  other.  For  the  evolu- 
tionist is  bound  on  his  theory  to  find  a  use  for  every- 
thing and  an  advantage  to  the  possessor  of  every 
quality  which  Hfe  has,  even  to  the  spots  on  a  pea- 
cock's tail.  It  has  also  to  explain  why  the  changes 
and  variation,  which  led  from  the  simplest  form  of 
life  up  to  insects,  ceased  at  that  point  on  that  line, 
and  went  no  further.  The  question  may  be  put  to 
me,  and  I  shall  answer  —  I  do  not  know.  There 
may  be  reasons  which  are  unknown  to  me,  which 
may  never  be  known  to  me.  Be  that  as  it  may, 
enough  is  known  to  me  of  the  wisdom  of  that  power 


LIFE  89 

made  manifest  in  the  relations  of  living  beings  to 
enable  me  to  trust  that  wisdom  is  manifested  here 
also.  Darwin  has  shown  us  the  toils  of  the  earth- 
worm in  the  service  of  the  higher  life ;  research  may 
show  us  that  these  forms  of  life,  which  have  stopped 
short  at  a  certain  stage  of  organization,  as  if  no 
further  advance  could  be  made  on  that  line,  may  be 
of  indispensable  service  to  those  higher  forms  that 
reached  their  higher  development  on  another  line. 
Perhaps  the  work  done  by  these  could  not  be  done 
by  forms  of  life  determined  by  another  line  of  ascent. 
For  the  manifold  forms  of  life  seem  to  be  a  gigantic 
system  of  cooperation,  in  which  each  exists  for  all 
the  others.  Certainly  there  are  many  facts  that  seem 
to  lead  to  that  conclusion  —  facts  set  forth  in  a  new 
and  interesting  form  by  Prince  Kropotkin,  Professor 
Geddes,  and  others,  on  which  I  cannot  dwell  here. 

Apart,  then,  from  the  machinery  of  evolution  and 
the  difficulties  which  it  brings  with  it,  we  have  learned 
to  look  at  life  as  one.  It  has  a  continued  history. 
The  first  form  is  bound  up  with  the  latest  outcome  of 
life.  The  highest  form  of  hfe  is  the  epitome  of  the 
whole  history  of  life,  and  all  life  as  at  present  consti- 
tuted is  united  together  by  many  bonds,  some  visible, 
and  some  invisible.  This  great  thought  we  owe  to 
organic  evolution  and  its  expounders.  It  looks  much 
more  of  a  rational  scheme  than  that  which  our  fathers 
learned  from  their  scientific  teachers.  They  thought 
of  a  series  of  unrelated,  special  creations,  each  special 


90 


THEISM 


creation  being  suddenly  thrust  into  an  environment. 
(See  Milton's  description.)  Creatures  are  made  not 
without  their  own  cooperation,  and  they  are  made  so 
as  to  make  themselves.  This,  also,  we  have  learned 
from  evolution.  Evolution  has  laid  stress  on  the 
striving  of  life  after  greater  fulness,  on  the  stern 
grip  of  life  on  every  advantage  gained,  and  on  the 
readiness  of  life  to  press  on  to  larger  issues.  Inheri- 
tance cannot  be  merely  received  by  it,  the  heir  must 
be  equal  to  the  inheritance,  or  it  will  pass  away.  In- 
herited qualities  are,  in  the  most  real  sense,  also 
acquired,  while  acquired  qualities  are  transmitted, 
Weissmann  notwithstanding.  But  it  is  not  really  of 
importance  for  us  to  advert  to  that  controversy, 
which  seems  to  be  a  somewhat  idle  one.  For  the 
main  impulse  to  the  denial  of  the  transmission  of 
acquired  qualities  arises  from  the  attempt  of  Weiss- 
mann to  substitute  another  unity  for  the  unity  of  the 
organism.     But  we  pass  it  by  at  present. 

Looking  at  life  from  the  standpoint  we  have  now 
attained,  we  see  a  web  of  the  greatest  complexity. 
We  see  growth,  gradation,  adaptation,  preadaptation, 
organization,  means  adapted  to  ends,  and  larger  ends, 
dimly  arising  before  our  view,  as,  under  the  prompt- 
ing of  evolution,  men  are  pressing  on  to  explore  the 
vistas  which  beckon  them  on.  Without  controversy 
the  unveiling  of  the  processes  of  life  has  given  us  a 
larger  conception  of  the  wisdom  of  the  power  at  work 
in  the  phenomena  of  life.    Something  was  learned  of 


LIFE  91 

wisdom  even  when  we  looked  at  life  from  the  external 
standpoint  of  Paley.  It  gave  us  a  lofty  conception 
of  the  skill  of  the  artificer.  For  the  machinery  was 
so  much  more  skilfully  constructed  than  any  machine 
made  by  man,  that  the  wisdom  of  the  human  and  the 
divine  artificer  could  not  be  compared.  Then  there 
were  machines  that  produced  other  machines,  to 
speak  of  organisms  as  machines  for  a  moment,  and 
making  better  machines  as  time  went  on,  so  that  the 
carpenter  did  not  give  us  an  unworthy  conception  of 
the  matter  so  far  as  mere  skill  of  adaptation  and  use 
were  concerned.  But  even  Paley  felt  that  the  car- 
penter theory  was  inadequate,  and  the  use  he  made  of 
the  argument  and  illustration  was  to  show  that  these 
skilful  contrivances  were  not  without  an  adequate 
cause. 

The  effect  of  evolution  has  been  simply  to  transfer 
the  cause  from  a  mere  external  influence  working 
from  without  to  an  immanent  rational  principle. 
The  skill  of  the  carpenter  is  now  within  the  living 
creatures,  and  they  work  onward  and  upwards  to  the 
issues  now  becoming  manifest  to  the  beholder.  At 
all  events  the  wisdom  and  the  skill  are  there,  account 
for  them  as  we  may.  They  are  connected,  too,  with 
the  actual  working  of  life  as  that  is  manifested  in  the 
living  beings  we  see  in  the  world.  At  present  it  is 
too  early  to  ask  if  the  living  power  we  see  at  work  in 
the  world  of  life  is  also  a  transcendent  power,  which 
means  something  for  itself.     As  far  as  we  have  yet 


92  THEISM 

looked  at  the  world  and  the  phenomena  presented  to 
us  by  it,  we  have  no  data  even  for  the  consideration 
of  such  a  question.  For  we  see  that  a  world  of  in- 
organic phenomena  has  become  a  world  of  life,  and 
the  story  of  the  inorganic  world  could  be  rationally 
read  as  the  story  of  a  preparation  for  life,  and  the 
story  of  life  —  its  existence,  growth,  and  progress  — 
was  a  story  of  the  interactions  between  life  and  its 
environment,  so  that  we  have  not  had  cause,  as  yet,  to 
raise  the  question  of  the  ground  of  the  world  and  the 
character  of  that  ground,  save  in  so  far  as  it  is  inti- 
mated to  us  by  the  manifestations  we  have  seen.  We 
may  obtain  more  light  as  we  proceed ;  meanwhile  it 
is  evident  that  there  is  power  at  work  greater  than 
we  can  measure,  that  there  is  wisdom  of  the  highest 
kind  at  work,  and  that  power  is  not  a  stranger  to  life. 
It  is  not  an  unknowable  power,  for  it  is  a  manifested 
power,  and  a  power  so  far  as  it  is  manifested  is  known, 
or  may  be  known.  It  may  transcend  in  its  greatness 
and  excellence  our  capacity  of  knowledge,  we  may 
have  to  speak  of  it  as  unlimited,  and  may  have  to  use 
all  kinds  of  adjectives  to  negative  any  Hmits  to  the 
positive  excellence  of  it,  but  negative  adjectives  do 
not  alter  the  positive  character  of  the  power.  Un- 
limited power  is  power,  and  endless  life  is  life.  It  is 
one  of  the  most  curious  freaks  of  metaphysics  that 
a  power  manifested  in  the  whole  universe  should  be 
described  as  unknowable.  Underlying  such  a  con- 
ception must  lurk  a  curious  theory  of  substance  and 


LIFE  93 

attributes,  which  can  only  regard  attributes  as  a  way 
of  concealing  the  substance.  Attributes  reveal  sub- 
stance, they  are  the  qualities  which  define  it,  show 
its  way  of  being  and  working,  and  enable  it  to  be 
known.  This  way  of  speech  is  forced  on  us,  for,  if 
we  could,  we  should  never  speak  in  that  way.  For 
the  way  of  speaking  supposes  that  we  can  separate 
being  from  its  modes  of  manifestation  ;  we  may  speak 
of  substance  in  that  way,  as  speech  is  sometimes 
unreal,  but  substance  without  attributes  is  nothing, 
and  is  unthinkable. 

Beings  who  think  at  all  cannot  place  at  the  basis 
of  all  things  an  unthinkable  or  postulate  irrational- 
ity as  the  ground  of  an  intelligible  universe.  The 
world  does  appear  to  exist  in  relations  that  can  be 
thought,  and  the  operations  of  it  correspond  to  those 
which  thought  establishes  among  its  objects.  At  all 
events,  evolutionary  science  has  shown  us  such  rela- 
tions between  the  life  of  the  present  and  the  life  of 
the  past  as  to  make  the  relation  between  them  one 
that  we  can  understand.  If  the  advocates  of  evolution 
have  postulated  accidental  causes,  and  done  much  to 
make  the  transition  from  the  category  of  cause  and 
effect  to  the  category  of  means  and  end  unthinkable, 
well,  that  is  their  misfortune,  and  may  have  arisen 
from  inexact  ways  of  thinking ;  but  apart  from  that 
they  have  been  successful  in  showing  us  a  world  of 
life  which  is  intelligible.  We  take  their  results,  and 
leave  their  philosophy  on  one  side.     We  are  grate- 


94  THEISM 

ful  to  them  for  enabling  us  to  see  that  the  world  of 
life  is  a  world  governed  by  rational  methods,  and 
thus  they  have  enabled  us  to  say  that  there  is  a 
rational  living  power  at  work  in  the  world.  That  is 
the  only  conclusion  we  infer  at  this  stage. 

As  life  unfolds  itself,  and  as  the  possibilities  of  it 
come  forth  to  view,  other  inferences  may  be  drawn 
as  to  the  character  of  the  power  at  work  in  the  uni- 
verse, but  we  may  not  push  any  argument  beyond  its 
due  limits.  Only  this  we  must  say,  that  for  purposes 
of  rational  explanation  the  highest  and  not  the  lowest 
is  the  standard  of  reference.  If  we  are  to  explain  the 
process  of  evolution,  we  must  have  regard,  not  to  the 
starting-point,  but  to  the  goal.  It  is  true  that  a  hy- 
pothesis, precisely  the  opposite  of  this,  lies  at  the  basis 
of  the  synthetic  philosophy  of  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer, 
and,  also,  at  the  basis  of  much  current  writing  on 
evolutionary  topics.  This  is  the  key  to  a  great  deal 
of  their  argumentation,  and  to  their  strenuous  at- 
tempts to  explain  the  higher  in  terms  of  the  lower. 
One  has  sympathy  with  those  who  labour  at  an  im- 
possible task.  It  is  hard  on  one  who  has  undertaken 
to  explain  evolution  in  terms  of  the  distribution  of 
matter  and  motion  to  arrive  at  a  stage  where  matter 
fails,  and  then  to  be  compelled  to  deal  with  super- 
organic  evolution.  Hard,  also,  to  have  to  speak  of 
subject  and  object,  and  of  other  conceptions  which 
decline  to  be  subjected  to  a  process  of  distribution 
and  redistribution  of  matter  and  motion.    We  can  but 


LIFE  95 

express  our  sympathy,  and  pass  on  to  the  conviction 
that  the  source  of  explanation  Ues  not  where  they  are 
seeking  it.  What  has  appeared  in  the  process  of 
evolution  was  there  in  the  source  from  which  evolution 
flowed.  And  what  has  appeared  is  a  revelation  of  the 
living  energy  from  which  all  things  proceeded. 

On  this  topic  we  quote  from  the  Master  of  Balliol. 
"  When,  indeed,  we  turn  back  from  the  developed 
organism  to  the  embryo,  from  the  man  to  the  child, 
we  find  that  a  study  of  the  process  of  genesis  casts 
no  little  Ught  upon  the  nature  of  the  being  which  is 
its  result.  The  man  becomes  in  a  higher  sense 
intelligible,  when  we  trace  him  back  to  the  child. 
But,  primarily  and  in  the  first  instance,  it  is  the 
developed  organism  that  explains  the  germ  from 
which  it  grew,  and  without  having  seen  the  former 
we  could  have  made  nothing  of  the  latter.  No 
examination  of  the  child  could  enable  us  to  prophesy 
the  man,  if  we  had  not  previously  had  some  expe- 
rience of  mature  manhood;  still  less  would  an  ex- 
amination of  the  embryo  reveal  to  us  the  distinct 
lineaments  of  the  plant,  or  animal,  or  man.  Nor 
would  our  insight  be  greatly  helped  by  a  knowledge 
of  the  environments  in  which  the  process  of  develop- 
ment was  to  take  place. 

"  It  is  the  full  growth  and  expansion  of  this  mighty 
tree,  under  whose  shadow  the  generations  of  men 
have  rested,  that  enables  us  to  understand  its  obscure 
beginnings,  when  it  was  the  least  of  all  seeds.     De- 


96  THEISM 

velopment  is  not  simply  the  recurrence  of  the  same 
effects  in  similar  circumstances,  not  simply  the  main- 
tenance of  an  identity  under  a  variation  determined 
by  external  conditions.  Hence  it  is  impossible  from 
the  phenomena  of  one  stage  of  the  life  of  a  develop- 
ing being  to  derive  laws  which  will  adequately  explain 
the  whole  course  of  its  existence.  The  secret  of  the 
peculiar  nature  of  such  a  being  lies  just  in  the  way 
of  regular  transition  in  which,  by  constant  interaction 
with  external  influences,  it  widens  the  compass  of  its 
life,  unfolding  continually  new  powers  and  capacities 
—  powers  and  capacities  latent  in  it  from  the  first, 
but  not  capable  of  being  foreseen  with  any  definite- 
ness  by  one  who  had  seen  only  the  beginning.  It 
follows  that,  in  the  first  instance  at  least,  we  must 
read  development  backward  and  not  forward,  we 
must  find  the  key  to  the  meaning  of  the  first  stage  in 
the  last,  though  it  is  quite  true  that,  afterwards,  we 
are  enabled  to  throw  new  Hght  upon  the  nature  of 
the  last,  to  analyze  and  appreciate  it  in  a  new  way, 
by  carrying  it  back  to  the  first.  We  may  derive  an 
illustration  of  this  characteristic  of  development  from 
the  idea  of  development  itself;  for  the  idea  of  de- 
velopment is  one  of  the  latest  ideas  whose  meaning 
and  value  have  been  brought  to  light  by  the  progress 
of  man,  and  is  itself  the  much  wanted  key  to  the 
history  of  that  progress."  (*'The  Evolution  of  Re- 
ligion," Vol.  I.,  pp.  44-8.) 

To  understand  the  processes  of  the  world  and  the 


LIFE  97 

light  they  cast  on  the  ground  and  source  of  it,  we 
must  take  our  stand  on  the  highest  outcome  of  the 
Hfe  that  is  in  the  world.  True,  our  highest  explana- 
tion will  not  be  ultimate,  for  the  end  is  not  yet,  and 
our  interpretation  is  available  only  for  the  stage  at 
which  we  have  arrived.  A  further  manifestation 
will  arrive  by  and  by;  meanwhile  our  appreciation 
may  be  true  and  valuable,  so  far  as  it  goes. 

H 


IV 

RATIONAL  LIFE  AND  ITS  IMPLICATIONS 

Following  the  line  of  development  of  life  we 
come  to  a  form  which  seems  to  sum  up  in  itself  all 
the  characteristics  of  the  lower  forms,  and  to  present 
to  our  view  marks  unknown  before.  At  present  we 
do  not  dwell  on  the  line  of  descent,  or  of  ascent 
from  the  first  to  the  final  form  of  living  beings  on 
the  earth.  We  acknowledge  that  there  are  many- 
links  of  connection  between  man  and  other  forms 
of  life.  That  has  been  made  plain  enough  to  all. 
On  the  physical  side  man  is  an  animal,  perhaps  the 
highest  and  most  complicated  of  all  animal  forms, 
but  yet  with  evident  marks  of  his  relationship  to 
them.  Leaving  the  doctrine  of  descent  untouched, 
for  an  inadequate  treatment  of  it  would  serve  no 
good  purpose,  and  an  adequate  treatment  of  it,  even 
if  I  had  the  requisite  knowledge,  would  far  exceed 
my  limits,  I  remark  that  a  determination  of  this 
question  is  not  important  for  the  aim  I  have  in  view. 
All  that  is  necessary  from  the  point  of  view  of  the 
doctrine  of  descent  is,  that  we  admit  that  in  all  physi- 
cal respects  man  is  closely  related   to   other   forms 

98 


RATIONAL  LIFE  AND  ITS  IMPLICATIONS        99 

of  life.  It  is  confessedly  difficult  to  choose  a  form 
from  which  man  may  be  said  to  have  been  descended. 
But  physiologically  and  anatomically  man  is  like  all 
the  higher  animals.  No  doubt  there  are  differences, 
but  these  are  admitted  even  by  those  who  advocate 
the  doctrine  of  descent.  We  pass  on,  therefore,  to 
another  aspect  of  the  subject. 

Nor  do  I  spend,  at  this  stage,  any  time  on  the 
views  of  Darwin  and  Romanes  as  to  the  relation 
of  animal  to  human  intelligence.  Much  might  be 
said  on  this  topic,  and  something  may  be  said  later. 
What  I  am  concerned  with  here  is  not  how  man 
came  to  be,  nor  how  physically  he  was  evolved  from 
lower  forms  of  life,  nor  how  his  intelligence  is  re- 
lated to  lower  intelligences,  but  what  can  we  discern 
man  to  be  physically,  mentally,  morally,  and  reli- 
giously now  that  he  is  here. 

The  first  thing  that  we  note  about  him  is  that  he  is 
differently  related  to  his  environment  from  any  other 
living  being.  As  far  as  mere  organic  equipment 
is  concerned,  man  is  one  of  the  most  helpless  of 
animals.  He  is  not  so  swift  as  some,  nor  so  keen 
of  sight  as  others ;  his  sense  of  smell,  of  sound,  or  of 
touch  is  imperfectly  developed  in  comparison  with 
the  extraordinary  development  of  the  keenness  of 
the  senses  in  some  creatures.  He  has  not  teeth  and 
claws  like  the  tiger,  nor  horns  like  a  bull,  nor  can 
he  use  his  teeth  for  carpentering  like  the  beaver. 
There  is  scarcely  a  single  physical  quality  in  which 


100  THEISM 

he  is  not  surpassed  by  one  or  other  of  the  lower  forms 
of  living  creatures.  Yet  he  has  become  master  of 
them  all.  How }  Well,  first  of  all,  he  has  found  out 
a  way  of  making  his  environment  compensate  for  his 
organic  defects.  He  has  done  this  not  as  lower 
organizations  do  by  organic  modification,  but  by 
making  instruments  and  tools  to  serve  his  purpose. 
That  is  the  first  note  of  man  on  which  I  lay  stress. 
He  makes  tools.  How  much  is  implied  in  that  fact 
I  do  not  inquire  at  present,  but  it  does  mean  some- 
thing ;  at  least  there  is  a  new  departure.  There  is 
nothing  of  this  kind  to  be  met  with  among  lower 
animals.  Apes  may  fling  stones  or  fruit  at  the 
passers-by,  but  no  ape  has  ever  set  himself  deliber- 
ately to  fashion  a  tool  to  carry  in  his  hand  in  readi- 
ness for  the  hour  of  need.  The  rudest  tribes  of 
which  we  have  any  knowledge  have  this  power 
of  making  and  using  tools.  In  fact,  we  classify  the 
ages  of  human  development  by  reference  to  the  tools 
they  made  and  used.  The  first  tools  may  have  been 
those  which  lay  ready  to  hand,  as  Tylor  says, 
*'  Pebbles  for  slinging  or  hammering,  sharp  stone 
splinters  to  cut  or  scrape  with,  branches  for  clubs  and 
spears,  thorns  or  teeth  to  pierce  with."  ("Anthro- 
pology," p.  183.)  In  possession  of  tools  and  the 
power  of  making  them  he  was  furnished  with  the 
means  of  coping  with  animals  far  stronger  than  he. 

In   the    first   tool    made,    in    the    first   instrument 
fashioned,  there  lay  the  possibihty  and  the  promise 


RATIONAL  LIFE  AND  ITS  IMPLICATIONS      1 01 

of  all  the  vast  instrumental  command  over  nature 
characteristic  of  modern  civilization.  We  do  not 
need  to  dwell  in  detail  on  the  development  of  this 
human  art.  It  is  a  most  interesting  history,  and 
much  has  been  written  on  it.  Men  learned  to  make 
instruments  of  a  more  useful  and  powerful  kind,  they 
found  more  suitable  and  more  ductile  material  for 
their  instruments,  they  subjected  the  raw  material 
they  found  in  their  environment  to  processes  of 
manufacture,  until  they  had  bronze,  and  iron  tools, 
and  weapons.  On  the  form  of  these  weapons  they 
also  lavished  their  power  of  invention,  so  as  to  sat- 
isfy their  sense  of  beauty  as  well  as  their  desire  to 
make  the  instruments  effective.  Tools,  instruments 
for  use,  yes,  and  something  more, — they  discovered 
the  use  of  fire.  Very  early  in  the  history  of  man  fire 
was  discovered  and  pressed  into  their  service.  Hav- 
ing discovered  fire  they  had  a  still  more  powerful 
means  at  their  command.  With  it  they  had  the 
power  of  modifying  the  climate  in  which  they  lived, 
and  of  modifying  the  products  of  nature  into  a  form 
more  fit  for  human  use.  Other  results  followed  from 
this  tool-making  faculty.  Clothing  to  protect  them, 
houses  to  shelter  them,  and  a  thousand  things,  all  of 
which  formed  new  departures  on  the  part  of  this,  the 
latest  form  of  life. 

Clearly  life  has  put  itself  to  new  uses,  and  taken 
on  new  qualities  unknown  in  connection  with  lower 
forms  of  life.     The  relation   to   the  environment   is 


102  THEISM 

something  new.  Every  change  of  life  in  response 
to  the  change  of  the  environment  has  been  organic. 
The  only  response  living  creatures  could  make  was 
to  put  forth  structures  to  provide  for  new  needs. 
Feet  were  modified  so  that  birds  might  swim,  necks 
were  elongated  so  that  the  creature  might  have  a 
wider  range  from  which  to  obtain  food,  and  so  on 
over  the  whole  range  of  adaptation  of  living  creatures 
to  their  environment.  They  could  meet  external 
changes  only  by  corresponding  changes  of  the  or- 
ganism. The  expensiveness  of  organic  change  set 
an  obvious  limit  on  the  possible  advance  of  the  living 
being.  Up  to  the  advent  of  man  the  condition  of 
progress  seemed  to  have  been  the  possibility  of  or- 
ganic change.  With  the  advent  of  man  the  nature 
of  progress  seems  to  change. 

Not  that  we  are  to  regard  man  as  altogether  in- 
dependent of  his  environment,  nor  are  we  to  think 
of  him  as  able  to  modify  it  so  as  to  change  it  al- 
together. If  we  were  to  dream  of  such  a  possibility, 
the  facts  of  the  case  would  immediately  refute  our 
imagination  ;  for  gravitation  works  on  us  as  on 
other  organisms.  Heat  and  cold  affect  us,  and  the 
seasons  in  their  changes  deal  with  us  in  their  own 
way ;  our  food  and  our  drink  must  be  taken  in  and 
assimilated,  and,  in  short,  our  whole  physical  nature 
is  in  endless  ways  in  relation  to  our  environment. 
Nor  is  the  influence  Hmited  to  the  daily  and  yearly 
changes  that  we  experience  in  the  slow  succession 


RATIONAL   LIFE  AND  ITS  IMPLICATIONS      1 03 

of  the  ages.  These  changes  accumulate,  and  thus 
man  has  been  differentiated  into  the  various  races 
of  mankind,  with  their  characteristic  marl<:s  and 
divisions.  Differences  of  colour,  stature,  physical 
conformations  of  skull,  skeleton,  eyes,  hair,  and  so 
on,  appear  as  differences  wrought  in  the  various 
races  of  mankind,  whose  Hkeness  to  each  other 
marks  them  as  one.  Man  lives  under  conditions 
of  time,  space,  climate,  and  a  thousand  other  as- 
pects of  the  environment,  and  he  must  respond  to 
them  all. 

But  the  difference  is  that,  while  animals  appear 
to  respond  to  these  conditions  only  in  the  way  of 
organic  modification,  man  responds  to  them  in  the 
way  of  organic  modification,  but  also  in  another 
and  an  additional  way.  He  adapts  the  environment 
to  him  by  putting  it  to  a  use  which  he  impresses 
on  it — a  use  which  was  not  there  until  he  invented 
it.  The  stone  which  he  chips  until  he  can  take  a 
firm  grasp  of  it  means  the  appearance  of  a  new 
quality  of  life,  a  new  way  of  adaptation  to  the  en- 
vironment. On  this  we  lay  stress,  as  it  is  sufficient 
to  give  us  a  point  of  difference  between  man  and 
other  organisms,  with  regard  to  which  there  can  be 
no  difference  of  opinion.  It  is  difficult  to  reach  a 
satisfactory  limit  physically,  intellectually,  or  psy- 
chologically at  which  we  can  say,  here  the  differ- 
ence between  man  and  the  lower  animals  begins 
to   be   manifest.     Physically,  there   is  a  number   of 


104 


THEISM 


differences,  but  the  correspondence  between  part 
and  part  throughout  the  organism  of  some  animals 
and  of  man  is  so  great  that  a  satisfactory  delimita- 
tion can  scarcely  be  obtained.  So,  also,  it  may  be 
said  of  the  feelings,  emotions,  cognitions,  that  for 
every  aspect  of  the  mental  nature  of  man,  some- 
thing resembling  it  may  be  forthcoming  on  an  ex- 
amination of  mind  in  animals.  So  instead  of  taking 
our  stand  on  these,  with  regard  to  which  there 
might  emerge  endless  argumentation,  we  simply 
mark  this,  on  which  there  is  no  dispute,  man  is 
a  tool-making  animal.  This  one  difference,  rightly 
understood,  gives  in  itself  a  number  of  other  differ- 
ences. It  reveals  the  advent  of  a  power  which  can 
use  its  environment  in  a  new  way  for  its  own  benefit. 
Looking  at  this  from  the  point  of  view  of  advantage, 
the  power  of  using  instruments  not  organically  re- 
lated to  the  organism  is  of  incalculable  benefit  in 
the  struggle  for  existence.  It  gave  the  rational  ani- 
mal a  superiority  over  those  better  equipped  than 
himself  in  the  race  for  life.  Some  creatures  were 
swifter,  some  stronger,  some  better  armed,  some 
more  cunning;  but  this  new  power  enabled  him  to 
be,  in  effect,  swifter,  stronger,  and  wiser  than  all 
of  them,  and  in  large  measure  to  press  them  into 
his  service. 

Stress  is  laid  on  this  aspect,  as  it  is  a  favourite 
way  of  stating  the  fact  on  the  part  of  evolution- 
ists.    Reason    did    give   the    human    species  an  ad- 


RATIONAL   LIFE  AND  ITS  IMPLICATIONS      1 05 

vantage  which  grew  from  more  to  more.  I  do  not 
protest,  for  it  represents  a  truth.  Intelligence  is  a 
weapon  of  enormous  power,  and  the  use  of  it  has 
enthroned  man  as  the  most  povv'erful  of  all  crea- 
tures. Whether,  regarded  in  this  abstract  way  as 
only  a  weapon,  it  could  have  led  on  to  the  results 
we  see,  is  another  question.  It  is,  of  course,  pos- 
sible to  look  at  reason  only  in  this  light,  and  to 
regard  it  as  a  cunning  device  fitted  to  give  the 
possessor  of  it  an  advantage  in  the  struggle  for  ex- 
istence. It  has  been  so  regarded,  and  it  has  been 
insisted  on  by  those  who  desire  to  explain  human 
phenomena  in  terms  of  biology.  Reason  has  been 
represented  as  if  it  acted  only  in  the  interests  of  the 
individual;  but  this  topic  we  postpone  for  the  mo- 
ment, and  shall  return  to  it  when  we  look  at  the 
theory  of  Mr.  Benjamin  Kidd. 

Meanwhile  let  us  follow  for  a  little  the  significance 
of  the  change  which  has  happened  to  living  things  by 
this  new  departure.  Tools  once  made,  and  the  power 
of  making  them  once  discovered,  became  one  of  the 
permanent  gains  of  the  race  of  men.  Of  this  there 
was  no  reversal.  More  and  better  tools  were  made, 
better  materials  for  the  purpose  were  discovered, 
and  tools  might  pass  from  hand  to  hand.  It  gave 
to  man  a  new  view  of  the  uses  to  which  he  might 
put  the  environment,  and  he  found  that  the  environ- 
ment lent  itself  readily  to  such  uses.  It  led  on  to 
greater   discoveries.     With   tools   he   could   build    a 


I06  THEISM 

better  and  more  commodious  shelter  from  the  ex- 
tremes of  heat  and  cold,  could  command  a  more 
steady  supply  of  food,  and  a  more  convenient  form  of 
clothing.  As  he  advanced  in  the  application  of  his 
power  to  his  environment,  he  found  that  it  responded 
to  his  attempts,  that  it  was  not  a  fixed,  unyielding 
thing  with  which  he  was  in  intercourse,  but  one 
that  seemed  elastic,  accommodating,  ready  to  take  on 
the  forms  and  adaptations  which  he  desired.  The 
earth  would  grow  grain  for  him,  would  keep  it  for 
him,  if  he  could  persuade  it  to  take  the  form  of  a 
storehouse,  thus  he  could  secure  his  food  for  a  year 
or  two  before  it  was  needed.  Thus  he  caused  his 
environment  to  meet  his  needs,  to  provide  him  with 
more  ample  accommodation,  more  and  better  food, 
warmth,  when  the  natural  source  of  warmth  was 
obscured,  clothing,  when  he  lost  the  power  of  modi- 
fying himself  to  meet  the  varying  seasons  of  the 
year,  and  so  on.  It  is  not  necessary  to  add  other 
particulars.     We  see  the  story. 

We  note  that  all  this  gain  is  at  the  expense  of  the 
environment.  Gain  made  by  life  before  the  advent 
of  man,  was  attained  by  the  forthputting  of  more 
adapted  structures  on  the  part  of  the  organism. 
Life  advanced  by  modification  of  structure,  and 
adaptation  to  a  climate  of  large  variation  was  con- 
ducted by  changes  of  the  organism,  by  growing  a 
thicker  coat  of  hair,  and  of  a  different  colour,  or  by 
the    use  of    many  devices  to  which  our  attention  is 


RATIONAL  LIFE   AND   ITS  IMPLICATIONS      107 

drawn  by  writers  on  natural  history.  All  of  them, 
however,  were  due  to  organic  modification.  But  the 
rational  being  has  ceased  so  far  to  modify  himself, 
and  modifies  his  environment  instead.  Clearly  this 
is  a  significant  change,  and  one  which  gives  us  a 
new  conception  of  the  significance  of  life  and  its 
possibilities. 

Then  we  pass  on  to  ask  how  this  gain  is  to  be  con- 
served, and  how  it  is  to  be  handed  on  to  the  succeed- 
ing generations  of  the  human  race.  Up  to  this  time 
the  gain  made  by  one  generation  or  one  individual 
animal  could  be  handed  on  only  to  his  own  posterity, 
that  is,  if  we  suppose  that  acquired  qualities  can  be 
transmitted.  The  line  of  transmission  of  acquired 
qualities  could  only  be  the  line  of  descent.  This  was, 
however,  a  hazardous  line  of  action.  For  accidents 
might  happen  to  the  strongest,  most  highly  evolved, 
individual  of  the  species ;  and  his  qualities  could  not 
be  transmitted  if  he  had  no  offspring.  Organic 
modification  was  clearly  an  unsatisfactory  means 
either  for  the  acquisition  or  the  transmission  of  the 
gains  won  by  the  species  in  the  race  for  good.  One 
might  predict  that  the  rational  being  who  had  found 
a  way,  or  for  whom  a  way  had  been  found,  of  making 
an  advance  without  modifying  himself,  would  also 
find  a  way  by  which  the  gain  would  be  preserved. 

Here  there  comes  to  our  view  the  first  sign  of  the 
truth  that  reason  is  not  a  disintegrating,  disuniting 
power,  but  a  power  which  makes  for  unity,  progress, 


I08  THEISM 

and  integration.  To  preserve  and  increase  the  gain 
won  by  him  who  had  made  the  first  tool,  there  was 
needed  a  way  by  which  that  power  could  be  com- 
municated to  others  not  necessarily  in  the  line  of 
direct  descent.  Reason  found  a  way,  a  way  unknown 
before.  Whatever  may  be  the  extent  of  communica- 
tion between  animal  and  animal,  it  is  evident  that  that 
way  is  not  to  be  compared  with  the  way  in  which 
man  may  communicate  with  man.  The  instrument 
which  man  has  found  for  the  conservation  of  his  hard 
won  gain  is  language,  which,  when  once  won,  in- 
creased the  practical  power  of  reason  immeasurably. 
It  preserved  the  past,  it  led  on  to  greater  gain  in  the 
future. 

Now  this  instrument  which  is  the  offspring  of 
reason,  which  reflects  and  embodies  reason,  is  mani- 
festly a  social  product.  The  very  rudiments  of 
speech  indicate  the  fact  that  it  arose  because  men 
had  learned  to  work  together.  To  be  able  to  name 
a  thing  so  that  others  might  recognize  it  by  the  name, 
to  have  a  cry  which  would  indicate  the  approach  of 
anger,  to  have  a  word  the  speaking  of  which  would 
give  a  signal  for  a  pull  altogether,  the  power  to  com- 
municate to  his  fellow  what  was  in  his  own  mind, 
and  all  the  other  facilities  so  well  known  to  us  that 
we  seldom  think  of  them,  are  of  immense  significance 
as  we  look  at  them  when  they  were  a  new  thing  in 
the  manifestation  of  life.  It  is  another  illustration 
of  the  fact  that  man  advances  by  modifying  his  en- 


RATIONAL   LIFE  AND  ITS  IMPLICATIONS       109 

vironment.  The  tongue  and  ear,  in  the  service  of 
reason,  use  the  atmosphere  for  their  own  intelHgcnt 
purposes.  First  for  communication  to  one  another 
of  their  thoughts,  wishes,  desires,  and  then  for  the 
conservation  of  their  gains.  Manifestly  the  power 
gained  by  men  was  vastly  increased  by  the  discovery 
of  this  new  instrument.  Words  spoken  could  be  re- 
membered, the  experience  of  one  could  be  communi- 
cated to  another  by  the  use  of  this  instrument,  and 
a  youth  could  set  out  on  the  warpath  instructed  by 
the  warning  of  those  who  had  had  experience  of 
war. 

The  lessons  of  experience  could  be  handed  on  to 
others.  What  men  had  learned  of  land  and  sea,  of 
wood  and  river,  of  the  nature,  habits,  and  mode  of 
life  of  the  animals  they  followed  in  the  chase,  might 
be  told,  and  the  gain  could  be  conserved  and  handed 
on  merely  by  the  use  of  speech  and  not  by  hereditary 
transmission  alone.  So  far  as  we  have  come  we  find 
that  the  advent  of  reason  means  deliverance  from  the 
control  of  mere  biological  processes.  The  making 
of  tools  was  the  discovery  of  a  less  costly  way  of  ad- 
aptation to  the  environment  than  that  which  life  had 
heretofore  followed.  The  discovery  of  the  power  of 
speech  was  the  establishment  of  a  means  of  main- 
taining and  extending  the  gains  of  men  beyond  the 
means  of  transmission  by  descent,  apparently  the  only 
means  of  transmitting  gain  which  life  had  formerly 
discovered.     We  shall  have  many  other  illustrations 


no  THEISM 

of  this  as  we  proceed.  At  present  we  lay  stress  on 
these  two,  as  in  themselves  a  sufficient  proof  that 
biology  is  helpless  in  the  presence  of  these  new 
phenomena.  The  processes  described  by  biology,  as 
adequate  for  all  beings  up  to  man,  are  clearly  inade- 
quate here.  It  is  not  possible  to  deal  with  man  as 
a  mere  biological   animal. 

Nor  is  it  possible  to  deal  with  man  as  if  he  were 
a  mere  individual.  Looking  back  to  the  advent  of 
speech,  we  see  that  the  very  condition  of  its  advent 
was  that  man  was  a  social  being.  Obviously  speech 
implies  men  living  together,  conscious  of  common 
needs,  of  common  aims,  and  of  common  powers 
requiring  expression.  A  solitary  individual  would 
neither  feel  the  need  nor  have  the  power  of  speech. 
But  a  solitary  individual  need  not  be  considered,  as 
he  is  only  the  abstract  possibility  which  exists  simply 
for  the  purpose  of  making  a  certain  philosophy  con- 
ceivable. What  that  philosophy  is  we  shall  see  by 
and  by.  Meanwhile  we  may  take  it  as  axiomatic 
that  language  is  a  social  product.  Its  existence  is  a 
proof  that  the  individual  exists  as  a  rational  human 
being  in  relation  to  society,  that  he  can  be,  grow, 
develop  his  rational  powers,  only  in  intercourse  with 
his  fellows. 

Tool-making  and  speech  introduce  us  to  such 
modifications  of  the  environment  as  make  it  largely 
new.  If  we  are  to  understand  the  progress  of  man, 
we  must  look  at  him  not  as  if  he  were  in  intercourse 


RATIONAL   LIFE  AND  ITS  IMPLICATIONS      III 

with  an  environment  whicli  is  fixed  and  unchange- 
able, but  with  one  which  changes  from  age  to  age 
by  those  modifications  which  are  due  to  the  rational 
being  himself.  A  world  modified  by  the  instruments 
made  by  man  is  a  different  world  from  what  it  was 
before  the  advent  of  that  advance.  At  all  events 
it  is  different  to  man.  A  larger  difference  appears 
when  man  discovered  the  way  to  speak.  Now  the 
environment  is  not  the  old  environment  which  sur- 
rounded men  before  speech  was  discovered ;  it  is  the 
old,  plus  the  change  wrought  for  him  by  the  presence 
of  human  beings  who  can  speak  and  tell  him  of  their 
experience.  The  environment  is  no  abstraction ;  it  is 
a  real  concrete  thing  of  amazing  complexity,  a  com- 
plexity that  varies  to  every  individual.  We  are  apt 
to  place  an  abstract  individual  in  an  abstract  en- 
vironment, but  that  is  not  the  way  of  reahty.  The 
environment  of  the  rational  being  who  had  advanced 
so  far  as  to  make  tools  and  to  speak  had  taken  on 
new  meanings,  and  every  rational  being  born  into  it 
had  an  environment  enriched  by  all  the  experience  of 
the  race.  Not  wind  and  weather,  sun,  moon,  or  stars, 
not  all  the  physical  surroundings  of  his  existence, 
made  up  his  environment,  but  to  these  were  added 
the  care  of  parents  during  his  prolonged  infancy  and 
his  helpless  childhood,  the  training  he  received,  the 
beliefs  he  saw  in  his  acquaintances,  and  the  thousand 
influences  which  moulded  him.  This  was  the  envi- 
ronment of  the  rational  being. 


112  THEISM 

Again,  we  say  we  must  widen  our  biological  method 
if  we  are  to  understand  the  nature  of  a  rational  being. 
To  speak  of  environment  in  the  large  and  general 
way  now  fashionable,  is  to  mislead.  The  environ- 
ment is  relative  to  the  organism,  as  the  organism  is 
relative  to  the  environment.  A  dog  seems  to  live  in 
a  world  of  smells,  and  other  animals  in  a  world  suited 
to  their  prevaihng  characteristics.  A  thousand  kinds 
may  live  in  a  square  mile  of  ground,  and  each  of 
them  may  have  a  different  environment.  An  organ- 
ism so  far  selects  its  own  environment,  and  takes 
from  it  what  it  needs.  It  is  time  to  put  something 
like  an  arrest  on  the  attempt  to  apply  to  the  rational 
being  those  methods  of  interpretation  which  may 
have  been  found  adequate  in  a  lower  sphere,  but 
when  applied  here  can  only  mislead.  Man's  environ- 
ment is  largely  made  by  man. 

As  we  follow  on  down  the  stream  of  time  we  see 
this  rational  being  making  more  advances.  We  do 
not  see  that  advance  is  always  made,  or  that  reason 
always  hits  the  mark.  On  the  contrary,  we  see 
enough  of  mistakes,  many  blunders,  much  stumbling, 
as  it  tries  unaccustomed  ways.  Reason  has  had 
sometimes  to  pay  a  price  for  the  advantages  it  has 
won  for  man.  The  tentative  blundering  way  in 
which  it  reaches  forth  after  the  accomplishment  of 
its  aims,  the  way  it  uses  inadequate  means  for  its 
ends,  the  miscalculations  and  failures  it  makes,  are 
in   striking   contrast  to  the   sureness,  accuracy,   and 


RATIONAL  LIFE  AND   ITS  IMPLICATIONS      113 

completeness  with  which  other  animals  achieve  their 
more  limited  results.  It  takes  time  for  reason  to 
find  out  what  means  will  achieve  certain  ends. 
Trial  after  trial  is  made,  failure  is  added  to 
failure,  but  reason  has  the  power  of  learning  from 
its  failures,  and  of  making  them  stepping-stones  to 
higher  things. 

Nor  is  the  heritage  which  rational  men  have  handed 
on  to  their  successors  always  a  heritage  of  goodness, 
or  righteousness,  or  truth.  It  is  no  story  of  unmin- 
gled  good  nor  of  untroubled  progress  that  history  has 
to  tell  regarding  the  human  race.  From  one  point  of 
view  the  story  of  hfe  may  be  told  as  a  story  of  progress, 
if  we  neglect  the  failures  and  have  regard  only  to  those 
who  have  succeeded.  But  not  even  this  can  be  said 
of  the  human  story.  The  advent  of  reason,  if  in  one 
way  a  signal  advance,  is  in  another  way  a  story  of 
retrogression.  True,  it  won  for  man  the  mastery  over 
other  races,  but  it  did  not  enable  him  to  master  him- 
self. Powerful  to  enable  him  to  adapt  himself  to  his 
environment,  and  his  environment  to  him,  it  seemed 
powerless  to  guide  him  on  to  truth,  goodness,  and 
love.  As  we  look  at  reason  at  work,  in  the  earher 
races  of  men,  it  seems  to  be  in  the  service  of  every 
lust  and  every  passion  that  rise  within  the  heart  or 
lure  the  mind  on  to  the  gratification  of  the  baser 
feelings  and  desires.  Reason  does  not  seem  to  be 
even  coordinated  with  the  desires  and  passions,  it 
seems  to  be  a  servant  to  them.  It  is  far  from  having 
I 


1 14  THEISM 

attained  the  supremacy  which  it  apparently  ought  to 
have.  The  advent  of  reason,  from  an  ethical  point 
of  view,  results  in  a  degradation  and  a  fall.  In  some 
ways  it  brought  man  below  the  level  of  the  higher 
animals.  Lust,  desire,  passion,  in  a  rational  being, 
took  a  deeper  and  a  more  malignant  form.  Reason 
enabled  the  rational  being  to  picture  the  object  of 
desire  in  more  alluring  forms,  and  put  something  Hke 
an  infinite  element  into  it. 

The  lusts  and  desires  of  other  animals  were  excited 
only  while  the  objects  of  them  were  within  their 
reach ;  but  the  rational  being  could  treasure  them  up 
in  memory,  paint  them  in  imagination,  linger  over 
them  in  anticipation  and  in  retrospect,  until  he  or- 
dered his  reason  to  use  all  means  for  the  gratification 
of  his  desire.  Passions  and  desires  partake  of  the 
higher  nature  of  reason.  They  may  be  transformed 
from  their  original  teleological  function,  and  the  grati- 
fication of  them  may  and  sometimes  does  become  an 
end  in  itself.  With  the  higher  animals,  feelings,  pas- 
sions, desires,  seem  to  be  always  teleological ;  they  are 
for  the  furtherance  of  the  good  of  the  individual  and 
of  the  race.  When  the  teleological  end  is  reached, 
the  animal  seems  satisfied.  With  the  rude  human 
being  the  mere  teleological  reference  seems  to  become 
confused,  uncertain ;  as  if  reason  had  paralyzed  in- 
stinct, and  the  gratification  of  the  lust  of  the  moment 
had  become  an  end  in  itself.  How  shall  the  human 
being  learn  self-knowledge,   self-reverence,   self-con- 


RATIONAL  LIFE  AND   ITS  IMPLICATIONS      I15 

trol?  It  is  the  problem  of  destiny  for  the  human 
being.  For  other  animals  had  a  guide  for  conduct ; 
they  were  under  the  imperious  dictation  of  instinct, 
that  proceeded  to  its  end  with  a  precision  that  seemed 
infallible.  Their  ideal  was  easily  realized,  if  it  can  be 
called  an  ideal.  But  for  the  rational  being  the  advent 
of  reason  seemed  to  have  set  him  free  from  the  sure 
guidance  of  teleological  function,  and  to  have  cast 
him  loose  on  a  sea  of  adventure.  Reason  had  at  once 
raised  him  higher  and  sunk  him  lower  than  the  other 
animals. 

Thus  we  see  him  set  out  on  his  perilous  path, 
slowly  trying  to  feel  his  way  to  the  recognition  of 
a  standard  of  conduct,  and  to  substitute  rational 
self-guidance  for  the  leading  of  instinct.  It  would 
be  long  to  tell  the  story  of  his  failures  and  success ; 
and  in  what  I  do  say,  I  wish  not  to  go  beyond  the 
domain  of  science.  It  is  a  pathetic  story  that  sci- 
ence tells  us  of  the  efforts  of  the  earliest  men  in  their 
search  after  a  standard  of  conduct.  The  story  is  often 
told  in  an  unfriendly,  unsympathetic  way,  as  if  science 
rejoiced  to  show  us  how  rude  and  lowly  were  the  be- 
ginnings of  our  science,  our  ethics,  our  philosophy, 
and  our  religion.  True,  their  beginnings  were  lowly 
and  rude  enough,  but  still  a  beginning  was  made. 
There  is  something  to  me  very  great  in  the  first  sign 
of  recognition  by  man  of  a  rule  of  conduct,  other 
than  the  gratification  of  his  own  desires.  Science 
may  tell  me  truly  that  the  taboo,  or  the  command 


Il6  THEISM 

which  prohibited  a  certain  course  of  conduct,  was 
superstitiously  believed  and  observed,  and  I  shall 
say  nothing  to  the  contrary ;  but  I  do  say  that  the 
recognition  by  man  of  something  sacred,  of  some- 
thing which  he  must  not  touch  or  desire,  of  com- 
mands which  he  must  unconditionally  obey,  was  a 
great  step  on  the  way  by  which  he  might  learn 
that  for  him  there  was  a  rational  ideal  which  he 
was  bound  to  realize.  As  yet  he  had  nothing  worthy 
of  the  great  names  of  science,  philosophy,  ethics, 
or  religion.  He  is  simply  a  rational  being,  whose 
rationality  has  not  realized  itself. 

With  rationality  exercised  in  the  way  of  making 
tools  and  employed  in  speech,  some  restraints  on  the 
lawlessness  of  human  desires  must  speedily  have 
arisen.  Habits  were  formed,  actions  were  discovered 
to  be  harmful  to  one's  self  and  injurious  to  others, 
and  these  were  prohibited.  As  experience  widened, 
the  number  of  these  grew  until  there  would  exist 
something  like  a  code  for  conduct.  At  present 
I  am  not  dealing  with  supernatural  sanctions  for 
conduct,  though  almost  all  actions  were  regarded  by 
primitive  man  as  subject  to,  and  prescribed  by,  a 
supernatural  power.  Leaving  that  fact  alone  for  the 
present,  let  us  follow  on  along  the  line  I  have 
indicated. 

How  is  reason  to  act  in  harmony  with  all  the  other 
faculties  of  man  }  In  other  words,  how  shall  man 
become  altogether  rational }     How  shall  reason  en- 


RATIONAL  LIFE  AND  ITS  IMPLICATIONS      117 

ter  into  and  transform  the  emotions,  cognitions,  and 
volitions  of  man,  until  they  become  the  feelings, 
thoughts,  and  actions  of  a  rational,  self-guided  being? 
For  reason  is  used  by  me  in  that  wide  sense,  and  the 
goal  of  a  rational  being  is  that  he  is  to  become 
rational  all  through.  As  we  read  the  story  of  a  man 
pictured  to  us  by  the  students  of  anthropology,  we 
see  him  in  a  very  rude  and  uncultured  state.  He 
has  tools,  fires,  shelter,  food ;  he  has  speech,  as  the 
earhest  records  of  him  abundantly  show.  He  has 
subdued  certain  other  animals  and  pressed  them  into 
his  service.  He  has  certain  thoughts  about  the 
world  in  which  he  is,  but  it  is  largely  a  world  not 
realized.  He  has  not  reached  the  thought  of  a  fixed 
order  of  the  world;  forms  of  life  and  death  have 
given  to  him  certain  thoughts  about  them,  and  about 
himself.  He  has  learned  that  certain  actions  he 
must  not  do,  certain  things  he  must  not  touch,  and 
certain  ceremonies  he  must  perform.  He  believes 
that  if  he  transgress  the  one  or  omit  the  doing  of  the 
other,  he  will  pay  the  penalty.  Habits  become  fixed, 
beHefs  grow,  and  a  standard  of  conduct  emerges,  and 
these  develop  into  institutions,  which  again  have  a 
reflex  influence  on  those  who  live  under  them. 
These  are  realities  for  those  who  are  born  and  grow 
up  under  their  influence.  They  are  part  of  their 
environment. 

A  little  later  we  find   that  man   has  formed   for 
himself  a  rule  of    conduct,  consisting  of   rules  of  a 


1 1 8  THEISM 

very  drastic  kind.  The  individual  is  almost  lost  to 
sight,  and  what  we  find  is  a  company  of  men  the 
actions  and  relations  of  which  are  prescribed,  and 
whose  very  thoughts  are  bound  into  a  system  of 
rules.  The  unit  seems  to  be,  not  the  individual,  but 
the  family  or  the  tribe,  and  the  individual  has  no 
rights  and  no  freedom;  he  is  merely  a  member  of 
the  tribe.  As  soon  as  organization  appeared  it  seems 
to  have  been  carried  to  an  extreme.  The  existing 
savage  and  the  rude  man  of  primitive  times  are 
bound  together  in  the  most  rigid  fashion  by  a  set  of 
most  elaborate  rules,  all  of  which  are  enforced  by  the 
most  awful  sanctions.  Whatever  may  be  the  origin 
of  these  rules  which  bind  the  mind  and  guide  the 
action  of  the  ruder  tribes  of  men,  there  can  be  no 
doubt  of  their  existence.  The  evidence  is  abundant 
and  clear.  Rules  regarding  his  relation  to  the  world 
of  objects  around  him,  rules  regarding  his  relations 
to  the  other  members  of  the  tribe,  rules  concerning 
marriage,  rules  regarding  his  attitude  toward  the 
unseen  powers  on  which  he  felt  his  dependency, 
were  ever  present  and  operative  on  him. 

Thus  a  check  on  the  lawlessness  of  the  individual 
was  obtained,  but  apparently  at  a  high  price.  The 
individual  was  sacrificed  to  the  society,  and  the  good 
of  the  tribe  seemed  to  be  the  end  of  these  elaborate 
rules.  At  all  events,  whether  that  was  what  was 
meant,  that  was  accomplished.  Among  the  rudest 
tribes  and  in  the  besiinninsrs  of  civilization,  what  we 


RATIONAL  LIFE  AND  ITS  IMPLICATIONS      119 

find  is  not  the  individual,  but  the  clan  or  tribe. 
Power  is  in  the  hands  of  the  father  or  the  mother,  in 
the  hands  of  the  chief  or  the  priest,  and  every  rule 
served  to  add  to  the  further  consolidation  of  that 
power.  This  was  one  way  of  harnessing  reason  and 
of  making  it  work  within  bounds  and  on  certain 
lines.  Having  dislocated  the  action  of  instinct,  and 
having  introduced  uncertainty  where  certainty  ob- 
tained in  lower  animals,  reason  was  uneasy  until  it 
obtained  another  kind  of  instinct,  one  instituted, 
guided,  and  made  by  itself.  For  the  characteristic 
of  reason  is  that  it  must  justify  to  itself  the  action 
it  prescribes.  It  must  give  a  reason  for  its  action. 
Whether  it  was  a  true  or  adequate  reason  is  another 
question. 

Customs,  habits,  beliefs,  arose  among  men  and 
grew  into  a  system,  a  system  which  has  varied  in 
content  and  form  with  the  different  races  of  men. 
One  thing  we  observe  with  regard  to  them  all  is  that 
each  had  its  explanation  of  the  origin,  meaning,  and 
sanction  of  their  rites  and  customs.  Having  obtained 
the  rule  and  acted  on  it,  having  established  the 
custom  and  made  it  binding,  the  rational  being  set 
himself  to  find  reasons  for  his  practice.  What  he 
set  forth  as  explanation  is  to  be  found  in  the  my- 
thologies of  the  race.  Mythology  is  largely  expla- 
nation. It  is  the  science,  the  philosophy,  the  theology, 
of  the  races  of  men.  As  we  read  these  mythologies,  — • 
and  nowadays  they  take  much  time  to  read  them,  — ■ 


1 20  THEISM 

we  greatly  admire  the  ingenuity  and  versatility  of  our 
ancestors.  They  were  not  content  with  mere  accept- 
ance of  the  customs,  rites,  ordinances,  which  were 
handed  down  to  them,  and  made  binding  on  them  ; 
they  endeavoured  to  make  their  assent  to  their 
observance  rational.  The  explanation  found  was 
such  as  was  possible  to  a  rational  being  whose 
rationality  was  not  yet  consciously  realized  by  him- 
self. But  the  main  thing  to  observe  is  that  an 
explanation  was  felt  to  be  needed ;  the  kind  of  ex- 
planation that  was  forthcoming  is  not  so  important 
for  our  purpose. 

It  is  another  element  in  the  system  of  differences 
between  the  being  who  is  at  least  implicitly  rational, 
and  the  animal  that  remains  irrational  to  the  end, 
that  the  one  seeks  for  an  explanation  of  his  expe- 
rience and  the  other  does  not.  The  primitive  man 
asked  himself  and  others  regarding  the  origin  of 
things,  their  meaning,  their  ongoing,  their  goal ;  he 
asked  also  about  himself,  and  his  relations  to  what 
was  beneath,  around,  and  above  him.  His  answers 
to  these  questions  are  to  be  found  in  the  mythologies 
and  religions  which  are  so  sympathetically  studied 
to-day.  We  have  our  theories  of  mythology,  we 
speak  of  animism,  of  the  worship  of  ancestors,  of 
polytheism,  of  theism,  and  of  the  strange  expe- 
rience of  the  human  race,  and  of  the  explanation 
of  their  experience  which  they  set  forth  for  them- 
selves.    Sometimes  our  theories  are  a  bed  of   Pro- 


RATIONAL  LIFE  AND  ITS  IMPLICATIONS       12 1 

crustes  for  the  poor  facts,  which  are  mangled  and 
tortured  in  the  process.  Happily  the  facts  survive, 
and  their  sufficient  explanation  will  be  reached  by 
and  by. 

Meanwhile  let  us  say  that  in  these  mythologies  of 
the  past  we  have  the  rudiments  of  the  science  of 
to-day.  Here  is  man's  first  recorded  recognition 
of  the  uniformities  of  nature.  That  water  would 
assuage  thirst  to-day  and  to-morrow,  that  fruits 
would  satisfy  hunger,  that  the  animals  he  chased 
and  caught  to-day  indicated  that  animals  of  the 
same  kind  would  behave  in  a  similar  way  when  he 
followed  again  in  pursuit,  that  the  sun  would  con- 
tinue to  rise  and  give  him  light  and  heat,  and  that 
there  was  a  time  for  the  growing  and  ripening  of 
things  and  for  their  decay,  would  soon  be  borne 
in  upon  his  mind,  and  serve  to  regulate  his  conduct. 
Other  uniformities  would  be  added  as  experience 
widened,  likely.  The  fact  that  things  maintained 
their  properties  from  day  to  day  must  have  been 
soon  learned  by  him.  Likeness  and  unlikeness  im- 
pressed the  primitive  man  as  they  impress  his  de- 
scendants, and  a  rude  classification  of  them  would 
be  formed.  So  science  began  to  be,  not  in  its  sepa- 
rateness  as  with  us,  but  mixed  up  with  many  ex- 
planations which  were  not  scientific. 

But  the  unscientific  explanation  of  the  primitive 
man  does  not  affect  the  fact  that  here  were  the  be- 
ginnings of  science,  or  the  truth  of  the  science  which 


122  THEISM 

has  grown  from  such  a  beginning.  Science  of  a  kind 
is  there,  even  if  it  be  only  in  the  form  of  a  recogni- 
tion of  a  permanence  in  things  and  their  behaviour. 
Is  it  contended  that  early  man  looked  at  all  things 
from  his  own  standpoint  and  thought  that  everything 
had  a  spirit  and  life  in  it  t  Is  animism  the  science 
of  the  primitive  man  t  It  is  so  said  by  Dr.  Tylor. 
I  have  some  doubts  as  to  whether  there  is  evidence 
to  warrant  such  a  conclusion.  That  man  could  not 
distinguish  between  the  living  and  the  non-living 
seems  to  me  an  incredible  proposition.  That  he 
thought  some  non-living  things  to  have  a  kind  of 
life  seems  to  be  true,  but  he  had  some  special  reason 
for  that  belief.  Mr.  Spencer  explains  the  matter  by 
the  supposition  that  the  primitive  man  thought  a 
ghost  had  taken  possession  of  the  non-living  object, 
and  he  therefore  accepted  it  as  living.  It  is  allow- 
able to  accept  Mr.  Spencer's  testimony  that  there 
is  a  fact  to  be  explained,  though  we  cannot  accept 
his  explanation.  But  the  question  is  too  large  for 
discussion  here. 

What  I  am  concerned  with  is  the  fact  that  science 
began  as  soon  as  man  recognized  the  uniformity  of 
nature  in  some  things  at  least.  That  these  uniformi- 
ties were  recognized  is  apparent  from  the  mytholo- 
gies themselves.  Still  further,  these  mythologies 
furnish  us  with  the  rudiments  of  a  philosophy  and 
an  ethic.  They  contain  the  first  reflections  of  men 
on   the    beginnings   of    things,  and   on    the    causes 


RATIONAL  LIFE  AND  ITS  IMPLICATIONS      123 

which  produced  them.  Very  childish  and  very 
pathetic  they  seem  to  us  as  we  read  of  the  rise  of 
the  world  and  the  making  of  man,  but  we  again 
say  that  they  form  a  tribute  to  the  greatness  of  man. 
To  ask  the  question,  even  though  they  could  find  no 
answer,  shows  that  life  had  put  forth  new  phe- 
nomena. If  early  man  found  an  explanation  of  the 
universe  in  chaos,  and  dwelt  on  a  way  in  which  chaos 
did  come  to  an  ordered  world,  well !  modern  philoso- 
phy, in  some  moods  and  in  some  minds,  does  go  back 
to  a  lifeless  chaotic  cloud  of  fifty  million  years  ago. 
Others  again  dwell  on  the  persistence  of  force,  and 
tell  of  a  wonderful  transformation  by  which  the 
homogeneous  becomes  heterogeneous.  It  would  ap- 
pear that  with  regard  to  origins  we  are  as  helpless 
as  they. 

To  mythology  as  bearing  on  theology  and  rehgion, 
we  shall  return  at  a  later  stage  of  our  argument. 
For  the  right  understanding  of  the  philosophy  and 
ethics  of  early  man,  we  have  to  look  at  the  institu- 
tions which  he  has  formed.  The  fundamental  insti- 
tution is  the  family.  It  was  a  long  time  in  the 
history  of  man  before  the  family  was  recognized 
in  its  ethical  significance.  The  history  of  marriage 
is  a  sad  story,  and  the  whole  business  can  scarcely 
be  described.  The  relations  between  the  sexes  were 
no  doubt  subject  to  certain  regulations  even  in  the 
rudest  tribes,  and  a  restraint  of  some  kind  was  laid 
on  the  lusts  of    man.     But  it  is  evident   that   until 


124  THEISM 

monogamous  marriage  became  the  rule,  ethical 
progress  could  scarcely  be  attained.  This  lies  at 
the  foundation  of  family  Ufe ;  and  the  moral  state  of 
a  community  may  be  estimated  by  the  regard  they 
have  to  the  holiness  of  family  life.  For  the  family 
is  the  first  and  most  important  of  those  institutions 
which  help  to  mould  the  opening  life  of  a  young 
man  or  woman.  The  unsatisfactory  character  of 
man's  ethical  development  may  be  largely  traced 
to  the  fact  that  the  ideal  of  a  family  appears  com- 
paratively late  in  the  history.  Instead  of  a  family 
in  the  proper  sense  of  the  word,  we  may  have  a 
matriarchate  in  which  kinship  was  reckoned  by  the 
mother,  or  a  polygamous  establishment  in  which  the 
relation  of  parent  and  child  had  little  ethical  signifi- 
cance, or  there  may  be  polyandry ;  in  fact,  you  may 
have  and  actually  have  all  kinds  of  relationships 
estabUshed  between  men  and  women  into  which 
purity,  permanence,  and  equality  did  not  enter. 
Still  into  such  imperfect  relationships  there  entered 
something  of  the  tender  self-sacrifice  of  a  mother's 
love,  and  something  of  a  father's  providing  care. 
The  helplessness  of  a  child  during  its  prolonged 
infancy  made  a  strong  appeal  to  the  mother,  and 
drew  forth  something  of  love,  of  exquisite  tender- 
ness, and  devoted  service. 

Thus,  while  the  ideal  of  a  real  family  lay  in  the 
distant  future,  and  could  not  be  realized  until  reason 
had  come  to  a  larger  fulfilment,  enough  was  attained 


RATIONAL  LIFE  AND  ITS  IMPLICATIONS      125 

to  show  forth  what  a  family  ideal  might  come  to 
be,  when  human  character  would  attain  to  a  more 
rational  completeness.  As  it  was  in  the  olden  world, 
marriage  could  not  attain  its  ideal  end.  It  was  too 
often  the  source  of  contradiction  and  confusion, 
and  both  the  physiological  fact  of  sex  and  the  emo- 
tional fact  of  sexual  love  became  antagonistic  to  the 
very  notion  of  ethics.  They  were  too  often  sepa- 
rated from  their  teleological  function,  and  men  were 
powerless  to  transfigure  them  into  that  higher  order 
in  which  the  light  of  reason  works  through  love. 
Still,  even  in  their  imperfection,  they  enable  us  to  see 
in  the  mutual  love  of  parents  and  children,  in  the 
mutual  bonds  that  made  the  family  one,  and  in  the 
service  of  self-sacrifice  which  the  members  of  a  fam- 
ily felt  bound  to  render  to  one  another,  the  promise 
of  a  larger  future.  In  the  family  the  first  lessons 
of  experience  are  learned,  the  discovery  is  made  that 
the  child  is  one  among  others,  bound  up  with  others 
in  a  larger  unity,  and  held  together  with  them  in  the 
bonds  of  common  interests  and  common  work.  Such 
lessons  as  these  could  be  learned  in  the  imperfect 
family  of  the  ancient  world.  Further,  the  children 
of  the  house  had  at  their  disposal  all  the  experience 
of  the  parents.  In  the  family  they  learned  to 
speak,  to  name  things  and  to  use  them,  they  learned 
to  love  and  to  work.  On  the  other  hand,  parents 
simply  as  parents  rose  to  a  greater  height  as  human 
beings,  their   hearts   throbbed  with    a  greater  love. 


1 26  THEISM 

they  looked  at  life  with  a  wider  outlook,  and  they 
rose  in  the  scale  of  being,  because  of  the  young 
beings  whose  life  was  bound  up  in  theirs. 

In  the  family  life,  even  of  the  olden  world,  we  find 
the  great  sphere  of  ethical  training.  Here  is  the  first 
lesson  that  reason  learned  in  its  endeavour  to  make 
for  itself  a  rational  world.  Here  an  individual  pre- 
disposed to  use  reason  for  himself  alone  as  a  mere 
instrument  for  his  own  pleasure,  or  glory,  learned 
that  reason  had  a  grander  meaning  and  a  wider 
purpose.  The  individual  learned  that  he  was  not 
separate  and  isolated,  that  in  fact  he  could  only 
find  himself  by  losing  himself,  and  find  himself 
transformed  and  glorified  by  knowing  himself  (as 
Hegel  has  said)  as  the  unity  of  himself  with  another 
and  of  another  with  him.  Such  is  the  love  that  lies 
at  the  basis  of  family  life.  Then  comes  the  larger  life 
of  the  family,  when  fathers  and  mothers  find  them- 
selves in  the  unity  which  is  made  up  of  parents 
and  children.  Glorified  in  fatherhood  and  mother- 
hood as  children  are  given  to  them,  glorified  still  fur- 
ther as  the  children  win  more  room  in  their  hearts, 
parents  give  more  and  more  love  as  they  watch 
the  growing  intelUgence,  the  warm  affection,  and 
the  thousand  winning  ways  of  children.  This  is  the 
first  school  of  humanity,  good  for  the  lessons  taught 
to  parents  and  to  children.  Here  we  learn  the 
first  lessons  in  self-reverence,  self-knowledge,  self- 
control.     Here  we  find  the  first  example  of  the  great 


RATIONAL   LIFE  AND   ITS  IMPLICATIONS      1 27 

ethical  law  that  a  man  must  lose   himself   in  order 
to  find  himself. 

Speaking  for  myself,  I  must  say  that  I  feel   un- 
speakably grateful  to  Hegel  and  to  the  many  eminent 
men  who  work  in  philosophy  under  the  inspiration 
and  the  hope  inspired  by  Hegel,  for  the  wondrous 
light  they  have  cast  on  the  significance  of  the  family. 
I  say  this  all  the  more  emphatically  as  I  do  not  agree 
with  them  in  some  of  their  contentions.     "  The  unity 
which  is  founded  on  natural  feeling,"  says  Professor 
Mackenzie,  "must  precede  that  which    depends   on 
acquired  sympathies  and  thoughts.      To  begin  with 
the  love  of  humanity,  would  be  to  begin  with  a  cold 
abstraction.       The    family  is    like    a   burning   glass, 
which  concentrates  human  sympathies  on    a    point. 
Within   that   narrow  circle    selfishness   is   gradually 
overcome,    and    wider    interests    developed.      Each 
one    is    supplied    with    the    opportunity  of   knowing 
a  few  human  beings  thoroughly,  than  which  nothing 
is  more  important  as   a   first  stage  in  the  transcen- 
dence of  the  merely  individual  self.     One  who  knows 
only  himself  inwardly,   and  sees    others   only  by   a 
kind  of  outward  observation,  which  in  a  large  cir- 
cle is  an  almost  inevitable  result,  is  apt  to  become 
for   himself   too   entirely   the   centre   of    his   world, 
if,  indeed,  he    ever    forms    a   world    or    cosmos    for 
himself  at  all.     The  family  enables  a  few  persons 
to  become  not  merely  objects   for   each    other,  but 
parts  of  a  single  life;    and  the  unity  thus  effected 


128  THEISM 

may  then  be  very  readily  extended  as  sympathies 
grow."  C  Social  Philosophy,"  pp.  363-4,  2d  edi- 
tion.) 

Parts  of  a  single  life  —  it  is  a  significant  phrase, 
and  states  in  few  words  the  ethical  significance  of  the 
family  when  it  is  properly  constituted.  But  it  pre- 
supposes that  the  family  proceeds  from  one  union 
and  not  from  many,  from  one  centre  formed  by  two 
who  have  found  themselves  in  each  other.  But  we 
shall  not  return  to  the  undeveloped  family  life  of  the 
early  races  of  mankind.  On  that,  enough  has  been 
said  already.  We  may  reassert,  however,  that  im- 
perfect though  it  was,  it  yet  had  an  important  bear- 
ing on  the  training  of  men,  and  it  helped  them  to 
know  that  reason  was  not  theirs  in  order  to  be  used 
as  an  instrument  for  the  gaining  of  merely  individual 
ends,  but  that  it  was  theirs  in  order  that  man  might 
recognize  himself  as  a  part  of  a  whole,  and  that  he 
could  not  realize  himself  save  in  relation  to  a  whole. 
This  has  an  unspeakable  significance  for  the  develop- 
ment of  man,  as  a  sane  and  sound,  moral  and  rational, 
being.  We  have  laid  stress  on  the  family  as  the 
sphere  in  which  this  has  been  effectively  done.  The 
unity  of  the  family  is  a  moral  and  spiritual  unity, 
constituted  by  spiritual  bonds.  The  unity  of  an 
organism  is  physical  and  visible,  and  is  constituted 
for  organic  ends.  It  is  one  of  the  functions  of 
reason  to  transcend  the  unities  constituted  by  organic 
ends,  and  to  recognize  larger  unities,  based  on  bonds 


RATIONAL  LIFE  AND  ITS  IMPLICATIONS      1 29 

which  do  not  reveal  themselves  to  sense,  and  cannot 
be  traced  by  physical  causation.  The  bond  which 
holds  the  family  together  is  moral  and  spiritual,  and 
is  cognizable  only  by  a  rational  being,  as  it  can  be 
constituted  by  rational  beings  alone.  The  begin- 
ning of  such  a  possibility  is  to  be  thankfully  recog- 
nized, and  the  growth  of  it  is  one  of  the  signs 
which  herald  the  coming  of  a  better  day  for  hu- 
manity. It  was  a  great  triumph  when  the  rational 
being  recognized  himself  as  a  member  of  a  larger 
whole,  and  comprehended  that  bonds  which  he  could 
not  touch,  nor  see,  nor  handle,  were  stronger,  and 
held  him  with  a  firmer  grasp  than  any  physical  bond 
could  do.  There  were  many  agencies  needed  to 
bring  about  this  great  end.  And  of  these  agencies 
the  family  was  the  first  and  one  of  the  strongest. 
But  then  the  family  was  only  after  all  one  circle 
within  a  larger  circle,  and  the  Hfe  which  had  no  in- 
terest beyond  the  family  was  a  contracted  Hfe.  It 
might  look  at  reason  as  an  instrument  to  be  used 
only  for  the  advance  of  the  family,  and  the  struggle 
of  reason  against  selfishness  might  be  repeated  in 
this  larger  sphere.  The  completeness  of  the  family 
and  the  satisfaction  which  the  members  found  in  one 
another  might  hinder  them  from  the  recognition  that 
the  family  could  find  their  ethical  significance  only 
in  the  recognition  of  the  fact  that  they  were  members 
of  a  still  larger  whole.  Thus  on  every  step  of  the 
upward  spiral,  the  conflict   between  the  selfish  and 

K 


130  THEISM 

the  rational  was  renewed.  It  still  goes  on  and  will 
go  on,  until  the  worth  and  freedom  of  the  individual 
are  recognized,  and  the  fact  accepted  that  the  worth 
and  value  of  the  individual  can  only  be  realized  in 
a  society  which  receives  his  all  from  him  and  returns 
it  to  him  enhanced  a  thousand  fold. 


THE  MAKING  OF  MAN 

Something  of  the  significance  of  the  family  has 
been  seen ;  and  the  part  it  plays  in  the  evolution  of 
man  is  great.  Part  of  the  heritage  of  humanity 
belongs  to  the  parents  before  they  have  come 
together;  stores  of  spiritual  energy  laid  up  for 
them  in  the  tradition  of  the  ages.  But  it  is  in  the 
faces  of  the  father  and  the  mother  that  the  child 
finds,  in  concrete  form,  the  touch  that  wakens  up 
the  dull  materials  of  humanity  and  quickens  them 
into  emotional  and  spiritual  life.  Spiritual  parent- 
ship  takes  the  place  of  merely  natural  parentship, 
and  in  the  interchange  of  affection  between  parents 
and  children,  fatherhood  and  sonship  take  on  an 
added  glory.  The  child  reveals  to  the  parents  depths 
of  life  undreamed  of  before ;  gives  a  new  centre  to 
existence,  a  new  stimulus  to  effort,  and  builds  for 
them  a  wider  horizon  and  a  larger  future. 

As  has  been  said  already,  the  family  is  only  one 
stage  of  the  progress  of  man.  Beyond  the  family 
is  dimly  seen  the  wider  circle  of  the  tribe,  and  the 
city.    We  say  dimly  seen,  for  in  the  early  ages  the 

131 


132  THEISM 

vision  is  not  distinct.  The  gain  was  very  slow,  and 
not  for  a  long  time  have  we  the  emergence  of  the 
state.  True,  we  have  at  an  early  stage  in  history 
gigantic  specimens  of  world  empires,  in  which  the 
few  seemed  to  use  the  many  for  their  own  pur- 
poses, simply  as  instruments.  The  ancient  world 
empire  was  no  realized  ideal  of  happiness  or  prog- 
ress for  men.  True,  the  works  remain  to  this  hour ; 
symbols  of  many  things,  and  are  fitted  to  give  rise 
to  many  reflections.  We  wonder  at  the  skill,  labour, 
cooperation,  and  resources  of  the  generations  that 
built  the  pyramids,  and  baked  the  bricks  of  Babylon. 
But  these  —  triumphs  of  organization  though  they 
were  —  did  not  give  the  promise  of  permanence,  for 
the  organization  was  impressed  on  the  individuals 
from  above  and  from  without,  and  did  not  guaran- 
tee a  corresponding  inward  growth  of  the  individual. 
The  building  of  world  empires  was  premature,  and 
they  passed  away. 

All  along  the  line  of  progress  we  see  the  con- 
flict between  the  individual  and  what  we  may  call 
society.  The  individual  tends  in  irrational  fashion 
to  look  at  reason  and  all  its  implications  as  some- 
thing to  be  used  for  himself,  irrespective  of  the 
claims  of  others.  While  association  in  family  life 
gives  him  some  idea  of  the  obligation  that  lies  on 
him  to  regard  the  claims  of  others,  speedily  the 
family  becomes  simply  a  larger  unity,  the  interests 
of  which  may  be  regarded  as  in  conflict  with   the 


THE  MAKING    OF  MAN  1 33 

interests  of  others.  Rivalry,  competition,  and  con- 
flict are  renewed  on  the  larger  scale,  and  the 
family  is  held  in  abstraction  precisely  as  the  in- 
dividual was  held  in  abstraction  and  looked  at  as 
a  separate  being  bound  up  in  his  own  interests. 
Similarly,  the  tribe  became  a  unit  of  abstraction, 
and  its  interests  were  held  to  be  in  conflict  with  the 
interests  of  others.  Thus  the  course  of  history  is 
marked  by  conflicts  of  all  kinds,  and  conflicts  which 
assumed  a  larger  scale  as  the  organized  unities  of 
men  became  larger  and  larger.  Wars  between  in- 
dividuals became  the  vendettas  of  families ;  these 
became  wars  between  villages,  and  these  in  turn 
became  the  strife  between  states,  and  the  struggle 
continued  on  a  larger  scale,  and  it  is  not  over  yet. 

The  conflict  was  not  altogether  evil.  There  were 
many  features  of  the  hum.an  character  which  could 
be  developed  only  through  conflict.  Courage,  en- 
durance, skill,  foresight,  command  of  oneself  and 
of  the  resources  of  life,  might  be  developed  through 
the  call  which  war  made  on  the  faculty  of  man. 
Nor  were  these  all.  The  other-regarding  virtues, 
also,  found  opportunity  of  realization.  Loyalty  to 
leaders,  obedience,  trust,  self-sacrifice,  and  a  pas- 
sion for  the  country  which  gave  a  man  birth,  grew 
in  the  conflict.  The  effect  produced  on  the  mind 
of  a  people  by  a  continued  conflict  with  their  neigh- 
bours may  be  the  production  of  the  other-regard- 
ing disposition.     Much  might  be  written  from  this 


134 


THEISM 


point  of  view,  and  a  great  deal  of  what  is  good 
and  worthy  has  been  written.  What  a  wealth  of 
inspiring  thought  and  high-souled  emotion  lies  in  the 
war  songs  of  a  people !  The  iron  hand  of  war 
gripped  them,  welded  them  into  a  unity,  made  them 
feel  the  pulse  of  a  common  life,  made  them  quiver 
at  the  thought  of  a  common  danger,  made  them 
feel  vividly,  as  they  would  not  otherwise  have  felt, 
the  unity  of  a  mother  country,  as  if  she  were  their 
mother  indeed,  and  reinforced  the  feeUng  of  pa- 
triotism with  a  thousand  associations  in  which  there 
was  nothing  mean  or  sordid.  Patriotism  aroused 
somehow,  stimulated  and  quickened  by  all  the  asso- 
ciations of  dangers  manfully  faced  and  overcome,  of 
triumphs  won  by  bravery,  courage,  and  endurance, 
forms  one  of  the  stages  in  the  upward  progress  of 
humanity. 

A  flood  of  war  to  rebaptize  the  nations ;  yes,  war 
has  had  that  effect  once  and  again  in  the  history 
of  the  world.  The  trials  and  triumphs  of  war  have 
had  their  permanent  effects  on  human  character 
and  development.  If  we  Hmit  our  view  to  one  peo- 
ple, and  refuse  to  look  across  the  border,  we  might 
speak  at  length  on  the  development  of  the  manly 
virtues,  might  sing  that  it  is  sweet  to  die  for  one's 
native  country,  and  dwell  on  the  reflex  results  on 
human  character,  and  the  widening  of  the  bounds 
of  feeling,  and  so  on.  In  the  same  way  we  might 
dwell  on  the  struggle  for  existence  in  the  lower  world, 


THE   MAKING   OF  MAN  1 35 

and  show  eloquently  how  the  strong  became  stronger, 
and  the  swift,  swifter,  until  the  higher  races  ap- 
peared. In  neither  the  one  case  nor  the  other  is 
the  picture  an  alluring  one.  In  both  cases,  I  must 
say,  that  as  I  read,  I  long  for  a  heaven  for  the 
failures,  for  some  compensation  for  the  unsuccess- 
ful. And  verily  they  have  had  their  compensation, 
and  the  meek  inherit  the  earth.  But  of  this  I  shall 
speak  later  on. 

The  story  of  this  incessant  competition  may  be 
read  from  another  point  of  view.  I  read  it  not  so 
much  in  relation  to  the  victory  which  one  people, 
city,  or  tribe  wins  over  another,  as  in  the  light 
which  it  casts  on  the  growth  of  human  character. 
It  is  a  step  in  the  process  of  welding  men  together, 
it  is  one  of  the  cases  in  which  something  produces 
its  opposite.  The  war,  which  had  such  sad  results 
when  looked  at  from  one  point  of  view,  had  good 
effects  on  the  nation  who  made  war.  It  taught  the 
rational  being  that  he  had  wider  interests  than  his 
personal  interests,  that  he  had  larger  aspirations 
than  those  of  his  family  or  his  tribe,  and  it  taught 
him  that  all  his  rational  powers  ought  to  be  used  in 
the  service  of  the  wider  unity.  The  devotion  of  a 
man  to  the  state,  the  development  of  the  thought 
of  duty  to  the  fatherland,  the  discovery  of  himself  as 
a  citizen  of  the  state,  as  a  responsible  member  of  a 
larger  whole,  was  a  great  gain,  won,  as  all  ethical 
gains  are  won,  at  a  tremendous  cost. 


136  THEISM 

The  cost  is  great,  and  grows  in  magnitude  as  one 
thinks  of  it.  Strife  everywhere,  man  against  man, 
tribe  against  tribe,  city  against  city,  state  against 
state,  reason  turned  from  its  ideal  and  made  an  in- 
strument of  disintegration,  is  that  the  record  of  his- 
tory, and  the  condition  of  progress  ?  Are  men  to 
grow  into  larger  and  larger  unities,  to  organize 
themselves  into  wider  communities,  in  order  to  co- 
operate for  war  on  a  larger  scale  ?  Every  stranger 
an  enemy,  and  every  one  of  unknown  speech  one  to 
be  attacked,  such  appeared  to  be  the  state  of  the 
human  race  at  one  time,  and  it  is  not  unusual  to-day. 
The  problem  is  to  think  out  how  this  process  will 
result  in  our  higher  civilization,  with  its  ethics,  philos- 
ophy, religion,  with  its  sense  of  the  value  of  the  in- 
dividual, and  of  the  worth  of  human  life.  It  is  a 
great  and  difficult  problem,  look  at  it  as  we  may. 

A  problem  less  difficult  may  occupy  us  first.  How 
shall  there  be  brought  into  existence  a  visible  com- 
munity of  men  and  women  united  together  in  such 
a  way  that  there  will  result  a  coordination  and  sub- 
ordination of  individuals  and  their  actions  toward 
some  common  end  that  belongs  to  all,  and  can  be 
enjoyed  by  each  .^  The  first  solution  of  the  problem 
is  the  family.  There  it  has  found  a  partial  solution, 
but  only  on  a  small  scale,  and  for  a  short  time.  The 
unity,  observe,  is  not  merely  organic  ;  if  it  is  to  exist 
at  all,  it  must  be  constituted  out  of  elements  so  far 
independent  of  each  other  as  to  be  individuals  who 


THE  MAKING    OF  MAN 


137 


can  move,  act,  think,  feel,  and  will  on  their  own  ac- 
count. In  other  words,  the  unity  must  be  consti- 
tuted on  rational  grounds  and  upheld  by  rational 
beings,  who  have  the  power  of  disrupting  at  their 
pleasure.  I  am  aware  that  the  social  contract  no 
longer  appears  in  philosophy,  and  aware,  also,  that 
constitutions  grow  and  are  not  manufactured.  I 
have  put  the  matter  as  I  did  merely  for  the  sake  of 
stating  the  problem,  and  of  enabling  us  to  realize 
what  a  problem  it  is.  Carlyle  puts  a  parallel  prob- 
lem, ''  Given  a  world  of  knaves,  to  deduce  an  honesty 
from  their  united  action."  Given  a  world  of  appar- 
ently disunited  beings,  how  will  you  train  them  to 
act  together,  to  care  for  a  common  interest,  and  to 
recognize  that  they  must  work  together,  if  they  are 
to  obtain  a  good  worth  having }  As  I  said,  the  first 
answer  is  the  family.  In  it  a  common  interest  is 
obvious,  and  feeling  and  affection  help  to  build  up 
this  unity  of  love  and  mutual  benefit. 

Beyond  the  family  there  are  again  obvious  com- 
mon ways  of  action,  and  bonds  of  union.  Trade, 
commerce,  union  for  a  temporary  purpose,  which 
requires  cooperation  and  mutual  trust  for  its  reahza- 
tion,  these  readily  occur  to  us  all.  Outside  of  partic- 
ular families,  and  yet  within  the  larger  unity  of  the 
state,  people  unite  themselves  in  a  thousand  ways 
for  different  ends,  drawn  together  because  they  form 
friendships  with  each  other,  or  united  because  they 
follow  a  common  pursuit.     These  bonds  are  volun- 


138  THEISM 

tarily  constituted,  and  are  all  the  stronger  and  more 
disinterested  on  that  account.  Within  the  larger 
society  there  may  be  many  people  associated  to- 
gether for  special  ends,  and  the  educative  power  of 
such  unions  may  be  great.  In  these  the  compulsory 
character  of  merely  natural  unions  slips  into  the 
background,  and  men  learn  that  though  they  have 
formed  bonds  for  themselves,  they  are  not  less  bound, 
but  more.  Along  the  line  of  such  association  freely 
formed,  and  carried  out  with  honour  and  fideUty,  is 
to  be  found  a  large  part  of  the  moral  education  of 
mankind.  For  the  need  is  to  prevent  the  gift  of 
reason  from  being  merely  the  addition  of  a  disruptive 
element  to  life. 

That  such  a  view  of  the  quality  which  distin- 
guishes man  from  other  animals  may  be  taken  is 
quite  apparent.  It  has  been  taken  by  the  possess- 
ors themselves,  and,  also,  by  those  who  have  spec- 
ulated on  the  question.  By  the  possessors  them- 
selves, for,  as  we  have  seen,  it  is  one  of  the  hardest 
problems  that  have  emerged  in  history  to  persuade 
men  that  a  selfish  use  of  reason  is  irrational.  It 
seems  almost  to  be  a  law  of  history  that  only  one 
good  result  can  be  won  at  one  time.  Human  growth 
seems  to  be  made  by  the  process  of  laying  emphasis 
on  one  thing  at  a  time,  to  the  neglect  of  another 
which  in  the  long  run  is  of  equal  importance.  It 
would  almost  seem  that  in  order  that  a  truth  may 
be  recognized  at  all,  it  must  be  emphasized  as  if  it 


THE  MAKING    OF  MAN  1 39 

were  the  whole  truth.  The  immediate  ilkistration 
of  this  law  is  that  of  the  relation  of  the  individual 
to  society.  In  order  that  the  individual  may  learn 
to  know  that  he  is  little  in  himself,  apart  from  his 
fellows,  the  way  of  his  training,  as  we  see  it  in  his- 
tory, is  to  bind  him  with  his  fellows  in  so  drastic  a 
fashion  that  he  is  scarcely  able  to  make  any  move- 
ment on  his  own  account. 

Rules  gird  him  about,  customs  cluster  around  him, 
his  feeling,  thought,  action,  are  prescribed  for  him, 
and  apparently  for  him  there  is  no  initiative,  and 
scarcely  any  independent  course.  Actions  are  done 
because  others  have  done  them,  observances  are  held 
because  they  have  been  handed  down,  and  in  all 
the  round  of  the  experience  of  every  day  the  course 
is  prescribed.  Certain  trades  are  hereditary;  men 
are  bound  to  live  and  work  as  their  fathers  did; 
castes  are  formed;  in  fact,  illustrations  of  this  are 
so  numerous  that  it  is  not  needful  to  enter  into 
detail.  Formed  as  they  were  in  the  early  ages  of 
the  human  race,  they  must  from  the  nature  of  the 
case  be  rude,  irrational,  and  inadequate.  But  it  may 
have  been  the  only  way  of  teaching  the  rational 
being  the  necessity  of  recognizing  the  wider  claims 
of  reason.  As  obedience  was  the  way  of  fitting  a 
man  for  the  responsibility  of  command,  so  the  way 
of  teaching  the  individual  the  responsibility  attached 
to  rationahty  as  such,  was  to  bind  him  in  bonds 
which  almost  rendered  disobedience  impossible.     At 


140  THEISM 

all  events  that  has  been  the  historical  method  of 
training  the  rational  being  and  of  teaching  him  the 
right  use  of  reason. 

As  at  one  time  the  making  of  rules  for  the  guid- 
ance of  man  seemed  to  be  the  main  object  of  society, 
there  came  a  time  when  the  breaking  of  rules,  shown 
to  be  inadequate,  and  the  criticism  of  beliefs  proven 
to  be  without  evidence,  came  to  be  the  highest  duty 
of  man.     The  making  of  rules,  as  well  as  the  break- 
ing of  them,  was  alike  the  work  of  the  rational  being. 
Late  in  human  history  came  the  recognition  of  the 
fact  that  rules  were  made  for  man,  not  man  for  rules. 
To  put  it  more  clearly,  the  discovery  of  the  individual 
person  and  his  worth  appears  as  one  of  the    latest 
achievements  of  man.     We  might  write  a  philosophy 
of  history  from  this  point  of  view.     We  might    set 
forth  the  strenuous  work  of  the  earliest  races  of  the 
human  family  to  subdue  the  merely  selfish  rational 
being    and    make    him    subject    to    the    dominating 
claims    of    the    whole.      The    success    of    that    task 
might  seem  to  be  almost  too  complete.     Then  there 
might  be  set  forth  the  slow  process  of  the  emancipa- 
tion of  the  individual  from  the  chains  and  shackles 
forged  for  him  by  the  rules,  traditions,  and  customs 
of  society. 

How  many  mighty  movements  of  the  historic  ages 
converge  toward  this  end!  For  us  modern  men 
the  mightiest  are  Rome,  Greece,  and  Palestine.  The 
great  structure  of  Roman  law  is  one  of  the  mig-htiest 


THE  MAKING    OF  MAN  I4I 

achievements  of  the  human  mind.  Its  vast  and  ma- 
jestic form  stands  at  the  beginning  of  our  modern 
civiUzation,  and,  in  its  completeness,  it  sets  forth  and 
vindicates  the  mutual  coordination  of  all  in  the  one 
great  system  in  which  both  gods  and  men  had  their 
place  and  their  part.  Each  person  had  his  position 
and  his  rights,  and  these  could  be  vindicated  if  any 
one  encroached  on  them.  Much  might  be  said  on 
this  were  there  time.  Alongside  of  the  debt  we  owe 
to  Rome  is  the  debt  we  owe  to  Greece.  The  philoso- 
phy of  Greece,  its  reflection  on  nature,  on  art,  on  the 
city-state,  on  man  as  a  thinker,  on  man  as  an  indi- 
vidual, as  a  member  of  the  state,  as  a  being  free  and 
yet  under  law  ;  in  fact,  all  the  mighty  achievements  of 
Greece  in  science  and  philosophy  were  elements  for 
the  solution  of  the  great  problem  of  the  relation  of 
man  to  men  and  of  men  to  man.  But  not  from  Rome 
nor  from  Greece  did  the  greatest  service  come  toward 
the  recognition  of  the  worth  of  the  individual.  To 
another  people  much  is  due,  and  from  another  source 
did  the  greatest  influence  toward  the  emancipation 
of  the  individual  from  the  irrational  bonds  that  bound 
him  come.  From  the  Hebrews,  too,  came  the  recog- 
nition of  the  immense  worth  of  the  individual  life  and 
of  the  contribution  which  the  individual  might  make 
to  the  worth  of  humanity.  It  was  from  the  Hebrews 
that  the  largest  contribution  came,  the  worth  of  which 
we  shall  not  attempt  now  to  measure.  From  Rome, 
Greece,  and  Palestine  came  those  mighty  influences 


142  THEISM 

that  moulded  man,  and  fitted  him  to  ask  the  question 
of  how  society  is  to  be  built  up,  without  the  sacrifice  of 
the  individuality  of  the  individual.  Notwithstanding 
the  mighty  influences  of  these  historic  peoples,  and 
notwithstanding  the  new  spirit  that  breathed  over  man 
at  the  advent  of  Christianity,  it  was  a  long  time  before 
men  consciously  faced  the  question,  —  of  the  relation  of 
man  to  men.  When  it  was  raised  by  Descartes  in  his 
own  way,  and  when  he  asked  for  a  rational  sanction 
for  everything  that  he  could  question,  he  opened  the 
way  for  a  reaction  that  isolated  the  individual,  insisted 
on  his  independent  worth,  and  actually  left  the  notion 
of  society  out  of  account.  It  was  a  time  great  in  ab- 
stractions :  an  abstract  mind  was  beside  an  abstract 
body,  and  men  made  for  themselves  the  great  problem 
of  getting  body  and  mind  again  in  relation.  It  was 
a  time,  too,  when  men  looked  at  everything  as  fixed, 
static,  unchangeably  determined  in  its  own  nature, 
and  the  problem  is  like  the  problem  of  biology  to- 
day, —  how  to  get  the  organism  back  into  unity  after 
they  have  disrupted  it  into  fragments. 

So,  also,  with  regard  to  the  relation  of  the  indi- 
vidual to  society,  men  had  to  invent  ways  of  restoring 
the  lost  unity.  The  abstract  individual  restored  to 
some  recognition  of  his  relative  independence,  had 
his  revenge  on  the  society  which  had  enslaved  him. 
So,  too,  the  abstract  individual  set  his  discoverers  to  a 
task  harder  than  ever  was  Egyptian  bondage.  Given 
the  abstract  individual  in  his  completeness  and  inde- 


THE  MAKING    OF  MAN  1 43 

pendence,  to  construct  society,  that  was  the  problem 
of  a  philosophy  which  started  from  the  individual. 
It  would  be  long  to  tell  the  story  of  the  social  con- 
tracts, of  the  liberty,  equality,  and  fraternity ;  of  the 
devices  which  were  set  forth  as  the  way  in  which  so- 
ciety was  constituted  out  of  independent  individuals. 
It  was  a  reaction  against  that  method  which  neglected 
the  individual,  which  made  him  merely  a  link  in  a 
chain,  and  gave  him  no  position  of  worth  in  relation 
to  society.  But  like  all  reactions  it  went  too  far.  It 
in  its  turn  neglected  the  other  factor. 

The  literature  of  the  Aufklarung  is  instructive  in 
many  ways.  Nor  are  we  done  with  it  yet.  It  is  with 
us  to-day  on  our  side  of  the  water,  and,  perhaps,  on 
your  side  too.  From  it,  in  particular,  we  have  got 
those  definitions  of  reason  and  rationaUsm  which  have 
made  it  seem  to  be  the  private  property  of  the  indi- 
vidual, which  has  set  it  in  opposition  to  other  parts 
of  human  nature,  and  given  occasion  to  the  contrarie- 
ties of  reason  and  faith,  reason  and  authority,  and 
of  other  contradictions  within  human  nature,  which 
have  played  a  great  part  in  modern  thought.  Of 
course,  if  you  begin  with  the  individual,  whether  it  be 
an  individual  atom,  or  anything  else,  you  can  scarcely 
persuade  the  individual  to  become  part  of  a  system. 
It  is  easy  to  take  a  watch  to  pieces,  it  takes  a  skilled 
workman  to  put  it  together  again.  Starting  as  it  did 
from  the  individual,  laying  stress  on  his  separateness 
and  isolation  as  it  did,  the  philosophy  of   individu- 


144  THEISM 

alism  had  to  fall  back  on  artificial  ways  in  order  to 
restore  somehow  the  social  unity  which  it  had  dis- 
rupted. It  was  the  counterpart  of  the  previous  age- 
long movement  that  had  resulted  in  the  suppression 
of  the  individual.  It  did  a  good  work  for  human 
thought  in  laying  emphasis  on  the  neglected  factor. 
It  taught  us  that  if  we  are  to  understand  ourselves 
and  our  cosmical  position,  we  must  travel  from  society 
to  the  individual,  and  from  the  individual  to  society, 
and  not  till  we  have  done  both  shall  we  be  prepared 
to  make  that  synthesis  which  shall  recognize  that  each 
is  for  the  other,  in  the  other,  and  that  taken  apart 
they  fall  into  meaninglessness. 

Leaving  for  subsequent  treatment  the  conception 
of  personality,  let  us  set  ourselves  to  think  of  the 
largest  unity  we  have  yet  reached.  Humanity  is 
one,  subsisting  in  real  connection  of  whole  and  part 
from  the  first  appearance  of  man  until  the  present 
day ;  all  the  generations  are  linked  together  in  un- 
broken sequence,  and  each  generation  adds  to  the  tra- 
dition of  its  predecessors ;  it  is  a  great  thought,  but 
one  that  we  can  scarcely  think.  Yet  it  is  true  and 
real  that  the  words  I  use  in  order  to  convey  my 
thought  to  you  actually  have  been  formed  by  the 
mental  striving  of  all  men  who  have  lived  and 
worked  on  the  earth.  The  instruments  I  use  from 
day  to  day  to  do  my  work  are  a  direct  inheritance 
handed  down  from  the  first  tool-maker.  The  ship 
on   which    I    voyaged    to   these   Western    shores   is 


THE  MAKING   OF  MAN  I45 

descended  from  the  rude  canoe  which  first  made 
the  water  that  separates  land  from  land  to  serve 
as  a  way  of  communication.  The  mighty  machin- 
ery of  to-day  which  places  all  the  resources  of  the 
planet  at  the  service  of  every  man,  is  the  fruit  of 
that  inventive  faculty  displayed  by  the  earliest  work- 
ers of  mankind. 

These  things  come  first  to  mind  as  we  seek  for 
illustrations  of  the  solidarity  of  man.  But,  while 
they  are  the  most  obvious,  they  are  not  the  strongest 
or  the  most  vivid  of  such  illustrations.  The  emotions 
of  men  are  of  the  same  kind  from  the  beginning 
until  now.  Pain  and  pleasure  are  sought  and  avoided 
all  through  the  ages,  and  desire  and  aversion  are 
still  the  motives  which  spur  to  action.  No  doubt 
the  experiences  of  the  ages  have  enriched  the  con- 
tents of  the  emotions,  if  they  have  not  changed 
their  character.  Nor  has  the  intellectual  character 
changed  through  the  ages,  however  much  the 
settled  data  on  which  intellect  works  have  been 
increased.  Man  is  one  through  all  time,  and  the 
connections  between  the  successive  generations  are 
exceedingly  close.  The  first  emotions,  desires,  af- 
fections of  men  have  flowered  and  come  to  the  fruit 
they  bear  to-day,  and  the  earliest  experience  of  good 
and  evil  has  had  in  it  the  great  ethical  principles 
which  guide  the  action  of  the  wisest  and  best  to 
this  hour. 

Nor  do  we  find  anything  different  as  we  question 

L 


146  THEISM 

the   philosophies   of   the   past   and    present.      Long 
ago  appeared  the  materiahst,  the  positivist,  and  the 
idealist.      The  primitive   man   looked   at   the   world 
outside,  and  seemed  to  think  of    himself    simply  as 
part  of  that  world,  determined  by  it,  and  made  by 
it.     Ere  reflection  following    on    action   taught   him 
to  know  himself  as  a  source  of  energy,  he  regarded 
himself,  so  far  as  he  had  thought  at  all,  as  a  product 
of  the  world  outside.     Nor  is  that  way  of  thinking 
dead  yet.     Uniformities  of  succession  generate  uni- 
formities of  thought,  we  are  told,  and  the  advocate 
of   that  view  spends  volumes   to   prove  that  matter 
makes  mind,  and  necessities  of  matter  may  be  trans- 
formed into  mental   necessities.     To  look  at  matter 
as  first  and  causal,  and  productive  of  mind,  has  been 
always  with  men,  and  still  is  here,  and  the  unity  of 
thinking  is  so  far  proven.     But  the  idealist  view  did 
not  linger  far  behind.     For  soon  the  early  man  found 
that  he  could  do  something  and  be  something.     He 
knew  himself  as  a  worker,  as  one  that  had  feelings, 
desires,  wants,  and  who  could   take    steps  to  carry 
out  his  wishes ;  thus  the  world  became  transformed 
before  his  mind,  and  became  a  world  figured  in  his 
own  likeness.     So  the  great  ideal  philosophies  took 
their  beginning,  and  these  also   appear  perennially, 
for  they,  too,  have  their  roots  deep  down  in  the  spirit- 
ual nature  of  man.     From  the  beginning  men  have 
asked  the  same  questions,  and  they  will  continue  to 
ask  them  to  the  end.     The  answers  to  these   ques- 


THE  MAKING    OF  MAN 


147 


tions  make  up  the  science,  the  ethics,  the  philosophy, 
and  the  theology  of  the  world. 

I  deal  with  the  questions  and  the  answers  in  order 
to  illustrate  the  theme  I  have  in  hand,  namely,  the 
unity  of  man.  However  great  the  advance  that  has 
been  made,  however  wide  our  knowledge,  and  how- 
ever great  our  command  over  the  forces  of  nature, 
the  advance  itself  is  a  testimony  to  the  unity  of  that 
human  nature  to  which  it  is  due.  Physically,  morally, 
and  intellectually  man  is  one.  We  shall  not  find 
the  union  to  be  constituted,  as  the  organism  is  con- 
stituted, by  physical  bonds.  To  understand  the  unity 
of  man  in  any  adequate  way,  we  must  transcend  the 
physical  and  the  visible,  and  seek  the  bond  of  union 
in  the  invisible,  that  is,  in  the  intellectual,  moral,  and 
spiritual,  or,  to  use  the  word  which  includes  all  these, 
in  the  rational  sphere. 

The  demand  which  reason  makes  on  reason  to 
think  humanity  as  a  unity  is  confessedly  great,  and 
it  is  difficult  to  say  whether  we  can  think  it  so.  It 
is  difficult  to  think  of  the  past  generations  of  men 
in  their  concrete  reality ;  it  is  difficult  to  think  the 
people  living  in  their  concrete  reality  at  the  present 
hour,  and  it  is  scarcely  possible  to  realize  at  all  the 
generations  yet  to  be.  When  we  try  to  realize  the 
past,  we  break  it  up  into  histories  of  nations,  of  in- 
stitutions, of  philosophies,  of  religions,  and  so  on, 
and  perhaps  that  is  the  best  we  can  do.  But  we 
ought  to  remember  that  all  these  histories  are  only 


148  THEISM 

aspects  of  the  great  reality  that  has  been,  and  has 
been  acted  in  sorrow,  trial,  and  suffering  in  the  lives 
and  acts  of  men  on  this  round  earth.  At  all  events, 
this  thought  should  make  us  a  little  more  humble, 
a  little  less  sure  as  to  the  conclusions  we  draw  from 
our  reasonings  and  philosophies  —  the  unity  of  man 
is  there  whether  we  can  think  it  or  no.  And  in  a 
measure  we  can  think  it,  at  least  so  far  as  to  recog- 
nize that  it  is  there. 

We  may  rise  to  the  magnitude  of  the  thought 
slowly  and  gradually.  From  the  family  to  the  tribe, 
from  the  tribe  to  the  city,  from  the  state-city  to  the 
state,  from  the  state  to  the  great  federal  union,  and 
from  the  great  federal  union  to  the  federation  of  the 
world,  and  to  the  recognition  of  the  fact  that  God 
has  made  of  one  blood  all  the  nations  of  the  earth. 
In  some  way  we  must  rise  to  this  magnitude  if  we 
are  to  understand  the  problem  which  we  set  to  our- 
selves. It  is  easier  to  grasp  the  lesser  unities  in 
our  thought,  and  to  apprehend  the  significance  of 
the  family  and  so  on;  but  our  thought  cannot  rest 
until  we  recognize  the  larger  unity  in  which  these 
lesser  unities  are.  Nor  can  we  recognize  fully  our 
own  significance  as  moral  beings  existing  here  and 
now,  unless  we  see  in  a  measure  our  relations  to  all 
the  rational  beings  which  have  been  and  shall  be. 
It  is  the  business  of  reason  to  realize  relations  and 
to  act  on  the  recognition  of  them.  Nor  will  the 
recognition  of  these  invisible  but  real   bonds  which 


THE  MAKING    OF  MAN  1 49 

bind  US  to  the  past  of  humanity  be  without  influence 
on  our  thought,  character,  and  conduct. 

I  am  aware  that  in  this  contention  of  mine  I  am 
running  the  risk  of  contradiction  by  many  of  our  fore- 
most workers  in  philosophy.     Professor  Wallace  says  : 
*'  The  rule  for  man  is  not  merely  to  accept  the  given, 
but  to  mould  and  fashion   it   for   himself.     In    him 
nothing  merely  is ;  it  is  to  be ;  it  has  taken  on  it  a  new 
law,  the  law  of  becoming,  as  the  law  which  governs 
him  and  the  things  he  deals  with.     With  his  emer- 
gence on  the  scene,  the  world   has,  as  it  were,  got 
a  new  relative  centre;    all  things  have  become,  or, 
rather,  are  more  and  more  becoming,  anthropocen- 
tric."    ("  Natural  Theology  and  Ethics,"  p.  112.)    Pro- 
fessor James,  of  Harvard,  to  whom  we  all  owe  so 
much,  for  he  has  shown  how  philosophy  may  also  be 
literature,  says,  in  an  oft-quoted  passage,  which  also 
he  has  quoted  from  himself:  "We  have  no  organ  or 
faculty  to  appreciate  the  simply  given  order.     The 
real  world  as  it  is  given  objectively  at  this  moment  is 
the  sum  total  of  all  its  beings  and  events  now.     But 
can  we  think  of  such  a  sum }     Can  we  realize  for  an 
instant   what   a   cross-section    of    all  existence  at  a 
definite  point  of  time  would  be.?     While  I  talk  and 
the  flies  buzz,  a  sea-gull  catches  a  sea  fish  at  the 
mouth  of  the  Amazon,  a  tree  falls  in  the  Adirondack 
wilderness,  a  man  sneezes  in  Germany,  a  horse  dies 
in  Tartary,  and  twins  are   born    in   France.     What 
does  that  mean  1     Does  the  contemporaneity  of  these 


-I50  THEISM 

events  with  one  another,  and  with  a  million  others  as 
disjointed,  form  a  rational  bond  between  them,  and 
unite  them  into  anything  that  means  for  us  a  world  ? 
Yet  such  a  collateral  contemporaneity,  and  nothing 
else,  is  the  real  order  of  the  world.  It  is  an  order 
with  which  we  have  nothing  to  do  but  to  get  away 
from  it  as  fast  as  possible.  As  I  said,  we  break  it ;  we 
break  it  into  histories,  and  we  break  it  into  arts,  and 
we  break  it  into  sciences ;  and  then  we  begin  to  feel 
at  home."  ("  The  Will  to  Believe,"  pp.  1 18-9.)  Pres- 
ident Hyde  quotes  the  passage  from  Professor  James 
and  adds  :  "The  passage  from  Professor  James  shows 
that  the  world  in  which  we  live  is  a  construction  made 
by  the  mind  in  the  interest  of  the  heart  and  will :  and 
that  'in  this  one  great  world  there  are  subordinate 
worlds  of  history,  science,  and  art.  It  shows  how 
utterly  unintelHgible  and  uninhabitable  and  unendur- 
able a  real  as  opposed  to  an  ideal  world  would  be ;  and 
that  practical  idealism  is  simply  a  presentation  of  the 
familiar  facts  of  everyday  hfe  in  their  rational  rela- 
tions, as  elements  in  a  logical  process  and  parts  of  an 
organic  whole."  ("Practical  Idealism,"  pp.  5-6.)  Mr. 
Herbert  Spencer  has  a  passage  in  which  he  enume- 
rates a  number  of  simultaneous  occurrences  happen- 
ing at  the  same  moment,  and  his  inference  is  that  the 
unknowable  power  must  be  something  higher  than 
intelligence,  for  no  intelligence  could  endure  so  heavy 
a  strain.  Thus  from  HegeHans,  Non-Hegelians,  and 
agnostics  there  is  a  consensus  of  opinion  which  seems 


THE  MAKING    OF  MAN  I5I 

to  condemn  my  argument  as  it  has  been  set  forth  up 
to  this  time. 

I  find  myself  in  agreement  with  these  authorities 
in  so  far  as  they  set  forth  the  necessity  under  which 
we  He  as  to  the  breaking  up  of  things,  and  the  fact 
that  the  world  we  live  in  is  constituted  by  our  own 
activity.  We  do  and  we  must  break  up  things ;  but 
then  we  do  and  we  must  unite  the  breakages  into  a 
unity  again,  and  make  them  as  hke  the  original  unity 
as  we  can.  In  fact.  Professor  James  does  this  very 
thing  himself  in  the  sequel  to  the  passage  we  have 
quoted.  '*  We  make  ten  thousand  separate  serial 
orders  of  it,  and  on  any  one  of  these  we  react  as 
though  the  others  did  not  exist.  We  discover  among 
its  various  parts  relations  that  were  never  given  to 
sense  at  all  (mathematical  relations,  tangents,  squares, 
and  roots,  and  logarithmic  functions),  and  out  of  an 
infinite  number  of  these  we  call  certain  ones  essential 
and  lawgiving,  and  ignore  the  rest.  Essential  these 
relations  are,  but  only  for  otir  purpose,  the  other 
relation  being  just  as  real  and  present  as  they,  and 
our  purpose  is  to  conceive  simply  and  to  foresee. 
Are  not  simple  conception  and  prevision  subjective 
ends  pure  and  simple }  They  are  the  ends  of 
what  we  call  science ;  and  the  miracle  of  miracles 
—  a  miracle  not  yet  exhaustively  cleared  up  by 
any  philosophy  —  is  that  the  given  order  lends  it- 
self to  the  remodelling.  It  shows  itself  plastic  to 
many  of  our  scientific,  to  many  of  our  aesthetic,  to 


152  THEISM 

many  of  our  practical  purposes  and  ends."  (pp. 
119-20.) 

It  is  a  striking  paragraph,  eloquently  and  felici- 
tously expressed,  and  yet  a  great  deal  is  implied  in 
it  which  has  not  found  expression.  The  thousand 
separate  serial  orders  can  be  made  by  us,  because 
there  is  one  order  lying  at  the  basis  of  them,  as  the 
condition  of  their  possibility.  If  some  seem  to  re- 
spond, as  we  react  on  them,  as  if  the  others  do  not 
exist,  the  response  is  not  complete,  but  measured 
and  conditioned  by  the  others,  and  we,  perhaps,  un- 
consciously, make  allowance  in  our  reaction  for  their 
existence  and  their  influence.  Illustrations  of  this 
have  been  given  already,  and  we  need  not  repeat 
them  here.  I  confess  that  it  is  difficult  to  follow 
Professor  James  when  he  asks,  "Are  not  simple 
conception  and  prevision  subjective  ends  pure  and 
simple  .''  "  What,  then,  becomes  of  the  objectivity  of 
science,  and  of  the  fact  that  nature  will  carry  out  our 
purpose,  if  we  can  intelligently  instruct  her  to  do  so } 
We  at  once  get  back  the  objectivity  of  science  in  the 
miracle  of  miracles  which  no  philosophy  has  yet  ex- 
haustively cleared  up.  The  given  order  lends  itself 
to  the  remodelling.  Yes,  but  that  is  only  one-half 
of  the  story.  The  remodelling  would  do  well  to  lend 
itself  to  the  given  order. 

In  truth,  there  seems  to  lie  at  the  basis  of  the  view 
of  Professor  James  a  kind  of  belief  that  there  is  an 
irrational,  contingent,  and  irreducible  element  in  the 


THE  MAKING    OF  MAN  1 53 

given  order.  Hence  the  way  in  which  he  piles  up 
the  number  of  events  which  happen  contemporane- 
ously all  over  the  world,  which  we  cannot  reduce  to 
any  order.  The  number  might  be  indefinitely  in- 
creased, and  the  impression  made  by  them  might 
also  be  multiplied.  It  is  quite  true  that  we  have  to 
make  our  selection  out  of  the  actualities  of  the  world, 
if  we  are  to  understand  its  ongoing  at  all.  But  the 
talk  goes  on  as  if  the  world  were  unintelligible  until 
we  came  into  it.  We  speak  as  if  we  constitute  the 
order  of  the  world,  and  as  if  the  rationality  of  the 
world  depended  on  our  remodelling  of  it.  I  venture 
humbly  but  emphatically  to  enter  my  dissent.  The 
thousand  serial  separate  orders  which  we  make  of 
the  world  are  possible  because  the  relations  are 
there  already,  and,  while  in  a  sense  we  make  them, 
we  in  a  truer  sense  simply  recognize  them.  How  is 
it  that  our  separate  serial  orders  are  always  under- 
going reconstruction,  and  our  histories  of  science, 
literature,  art,  philosophy,  need  ever  to  be  rewritten, 
if  it  were  not  for  the  necessity  of  bringing  our  serial 
orders  into  closer  conformity  to  the  given  order } 

Take  the  works  of  science,  and  let  us  ask  ourselves 
what  is  their  history  ?  Is  it  not  true  that  the  great- 
est and  most  severe  critic  of  science  is  just  the  given 
order.?  The  conceptions  of  physics  and  chemistry 
have  been  recast  within  our  own  time.  The  old  ter- 
minology has  almost  passed  into  abeyance,  and  the 
talk  now  is  in  terms  of  energy  and  evolution.     The 


154  THEISM 

world  of  science  presents  another  aspect  at  the 
end  of  this  century  from  that  which  it  ever  had 
before.  If  it  is  the  business  of  science  to  conceive 
simply  and  to  foresee,  then  it  fulfils  that  function 
more  completely  than  before.  Why  t  Because  it 
tries  to  see  the  thing  and  its  working  as  they  are 
in  the  given  order.  It  tries  to  see,  as  Clerk  Max- 
well said  in  his  youth,  the  "particular  go"  of  the 
thing.  There  is  a  standard  and  a  goal  for  science, 
and  that  standard  would  seem  to  be  the  recognition 
and  the  statement  of  the  rationality  of  the  given 
order. 

While  this  is  true  of  the  physical  sciences,  it  is 
still  more  true  of  the  sciences  which  deal  with  man. 
In  those  sciences,  we  have  to  deal  not  only  with  the 
immanent  rationality  of  the  world,  which  manifests 
itself  as  irreversible  and  irresistible  order,  but  with 
the  manifestations  of  finite  intelligence  which  is  on 
the  way  to  realize  itself.  Histories  of  knowledge, 
ethics,  philosophy,  and  religion  deal,  as  one  might 
say,  with  rationality  in  the  making.  The  making  of 
a  finite  rational  being  seems  to  be  a  long  and  costly 
work.  Account  is  to  be  taken  of  the  ultimate 
rationality  of  the  world,  and  also  of  the  tentative 
efforts  of  the  finite  being  who  has  to  make  his  own 
world.  But  we  should  never  be  able  to  make  the 
worlds  in  which  we  dwell,  in  each  of  which  there  is  a 
centre  and  circumference  relative  to  the  individual, 
if  there  were  not  in  each  of  us  a  trust  that  in  the 


THE   MAKING    OF  MAN  1 55 

larger  world,  which  includes  the  separate  serial  worlds, 
there  is  a  rationality  as  much  greater  than  ours  as  the 
real  world  is  greater  than  our  ideal  worlds. 

Each  of  us  is  equal  to  the  world  which  we  have 
constructed  for  ourselves.  Everything  in  that  world 
is  relative  to  the  person  who  was  active  in  the 
making  of  it.  May  we  not  suppose  a  rational 
intelUgence  for  which  the  world  is,  and  to  which  all 
the  simultaneous  and  successive  changes  may  be 
present  as  really  as  the  world  of  our  experience  is 
to  ourselves  1  May  not  the  given  order  be  the 
rational  order  after  all,  and  our  serial  editions  of  it 
be  simply  attempts  after  something  not  yet  seen  by 
us  1  At  all  events  the  statement  that  the  real  is  the 
rational  is  a  proposition  for  which  a  good  deal  may 
be  said. 

So  we  come  back  to  our  proposition  that  we  must 
strive  to  rise  to  the  thought  of  the  wider  and  wider 
unities  that  meet  us  as  we  read  the  unfolding  history 
of  the  world.  We  must  try  to  think  things  together, 
and  not  merely  in  the  separate  serials  presented  to 
us  for  our  easier  reading.  We  must  try  to  think 
things  together,  for  they  are  together.  Our  serials 
may  be  useful  and  profitable  reading,  if  we  remember 
that  they  must  be  bound  together  and  read  together 
if  we  are  to  reach  the  goal.  Even  then  they  must 
be  read  only  as  approximations  to  the  great  reality. 
The  great  order  of  the  world  has  made  room  for  the 
order  which  a  rational  being  constructs  for  himself 


1 56  THEISM 

within  it;  it  would  be  strange  if  the  rational  being 
were  to  conclude  that  there  was  no  reason  in  the 
world  until  he  put  it  there.  The  response  which 
the  world  makes  to  our  intelligent  efforts,  the  plas- 
ticity of  the  world  under  our  remodelling  hand,  looks 
as  if  provision  were  made  in  the  nature  of  things  for 
the  advent  of  such  a  being  as  man.  At  all  events, 
it  is  true  that  a  rational  being  has  found  a  place  in 
the  system  of  things,  and  has  room  and  freedom  to 
work  there. 

The  race  of  rational  beings  has  lived  and  worked 
here  for  a  long  time,  and  has  left  traces  of  them- 
selves and  their  work.  They  have  transformed  the 
place  in  which  they  have  lived,  have  made  for  them- 
selves a  home  in  it.  The  fruits  of  the  earth  have 
been  modified  to  meet  their  wants,  the  plants  have 
taken  on  new  forms  to  gratify  their  taste  and  to  feed 
and  clothe  them,  the  winds  of  heaven  serve  their 
pleasure,  fire  has  become  their  servant,  and  the 
lightnings  carry  their  messages.  Cities  have  risen 
at  their  command,  and,  while  they  have  subdued 
the  earth  to  their  purpose,  they  have  themselves 
grown  from  more  to  more.  They  have  worked  on 
the  same  lines  from  the  first  to  the  last,  only  with  an 
intelligence  that  has  grown  with  the  demand  made 
on  it.  They  have  left  the  record  of  their  hopes, 
fears,  beliefs,  aims,  and  purposes,  and  have  enabled 
us  to  see  how  they  looked  on  the  heavens  above,  and 
the  earth  beneath  ;  what  they  thought  of   the  past. 


THE  MAKING    OF  MAN  I  57 

the  present,  and  the  future.  We  know  how  they 
regarded  the  great  mystery  of  existence,  and  we 
can  read  their  growing  apprehension  of  the  great- 
ness of  the  world  in  which  they  lived.  Is  it  any 
wonder  that  we  are  constrained  to  think  of  them  as 
a  unity } 

Here,  too,  may  come  forth  considerations  similar 
to  those  which  Professor  James  set  forth  in  another 
connection.  We  may  be  told  that  we  have  no  organ 
to  grasp  so  large  a  unity.  If  we  cannot  grasp  the 
contemporaneity,  how  shall  we  grasp  the  contem- 
poraneity and  the  succession,  too.-*  And  yet  it 
must  somehow  be  grasped,  for  we  all  recognize  it 
as  a  fact.  If  we  begin  with  any  unity  in  which  we 
may  imagine  ourselves  to  be  placed,  we  shall  find 
ourselves  pushed  in  thought  on  and  on  till  we  are 
face  to  face  with  the  whole  race  as  they  have  existed 
in  space  and  in  time.  Our  thought  refuses  to  be 
shut  up  in  compartments.  Begin  where  we  stand 
with  any  individual  now  present,  and  from  him  we 
shall  be  thrust  forth  to  the  thought  of  this  great 
city,  and  of  all  the  complex  relations  which  make  up 
the  history  and  the  present  constitution  of  this  city. 
From  the  city  we  shall  be  driven  in  thought  to  the 
state,  and  to  the  great  nation  of  which  it  forms  an 
integral  part.  Then  our  thought  will  find  no  resting 
place  until  we  think  of  the  relations  of  this  state  to 
the  other  states  of  the  world.  You  cannot  write  a 
history  of  the  United  States  without  a  glance  at  the 


158  THEISM 

countries  on  the  other  side  from  which  your  fore- 
fathers came ;  you  cannot  explain  your  ethics,  phi- 
losophy, religion,  without  regard  to  the  rock  whence 
you  are  hewn,  and  the  ancestral  traits  you  carried 
with  you  to  your  home  here.  No  doubt  you  have 
also  made  your  own  contribution  to  the  thought 
and  life  of  men  —  a  contribution  which  grows  larger 
every  day. 

The  matter  in  hand  is  that  you  cannot  begin 
anywhere  without  assuming  in  your  thought  the 
whole  history  of  mankind.  And  you  cannot  con- 
tinue thinking  to  any  purpose  without  the  postulate 
of  the  larger  unity  of  the  human  race  which  un- 
derlies all  your  thinking.  It  may  not  have  come 
clearly  before  your  consciousness,  but  as  soon  as  it 
is  pointed  out,  we  all  recognize  that  it  has  been 
the  tacit  assumption  of  all  of  us.  So  I  am  not  to 
be  debarred  from  the  use  of  this  unity  of  man  by 
any  difficulty  which  may  be  brought  against  my 
power  adequately  to  conceive  it.  Difficulties  as 
great,  and,  in  the  opinion  of  some,  as  insuperable, 
can  be  brought  against  the  conception  of  any  unity 
whatsoever.  You  have  only  to  read  "Appearance 
and  Reality,"  by  Mr.  F.  H.  Bradley,  to  find  as  fine 
an  assortment  of  difficulties  as  can  be  found  in 
any  place  in  the  world.  The  difficulties  are  perplex- 
ing enough,  whether  you  speak  of  time,  or  space, 
or  self,  or  of  anything  else  which  you  think  as 
one.     In   this   related   world   you  can  never  take  a 


THE   MAKING    OF  MAN  1 59 

thing  out  of  its  relations,  for,  as  soon  as  you  bring 
in  the  relations,  it  may  be  shown  that  you  have 
broken  up  the  unity.  It  may  be  shown  that  you 
have  no  right  to  speak  of  the  weight  of  any  par- 
ticular body,  for  when  you  do,  you  are  simply 
speaking  of  a  relation  which  this  particular  thing 
has  to  all  the  things  which  make  up  the  universe. 
In  fact,  difficulties  arise  when  we  speak  of  any 
unity  in  which  differences  occur,  and  which  is 
made  up  of  differences.  There  is  no  greater  in- 
herent difficulty  in  thinking  of  a  unity  made  up  of 
many  differences,  than  there  is  in  thinking  of  a 
unity  made  up  of  a  few. 

It  is  quite  true  that  thought  cannot  rest  until 
it  reaches  a  final  unity  in  which  all  existence  finds 
its  place,  which  will,  also,  give  to  every  difference  a 
place  and  a  function  in  the  unity  of  all.  Thought 
ever  tends  that  way,  and  many  have  been  the  at- 
tempts made  to  find  a  unity  of  that  kind.  We  are 
not  yet  ready  for  the  consideration  of  these.  We 
are  familiarizing  ourselves  with  the  wider  and 
wider  unities  which  have  met  our  view  as  w^  fol- 
lowed the  history  of  the  world  set  forth  t(5  -us  by 
science.  We  have  come  in  man  to  a  new  kind  of 
unity,  which  in  many  ways  has  transcended  those 
we  met  before.  Not  merely  an  organic  unity,  nor 
a  mechanical  unity  held  together  by  pressure,  but 
a  unity  of  independent,  self-guided,  rational  beings, 
held  together  by  an  inward  motive,  and  bound  by 


l6o  THEISM 

bonds  which  are  moral  and  spiritual.  Constituted 
for  each  individual  by  descent,  tradition,  upbringing, 
education,  family,  and  social  intercourse,  it  has  to 
be  constituted  anew  by  him  of  his  own  choice 
and  rational  desire.  Into  that  union  the  individual 
has  to  bring  himself  with  all  that  has  been  given 
him,  and  all  that  he  has  made  himself  to  be;  and 
he  has  to  find  himself,  as  he  can  find  himself  only, 
in  the  society.  It  is  open  to  him  to  refuse  to  enter 
into  the  unity  of  humanity  on  the  terms  which 
alone  can  make  the  union  beneficial  to  the  society 
and  to  himself.  He  may  in  a  short-sighted  and 
irrational  way  refuse  the  wider  outlook,  disregard 
the  limitations  and  restraints,  which  the  good  of 
the  whole  has  laid  on  the  individual;  he  may  look 
at  all  things  from  an  individual  standpoint ;  he  may 
use  the  means  provided  by  the  labour  of  the  gen- 
erations for  what  he  thinks  his  own  benefit,  and 
the  strength,  skill,  and  power  he  owes  to  society 
may  be  turned  against  it:  these  considerations  only 
show  how  diflficult  it  is  to  constitute  a  rational 
unity  out  of  individuals  who  are  only  partially 
rational,  and  have  not  become  rational  enough  to 
know  wherein  their  highest  interests  lie. 

At  this  point  emerge  other  considerations  on 
which  we  have  not  touched  as  yet.  We  have  to  con- 
sider the  beliefs  of  humanity  from  a  point  of  view 
which  throws  into  reUef  another  aspect  of  man. 
If   the  ideal   of    humanity  is  higher   than  we  have 


THE  MAKING    OF  MAN  l6l 

yet  seen,  if  we  have  to  look  at  man  as  continu- 
ing in  existence  beyond  this  world  of  time,  if  we 
are  to  regard  the  members  of  the  human  race  as 
living  at  this  hour,  somewhere,  after  they  have 
passed  from  this  life,  clearly  our  conception  of  the 
unity  of  humanity  receives  a  breadth  unspeakably 
great.  If  we  continue  to  live  on,  and  if  the  other 
life  is  in  connection  with  the  present  life,  then  the 
relation  of  the  individual  to  the  unity  of  humanity 
assumes  a  new  form,  and  the  bonds  of  union  be- 
come still  more  spiritual  than  before.  We  feel  at 
once  that  we  are  members  of  a  larger  whole,  and 
the  responsibility  to  the  whole  assumes  a  graver 
aspect.  Whatever  we  do  here  has  an  eternal  as- 
pect. We  are  ourselves  transformed  under  the 
grander,  deeper  light,  and  our  feelings,  desires, 
aims,  thoughts,  have  a  deeper  meaning,  for  we 
recognize  that  we  are  not  the  children  of  time. 

It  may  be  asked  whether  at  this  stage  we  have 
not  passed  beyond  rational  grounds,  and  have 
brought  to  light  hopes  or  fears  which  reason  can- 
not verify.  It  has  been  contended  that  reason  has 
to  do  only  with  the  present  world  and  the  present 
Hfe,  and  to  go  beyond  these  is  to  bring  in  what 
passes  the  bounds  of  verification.  Precisely  as  it 
has  been  contended  that  reason  has  only  to  do 
with  the  interests  of  the  individual,  so  it  has  been 
contended  that  it  has  to  do  only  with  the  present 
life.     Both  these  propositions  have  been  advocated 


1 62  THEISM 

by  Mr.  Kidd  in  his  work  on  ''  Social  Evolution,"  and 
it  seems  right  to  look  at  his  argument.  Meanwhile, 
let  us  observe  that  even  if  we  limit  our  view  to  the 
present  Ufe,  and  to  the  disclosures  of  history,  it  is 
clear  that  the  bonds  between  the  individual  and 
society  are  of  the  most  real  and  practical  kind. 
We  can  discover  these  bonds,  can  discern  these 
conditions;  indeed,  they  have  been  discovered  and 
set  forth,  so  that  he  who  runs  may  read.  The  rela- 
tions are  as  real  as  those  set  forth  in  physics,  and 
the  sanctions  for  social  conduct  are  as  real  and 
as  conspicuous  as  those  which  dictate  a  regard  to 
the  welfare  of  the  individual.  But  it  may  be  well 
to  hear  what  Mr.  Kidd  has  to  say  on  the  subject, 
and  to  discuss  the  matter  with  him  at  some  length. 


VI 

IS  A  RATIONAL  RELIGION  POSSIBLE? 
Mr.  benjamin  KIDD  AND  Mr.  ARTHUR 
BALFOUR 

It  may  be  well  to  begin  with  a  quotation  from  the 
work  of  Mr.  Benjamin  Kidd  on  "  Social  Evolution." 
That  book  has  had  a  great  vogue  with  us,  and  it 
seems  also  to  have  attracted  attention  on  this  side  of 
the  Atlantic.  Its  recognition  of  the  part  which  re- 
ligion has  in  social  evolution,  its  insistence  on  the 
altruistic  character  of  social  moraUty,  and  the  coura- 
geous maintenance  of  the  proposition  that  the  hope  of 
humanity  lay  in  the  development  of  religious  feeling 
and  of  the  conduct  that  springs  therefrom,  won  the 
approval  of  all  who  felt  the  need  of  religious  sanctions 
for  the  guidance  of  their  own  lives.  They  were  so 
much  entranced  with  the  clear  and  emphatic  insist- 
ence of  the  necessity  of  religion  for  man,  that  they 
forgot  to  ask  whether  a  religion  was  possible  on  the 
terms  and  within  the  Hmits  prescribed  by  Mr.  Kidd. 
As  I  read  the  book  and  watched  the  reception  given  to 
it,  I  came  to  the  conclusion  that  the  Aufklarung  was 
not  yet  dead.     Here  was  a  book  with  all  the  notes  of 

i6; 


1 64  THEISM 

the  Aufklarung,  with  the  tendency  of  the  Aufkliirung 
to  shut  up  nature  and  human  nature  into  compart- 
ments, and  to  introduce  discord  and  anarchy  into 
the  separate  compartments,  that  placed  rehgion  and 
moraUty  out  of  rational  relation  with  one  another, 
and  pitted  reUgion  against  rationality  so  far  as  to  say 
that  a  rational  religion  is  impossible  ;  and  yet  the  book 
was  praised  beyond  measure,  and  edition  after  edition 
was  rapidly  sold. 

I  was  reminded  of  Henry  Thomas  Buckle  and 
his  "  History  of  Civilization."  The  two  men  and  the 
two  books  were  not  unlike  each  other.  They  dealt 
largely  with  the  same  problem  and  they  used  the 
same  method.  It  is  true  that  the  principle  of  prog- 
ress to  which  the  advance  of  civilization  is  due  is 
not  the  same,  but  in  both  the  principle  is  one-sided, 
and  in  both  it  proceeds  on  the  assumption  of  a  radical 
contradiction  in  human  nature.  The  principle  of 
progress  is  with  Mr.  Buckle  intellectual;  with  Mr. 
Kidd  it  is  extra-rational.  With  Mr.  Buckle  religion, 
at  least  in  its  historical  manifestations,  is  super- 
stitious, irrational,  and  a  hindrance  to  progress ;  with 
Mr.  Kidd  it  is  also  extra-rational,  irrational,  but  a 
help,  indeed  the  only  help  to  progress.  Cultivate 
the  intelHgence,  enlighten  the  mind,  spread  the  light 
of  knowledge  everywhere,  and  the  millennium  is 
sure  to  come,  so  spoke  the  earlier  prophet,  as  he  pero- 
rated with  such  eloquence  as  he  could  command  on 
the  advance  of  the  species,  and  contrasted  the  past 


IS  A   RATIONAL   RELIGION  POSSIBLE?         165 

with  the  present.  The  prophet  of  the  present  tells 
a  different  story.  Enlightenment  is  not  increasing, 
and  it  would  not  be  good  for  the  human  race  if  it  did 
increase.  The  human  mind  has  not  grown  through- 
out the  ages,  for  was  not  a  Greek  as  intelligent  as  we 
are  }  There  is  no  rational  sanction  for  progress,  for 
the  secret  of  progress  lies  in  the  unintelligible  and 
the  irrational.  Let  us  struggle  to  overcome  our  own 
reason,  and  let  us  subordinate  it  to  the  irrational,  so 
shall  we  hasten  the  wheels  of  progress  and  advance 
civilization. 

Thus  we  have  in  both  writers  the  essential  princi- 
ple of  the  Aufklarung,  — the  splitting  up  of  man  into 
unrelated  factors,  the  rupture  of  the  unity  of  intelli- 
gence, the  assumption  that  essential  and  related 
parts  of  human  nature  are  in  entire  antagonism  to 
one  another ;  and  the  consequence  follows  that  they 
must  brand  that  part  they  do  not  use,  and  cast  it  out 
as  an  intruder,  and  a  disturber  of  the  peace  and  prog- 
ress of  humanity.  It  is  quite  an  accident  that  Mr. 
Buckle  regards  religion  as  the  intruder,  and  Mr. 
Kidd  looks  on  reason,  in  his  sense  of  the  word,  as  the 
enemy ;  for  the  positions  might  be  reversed  and  the 
same  result  would  follow.  I  for  one  protest  against 
the  breaking  up  of  the  mind  into  separate  faculties 
that  in  the  phraseology  of  some  seem  to  act  inde- 
pendently of  one  another,  and  against  that  assump- 
tion that  the  manifold  of  sense  has  to  wait  till  it  is 
gathered  up  into  the  unity  of  apperception ;  and  I 


1 66  THEISM 

protest,  also,  against  the  introduction  into  philosophy 
of  phraseology  which  will  prevent  me  from  seeing 
that  feeling,  thinking,  acting,  is  done  by  the  whole 
being,  and  is  not  a  series  of  unrelated  processes  con- 
ducted by  abstractions. 

Let  us,  however,  hear  Mr.  Kidd.  "  This  orderly 
and  beautiful  world  which  we  see  around  us  is  now, 
and  always  has  been,  the  scene  of  incessant  rivalry 
between  all  the  forms  of  life  inhabiting  it  —  rivalry, 
too,  not  chiefly  conducted  between  different  species, 
but  between  members  of  the  same  species.  The  plants 
in  the  green-sward  beneath  our  feet  are  engaged  in 
silent  rivalry  with  each  other,  a  rivalry  which  if  al- 
lowed to  proceed  without  outside  interference  would 
know  no  pause  until  the  weaker  were  exterminated. 
Every  plant,  organ,  or  quality  of  these  plants  which 
calls  forth  admiration  for  its  beauty  or  perfection  has 
its  place  and  meaning  in  this  struggle,  and  has  been  ac- 
quired to  ensure  success  therein.  The  trees  of  the  for- 
est which  clothe  and  beautify  the  landscape  are  in  a 
state  of  nature  engaged  in  the  same  rivalry  with  each 
other.  Left  to  themselves  they  fight  out,  as  unmistaka- 
ble records  have  shown,  a  stubborn  struggle  extending 
over  centuries  in  which  at  last  only  those  forms  most 
suitable  to  the  conditions  of  the  locality  retain  their 
places.  But  so  far  we  view  the  rivalry  under  simple 
conditions ;  it  is  amongst  the  forms  of  animal  life  as 
we  begin  to  watch  the  gradual  progress  upwards  to 
higher  types  that  it  becomes  many  sided  and  complex. 


IS  A   RATIONAL  RELIGION  POSSIBLE?         167 

It  is  at  this  point  that  we  encounter  a  feature  of 
the  struggle  which  recent  developments  of  biological 
science  tend  to  bring  into  ever  increasing  prominence. 
The  first  necessity  for  every  successful  form  engaged 
in  this  struggle  is  the  capacity  for  reproduction  be- 
yond the  limits  which  the  conditions  of  life  for  the 
time  being  comfortably  provide  for.  The  capacity 
for  multiplying  in  this  way  is  at  first  one  of  the  princi- 
pal resources  in  the  development  upwards,  and  in  the 
lower  forms  of  life  it  is  still  almost  the  sole  equip- 
ment. But  as  progress  begins  to  be  made,  a  deeper 
cause,  the  almost  illimitable  significance  of  which 
science  is  beginning  to  appreciate,  requires  that  all 
the  successful  forms  must  multiply  beyond  the  limits 
of  comfortable  existence. 

Recent  biological  researches,  and  more  particularly 
the  investigations  and  conclusions  of  Professor  Weis- 
mann,  have  tended  to  greatly  develop  Darwin's  orig- 
inal hypothesis  as  to  the  conditions  under  which 
progress  has  been  made  in  the  various  forms  of  life. 
It  is  now  coming  to  be  recognized  as  a  necessarily  in- 
herent part  of  the  doctrine  of  evolution  that,  if  the 
continual  selection  which  is  always  going  on  amongst 
the  higher  forms  of  life  were  to  be  suspended,  these 
forms  would  not  only  possess  no  tendency  to  make 
progress ;  they  must  actually  go  backwards.  That 
is  to  say,  if  all  the  individuals  of  every  generation 
in  any  species  zvere  allowed  to  equally  propagate 
their  kind,  the  average  of  each  generation  would  con- 


1 68  THEISM 

tinually  tend  to  fall  below  the  average  of  the  genera- 
tion which  preceded  it^  and  a  process  of  slow  bnt 
steady  degeneration  would  e7isiie''  ("Social  Evo- 
lution," pp.  38-9.) 

We  have  quoted  at  length,  as  the  quotation  sets 
forth  one  of  the  main  elements  of  Mr.  Kidd's  argu- 
ment. At  the  outset  we  notice  the  stress  he  lays  on 
struggle.  Rivalry  everywhere,  cell  against  cell,  part 
against  part,  organism  against  organism,  species 
against  species,  and  genus  against  genus.  It  is  set 
forth  in  the  most  extreme  and  one-sided  way,  with 
utter  bhndness  to  the  other  side  of  the  story.  There 
is  no  word  of  that  which  made  the  so-called  struggle 
possible,  and  no  thought  of  the  fact  that  every  spe- 
cies is  serviceable  to  every  other.  Nor  is  there  any 
mention  that  the  plant  Hfe  must  precede  animal  Hfe, 
in  order  to  lift  matter  to  that  chemical  level  at  which 
it  may  become  the  vehicle  of  animal  life.  Nor  is 
there  any  regard  to  the  fact  that  the  various  species 
of  animals  depend  on  one  another  to  a  degree  which 
passes  calculation.  The  soil  on  which  corn  is  grown 
has  been  worked  over  and  over  again,  until  it  has 
attained  that  condition  which  makes  it  fit  for  the 
growing  of  corn.  In  truth,  Mr.  Kidd,  following  his 
masters,  has  isolated  one  set  of  phenomena,  fixed  his 
thought  on  it  exclusively,  until  he  has  quite  forgotten 
that,  if  there  be  a  struggle,  it  is  a  struggle  within  one 
system. 

Nor  has  he  observed  that  the  higher  the  organism 


IS  A   RATIONAL   RELIGION  POSSIBLE?  1 69 

the  less  the  fertiUty.     On  this  Mr.  Spencer  has  writ- 
ten much  that  is  to  the  purpose,  and  has  gone  far 
to  prove  that  there  is  a  law  of  fertility.     But  then 
Mr.   Spencer,  though  a  thorough-going  evolutionist, 
is,  unlike  Mr.  Kidd,  a  disbeliever  in  the  adequacy  of 
natural  selection.    Mr.  Kidd  says  grandly,  "  Amongst 
the  higher  forms  it  is   an   inevitable    law   not   only 
that  competition  and   selection   must  always  accom- 
pany progress,  but  that  they  must  prevail  amongst 
every  form  of  Ufe  which  is  not  actually  retrograd- 
ing.    Every  successful  form  must,  of  necessity,  mul- 
tiply beyond  the  limits  which  the  average  conditions 
of  life  comfortably  provide  for.     Other  things  being 
equal,  indeed,  the  wider  the  Hmits  of  selection  the 
keener  the  rivalry,  and  the  more  rigid  the  selection 
the   greater  will  be  the    progress."     (p.  41-)     It  is 
so  easy  to  make  general   statements,  and  to  speak 
of  inevitable  laws,  and  yet  the  greater  part  of  Mr. 
Kidd's  book  is  taken  up  with  a  proof  that  the  suc- 
cess of  humanity  as  a  social  system  is  due  to  the 
fact  that  men  have  somehow  disregarded  the  stern 
competition  and   rivalry  which   he   speaks  of   with 
so  strong  an  emphasis.     No  wonder  that  he  regards 
such  conduct  as  irrational.     But  of  this  more  in  the 

sequel. 

We  note  further  the  adherence  of  Mr.  Kidd  to  the 
opinion  of  Weismann.  In  his  usual  fashion  he  speaks 
of  Weismann's  view,  as  if  it  had  been  accepted  by 
those  who  know.     He  might  have  told  us  which  of 


I/O  THEISM 

Weismann's  views  he  holds  by,  for  Weismann  has  set 
forth  at  least  half  a  dozen  different  ones.  But  take 
the  one  Mr.  Kidd  has  chosen,  and  on  which  he  dilates 
at  some  length.  It  is  scarcely  possible  to  follow  the 
reasoning  of  Weismann  and  the  elaboration  of  that 
reasoning  by  Mr.  Kidd.  They  make  the  strange  sup- 
position of  the  cessation  of  natural  selection.  In  one 
breath  they  tell  us  that  this  is  the  law  of  life  and 
progress,  and  then  calmly  speak  of  its  cessation,  and 
seek  to  trace  out  its  consequences.  It  seems  to  me 
that  I  could  make  the  supposition  of  the  cessation  of 
gravitation,  and  on  that  supposition  trace  out  a  good 
many  consequences  of  an  inconvenient  kind.  Really 
they  must  make  their  choice.  Natural  selection  is 
universal  or  it  is  not.  It  seems  to  me  that  it  is  uni- 
versal in  the  sense  that  there  must  be  a  correspond- 
ence between  the  organism  and  its  environment.  The 
fittest  must  survive  whatever  the  fittest  may  be.  The 
survival  tests  the  fitness.  To  speak  from  the  stand- 
point of  evolution  of  '*  a  process  of  slow  but  steady 
degeneration  "  is  to  go  beyond  the  mark,  and  to  bring 
in  a  standard  not  derived  from  evolution. 

The  stress  and  strain  of  rivalry  and  competition 
may  work  for  progress,  or  may  work  for  degrada- 
tion. Change  the  environment  of  this  place  a  few 
degrees,  and  lower  it  on  the  average  until  it  became 
what  it  is  in  the  Arctic  regions,  and  the  fittest  would 
survive,  but  it  would  be  a  different  kind  of  fitness. 
What  we  may  call  a  degraded  form  would  inevitably 


IS  A   RATIONAL  RELIGION  POSSIBLE?  I/I 

be  the  outcome  of  such  a  state  of  matters.  It  is 
noticeable  that  Mr.  Kidd  makes  another  assumption 
which  he  has  not  attempted  to  justify.  He  simply 
asserts  it  as  indubitable.  Assuming  for  the  sake  of 
examining  his  proposition  on  its  merits,  that  the  ces- 
sation of  natural  selection  is  possible,  why  does  he 
assume  that  the  result  would  be  degeneration }  Un- 
derlying the  assumption  is  the  thought,  never  ex- 
pressed, but  always  understood,  that  variation  would 
cease,  or  that  the  organism  would  vary  only  in  one 
direction.  How  does  this  assumption  agree  with  the 
hypothesis  of  indefinite  variation }  This  is  one  of  the 
points  which  have  emerged  in  the  controversy  be- 
tween Weismann  and  Spencer,  on  which  Spencer 
lays  great  stress,  and  to  which  Weismann  has  given 
no  satisfactory  answer.  If,  as  Mr.  Kidd  says,  "the 
higher  forms  of  life  would  tend  to  sink  back  again  by 
a  degenerative  process  through  those  stages  of  devel- 
opment by  which  they  reached  their  present  position," 
this  could  only  be  characterized  from  the  standpoint  of 
evolution  as  a  case  of  the  survival  of  the  fittest.  In 
truth,  one  gets  a  little  tired  of  this  kind  of  argument, 
and  one  wishes  for  a  little  consistency  of  thought  and 
of  adherence  to  one  point  of  view  for  a  time.  Mr. 
Kidd  cannot  eat  his  cake  and  have  it.  If  he  is  to  use 
the  language  and  to  unfold  the  arguments  of  evolu- 
tion, he  has  no  right  to  speak  of  degeneration,  for 
that  is  to  bring  in  another  measure  than  that  used  by 
evolution.     He  can  only  speak  of  the  survival  of  the 


1/2  THEISM 

fittest,  and  whatever  survives  is  the  fittest.  Thus  his 
talk  about  progress  is  swept  away,  as  being  beyond 
the  sphere  to  which  judgment  is  limited  by  the 
premises. 

Greater  wonders  meet  us  as  we  follow  on  in  the 
perusal  of  Mr.  Kidd's  book.  He  brings  the  laws 
of  biology  to  the  interpretation  of  human  Hf  e ;  he 
makes  no  discrimination  between  the  more  involved 
life  to  which  he  comes  and  the  less  involved  Hfe  he 
has  previously  studied,  and  we  rather  expect  that 
he  will  soon  get  into  difficulties.  Even  in  the  lower 
Hfe  he  has  refused  to  look  at  anything  save  rivalry, 
competition,  and  the  struggle  for  existence.  He  has 
refused  to  look  at  the  tenderness  and  devotion  of  a 
mother  to  her  little  ones,  and  there  are  such  among 
animals.  He  has  not  noticed  union  and  subordina- 
tion to  their  leader  of  a  herd  of  grass-eaters,  nor  how 
they  work  together  for  their  common  advantage. 
These  herds  set  sentinels  to  watch  while  others  feed ; 
they  obey  the  signal  of  their  leaders.  If  there  are 
struggle  and  suffering,  there  are  among  animals  love, 
gentleness,  care  for  their  young,  and  the  germs  of 
many  virtues  which  in  flower  and  fruit  are  the  glory 
of  humanity.  These  have  been  omitted  from  Mr. 
Kidd's  picture. 

Biology  has  to  be  widened  and  narrowed  when 
we  come  to  look  at  the  being  who  has  become  ra- 
tional. In  a  sense,  our  author  recognizes  a  differ- 
ence  between    rational   and   irrational   beings.      He 


IS  A   RATIONAL   RELIGION  POSSIBLE?  173 

carries  with  him,  however,  the  idea  that  "no  form 
can  make  any  advance,  or  even  retain  its  place  with- 
out deterioration,  except  by  carrying  on  the  species 
to  a  greater  extent  from  individuals  above  the  aver- 
age than  from  those  below  it,"  and  makes  the  prob- 
lem presented  to  the  rational  being  to  be,  what  shall 
his  behaviour  be  under  the  onerous  conditions  of  his 
existence.  It  is  only  fair  to  let  him  state  his  case : 
"  Here  at  last  was  a  creature  who  could  reason  about 
these  things  and  who,  when  his  conduct  is  observed,  it 
may  be  noticed,  actually  does  reason  about  them  in  this 
way.  He  is  subject  to  the  same  natural  conditions 
of  existence  as  all  the  forms  of  life  that  have  come 
before  him ;  he  reproduces  his  kind  as  they  do ;  he 
lives  and  dies  subject  to  the  same  physiological  laws. 
To  him,  as  to  the  others,  the  inexorable  conditions 
of  life  render  progress  impossible  in  any  other  way 
than  by  carrying  on  his  kind  from  successful  varia- 
tions to  the  exclusion  of  others ;  by  being  therefore 
subject  to  selection ;  by  consequently  reproducing  in 
numbers  beyond  those  which  the  conditions  of  life 
for  the  time  being  comfortably  allow  for;  and  by 
living  a  life  of  constant  rivalry  and  competition  with 
his  fellows  with  all  the  attendant  results  of  stress  and 
suffering  to  some,  and  failure  to  reach  the  full  possi- 
bilities of  life  to  large  numbers.  Nay,  more,  it  is 
evident  that  his  progress  has  become  subject  to  these 
conditions  in  a  more  stringent  and  onerous  form  than 
has  ever  before  prevailed  in  the  world.     For  as  he 


1 74  THEISM 

can  reach  his  highest  development  only  in  society, 
the  forces  which  are  concerned  in  working  out  his 
evolution  no  longer  operate  upon  him  primarily  as  an 
individual,  but  as  a  member  of  society.  His  inter- 
ests as  an  individual  have,  in  fact,  become  further 
subordinated  to  those  of  a  social  organism,  with 
interests  immensely  wider  and  a  life  indefinitely 
longer  than  his  own.  How  is  the  possession  of 
reason  ever  to  be  rendered  compatible  with  the  will 
to  submit  to  conditions  of  existence  so  onerous,  re- 
quiring the  effective  and  continual  subordination  of 
the  individual's  welfare  to  the  progress  of  a  develop- 
ment in  which  he  can  have  no  personal  interest 
whatever."     (pp.  68-9.) 

This  is  his  statement  of  the  problem,  and  we 
shall  look  at  it  as  stated,  or  we  may  take  it  as  set 
forth  by  himself  in  all  the  dignity  of  italics.  "  The 
interests  of  tJie  social  organism  and  those  of  the  in- 
dividnals  comprising  it  at  any  particular  time  are 
actually  antagonistic ;  they  can  never  be  reco7iciled ; 
they  are  inherently  and  essentially  irreconcilable ^ 
So  we  get  the  matter  at  last  with  all  the  breadth  and 
absoluteness  characteristic  of  the  Aufklarung.  The 
social  organism  becomes  an  abstraction  on  the  one 
side,  and  the  individuals  comprising  it  become  ab- 
stractions on  the  other,  and  the  whole  contents  of 
both  for  the  time  are  just  this  opposition  which  has 
also  been  abstracted  from  all  else.  Apparently  the 
author  has  forgotten  that  if  the  individuals  compris- 


IS  A   RATIONAL  RELIGION  POSSIBLE?         175 

ing  the  social  organism  disappear,  the  organism 
disappears  also,  and  with  the  disappearance  of 
the  organism  goes  all  that  gave  the  individual  his 
significance.  It  might  just  as  reasonably  be  said 
that  "the  interest  of  the  social  organism  and  those 
of  the  individuals  comprising  it  at  any  particular 
time  can  never  be  separated,  they  can  never  be 
antagonistic,  they  are  inherently  and  essentially  in- 
separable." As  an  axiom,  ours  is  as  good  as  his,  and 
it  has  the  advantage  of  being  more  consistent  with 
the  facts. 

Without  the  social  organism  the  individual  could 
not  be,  and  certainly  could  not  be  what  he  is.  Take 
him  as  he  stands  in  New  York  to-day,  and  let  the 
stress  of  competition  be  as  great  as  you  please,  see 
how  you  have  equipped  the  individual  for  his  work. 
At  his  command  you  have  placed  the  gift  of  com- 
mon speech  which  unites  him  with  his  fellows,  and 
places  at  his  service  the  immense  tradition  of  the 
experience  of  men  in  all  ages  and  chmes.  You  have 
trained  and  educated  him  in  your  schools,  and  have 
placed  at  his  service  the  trained  intelligence  of  men 
and  women  who  can  help  him  in  the  task  of  unfold- 
ing his  powers,  and  of  enabling  him  to  know  the 
world  in  which  he  lives,  and  of  making  it  realize  his 
purposes.  You  place  at  his  command  the  resources 
of  all  that  the  industry  of  former  times  has  accumu- 
lated, all  that  the  inventive  power  of  all  time  has 
discovered,  and  as  he  grows  up  he  has  at  his  break- 


1/6  THEISM 

fast  table  the  news  of  the  world.  It  is  really  not 
necessary  to  multiply  instances  of  the  service  which 
the  social  organism  has  done  in  the  making  of  the 
individual. 

He  is  trained  and  fitted  for  his  work  by  the  social 
organism,  and  not  merely  intellectually ;  he  has  had 
his  affections  drawn  forth,  his  social  qualities  devel- 
oped in  daily  intercourse  with  his  fellows,  and  his 
moral  and  religious  nature  has  been  strengthened 
by  his  place  in,  and  by  the  part  he  has  taken  in,  the 
moral  and  religious  institutions  in  which  he  has  been 
brought  up.  So  far  intellectually,  morally,  and  reli- 
giously he  has  had  the  opportunity  of  making  him- 
self, in  interaction  with  his  fellows  in  the  social 
organism.  It  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  to-day 
in  your  country  and  in  ours,  the  resources  of  civili- 
zation place  at  the  command  of  our  workingmen 
opportunities  which  kings  could  not  command  a 
thousand  years  ago.  But,  says  Mr.  Kidd,  the  social 
organism  lays  on  the  individuals  comprising  it  oner- 
ous burdens  for  which  there  is  no  rational  sanc- 
tion. Yes,  onerous  burdens  are  laid  on  every  man. 
It  is  the  law  of  life  that  man  must  be  a  worker,  and 
only  in  work  can  he  realize  himself.  But  that  law 
does  not  lead  us  to  the  partial  conclusion  of  Mr. 
Kidd. 

A  rational  sanction  !  what  does  Mr.  Kidd  mean  by 
the  phrase  and  what  does  he  mean  by  the  word 
"  reason  "  }    It  is  one  of  the  puzzles  of  his  book.    We 


IS  A    RATIONAL   RELIGION  POSSIBLE?         I'J'J 

are  surprised  as  we  find  that  the  only  function 
ascribed  by  him  to  reason,  is  that  it  is  a  power 
which  enables  the  individual  to  look  after  his  own 
interest.  It  enabled  him  to  overcome  his  competi- 
tors in  the  struggle  for  existence,  and  the  possessor 
of  reason  subdued  the  irrational  animals.  It  enabled 
him  to  discover  that  the  onerous  conditions  of  exist- 
ence still  continued  as  they  were  before  his  advent. 
Still  reason  did  not  throw  these  off,  for  it  was  circum- 
vented by  another  set  of  instincts  —  shall  we  call 
them  so }  —  which  serve  the  social  organism,  and 
help  man  to  subordinate  his  own  reason.  So  in  this 
artificial  way  Mr.  Kidd  tries  to  repair  the  rupture 
which  he  himself  had  made.  Reason  with  him 
simply  means  reasoning,  the  power  of  breaking  up, 
analyzing,  of  seeing  separate  particulars,  and  of 
dwelHng  on  these  exclusively.  It  can  discover  the 
onerous  obligations  of  existence  laid  on  the  indi- 
vidual, and  can  see  that  these  are  irreconcilable  with 
those  of  the  social  organism.  He  protests  that  "■  the 
terms  '  reason  '  and  '  rational '  are  here,  as  every- 
where throughout  this  book,  used  in  their  ordinary 
or  natural  sense,  and  not  in  that  transcendent  sense 
in  which  metaphysicians  toward  the  end  of  the  last 
century  set  the  fashion  of  using  them."    (p.  73.) 

Suppose  we  use  the  word  in  his  sense,  we  have 
still  to  contend  that  he  has  unduly  limited  the  scope 
of  reason.  For  reason  is  able  to  recognize,  not  only 
the  fact  that  it  is  under  onerous  obligations,  as  regards 

N 


I  y^  THEISM 

the  work  the  individual  has  to  do ;  it  is,  also,  able  to 
recognize  all  the  conditions  under  which  men  exist 
on  the  earth,  and  to  shape  its  course  accordingly.  It 
can  recognize  that  the  individual  is  no  mere  indi- 
vidual, and  that  when  he  endeavours  to  separate 
his  own  interests  from  those  of  the  social  organism, 
he  is  acting  irrationally.  To  limit  reason  as  Mr. 
Kidd  has  done,  is  to  set  down  a  limit  that  does  not 
exist,  save  in  his  own  imagination.  For  man  is  set 
here  under  a  number  of  conditions,  in  a  certain 
number  of  relations,  and  he  has  to  know,  as  far  as 
he  can,  these  conditions  and  relations.  Through 
these  he  has  to  realize  himself,  live  his  life,  and  do 
his  work.  It  is  the  business  of  reason  to  ascer- 
tain all  these  conditions  and  relations,  and  not  merely 
some  of  them.  The  relations  that  bind  him  to 
society  are  real  and  rational  relations,  and  the  ob- 
servance of  them  are  for  the  interest  of  the  indi- 
vidual. So  on  his  own  ground  we  say  again  to 
Mr.  Kidd  that  to  regard  the  interests  of  the  society 
and  the  individual  as  irreconcilable  is  an  irrational 
proceeding. 

In  truth,  according  to  Mr.  Kidd,  we  are  in  a  world 
that  is  fundamentally  and  utterly  irrational.  There 
is  no  rational  sanction  for  the  conditions  of  exist- 
ence necessarily  existing,  there  is  no  possibility  of  a 
rational  religion,  and  the  universe  is  one  in  which 
irrational  procedure  seems  to  be  the  rule.  Yet 
science  has   gone  to  work  on  the    supposition    that 


IS  A   RATIONAL   RELIGION  POSSIBLE? 


179 


the  world  was  intelligible,  and  found  that  it  was  so. 
And  men  have  lived  and  acted  on  the  assumption 
that  things  have  a  law,  and  a  meaning,  if  they  could 
find  that  law  and  meaning,  and  they  thought  they 
had  found  both  in  some  measure ;  but  here  comes 
Mr.  Kidd  with  the  discovery  that  in  the  highest  of 
all  the  phenomena  in  the  world  the  conditions  of 
existence  have  no  rational  sanction.  It  is  very 
wonderful,  and  it  has  been  discovered  by  the  reason 
of  Mr.  Kidd.  It  must  have  been  a  sad  thing  to 
find  out  that  reason  is  without  kith  or  kin  in  this 
wide  universe,  and  that  this  solitary  endowment  is 
unable  to  bring  the  conditions  of  existence  into 
harmony  with  itself,  or  itself  with  them.  At  this 
stage  it  might  have  occurred  to  Mr.  Kidd  to  retrace 
his  steps,  and  to  try  to  find  out  whether  this  contra- 
riety in  the  very  centre  of  life  did  exist.  He  might 
have  asked  whether  his  abstraction  of  the  individual 
from  the  social  organism  had  not  been  carried  to  an 
extreme. 

It  is  easy  to  make  abstractions,  easy  to  split  up 
the  individual  into  faculties,  and  to  place  one  mode 
of  the  action  of  a  being  into  irreconcilable  contra- 
diction with  another,  if  we  lose  sight  of  the  unity 
which  really  conditions  all  the  actions  of  every 
creature.  But  on  the  whole  we  may  say  that  that 
mode  of  procedure  has  been  overdone.  We  may 
say,  also,  that  it  has  been  overdone  in  the  more 
recent  study  of  the  relations   of    the  individual  and 


l8o  THEISM 

society.  It  does  not  work  to  sink  the  individual 
in  the  social  organism,  or  to  do  the  reverse.  The 
individual  can  only  realize  himself  in  the  organism, 
and  the  organism  suffers  when  the  individual  is  kept 
from  realizing  his  ideal.  Reason  has  a  higher  work 
than  that  assigned  to  it  by  Mr.  Kidd.  It  has  to 
seek  to  know  all  the  relations  in  which  rational 
beings  stand  to  one  another  in  the  social  organism ; 
the  relations  also  in  which  they  all  stand  to  the 
world  beneath  them,  and  to  what  is  above  them  all, 
and  to  define  the  rational  constitution  of  the  world 
in  view  of  all  these  relations  as  a  rational  system,  at 
least  as  a  system  that  can  be  thought.  For  any  indi- 
vidual to  look  merely  at  himself,  at  his  work,  at  the 
conditions  under  which  he  does  his  work,  to  disregard 
all  other  interests  save  those  which  seem  to  belong 
to  the  individual  for  the  moment,  is  possible  for  an 
individual,  but  only  if  he  disregards  the  wider  unity 
which  alone  can  render  his  life  and  work  fruitful. 
To  speak  of  reason  as  if  it  meant  an  instrument  only 
for  the  advantage  of  the  individual,  or  as  if  it  could 
not  discern  any  other  or  wider  bond,  is  to  degrade 
the  name  and  to  do  violence  to  the  ordinary  use 
of  language.  Reason  is  eminently  social,  and  can 
make  use  of  society  for  its  own  growth  and  further 
realization.  Instead  of  limiting  reason  to  the  func- 
tion to  which  it  is  reduced  by  Mr.  Kidd,  it  would  be 
more  consonant  to  fact  to  widen  its  use  and  to  make 
it    coterminous    with    all    the    activity   of    a    rational 


IS  A  RATIONAL  RELIGION  POSSIBLE?         i8l 

being.  Looking  at  the  rational  being,  we  see  the 
coming  of  the  time  when  all  the  feelings,  emotions, 
desires,  all  the  knowledge,  and  all  the  voluntary 
activity  of  the  rational  being  will  be  suffused  with 
reason,  and  all  will  move  in  harmony  with  the  ideal 
set  forth  by  reason  as  the  goal  to  be  reached  by  each 
and  all. 

As  Mr.  Kidd  has  unduly  limited  the  use  of  reason, 
and  made  it  only  an  instrument  for  the  benefit  of  the 
individual,  so  he  has  also  unduly  narrowed  the  sphere 
of  religion.  He  has  recognized  in  a  very  vivid  way 
the  influence  of  rehgion  in  the  progress  of  man,  and 
he  has  set  it  forth  in  such  a  way  as  to  call  attention 
to  it,  when  it  was  rather  neglected  by  writers  on 
evolution.  It  was  looked  at  as  altogether  supersti- 
tious, as  injurious,  and  as  a  hindrance  to  the  progress 
of  civilization.  But  Mr.  Kidd  is  emphatic  in  his 
statement  of  its  power  and  its  worth  as  the  instru- 
ment of  social  progress.  But  he  seems  to  us  to  leave 
out  of  the  conception  many  elements  which  are  nec- 
essary to  the  very  idea  of  a  religion.  Here  is  his 
definition  :  A  religion  is  a  form  of  belief,  pjvvidijzg 
an  nltra-rational  sanction  for  that  large  class  of  con- 
duct in  the  individual  where  his  interests  and  the 
interests  of  the  social  organism  are  antagonistic,  and 
by  zvhich  the  former  are  rendered  snbordijiate  to  the 
latter  in  the  general  interests  of  the  evolution  wJiich 
the  race  is  nndetgoing.     (p.  112.) 

This  is  a  description  of  religion  simply  by  one  of 


1 82  THEISM 

its  effects.  It  tells  us  nothing  of  religion  as  a  belief 
in  a  power  higher  than  ourselves  on  whom  we  feel  our 
dependence,  nothing  of  the  necessity  for  fellowship 
with  that  power,  nothing  of  what  seems  to  disturb  that 
fellowship,  and  of  how  it  is  to  be  restored,  nor  does 
it  say  anything  of  the  commandments  of  the  power. 
Every  religion  that  has  appeared  among  men  has  had 
its  beliefs,  its  commands,  and  its  consolations.  These, 
however,  do  not  appear  in  the  definition  of  Mr.  Kidd. 
His  definition  seems  to  have  been  prescribed  by  the 
necessities  of  his  system.  He  had  found  that  there 
was  no  rational  sanction  for  progress,  he  must  there- 
fore provide  an  irrational  sanction,  for  the  existence 
of  progress  is  a  fact.  Religion  is  the  instrument  by 
which  the  blank  is  supplied.  Our  contention  is  that 
religion  could  not  accomplish  the  task  he  assigns  to 
it,  if  it  did  not  accomplish  a  great  deal  more.  It  has 
the  power  he  assigns  to  it,  it  does  give  us  an  ideal 
of  unselfish  living  and  working,  but  it  does  not  Hmit 
itself  to  that. 

Indeed,  the  first  work  of  an  adequate  religion  is  to 
restore  the  synthesis  which  Mr.  Kidd  has  arbitrarily 
ruptured  and  cannot  get  together  again.  One  of  its 
chief  ethical  commands  is,  "  Love  thy  neighbour  as 
thyself."  That  is  to  say,  that  for  religion  the  self- 
regarding  virtues  are  not  unimportant.  It  is  as  much 
interested  in  those  things  that  make  for  the  true  in- 
terests of  the  self,  as  it  is  in  those  that  make  for  the 
interests  of  the  social  organism.     It  does  not  subor- 


IS  A   RATIONAL  RELIGION  POSSIBLE?  183 

dinate  individuals  to  the  race,  and  it  does  not  hesitate 
to  say,  "  What  shall  it  profit  a  man  though  he  should 
gain  the  whole  world  and  lose  his  own  soul  ?  "  The 
highest  form  of  religion  known  to  man  is  distinctive 
in  this  respect,  and  is  clearly  distinguished  from 
other  religions  in  the  stress  it  lays  on  the  value  and 
the  worth  of  the  individual,  on  the  necessity  of  devel- 
oping the  individual  to  the  height  of  the  ideal  which 
he  only  can  realize,  and  on  that  distinct  peculiarity 
which  makes  every  person  almost  a  type  by  himself. 
Religion  is  the  greatest  power  in  the  universe  for  the 
making  of  the  individual,  for  the  insistence  on  every 
help  which  can  tend  to  develop  the  distinctive  per- 
sonality of  each ;  in  fact,  there  is  no  power  known  to 
man  that  works  so  much  to  develop  the  personality 
of  the  individual  as  religion.  This  fact  is  altogether 
lost  sight  of  by  Mr.  Kidd. 

Religion  does  not  work  by  setting  the  interests  of 
the  individual  against  those  of  the  race.  Ye  are  mem- 
bers one  of  another.  In  fact,  religion  was  first  in  the 
field,  before  science,  before  philosophy  came  to  being; 
and  it  had  made  in  its  own  way  that  synthesis  which 
science  and  philosophy  have  not  yet  made,  after  ages 
of  toil.  Somehow  it  grasped  the  whole  in  its  whole- 
ness, raised  men  up  beyond  the  limited  and  the 
imperfect,  outran  its  own  powers  of  thinking,  and 
gave  to  man  such  a  sense  of  his  own  worth,  and  of 
the  worth  of  others,  as  even  in  the  imperfect  forms,  it 
had  long  ago,  made  man  somewhat  of  an  ideal  being. 


1 84  THEISM     . 

Religion  has  no  such  limited  function  as  that  pre- 
scribed to  it  by  Mr.  Kidd.  It  is  not  an  instrument  in 
the  general  interests  of  the  evolution  which  the  race 
is  undergoing.  It  is  something  greater  than  that.  It 
is  in  the  interest  of  the  individual  quite  as  much. 

In  a  page,  previous  to  his  treatment  of  religion,  Mr. 
Kidd,  in  a  simple  and  artless  manner,  says,  "  We  are 
speaking,  it  must  be  remembered,  of  a  rational  sanc- 
tion, and  reason  has,  in  an  examination  of  this  kind, 
nothing  to  do  with  any  existence  but  the  present, 
which  it  insists  it  is  our  duty  to  ourselves  to  make  the 
most  of."    (pp.  72-3.)    We  need  not  be  surprised  that 
he  says  later,  "  No  form  of  belief  is  capable  of  func- 
tioning as  a  religion  in  the  evolution  of  society  which 
does  not  provide  an  ultra-rational  sanction  for  social 
conduct  in  the  individual.     In  other  words,  a  rational 
religion  is  a  scientific  impossibility,  representing  from 
the  nature  of  the  case  an  inherent  contradiction  of 
terms."     (pp.  109-110.)     It  seems  a  very  sad  result 
for  the  rational  being.     He  seems  shut  up  to  the  di- 
lemma, either  to  lose  his  rationality  or  to  cease  to  be 
religious.     If  he  follows  our  author,  he  must  choose 
the  horn  of  the  dilemma  on  which  he  is  to  be  impaled. 
He  was  wont  to  think  that  a  belief  in  God  and  im- 
mortality was  a  belief  which  was  justifiable  on  rational 
grounds.     May  we  humbly  ask  why  a  form  of  belief 
which  provides  a  rational  sanction  for  social  conduct  in 
the  individual  may  not  be  capable  of  functioning  as  a 
religion  in  the  evolution  of  society  1    I  express  my  own 


IS  A   RATIONAL  RELIGION  POSSIBLE?  185 

conviction  that  if  Mr.  Kidd  is  right  in  calUng  "  a  ra- 
tional rehgion  a  scientific  impossibility,"  we  shall  soon 
see  an  end  of  religion  altogether.  For  it  is  a  necessity 
of  the  rational  being  to  bring  his  beliefs  into  some  kind 
of  order,  and  to  justify  them  to  himself;  and  if  you  shut 
him  out  from  that  hope,  you  will  drive  him  to  despair. 
After  reading  passages  Hke  these,  —  and  they 
abound  in  the  pages  of  Mr.  Kidd's  book,  — we  might 
expect  something  like  a  demonstration  of  the  funda- 
mental irrationality  of  religion.  A  statement,  at  least, 
of  its  opposition  to  the  interests  of  the  individual  might 
be  expected.  As  we  read,  we  find  that,  whatever  re- 
ligion may  be  in  itself,  and  whatever  be  the  nature  of 
its  sanction,  its  results  are  intelligible,  and  can  be 
stated  with  precision.  At  first  we  start,  led  by  Mr. 
Kidd,  with  the  notion  that  religion  is  a  method  of 
subordinating  the  individual  and  his  interests  to  the 
interests  of  the  social  organism.  We  read  on  and  we 
find  that  the  scene  is  changed,  and  another  attitude 
presents  itself.  The  social  organism  is  in  the  service 
of  the  individual.  The  social  organism  somehow 
labours  not  in  its  own  interest ;  it  works  in  order 
that  all  the  people  may  be  brought  into  the  rivalry 
of  life  on  equal  conditions.  If  this  be  so,  then  all  we 
need  to  do  is  to  make  this  plain  to  the  intelligence 
of  man,  the  individual;  and  we  shall  immediately  have 
a  rational  sanction  for  progress,  and  religion  may 
also  be  regarded  as  rational.  Lest  we  should  be 
thought  guilty  of  unfairness  to  Mr.  Kidd,  we  quote 


1 86  THEISM 

the  following  :  "  Now  the  prevailing  impression  con- 
cerning this  process  of  evolution  is  that  it  has  been 
the  product  of  an  intellectual  movement,  and  that 
it  has  been  the  ever  increasing  intelligence  and  en- 
lightenment of  the  people,  which  has  constituted  the 
principal  propeUing  force.  It  would  appear,  how- 
ever, that  we  must  reject  this  view.  From  the  nature 
of  the  case,  as  we  shall  see  more  clearly  later  on,  the 
intellect  could  not  have  suppHed  any  force  sufficiently 
powerful  to  have  enabled  the  people  to  have  success- 
fully assailed  the  almost  impregnable  position  of  the 
power-holding  classes.  So  enormous  has  been  the 
resistance  to  be  overcome,  and  so  complete  has  been 
the  failure  of  the  people  in  similar  circumstances  out- 
side our  civilization,  that  we  must  look  elsewhere  for 
the  cause  which  has  produced  the  transformation. 
The  motive  force  we  must  apparently  find  in  the 
immense  fund  of  altruistic  feeUng  with  which  our 
Western  societies  have  become  equipped ;  this  being, 
with  the  extraordinarily  effective  sanctions  behind  it, 
the  characteristic  and  determinative  product  of  the  re- 
ligious system  upon  which  our  civilization  is  founded. 
It  is  the  influence  of  this  fund  of  altruism  in  our  civ- 
ilization that  has  nndermined  the  position  of  the 
power-holding  classes.  It  is  the  resulting  deepening 
and  softening  of  character  amongst  us  which  alone 
has  made  possible  that  developmental  movement 
whereby  all  the  people  are  being  slowly  brought  into 
the  rivalry  of  life  on  equal  conditions."     (p.  177.) 


IS  A   RATIONAL   RELIGION  POSSIBLE?  187 

Surely  when  the  average  man  sees  that  people  are 
brought  into  the  rivalry  of  life  on  equal  conditions, 
and  that  by  the  effort  of  the  social  organism,  he  will 
cease  to  believe  that  there  are  no  rational  sanctions 
for  progress,  and  will  cease  to  think,  if  he  ever  did 
think,  that  his  interests  and  the  interests  of  the 
social  organism  are  irreconcilable.  It  is  a  curious  re- 
sult that  even  Mr.  Kidd  should  show  how  interests, 
said  by  him  to  be  irreconcilable,  work  together  for 
mutual  advantage.  We  notice,  in  passing,  a  curi- 
ous instance  of  Mr.  Kidd's  way  of  taking  aspects 
for  realities,  and  of  making  abstractions  do  the  work 
which  abstract  notions  can  never  do.  Note  how  he 
speaks :  ''  The  intellect  could  not  have  supplied  any 
force  sufficiently  powerful,"  and  so  on.  An  abstract 
intellect  could  not  supply  any  force  to  anything,  but 
neither  could  abstract  feeling  do  it.  No  great  move- 
ment, and  no  movement  however  insignificant,  could 
be  motived  apart  from  the  intellect,  feeling,  or  the 
conations  of  men.  To  speak  of  a  fund  of  altruistic 
feeUng,  as  if  it  stood  by  itself,  and  flowed  on  without 
touching  the  intelligence  and  the  will,  is,  with  all 
respect,  to  speak  psychological  nonsense.  But  this 
is  Mr.  Kidd's  way.  While  we  are  grateful  to  him 
for  the  service  he  has  done  in  the  emphasis  he  has 
laid  on  the  power  of  religion  in  evolution,  we  accept 
that  result  with  the  qualification  that  religion  is  a 
reasonable  service. 

It  may  be  useful  here  to  make  a  few  remarks  on 


1 88  THEISM 

Mr.  Arthur  Balfour's  book  —  "The  Foundations  of 
Belief,"  as  it  is  largely  on  the  same  lines  as  the  book 
of  Mr.  Kidd.  They  agree  in  using  the  word  "reason" 
in  the  same  sense  as  simply  reasoning,  and  they  simi- 
larly lay  stress  on  the  irrational  character  of  human 
beliefs.  Mr.  Balfour  professes  to  deal  with  the 
foundations  of  belief.  He  seeks  to  ascertain  the 
causes  and  the  genesis  of  belief.  For  this  end  he 
dwells  on  the  impressions  made  on  us,  on  effects 
wrought  on  us,  on  beliefs  effected  in  us  by  causes 
which  are  non-rational  in  themselves,  and  he  has 
many  wise  things  in  his  book  in  this  connection. 
After  the  questions  of  the  origin  and  growth  of  our 
beliefs  have  been  discussed  a  more  important  ques- 
tion emerges,  What  are  our  beliefs  worth  and  are  they 
vaUd }  and  this  is  scarcely  discussed  by  Mr.  Balfour. 
Mr.  Balfour  approaches  the  question  under  the  influ- 
ence of  the  traditional  philosophy,  and  has  not,  even 
though  he  has  recognized  that  there  is  a  difference 
between  the  existence  of  a  belief  and  its  validity, 
dealt  with  the  necessity  of  a  criterion  of  belief.  He 
has  shown  us  no  way  of  discriminating  between  be- 
liefs which  are  valid,  trustworthy,  related  to  reality, 
and  those  which  are  baseless,  irrational,  and  degrad- 
ing. As  far  as  psychology  is  concerned  one  belief 
is  as  good  as  another ;  when  its  nature,  its  genesis, 
are  ascertained,  the  work  of  psychology  is  done. 
English  psychology  always  maintained  the  validity 
of   the   original   element   of    mind,    or   the    original 


IS  A  RATIONAL  RELIGION  POSSIBLE?         189 

beliefs,  as  Stuart  Mill  called  them.  To  find  what 
these  were,  it  was  customary  to  refer  to  that  baby 
which  has  appeared  so  frequently  in  treatises  of 
English  psychology,  it  is  fashionable  now  to  refer  to 
the  primitive  man.  It  has  been  an  irrelevant  proced- 
ure from  first  to  last,  for  if  the  genesis  of  every  belief 
could  be  traced  so  that  we  could  refer  every  one  to 
its  adequate  cause,  we  should  still  have  no  criterion 
to  distinguish  between  beliefs  as  true  or  false.  The 
truth  or  falsehood  of  a  belief  is  not  to  be  determined 
by  a  consideration  of  its  origin,  but  by  an  examina- 
tion of  its  contents,  and  the  grounds  offered  for  its 
acceptance.  From  a  rational  point  of  view  a  belief 
must  be  self-evident,  or  it  must  be  proven,  or  at  least 
its  truth  must  appear  probable.  Either  in  itself  or 
in  its  relation  to  other  beliefs,  a  behef  must  have 
reasons  which  warrant  its  acceptance. 

One  objection  to  be  taken  to  Mr.  Balfour's  argu- 
ment is  that  he  speaks  of  our  beliefs  as  if  they  were 
mere  effects  wrought  in  us  by  non-rational  causes. 
The  assumption  of  the  passivity  of  the  mind  is  car- 
ried through  consistently.  He  never  looks  at  the 
possibility  of  the  mind  having  a  say  in  the  matter. 
Our  beliefs  are  wrought  in  us  we  know  not  how,  and 
no  account  is  taken  of  the  nature  and  activity  of  the 
mind.  No  mental  experience  is  a  mere  effect,  the 
stimulus  is  reacted  against  in  a  way  characteristic 
not  of  the  stimulus  but  of  the  mind.  But  this  is 
now  so  commonplace  that  it  need  not  be  dwelt  on. 


IQO  THEISM 

Nor  does  it  seem  necessary  to  speak  of  the  conten- 
tion that  our  beliefs  are  due  to  non-rational  causes. 
For  be  the  character  of  the  causes  what  it  may,  the 
beliefs  are  beliefs  of  a  being  who  is,  at  least,  im- 
plicitly rational,  and  every  experience  of  his  is  implic- 
itly rational.     On  this  I  do  not  dwell. 

Only  one  thing  in  "The  Foundations  of  Belief"  do 
I  refer  to,  and  I  refer  to  it  because  it,  also,  was  a  fa- 
vourite antithesis  of  the  Auf  klarung.  "  Authority  and 
Reason"  is  the  title  of  the  chapter  and  of  the  antith- 
esis in  Mr.  Balfour's  book.  "The  source  of  error 
which  has  next  to  be  noted  presents  points  of  much 
greater  interest.  Though  it  be  true,  as  I  am  contend- 
ing, that  the  importance  of  reason  among  the  causes 
v/hich  produce  and  maintain  the  beliefs,  customs,  and 
ideals  which  form  the  groundwork  of  life  has  been 
much  exaggerated,  there  can  yet  be  no  doubt  that 
reason  is,  or  appears  to  be,  the  cause  over  which  we 
have  the  most  direct  control,  or  rather  the  one  which 
we  most  readily  identify  with  our  own  free  and  per- 
sonal action.  We  are  acted  on  by  authority.  It 
moulds  our  ways  of  thought  in  spite  of  ourselves, 
and  usually  unknown  to  ourselves.  But  when  we 
reason,  we  are  the  authors  of  the  effect  produced. 
We  have  ourselves  set  the  machine  in  motion.  For 
its  proper  working  we  are  ourselves  immediately  re- 
sponsible;  so  that  it  is  both  natural  and  desirable 
that  we  should  concentrate  our  attention  on  this  par- 
ticular class  of  causes,  even  though  we  should  thus 


IS  A   RATIONAL   RELIGION  POSSIBLE?  19 1 

be  led  unduly  to  magnify  their  importance  in  the 
general  scheme  of  things."  (''The  Foundations  of 
Belief,"  p.  203.) 

This  is  part  of  the  general  contrast  between  au- 
thority and  reason  drawn  by  Mr.  Balfour,  in  which  the 
opposition  between  the  two  is  exaggerated,  and  their 
relations  to  one  another  obscured.  One  statement 
is  worthy  of  notice.  It  is  this,  "When  we  reason, 
we  are  the  authors  of  the  effect  produced."  We  are 
no  more  the  authors  of  the  effects  produced  by  rea- 
soning than  we  are  the  authors  of  our  experience 
generally,  or  rather  we  are  just  as  much  the  authors 
of  the  one  as  of  the  other.  Our  experience  is  in  one 
sense  given,  in  another  it  is  constructed  by  our  own 
activity.  So  when  we  reason,  we  construct  our  argu- 
ment, arrange  the  steps  of  it,  and  seek  to  set  forth 
the  truth  of  the  matter  in  hand ;  but  we  are  not  the 
authors  of  the  premises  or  the  conclusion,  if  these 
are  to  have  an  objective  reference.  The  worth  of 
the  argument  must  be  determined  by  some  objective 
standard.  In  all  its  experiences  the  mind  is  as  active 
as  it  is  in  reasoning.  What  we  lay  stress  on  is  the 
opposition  which  our  author  supposes  to  exist  be- 
tween authority  and  reason.  We  insist  on  it  because 
it  is  an  illustration  of  the  prevalence  of  that  mis- 
chievous habit  of  the  Aufklarung,  which  we  saw 
prevailing  so  greatly  in  the  reasoning  of  Mr.  Kidd. 
Here  is  the  same  thing  in  Mr.  Balfour,  and  we  may 
find  it  elsewhere.     "When  we  turn,  however,  from 


192  THEISM 

the  conscious  work  of  Reason  to  that  which  is  un- 
consciously performed  for  us  by  Authority,  a  very 
different  spectacle  arrests  our  attention.  The  effects 
of  the  first,  prominent  as  they  are  through  the  dignity 
of  their  origin,  are  trifling  compared  with  the  all-per- 
vading influences  which  flow  from  the  second.  At 
every  moment  of  our  lives,  as  individuals,  as  members 
of  a  family,  of  a  party,  of  a  nation,  of  a  Church,  of 
a  universal  brotherhood,  the  silent,  continuous,  un- 
noticed influence  of  Authority  moulds  our  feelings, 
our  aspirations,  and,  what  we  are  more  immediately 
concerned  with,  our  beliefs.  It  is  from  Authority  that 
Reason  itself  draws  its  most  important  premises." 
(pp.  227-28.)  The  last  sentence  may  be  turned 
round,  and  it  would  thus  lose  none  of  its  impressive- 
ness  or  its  truth.  It  is  from  reason  that  authority 
draws  its  most  important  premises.  For  all  the  in- 
stitutions to  which  reference  was  made  as  influen- 
tial in  moulding  our  beliefs  are  institutions  formed 
by  rational  beings  acting  in  concert  with  one  another. 
Families,  parties,  nations,  churches,  brotherhoods,  are 
themselves  rational  institutions,  and  are  the  work  of 
rational  creatures  who  were  conscious  of  the  bonds 
which  helped  them  to  make  themselves  into  a  unity. 
Every  one  of  these  organizations  is  constituted  by 
the  efforts  of  the  rational  beings  who  realized  them, 
and  any  influence  they  exert  on  the  individual  is 
really  due  to  reason.  We  fearlessly  assert  that  every 
instance  of  the  action  of  authority  as  opposed  to  rea- 


IS  A   RATIONAL  RELIGION  POSSIBLE?         193 

son,  set  forth  by  Mr.  Balfour,  may  be  turned  round 
and  easily  read  as  an  instance  of  the  influence  of 
reason.  We  might  take  the  case  of  language  and  by 
it  illustrate  the  contention  of  Mr.  Balfour. 

Language  moulds  our  feelings,  emotions,  desires, 
aspirations,  beliefs,  even  our  thoughts.  Whatever 
he  has  said  of  authority  may  be  said  a  fortiori  on 
behalf  of  language.  We  are  always  under  its  influ- 
ence; without  its  aid  we  could  neither  think  ade- 
quately nor  express  our  thought  nor  convey  our 
thought  to  another.  If  we  were  to  contrast  lan- 
guage and  reason  as  he  has  contrasted  authority 
and  reason,  we  could  make  a  pretty  effective  contrast 
indeed.  But  then  we  should  be  at  once  told  that 
we  were  engaged  in  an  idle  and  unprofitable  task, 
for  language  is  itself  the  product  of  reason,  and 
its  influence  is  the  influence  of  reason.  That  is  our 
answer  to  Mr.  Balfour;  his  antithesis  between  au- 
thority and  reason  is  misleading,  and  it  is  irrelevant. 
The  institutions  which  mould  our  lives,  actions,  and 
thoughts  are  themselves  rational  institutions,  the  prod- 
ucts of  that  reason  against  which  they  are  pitted  by 
Mr.  Balfour.  Before  he  could  make  good  the  antithe- 
sis between  reason  and  authority,  he  must  do  some 
work  on  both  notions,  he  must  first  eliminate  every- 
thing rational  from  the  institutions  he  has  named, 
and  everything  authoritative  from  reason,  and  when 
he  has  reduced  the  one  to  irrationality,  and  de- 
prived the  other  of  authority,  then  he  may  run  the 


1^4  THEISM 

antithesis  as  he  pleases,  and   it  will  not  be   worth 
much. 

There  are  elements  in  Mr.  Balfour's  book  worthy 
of  high  praise,  and  there  are  conclusions  with  which 
I  heartily  agree,  but  to  dwell  on  these  at  present  is 
not  my  purpose.  I  found  the  argument  of  Mr.  Kidd 
lying  athwart  my  course,  and  I  could  not  proceed 
until  I  got  it  out  of  my  way.  Mr.  Balfour's  work 
is  so  far  coincident  with  that  of  Mr.  Kidd ;  his  an- 
tithesis between  authority  and  reason  is  on  all  fours 
with  the  paradoxes  of  Mr.  Kidd;  and  so  far  I  have 
dealt  with  both.  Perhaps  the  method  common  to 
both  is  even  worse  than  the  results  to  which  they 
come.  For  the  habit  of  setting  part  against  part, 
and  of  straining  the  relation  in  which  two  or  more 
elements  in  a  larger  unity  stand  to  one  another,  until 
nothing  but  a  relation  of  contradiction  is  left,  is  so 
fatal  to  all  fruitful  thinking,  that  I  did  not  think 
the  time  wasted  to  show  its  falsity  in  the  particular 
instances  we  have  examined. 


VII 

PERSONALITY:  ITS  CHARACTER  AND  ITS 
MEANING 

We  have  read  the  story  which  science  has  un- 
folded to  us,  and  the  wonder  of  the  story  has  grown. 
We  have  come  to  see  that  the  unity  has  grown 
greater  and  more  complex,  and  the  diversity  tends 
ever  more  to  unity.  We  have  come  to  a  unity 
greater  than  we  can  grasp.  Not  a  fixed,  static, 
unchanging  unity,  but  one  that  grows,  develops, 
becomes  more  and  more,  and  yet  maintains  itself. 
Thus  we  came  to  the  great  organism  of  humanity  — 
an  organism  made  up  of  organisms,  relatively  inde- 
pendent of  one  another,  but  held  together  not  by 
visible  or  physical  bonds,  but  by  bonds  of  another 
kind  but  not  the  less  real.  A  unity  made  up  of  liv- 
ing unities,  each  of  which  is  so  far  a  self-contained 
whole,  calls  on  us  to  widen  our  conceptions  if  we 
are  to  grasp  the  reality.  Unities  conscious  of  them- 
selves, self-moved,  self-guided,  self-trained,  in  a  meas- 
ure, and  held  to  the  whole  by  bonds  which  can  at 
any  moment  be  broken ;  the  thought  of  a  unity  com- 
posed of  such  makes  us  acquainted  with  a  kind  of 
force  or  power  unknown  before.     So  varied  are  the 

195 


196  THEISM 

bonds  that  hold  the  social  order  together,  that  every- 
one of  them  in  turn  has  been  looked  at  as  a  relation 
of  opposition  to  the  others.  Self-interest  was  re- 
garded as  irreconcilable  with  the  universal  interest, 
authority  was  pitted  against  reason,  intelligence 
against  behef,  and  yet  no  one  of  these  could  be  dis- 
pensed with  if  the  social  organism  were  to  hold 
together  and  to  make  progress.  Reason  and  author- 
ity are  needed,  self-interest  is  as  necessary  as  the 
interest  of  the  whole,  science  is  needed  as  much  as 
religion,  and  reUgion  as  much  as  science ;  in  fact, 
without  any  of  these  qualities  and  acquirements  of 
humanity,  which  men  are  so  prone  to  place  in  ir- 
reconcilable opposition,  the  social  organism  could 
not  exist,  at  least  could  not  exist  in  its  well  being. 
So  out  of  the  life  of  the  social  organism  in  its  relations 
to  its  members  and  its  environment  have  arisen 
the  sciences,  arts,  intellectual,  ethical,  and  reUgious 
systems,  in  action  among  us  to-day,  the  histories  of 
which  make  up  so  much  of  the  recorded  thoughts 
of  men.  As  we  look  at  these  thoughts  and  systems 
we  see  them  living,  moving,  growing,  ever  approxi- 
mating to  an  ideal,  which  is  partly  given  and  partly 
won  by  patient  thought  and  work.  The  conviction 
deepens  with  the  ages  that  there  is  a  thought  greater 
than  our  thought,  a  system  larger  than  we  can  yet 
grasp,  and  an  ideal  formed  for  man  and  not  merely 
by  man. 

Up  to  the  present,  we  have  looked  at   the  world 


PERSONALITY  1 97 

disclosed  to  us  and  unveiled  to  us  by  science  merely 
as  it  unfolded  itself  to  us,  as  it  would  appear  to  a 
spectator  gazing  at  it  from  without.  We  looked  at  it 
mainly  for  the  purpose  of  learning  what  the  story  of 
the  world  would  disclose  to  us  of  the  intelligence  and 
purpose  at  work  in  it.  We  have  found  intelligence, 
purpose,  life,  at  work  in  the  world,  and  all  on  a  scale 
almost  passing  our  comprehension.  But  now  the 
question  rises,  What  do  we  really  know  of  intelligence, 
purpose,  life  t  We  know  of  many  works  of  intelli- 
gence, and  of  many  kinds  of  life.  We  know  that 
an  intelHgent  system  may  be  impressed  on  a  system 
of  mechanical  causes,  and  these  may  be  constrained 
to  work  out  a  purpose.  Watches,  clocks,  electric 
machines,  steam-engines,  and  all  machines  made  by 
men  are  intelligible  systems  in  which  mechanical 
causes  work  out  a  purpose  according  to  the  design 
of  the  worker.  Looking  as  a  spectator  we  saw  an- 
other kind  of  mechanism,  a  mechanism  in  which  the 
skill  of  the  designer  was  within  the  mechanism,  and 
the  purpose  was  wrought  out  not  by  impressing  a 
plan  on  alien  material,  but  by  an  immanent  move- 
ment from  within.  The  skill  of  the  designer  was 
within  the  organism,  and  the  process  was  by  growth. 
An  organism  we  saw  was  greater  than  a  mechanism. 
Still  we  learned  that  there  were  organisms  and 
organisms.  Growth  was  common  to  them  all,  but 
some  grew,  not  knowing  the  aim  and  purpose  of 
their  growth,  impelled  onwards  by  impulses  of  which 


198  THEISM 

they  were  unconscious,  drawn  by  desires  which  ruled 
them,  and  which  they  did  not  rule. 

In  the  unfolding  of  life  we  came  to  the  advent  of 
a  being  who  to  a  certain  extent  knew  himself  and 
his  purpose,  who  could  reach  his  purpose  and  attain 
his  ends  by  bending  the  environment  to  his  purpose. 
This  being  could  form  a  purpose  and  invent  means 
for  its  realization.  Can  we  obtain  a  nearer  view  of 
the  life,  which  we  saw  to  be  manifested  in  the 
sciences,  philosophies,  and  rehgions  of  the  world } 
It  was  the  most  wonderful  of  the  wonderful  things 
of  the  world  disclosed  to  us  by  science,  and  we  natu- 
rally desire  to  know  it  more  intimately.  For  our 
conception  of  the  life  at  work  in  the  world  must  be 
largely  determined  by  the  knowledge  we  may  attain 
of  the  hfe  at  work  in  the  being  who  has  made  the 
sciences.  Can  we  look  at  that  being,  not  merely  as 
spectators  of  his  work  and  of  his  way  of  doing  it, 
but  can  we  get  inside,  and  see  him  in  the  inward 
working  of  his  very  nature,  and  watch  himself  and 
his  purposes  in  the  making } 

Happily  we  are  at  home  in  this  world,  too.  We 
are  ourselves,  and  we  are  able  to  look  at  ourselves 
from  within,  and  are  able  to  look  at  the  other  side 
of  the  world,  which  from  one  side  has  engaged  our 
attention  so  long.  The  world  has  a  subjective  side, 
and  we  look  at  it  now  from  that  point  of  view. 
Here  we  may  well  begin  with  Hume,  who  has  set 
the   problems  which    since   his   time    are   the    main 


PERSONALITY  I99 

problems  of  psychology,  ethics,  and  metaphysics. 
"For  my  part,  when  I  enter  most  intimately  into 
what  I  call  myself,  I  always  stumble  on  some  par- 
ticular perception  or  other  of  heat  or  cold,  light  or 
shade,  love  or  hatred,  pain  or  pleasure.  I  never  can 
catch  myself  at  any  time  without  a  perception,  and 
never  can  observe  anything  but  the  perception. 
When  my  perceptions  are  removed  for  any  time,  as 
by  sound  sleep,  so  long  am  I  insensible  of  myself,  and 
may  truly  be  said  not  to  exist.  And  were  all  my  per- 
ceptions removed  by  death,  and  could  I  neither  think, 
nor  feel,  nor  see,  nor  love,  nor  hate,  after  the  dissolu- 
tion of  my  body,  I  should  be  entirely  annihilated,  nor 
do  I  conceive  what  is  farther  requisite  to  make  me  a 
perfect  non-entity.  If  any  one,  upon  serious  and  un- 
prejudiced reflection,  thinks  he  has  a  different  notion 
of  himself,  I  must  confess  I  can  reason  no  longer 
with  him.  All  I  can  allow  him  is  that  he  may  be 
in  the  right  as  well  as  I,  and  that  we  are  essentially 
different  in  this  particular.  He  may,  perhaps,  per- 
ceive something  simple  and  continued  which  he  calls 
himself,  though  I  am  certain  there  is  no  such  prin- 
ciple in  me.  But  setting  aside  som.e  metaphysicians 
of  this  kind,  I  may  venture  to  afifirm  of  the  rest  of 
mankind,  that  they  are  nothing  but  a  bundle  or  col- 
lection of  different  perceptions,  which  succeed  each 
other  with  an  inconceivable  rapidity,  and  are  in  a 
perpetual  flux  and  movement.  Our  eyes  cannot 
turn  in  their  sockets  without  varying  our  perceptions. 


200  THEISM 

Our  thought  is  still  more  variable  than  our  sight ; 
and  all  our  other  senses  and  faculties  contribute  to 
this  change ;  nor  is  there  any  single  power  of  the 
soul  which  remains  unalterably  the  same,  perhaps 
for  one  moment.  The  mind  is  a  kind  of  theatre, 
where  several  perceptions  successively  make  their 
appearance ;  pass,  repass,  glide  away,  and  min- 
gle in  an  infinite  variety  of  postures  and  situations. 
There  is  properly  no  simphcity  in  it  at  one  time,  nor 
identity  in  different ;  whatever  natural  propensity 
we  may  have  to  imagine  that  simphcity  and  identity, 
the  comparison  of  the  theatre  must  not  mislead  us. 
They  are  the  successive  perceptions  only,  that  con- 
stitute the  mind  ;  nor  have  we  the  most  distant 
notion  of  the  place  where  these  scenes  are  repre- 
sented, nor  of  the  material  of  which  it  is  composed." 
Thus  spoke  Hume  in  his  chapter  on  "  Personal 
Identity"  in  his  ''Treatise  on  Human  Nature,"  Part 
IV.,  Sect.  VI.  Again  he  says:  "  It  is  evident  that  the 
identity  which  we  attribute  to  the  human  mind,  how- 
ever perfect  we  may  imagine  it  to  be,  is  not  able  to  run 
the  several  different  perceptions  into  one,  and  make 
them  lose  their  characters  of  distinction  and  differ- 
ence, which  are  essential  to  them.  It  is  still  true  that 
every  distinct  perception  which  enters  into  the  com- 
position of  the  mind  is  a  distinct  existence,  and  is 
different  and  distinguishable  and  separable  from  every 
other  perception,  either  contemporary  or  successive." 
And  one  more  sentence,    **  What   we    call   mind   is 


PERSONALITY  20I 

nothing  but  a  heap  or  bundle  or  collection  of  dif- 
ferent perceptions  united  together  by  certain  rela- 
tions, and  supposed,  though  falsely,  to  be  endowed 
with  a  certain  simplicity  and  identity." 

The  questions  thus  stated  by  Hume  and  the  an- 
swers to  them  have  appeared  in  almost  all  treatises 
on  psychology  which  have  been  written  since  his 
time.  His  answers  have  in  the  main  been  the  an- 
swers of  the  English  school  of  psychology,  and  they 
are  found  almost  in  their  naked  simplicity  in  the 
works  of  the  two  Mills,  in  Bain,  Huxley,  and  Spen- 
cer. He  has  also  set  the  problem  of  the  self  for  psy- 
chologists generally,  and  they  toil  at  the  problem 
in  your  country  and  in  ours.  One  may  read  the  in- 
cisive discussion  of  the  problem  in  James's  ''  Psychol- 
ogy," and  in  the  able  discussions  of  Dr.  Ward,  and 
in  many  others.  I  take  from  the  discussions  simply 
what  I  need. 

The  introspective  glance  cast  by  Hume  into  his 
own  mind  and  its  working  is  graphically  described. 
"  The  mind  is  a  kind  of  theatre  where  several  per- 
ceptions successively  make  their  appearance,  pass, 
repass,  glide  away,  and  mingle  in  an  infinite  variety 
of  postures  and  situations."  True,  we  are  satisfied 
for  a  time,  and  then  we  ask.  What  is  the  theatre,  and 
for  whom  is  the  show  .-^  Hume  rather  anticipates  the 
question,  for  he  warns  us  that  "  the  comparison  of  a 
theatre  must  not  mislead  us,"  and  then  goes  on  to  say 
they  are  "  the  successive  perceptions  only  that  con- 


202  THEISM 

stitute  the  mind.  "  Having  made  use  of  the  theatre 
and  suggested  a  possible  spectator,  the  theatre  and 
the  spectator  are  at  once  withdrawn,  while  the  sug- 
gestion of  them  remains.  As  we  continue  to  think 
of  the  matter,  we  come  to  the  conclusion  that  we  are 
in  the  presence  of  a  unique  kind  of  thing,  which  seems 
be  at  the  same  time  knower  and  known,  actor  and 
spectator,  a  show  and  the  spectator  for  whom  the 
show  is.  The  spectator  and  the  gliding  perceptions 
attracted  our  attention,  and  played  the  part  of 
occupying  our  thought,  until  we  forgot  to  ask  the 
important  question  of  the  person  who  is  aware  of  the 
movements  of  the  gliding  sensations.  Then  we  found 
that  Hume  had  left  out  one-half  of  the  whole  busi- 
ness, and  that  the  half  without  the  action  of  which 
there  would  have  been  no  report. 

The  gliding  perceptions  come  and  go,  but  not 
unobserved  or  forgotten.  They  are  not  separate, 
unrelated,  or  unreferred.  They  are  present  to  a  con- 
sciousness which  is  also  present  to  them.  Hume's 
spectator  is  a  convenient  person  in  psychology,  and 
fulfils  a  useful  function.  As  a  fact,  he  is  brought  in 
now  and  then,  when  some  such  functionary  is  indis- 
pensable. All  of  us  postulate  him  at  some  point  or 
other,  and  we  usually  fancy  we  are  looking  on  from 
without  at  the  consciousness  of  somebody  else.  As 
a  matter  of  fact,  the  only  consciousness  I  can  ever 
hope  to  know  is  my  own.  I  can  interrogate  my 
own  consciousness  ;    I  can  compare  it  with  what  others 


PERSONALITY  203 

tell  me  is  within  their  consciousness,  but  really  my 
perceptions  are  mine ;  I  am  the  only  being  aware  of 
them  :  their  gliding,  passing,  and  repassing  are  for  me 
alone,  and  apart  from  my  recognition  of  them  they 
are  unrecognized. 

We  have  thus  to  amend  Hume's  description,  and 
say  the  mind  is  a  theatre  in  which  it  is  itself  actor 
and  spectator,  and  the  perceptions  do  not  constitute 
the  mind,  for  they  are  not  even  perceptions  until 
they  are  referred  to  the  mind.  To  put  it  in  more 
modern  phrase,  there  is  not  only  a  series  of  states  of 
consciousness,  there  is  also  a  consciousness  of  these 
states,  and  this  last  is  the  element  neglected  by 
Hume  and  by  his  successors.  It  is  quite  true  that  we 
can  never  interview  a  blank  self,  or  stand  face  to  face 
with  a  consciousness  devoid  of  contents  ;  true,  also, 
that  the  mind  is  always  found  in  a  particular  state  of 
consciousness,  but  it  is  equally  true  that  it  is  found  in 
every  state,  and  it  is  distinct  from  any  state,  for  it  is 
the  condition  of  the  existence  and  recognition  of  them 
all.  We  are  not  to  look  for  the  mind  as  if  it  were  a 
thing  among  other  things,  a  sensation  among  sensa- 
tions, or  a  perception  among  perceptions,  or  as  the 
sum  of  a  series  of  sensations,  rather  we  are  to  look 
for  mind  as  the  universal  condition  of  the  possibility 
of  all  experience.  As  Hoffding  says:  ''Conscious 
life  has  three  characteristics  :  (i)  change  and  con- 
trast as  condition  of  the  individual  elements  entering 
consciousness ;  (2)   preservation    or  reproduction   of 


204  THEISM 

previously  given  elements,  together  with  connection 
between  these  and  the  new  element;  (3)  the  inner 
unity  of  recognition." 

There  is  the  series  and  the  awareness  of  the 
series,  and  neither  of  the  two  can  be  neglected  in 
any  adequate  account  of  consciousness.  Presenta- 
tion, preservation,  recognition,  and  the  combination 
of  them  all  into  the  unity  of  experience  —  this  is 
the  fact  which  must  be  accepted,  and  cannot  be 
explained.  The  toil  imposed  on  the  followers  of 
Hume  by  their  attempt  to  build  something,  which 
might  pass  for  mind,  out  of  the  separate  elements  of 
the  series  of  states  of  consciousness  casts  the  labours 
of  Sisyphus  altogether  into  the  shade.  To  make 
ropes  out  of  sand  is  an  easy  task  in  comparison. 
When  Mr.  Spencer  reduces  the  beginnings  of  ex- 
perience to  nervous  shocks,  and  endeavours  to  build 
up  experience  out  of  these,  he  appears  to  succeed, 
because  he  brings  in  surreptitiously  the  idea  of  unity 
of  the  nervous  organism,  which  speedily  becomes 
transformed  into  a  unity  of  consciousness.  In  truth, 
the  unity  has  been  present  in  the  shocks  all  along, 
only  Mr.  Spencer  kept  it  hidden  until  he  needed  it, 
and  brought  it  out  at  a  certain  stage,  when  it  could 
no  longer  be  kept  back,  and  he  made  it  appear  as  a 
newly  manufactured  article. 

In  fact,  the  two  are  inseparable,  though  we  seem 
to  attend  only  to  one  of  them  at  a  time.  Conscious- 
ness may  be  fully  occupied  with  the  object  on  which 


PERSONALITY 


205 


attention  is  concentrated,  and  that  to  the  exclusion  of 
the  thought  of  itself.  I  watched  the  helmsman  on 
the  great  ship  on  which  I  once  crossed  the  Atlantic. 
He  had  enough  to  do,  for  there  was  a  considerable 
storm  on  hand.  I  saw  him  watch  the  waves  with  his 
hand  on  the  helm,  I  saw  the  tension  of  his  arms,  the 
firm  planting  of  the  foot,  the  swaying  of  the  body, 
and  the  tug  of  war  as  the  helm  met  the  waves,  and 
all  the  time  there  was  no  recognition  of  the  self  as 
the  centre  to  which  all  the  coordinated  movements  of 
mind  and  body  were  referred.  To  me,  the  onlooker, 
what  was  visible  were  the  skilful  watching  of  the 
ever  varying  movements  of  wind,  water,  and  ship, 
the  skilful  adaptation  of  the  helm  to  these,  and  the 
strenuous  work  which  he  did.  His  description  of  his 
work  would  scarcely  have  a  reference  to  his  mental 
processes,  while  mine  as  descriptive  of  his  work 
would  be  full  of  such  terms  as  would  describe  his 
mental  apprehension  of  the  varying  conditions  and 
the  adjustment  of  his  action  to  meet  them. 

To  the  fact  that  the  man  is  directly  conscious  of 
the  object,  and  only  conscious  of  himself  as  the 
subject  when  he  directs  attention  that  way,  may  be 
ascribed  the  plausibility  of  the  account  Hume  has 
given  of  the  process.  When  we  attend  to  the  pro- 
cess of  seeing,  we  attend  to  what  is  seen  and  to  the 
seeing  of  it.  There  is  a  double  process,  and  it  is 
little  wonder  that  a  plain  man  does  take  little  interest 
in  the  workings  of  his  own  mind.     What  is  present 


206  THEISM 

to  every  state  of  consciousness  is  not  distinctive  of 
any  state.  But  even  a  plain  man  is  aware  that  to 
the  ordinary  states  of  consciousness  there  is  added 
a  consciousness  that  they  have  come  and  gone.  It  is 
not  a  proper  recognition  of  the  fact  to  suppose  that 
several  perceptions  being  given,  their  collective  con- 
sciousness is  also  given,  for  the  awareness  of  the 
series  is  something  not  given  in  the  series.  In  short, 
there  is,  we  repeat,  a  series  of  states  of  consciousness 
and  a  consciousness  of  the  states.  Consciousness  is 
the  specific  feature  or  condition  of  ail  mental  states ; 
not  as  something  added  to,  apart  from,  or  antecedent 
to  mental  states,  but  as  that  element  which  consti- 
tutes them  as  mental  states.  Feeling,  knowing, 
acting,  are  conscious  states,  modes  of  consciousness, 
and  consciousness  is  not  the  sum  of  these,  but  the 
condition  of  their  existence.  We  may  write  of  feel- 
ing, knowing,  willing,  as  unconscious,  if  we  please,  but 
these  are  phrases  which  have  no  contents  for  con- 
sciousness. 

Faculties  are  modes  of  consciousness,  but  con- 
sciousness is  not  a  faculty.  It  is  impossible  to 
regard  it  as  the  outcome  of  unconscious  forces,  nor 
can  it  be  deduced  or  derived  from  anything  else ;  we 
must  just  accept  it  in  its  uniqueness  as  the  explana- 
tion of  everything  that  can  be  explained,  itself  un- 
explained. We  have  the  happiness  of  knowing  it 
from  both  sides,  we  know  it  from  without,  in  the 
same  way  as  we  know  other  objects  of  science;  and 


PERSONALITY  20/ 

we  know  it  from  within,  can  surprise  it  in  its  work- 
ing, and  constrain  it  to  disclose  its  secret  and  mani- 
fest its  nature  and  its  vocation.  While  we  affirm 
that  consciousness  must  be  assumed,  and  while  it 
cannot  be  derived  nor  resolved  into  something 
simpler,  still  the  conditions  of  its  exercise  may  be 
studied.  As  we  know  it  in  ourselves  it  has  a  begin- 
ning, a  growth,  and  a  history.  Thrust  into  the  midst 
of  conditions  not  realized,  slowly  learning  to  find 
itself  at  home  in  the  world,  and  gradually  coming 
to  the  knowledge  that  there  is  an  external  order  to 
which  it  is  related,  the  self-conscious  being,  in  inter- 
course with  things,  comes,  so  far,  to  the  knowledge 
of  self  and  of  the  world.  The  story  may  be  taken 
for  granted  here,  at  least  so  far  as  to  assume  that  the 
finite  personality  grows  to  the  recognition  of  itself. 
It  comes  to  distinguish  between  self  and  not-self. 
There  is  the  self  and  there  is  the  not-self.  But 
this  does  not  carry  us  very  far.  It  would  give 
only  a  very  vague  objectivity,  without  a  definite 
content. 

Consciousness  emerges  from  this  vague  state  when 
it  recognizes  that  there  are  distinctions  among  its 
objects,  relations  in  which  these  may  be  gathered 
up.  One  thing  is  related  to  another,  and  the  relations 
run  together,  and  in  virtue  of  these,  consciousness 
begins  to  find  itself  in  an  ordered  world,  and  comes 
to  know  that  its  own  principles  are  realized  in  the 
objects  it  finds  around  it.    In  virtue  of  its  own  rational 


208  THEISM 

nature  it  recognizes  that  it  is  in  a  rational  universe. 
One  remark  is  necessary  here  on  two  distinctions 
which  are  often  used  as  if  they  were  conterminous. 
One  is  the  distinction  between  self  and  not-self,  and 
the  other  is  that  between  subject  and  object.  These 
are  by  no  means  of  equal  extent  and  content.  The 
boundaries  of  the  first  distinction  are  fixed  and  deter- 
mined, the  boundaries  of  the  second  are  constantly 
changing.  The  one  may  be  called  an  ontological 
distinction,  for  it  relates  to  the  distinction  between 
two  things,  which  in  their  distinction  may  be  supposed 
to  make  up  the  whole  sphere  of  being.  The  dis- 
tinction between  subject  and  object  describes  a  mental 
function.  The  contents  of  the  two  are  constantly 
changing.  At  one  moment  the  object  may  be  this 
table,  with  its  shape,  colour,  its  material,  and  the 
next  moment  the  object  may  be  the  mental  process 
which  passed  through  the  mind  when  the  table  was 
the  object.  The  object  may  be  either  the  things  in 
the  outer  world,  or  it  may  be  the  states  of  conscious- 
ness by  means  of  which  we  deal  with  the  outer 
world.  It  may  be  the  thing  I  seem  to  see,  or  it  may 
be  the  vision  through  which  I  see  it. 

This  remark  is  necessary,  for  a  great  deal  of  talk 
has  come  into  existence  about  subject  and  object, 
and  many  inferences  drawn  from  the  contrast,  such 
as  that  there  cannot  be  an  infinite  consciousness,  for 
a  subject  implies  an  object ;  and  if  the  self  is  subject, 
it  cannot,  also,  be  object,   and  so   on,  all  of  which 


PERSONALITY  209 

disappears  when  we  remember  that  the  distinction 
between  subject  and  object  is  not  an  ontological 
distinction,  but  only  the  form  under  which  conscious- 
ness takes  place.  They  are  relations  within  one 
experience. 

Let  us  remember,  also,  that  we  are  dealing  here 
and  in  the  first  place  with  finite  selves,  each  of  which 
has  had  an  individual  history,  a  growth  to  conscious- 
ness ;  not  with  a  self  rational,  and  fully  self-conscious 
from  the  beginning.  As  we  wisely  form  our  concep- 
tion of  a  man  from  the  fully  developed  man,  thor- 
oughly furnished  in  all  that  concerns  humanity,  so 
we  take  our  ideal  of  consciousness,  not  from  the 
process  by  which  it  came  to  itself,  but  from  what  it 
manifests  when  it  is  fully  realized.  It  is  not  neces- 
sary for  our  purpose  to  dwell  on  the  natural  history 
of  the  individual,  but  we  must  lay  stress  on  one  thing. 
The  conception  of  self,  like  all  other  conceptions,  is 
one  of  gradual  growth,  and  the  time  of  its  perfect 
realization  is,  for  us,  not  yet.  If  you  ask  a  child 
what  its  idea  of  the  self  is,  the  most  likely  answer 
will  be  a  reference  to  the  outward  appearance.  The 
body  is  regarded  as  the  self,  and  most  people,  not 
trained  in  philosophy,  if  asked  about  the  self,  will 
look  for  it  as  if  it  were  laid  on  a  shelf,  a  thing  among 
other  things.  They  are  so  immersed  in  present  ex- 
periences that  they  never  ask  for  whom  and  whose 
is  the  experience  t  The  conception  of  self  is  not 
given  ready  made,  it  grows,  it  is  acquired, 
p 


2IO  THEISM 

While  the  experience  of  self  is  always  present  to 
every  mind,  the  conception  of  the  self  as  the  subject 
of  experience  may  never  come  to  clear  consciousness. 
There  is  a  clearness  and  vividness  in  self-conscious- 
ness which  puts  all  other  things  into  antithesis  with 
itself.  There  is  an  assertiveness  about  it  which  is 
unique.  The  world  falls  into  two  divisions  for  each 
of  us, — there  is  myself,  and  there  is  the  universe  of 
other  persons  and  thmgs,  —  and  this  antithesis  is  of  a 
kind  that  abides.  Other  people  there  may  be,  they 
also  may  think,  they  may  have  experiences  of  the 
same  kind,  but  these  experiences  lack  the  vividness 
and  impressiveness  of  my  experience  of  myself,  as  a 
living,  feeling,  thinking  being.  It  is  in  this  real  con- 
crete Hfe  of  feeling  that  selfhood  acquires  vividness 
and  reality.  Self-experience  may  be  the  only  form 
which  self-consciousness  may  assume.  The  self  may 
be  so  absorbed  in  the  process  of  experience,  so  lost 
in  the  feelings,  desires,  thoughts,  which  occupy  it 
from  moment  to  moment,  that  it  may  never  reflect 
on  itself,  and  never  ask  consciously  what  it  is.  It 
may  remain  on  this  level  all  through  its  earthly  life. 
Absorbed  in  its  objects,  living  out  its  experience  of 
pleasure,  engrossed  in  its  pursuits,  and  interested  in 
the  success  of  its  plans,  it  may  never  seek  to  reflect 
on  its  own  nature  or  on  the  wonder  implied  in  the 
most  simple  experience.  We  may  be  active,  ener- 
getic, far-sighted,  and  wise  to  the  uttermost,  and 
yet  we  may  have  never  given  a  single  hour  to  the 


PERSONALITY  211 

thought  of  that  self  which  has  all  these  character- 
istics. 

The  mind  may  direct  itself  on  either  element  of  ex- 
perience to  the  neglect  of  the  other,  it  may  focus  its 
attention  on  the  subject  or  on  the  object.  Self-con- 
sciousness may  remain  at  the  level  of  the  simple  expe- 
rience of  itself,  or  it  may  advance  to  a  conception  of 
the  self  as  the  subject  of  all  possible  experience  for 
the  self.  In  any  case,  a  perfect  self-consciousness  is 
implicit  in  every  consciousness.  It  is  possible  for  a 
self  to  advance  to  the  conception  of  itself  as  the  sub- 
ject of  experience,  which  takes  up  all  impressions, 
rules  them,  binds  them  into  a  system,  and  makes  them 
parts  in  one  consistent  experience.  In  that  case  self- 
consciousness  would  have  attained  its  ideal,  for  it 
would  have  reached  the  goal  of  self-knowledge  and 
self-control.  The  conception  of  a  perfect  self-con- 
sciousness consists  in  the  fact  that  it  is  in  posses- 
sion of  itself,  and  can  set  the  bounds  of  its  own 
experience.  Self-knowledge,  self-reverence,  self-con- 
trol, in  these,  and  not  in  its  finitude  or  infinitude,  lies 
the  conception  of  a  perfect  selfhood. 

Here,  then,  is  the  fundamental  element  in  the  con- 
ception of  personality,  the  highest  conception  which 
we  know.  A  person  is  one  who  has  experience  of 
self,  and  may  advance  to  the  conception  of  self  as 
the  subject  of  all  possible  experience,  at  least,  of  all 
experience  of  that  self.  Having  obtained  this  point 
of  view,  we  ought  to  go  farther  and  regard  the  self 


212  THEISM 

as  subject  of  all  possible  knowledge,  for  knowledge 
is  possible,  because  all  the  objects  of  knowledge  are 
or  may  be  brought  into  relation  to  the  self.  Objects 
out  of  all  possible  relation  to  the  self  are  for  that  self 
non-existent.  Apart  from  the  questions  raised  by 
the  theory  of  knowledge,  we  look  at  the  ethical  side 
of  conception  of  the  self,  as  it  is  of  the  highest  sig- 
nificance. Psychology  tells  us  that  there  is  a  self, 
the  theory  of  knowledge  affirms  the  worth  of  the 
self  as  the  subject  of  knowledge  for  which  all  objects 
are,  and  ethics  enables  us  to  look  at  the  self  in  the 
process  of  self-realization  and  self-determination. 
Ethically,  the  self  is  presented  to  our  view  as  in  the 
light  of  its  own  ideal,  determining  itself  in  certain 
directions  and  to  certain  ends.  It  has  to  choose  its 
ideals  and  to  realize  them. 

The  distinction  between  psychology,  theory  of 
knowledge,  and  ethics  is  not  absolute,  for  every 
problem  has  these  three  aspects,  and  all  meet  to- 
gether in  the  problem  of  the  self.  How  is  the  self 
to  be  realized  and  to  come  to  its  ideal .?  To  answer 
this  question  would  lead  us  very  far,  but  the  answer 
which  concerns  us  now  is  mainly  ethical.  From  this 
point  of  view  all  our  science  is  to  be  looked  at  in  its 
bearing  on  conduct,  in  its  tendency  to  build  up  char- 
acter, and  to  guide  conduct.  As  knowledge  Ues  in 
its  reference  to  the  self,  so  ethics  has  its  significance 
as  the  intelligible  means  for  the  realization  of  the 
self,  not  in  its  mere  selfhood,  but  as  a  member  of  a 


PERSONALITY  213 

kingdom  of  selves,  each  of  whom  is  a  self  which 
ought  to  be  helped  to  realize  its  ideal.  Take  sym- 
pathy, for  example,  and  look  at  it  psychologically,  it 
is  a  feeling  which  has  in  it  pleasure  or  pain.  We 
may  analyze  it  into  its  elements  and  set  forth  its  psy- 
chological meaning,  but  when  psychology  has  done 
its  work,  ethics  begins,  and  shows  that  by  means  of 
sympathy  the  self  reaUzes  that  it  is  only  one  in  a 
kingdom  of  selves,  each  one  of  whom  has  a  right  to 
count  for  one  in  the  kingdom  of  good.  The  self 
learns  to  judge  not  from  the  feeling  of  pleasure  and 
pain  which  he  experiences,  but  he  judges  his  actions 
by  the  good  or  harm  they  do  to  others. 

As  the  reference  to  self  is  the  unity  of  our  know- 
ledge and  of  our  experience,  in  the  ethical  Hfe  a 
similar  synthesis  must  take  place.  We  must  take 
care  lest  we  pay  too  large  a  price  for  our  intellectu- 
aUsm,  and  for  our  tendency  to  reduce  all  things  to 
system.  We  must  not  lose  hold  of  the  concrete,  liv- 
ing, throbbing,  palpitating  individual,  with  all  his 
interesting  experience,  and  substitute  a  cold  series 
of  abstractions  in  his  place.  Nor  ought  we  to  make 
the  ethical  life  a  thing  of  mere  feeling.  It  is  of  the 
essence  of  a  self-conscious  being  that  he  can  look 
back  on  the  changing,  impulsive,  fluctuating  Hfe  of 
himself,  submit  it  to  his  own  review  and  to  his  own 
reflection,  and  seek  to  find  the  principle  on  which  he 
has  lived,  and  to  gather  it  up  into  a  rational  whole. 
The    self-conscious    being   who    can    and   will,    with 


214 


THEISM 


insight,  foresight,  and  deUberation,  set  himself  to  do 
this  is  on  the  way  to  be  a  person  in  the  fullest 
sense  of  the  word.  He  takes  what  is  given  to  him, 
transforms  it  and  himself  into  a  larger  whole,  and 
in  so  doing  he  has  realized  himself  and  attained  to 
personality.  Personality  for  finite  beings  is  a  goal 
to  be  attained,  not  an  inheritance  they  have  received. 
Individuality  and  personaUty  are  to  be  distinguished 
from  each  other.  Individuahty  is  given,  personality 
is  won.  An  animal  has  individuality,  it  has  all  the 
impulses  and  feehngs  which  tend  to  self-preserva- 
tion and  race-preservation,  and  can  maintain  itself 
in  the  struggle  for  existence.  Man  is  also  a  self 
in  this  lower  meaning  of  the  word.  He  has  his  ap- 
petites, desires,  passions,  impulses,  which  demand 
satisfaction,  and  urge  him  on  to  action.  These 
exist  in  him,  and  rise  in  him  as  readily  as  in  any 
animal.  If  allowed  to  have  their  way  uncontrolled, 
in  their  total  working  they  would  constitute  the  man 
as  they  appear  to  constitute  the  animal.  But  they 
do  not,  at  least  they  need  not,  constitute  man.  As 
a  fact  they  do  not  so,  for  man  can  subdue  his  im- 
pulses, rule  his  passions,  control  his  desires,  and 
make  them  servants  to  a  higher  purpose.  He  can 
reflect  on  the  phenomena  which  make  up  his  mani- 
fold Hfe,  and  look  at  them  in  their  relation  to  a  final 
and  permanent  good.  Man  may  take  a  critical 
view  of  his  sentient  and  impulsive  fife,  subject  it  to 
a  judicial   review,  choose  which  tendencies  may  be 


PERSONALITY 


215 


repressed,  and  which  may  be  strengthened  and  en- 
couraged, and  thus  become  a  moral  personality. 
"Man  goeth  forth  to  his  work  and  his  labour  until 
the  evening."  Man  may  review,  he  has  the  power 
to  review  the  impulsive  course  of  his  past  Hfe,  can 
criticise  it,  arrest  its  course,  change  and  subdue  the 
lower,  animal,  merely  natural  self,  and  make  himself 
subject  to  a  rational  ideal,  and  so  build  up,  out  of 
the  plastic  material  of  sensibility,  a  stable  moral  self. 
Character  in  this  sense  does  not  belong  to  an  animal. 
Its  hfe  seems  to  be  a  life  of  natural  and  immediate 
sensibihty,  unchecked  by  any  glimmering  of  Hfe  as 
a  whole.  But  for  man  there  is  a  human  task.  All 
the  natural  tendencies  to  activity,  all  the  surging 
elements  of  natural  sensibility,  all  the  clamant  im- 
pulses of  his  nature,  have  to  be  looked  at  by  the 
rational  self,  criticised,  judged,  appraised,  their  rela- 
tive worth  established  in  the  judgment  of  the  rational 
being  who  measures  the  good  of  life  as  a  whole. 
The  hfe  of  man  is  not  a  struggle  of  natural  tenden- 
cies, he  is  the  subject  which  feels  all  the  promptings 
of  passion  and  desire,  but  he  is  also  the  critic  and 
judge  of  these,  and  it  is  as  critic  that  he  is  master  of 
his  own  destiny. 

"  He  saw  hfe  steadily  and  saw  it  whole,"  is  a 
saying  the  profundity  of  which  grows  on  us  the  more 
we  think  of  it.  It  was  spoken  only  of  one,  it  is 
ideally  true  of  every  rational  self-conscious  person. 
Not  lost  in  mere  individuality,  not  swept  along  Uke 


2i6  THEISM 

a  thing  by  the  stream  of  feeling  and  impulse,  but 
master  of  himself  and  of  his  work,  ruler  of  himself 
and  of  his  impulses,  having  regard  to  the  worth  of  life 
as  a  whole,  and  measuring  every  experience  by  its 
worth  for  the  whole  of  life ;  this  is  something  of  the 
meaning  of  the  saying.  Much  is  given  to  us,  but 
the  given  is  the  individuality  out  of  which  the  per- 
sonality is  to  be  made.  To  man  is  given  the  material 
out  of  which  the  rational  personality  is  to  be  realized. 
Much  is  given, — race  endowments,  all  that  heredity 
can  convey,  temperament,  constitution,  —  in  fact,  it 
would  be  tedious  to  enumerate  all  that  is  given  to 
the  individual.  Time,  place,  circumstances,  racial 
conditions,  the  atmosphere  of  society,  and  many 
other  things  are  given,  but  the  character  is  not  given, 
it  is  wrought  out  by  the  man  himself.  These  are 
given  that  we  may  realize  our  personality.  To  other 
beings  the  law  of  their  life  is  given ;  man  has  to  sub- 
ject himself  to  law,  and  to  choose  the  highest  law  to 
which  he  will  subject  himself. 

The  rational  being  has  thus  a  work  to  do.  The 
several  elements  in  the  individual  life,  the  antithe- 
sis into  which  they  tend  to  fall,  the  seeming  con- 
tradictions between  the  sensual  and  the  rational, 
between  the  individual  and  society,  and  all  the  other 
divergencies  which  might  be  stated,  are  to  be  har- 
monized in  the  unity  of  the  personal  life.  But  this 
is  only  one  part  of  self-realization.  To  unite  the 
several  elements  of  the  individual  life  so  that  there 


PERSONALITY  2 1 7 

will  ensue  a  realized  harmony  is  a  great  achievement ; 
it  is  still  greater  to  unite  the  several  personal  lives 
in  a  synthesis  of  a  larger  sort.  The  individual  is 
particular,  personality  is  universal.  All  humanity  is 
potentially  in  every  man.  Each  of  us  has  to  out- 
grow the  individual,  and  to  attain  to  somewhat  of 
that  personality  which  is  the  concihation  of  the 
several  individual  lives. 

**  Be  a  person  and  respect  others  as  persons." 
"  Always  use  the  humanity  in  thine  own  person  and  in 
the  persons  of  others,"  never  as  a  means,  but  always 
as  an  end,  or  as  it  is  in  Shakespeare,  "  To  thine  own 
self  be  true,  and  it  must  follow  as  the  night  the  day, 
thou  canst  not  then  be  false  to  any  man."  Each 
person  an  end  in  himself,  with  a  right  to  demand 
from  the  universe  the  means  for  the  realization  of 
himself,  and  every  person  a  law  to  himself  in  virtue 
of  the  realized  rationality  within  himself,  that  is  the 
ethical  ideal  set  before  us,  alas !  how  far  from  being 
realized  !  Still  in  our  best  moments  we  feel  that  this 
is  the  right  ideal  for  a  man.  To  feel  the  oneness  of 
the  rational  self  with  all  other  rational  selves  in  the 
world,  to  know  that  just  as  far  as  we  realize  the 
rational  ideal  of  humanity  in  ourselves,  we  are  ipso 
facto  brought  into  oneness  with  all  others  who  bear 
the  mark  of  personality.  This  oneness  does  not 
mean  the  obliteration  of  differences,  it  does  not  do 
away  with  that  characteristic  note  of  a  man  which 
makes  him  himself  something  distinct  from  all  other 


21 8  THEISM 

in  the  world,  but  it  gives  a  place  to  him  in  the  com- 
mon kingdom,  which  is  constituted  by  such  a  union 
of  all  as  is  consistent  with  the  freedom  of  each.  Our 
study  of  the  personality  of  man  leads  to  this 
conclusion,  that  personality  is  not  to  be  suppressed, 
not  to  be  submerged  in  a  larger  whole  which  will  swal- 
low it  up  as  the  river  swallows  up  the  snowflakes 
which  fall  on  it ;  rather  whatever  the  synthesis  may 
be,  it  at  least  must  be  of  a  kind  which  will  leave  the 
person  free  to  continue  in  his  self-conscious  activity, 
as  a  being  that  has  worth  and  significance  in  himself. 
That  is  to  say,  that  the  larger  unity  of  which  we  are 
in  search  must  be  constituted  on  another  basis,  and 
after  another  sort  than  any  we  have  met  in  the  course 
of  our  exploration.  The  cells  which  we  came  to 
know  in  their  differentiated  state  as  parts  of  one 
organism  had  a  union  among  themselves  only  on 
condition  that  they  were  in  subordination  to  the 
whole.  They  no  longer  maintained  a  separate  exist- 
ence. But  the  persons  who  make  up  a  society  main- 
tain their  relative  independence ;  there  are  character- 
istics which  they  cannot  give  up  if  they  are  to  remain 
persons.  They  must  continue  to  exert  all  the  modes 
of  their  consciousness,  must  live  out  their  own  feel- 
ing, thinking,  acting,  and,  in  a  word,  they  must  be 
themselves  and  not  others.  In  this  continuance  of 
their  personal  life  and  growth  consists  their  worth 
for  society,  and  their  worth  in  themselves.  Not  to 
be  ground  in  a  social  mill  until  all  angularities  are 


PERSONALITY 


219 


rubbed  off :  no,  that  is  not  the  ideal ;  rather  the  ideal 
is  to  sharpen  the  angularities  and  keep  them  in  all 
their  picturesqueness,  so  that  there  may  be  the  fullest 
development  of  the  uniqueness  of  every  personality, 
along  with  the  fulness  of  the  rational  unity  consti- 
tuted by  a  spiritual  integration  of  such  personalities. 
Such  a  unity  can  only  be  constituted  by  the  rational 
choice  of  such  personaHties.  The  unity  of  a  barrel 
is  made  by  the  hoops,  the  unity  of  an  organism  is 
constituted  by  a  principle  of  life  acting  from  within, 
the  unity  of  a  social  organism  must  be  constituted  by 
the  self-surrender  of  the  members  to  the  whole,  and 
of  the  whole  to  the  members.  Such  a  unity  is  not 
yet,  but  it  is  coming  nearer.  At  all  events,  we  have 
made  such  progress  as  to  be  able  to  set  forth  in  some 
adequate  way  the  conditions  of  such  a  social  union. 
We  can  see  that  the  ways  of  holding  peoples  and 
nations  together  which  have  prevailed  through  the 
past  have  not  been  ideal  ways.  Standing  armies, 
brute  force,  repressive  legislation,  one  people  holding 
another  in  subjection, — these  are  not  ideal  ways  of 
reaching  social  union.  But  on  these  I  am  not  called 
to  dwell.  What  I  am  concerned  with  is  the  necessary 
condition  to  any  social  union,  namely,  that  there  must 
be  full  scope  in  it  for  the  development  of  the  individ- 
ual to  a  personality,  and  that  the  surrender  of  the 
person  to  the  good  of  the  society  must  be  deliberate, 
rational,  free,  in  a  word,  it  must  be  rational  self- 
surrender. 


220  THEISM 

The  spirit  of  the  society  may  pass  into  the  mem- 
bers of  that  society,  and  the  social  ethos  be  realized 
in  each  member,  but  it  will  be  realized  by  him  in  his 
own  characteristic  way.  Character  may  be  as  dis- 
tinctive as  faces  are,  the  common  type  is  there,  but 
each  face  has  something  distinctive.  So  with  the 
personality,  it  is  one,  but  with  distinctions.  For  this 
spiritual  thing  which  we  call  personality  is  the  most 
unique  product  of  time.  Imperfectly  realized  as  it  is, 
it  yet  presents  us  with  the  most  complete  type  we 
know  of  imperviousness,  and  resistance  to  all  merely 
external  influences.  Force  may  be  brought  to  bear 
upon  it,  it  may  be  crushed  out  of  visible  existence, 
you  may  cage  it,  imprison  it,  and  the  caged  imprisoned 
thing  may  sing,  "  My  mind  to  me  a  kingdom  is."  It 
may  maintain  its  sturdy  independence,  and  if  it  is  to 
be  subdued,  it  must  be  by  influence  of  another  kind. 
If  it  is  to  recognize  itself  as  a  member  of  a  larger 
unity,  that  unity  must  come  to  it  in  a  fashion  which 
will  recognize  the  worth  of  the  person.  There  are 
limits  to  the  demands  which  the  social  organism  may 
make.  None  can  have  the  right  to  demand  from 
a  person  the  surrender  of  that  which  would  make 
him  cease  to  be  a  person  and  which  would  turn  him 
into  a  thing. 

These  remarks  have  a  wide  significance,  which  is 
not  limited  to  the  discussion  of  social  questions,  on 
which  I  do  not  enter.  They  have  a  bearing  on  phil- 
osophical and  ethical   questions,    the   discussion    of 


PERSONALITY  22 1 

which  is  occupying  the  attention  of  the  deepest 
thinkers  on  this  side  and  on  our  side  of  the  water. 
These  questions  will  be  looked  at  later.  Meanwhile 
let  us  look  at  the  process  by  which  the  rational  being 
may  be  persuaded  to  serve,  obey,  love,  and  work  in 
union  with  his  fellows.  For  by  persuasion  alone  can 
this  result  be  rightly  wrought  out.  It  is  by  ideals 
that  the  rational  man  is  led  to  self-surrender.  It  is 
by  an  appeal  to  his  rational  nature  that  the  process 
of  self-realization  can  be  guided  to  its  destined  end. 
Each  aspect  of  our  complex  nature  makes  its  own 
contribution  to  the  ideal.  Nor  can  science  make  any 
progress  without  an  appeal  to  an  ideal.  From  the 
experience  that  the  self  has  of  the  energy  it  exerts 
in  its  own  action,  science  leaps  forth  to  the  conception 
of  an  infinite  and  eternal  energy  from  which  all 
things  proceed.  From  the  intelligent  action  of  the 
self  and  the  room  for  that  action  which  it  experi- 
ences in  the  world,  science  obtains  the  conception  of 
an  intelligence  which  is  equal  to  the  ordering  of  the 
world.  Reason  is  postulated  as  the  cause  of  the 
rationahty  of  the  world.  From  the  appreciation  of 
beauty  and  harmony  which  man  finds  in  the  world, 
the  aesthetic  ideal  of  an  infinite  source  of  beauty  is 
constructed.  The  conscience  of  man  thirsting  after 
righteousness  cannot  rest  until  it  reaches  an  ideal  of 
perfect  righteousness  in  which  there  is  no  becoming, 
and  the  heart  of  man  demands  an  ideal  of  perfect 
goodness   and   love.     As    long   as   any    demand    of 


222  THEISM 

intelligence,  conscience,  heart,  or  reason  is  unrecog- 
nized, there  can  be  no  peace  for  man.  Only  when 
all  the  claims  of  the  many-sided  nature  of  man  are 
recognized  in  the  conception  of  an  all-wise,  holy,  lov- 
ing, all-powerful  God,  can  man  realize  himself. 

Are  these  ideals  real }  Are  they  not  the  objecti- 
fication  of  our  own  needs  t  Are  they  the  Brocken 
shadows  of  ourselves  cast  upon  the  wastes  of  space } 
Does  not  the  idea  of  an  infinite  personality  land  us 
in  contradiction }  Well,  I  do  not  hesitate  to  say 
that  for  the  interpretation  of  our  experience,  we  are 
entitled  to  make  those  assumptions  without  which 
experience  is  not  possible.  This  is  axiomatic.  In 
fact,  it  is  done  by  every  one  who  ventures  to  make 
universal  propositions.  Every  one  assumes  in  his 
philosophy  that,  to  use  the  words  of  Mr.  Spencer, 
"  I  am  in  the  presence  of  an  infinite  and  eternal 
energy  from  which  all  things  proceed."  We  are 
entitled  to  ask,  whence  this  conception  has  come } 
For  it  is  certain  that  our  finite  experience,  consid- 
ered in  itself,  cannot  make  such  an  affirmation.  As 
merely  quantitative,  we  cannot  measure,  weigh,  or 
reckon  an  infinite.  We  reach  the  idea  of  infinite 
power  by  recognizing  that  we  cannot  set  any  limit  to 
it,  yet  our  positive  notion  of  power  is  derived  from 
our  own  activity.  If  we  grant  to  Mr.  Spencer  the 
conception  of  infinite  and  eternal  energy,  we  still 
maintain  that  the  notion  is  positive,  not  negative. 
Infinite  and  eternal  are  not  negative,  they  merely 


PERSONALITY  223 

set  forth  that  there  are   objects  to  the  worth  and 
excellence  of  which  we  can  set  no  limits. 

The  main  object  of  these  remarks  is  to  show  the 
inconsistency  of  those  who  first  make  universal  prop- 
ositions themselves,  and  refuse  to  others  the  same 
right.  If  we  can  form  an  idea  of  power,  if  we  can 
without  contradiction  speak  of  an  infinite  and  eternal 
energy,  we  have  opened  up  the  way  to  the  affirmation 
of  other  ideals.  The  affirmation  of  an  energy  is  the 
raising  of  one  part  of  our  experience  to  its  ideal,  and 
the  idea  of  force  has  no  better  inherent  right  to  be 
thus  raised  to  the  infinite  than  any  other  idea  has. 
But  a  great  many  raise  this  conception  to  an  ideal 
height,  and  then  use  it  to  criticise  all  other  ideals. 
If  we  speak  of  perfect  righteousness,  of  infinite 
intelligence,  of  perfect  beauty,  or  of  eternal  good- 
ness and  love,  we  are  at  once  told  that  we  are  an- 
thropomorphic, and  those  who  say  so  forget  that 
the  notion  of  energy  is  quite  as  anthropomorphic  as 
any  of  these  mentioned.  In  truth,  the  contention,  if 
carried  out  consistently,  would  destroy  science  alto- 
gether, and  limit  our  thought  to  what  happens  in 
our  own  time  and  within  the  narrow  circle  of  our 
purely  personal  experience,  and  that  in  the  narrow- 
est sense  of  the  word  "  experience."  If,  as  the  cor- 
relative of  our  experience  of  power,  Spencer  can 
speak  of  an  infinite  and  eternal  energy,  he  may  not 
limit  the  rights  of  others.  If  infinite  power  is  in- 
volved in  our  experience  of  finite  power,  then  with 


224  THEISM 

a  right  as  good  infinite  reason  is  involved  in  the 
exercise  of  the  finite  reason  we  know,  aye,  and  with 
a  much  better  claim.  Perfect  righteousness,  holi- 
ness free  from  all  imperfection,  goodness,  and  love 
are  involved  in  the  finite  experience  of  the  righteous- 
ness, holiness,  and  love  realized  among  men.  I  know 
no  reason  why  they  claim  reality  for  their  ideal,  and 
refuse  reality  to  mine.  I  am  in  relation  to  an  ex- 
ternal world  which  reveals  itself  to  me  through  my 
senses,  and  I  can  interpret  these  manifestations  into 
a  system.  If  my  experience  thus  interpreted  is  jus- 
tified by  the  result,  as  it  is,  is  the  objective  reference 
exhausted  by  this  interpretation  of  sense  experience } 
Have  we  not  acted  on  the  supposition  that  all  our 
experience  must  have  an  objective  reference.?  In 
my  intellectual  action  I  must  think  there  is  an  intel- 
ligible world,  in  my  moral  action  I  make  the  same 
assumption,  namely,  that  heart  and  conscience  in 
me  are  related  to  an  objective  authority  which  has  a 
right  to  guide  my  life  and  dictate  my  action. 

These  ideals  stand  on  the  same  level,  or,  if  there  is 
any  preference,  the  preference  is  in  favour  of  these 
ideals  prescribed  by  the  necessities  of  the  higher 
nature  of  man.  But  I  do  not  pitch  them  against 
each  other.  For  we  need  for  our  thought  and  for  our 
life  the  conception  of  the  infinite  and  eternal  energy, 
and  we  go  on  to  say  that  this  energy  is,  also,  the 
realization  of  all  ideals,  and  all  these  ideals  are  real- 
ized in  the  One  Eternal  energy  from  which  all  things 


PERSONALITY  225 

proceed  and  to  which  they  all  tend  to  return.  The 
theistic  belief  is  that  all  these  positive  ideals  are  real- 
ized in  one  infinite  personaUty  to  whom  we  are 
related  in  many  ways,  whom  we  may  know,  and 
who  may  make  Himself  known  to  us.  Now  the  only 
category  we  know  in  which  and  by  means  of  which 
we  may  set  forth  the  infinite  qualities  of  such  a  being 
is  just  that  of  personality.  It  is  the  widest  word 
known  to  us  and  the  greatest  unity.  Even  in  the 
finite  person,  how  many  quaUties  meet !  Mind  and 
body,  matter  and  spirit,  instinct  and  reason,  feeUng, 
thought,  and  action,  consciousness  of  pleasure  and 
pain,  of  good  and  evil,  all  brought  together  within  the 
synthesis  of  one  experience.  We  say  then,  if  we  have 
the  right  of  raising  any  part  of  our  experience  to  its 
ideal,  a  fortiori  we  have  the  right  to  rajse  the  whole 
synthetic  unity  to  its  ideal,  and  that  gives  us  the  con- 
ception of  a  perfect  personality. 

But  personality  is  a  Hmitation,  and  how  can  you 
ascribe  a  limitation  to  the  unlimited  }  We  hear  this 
urged  by  many  in  our  land,  indeed,  it  is  the  favourite 
agnostic  position.  It  has  been  often  argued  during 
the  last  half  century,  and  I  shall  not  spend  much  time 
on  it.  With  Lotze,  I  would  say  that  perfect  person- 
ality can  only  be  found  in  the  infinite.  The  ideal 
personality  is  one  in  which  there  is  no  becoming, 
no  limits  save  those  set  by  itself,  which  is  in  perfect 
possession  of  itself,  and  sets  the  bounds  of  its  own  ex- 
perience and  determines  all  its  states.  To  the  reality 
Q 


226  THEISM 

of  such  a  personality  we  are  led  by  all  the  experience 
of  man.  It  is  the  demand  of  the  reason,  the  postu- 
late of  our  moral  nature,  the  claim  of  the  will,  which 
requires  it  as  the  guarantee  of  its  venture  of  faith, 
launched  as  it  is  on  a  world  not  realized.  To  me  the 
difficulty  is  not  whether  personality  should  be  predi- 
cated of  God,  but  whether  so  great  a  word  should  be 
a  predicate  of  man.  At  the  best,  we  are  imperfect 
persons,  with  a  personality  not  realized,  dependent, 
having  our  states  and  our  experience  largely  set  for 
us,  not  by  us,  not  able  to  determine  wholly  either  the 
character  or  the  limits  of  our  experience.  Yet  the 
personaHty  in  ourselves  is  so  far  given  as  to  enable 
us  to  see  what  a  perfect  personality  is. 

In  fact,  I  would  sum  up  the  whole  argument  in  this 
one  word,  ''personality."  I  do  not  employ  the  word 
''self-consciousness,"  as  some  do,  for  it  seems  to  me 
that  self-consciousness  is  only  one  element  of  person- 
ality. It  is  simply  the  outline  of  personality  which  has 
to  be  filled  up  with  the  elements  of  concrete  experience 
to  redeem  it  from  mere  abstractness.  Reason,  intelli- 
gence, righteousness,  love,  are  mere  metaphors  when 
divorced  from  their  significance  as  qualities  of  a  per- 
son. This  is  the  conclusion  to  which  we  are  led  by 
the  history  of  science  and  philosophy,  and,  as  we  shall 
see,  this  is  the  supreme  demand  of  rehgion,  and  if  it 
is  not  conceded,  religion  is  impossible  in  any  true 
sense  of  the  word. 


VIII 

RELIGION:    ITS   NATURE,   HISTORY,  AND 
DEMANDS 

In  speaking  of  religion,  there  are  two  proposi- 
tions I  desire  to  make  regarding  it  at  the  outset. 
The  first  is  that  religion  is  universal  and  belongs 
to  man  as  man.  All  men  have  been  conscious  of 
their  dependence  on  a  power  greater  than  them- 
selves, and  have  felt  a  necessity  of  being  on  good 
terms  with  that  power.  They  have  believed  in  the 
existence  of  such  a  power;  they  have  sought  to 
propitiate  that  power  in  many  ways ;  and  they  have 
recognized  that  that  power  had  prescribed  for  them 
a  certain  kind  of  life.  The  result  of  investigation 
leads  to  the  historical  conclusion  that  there  has 
been  no  people  without  a  religion;  at  least,  such 
a  people  has  not  yet  been  discovered.  A  rehgion 
gives  a  creed  to  believe,  commands  to  obey,  and 
consolations  to  be  enjoyed.  And  these  are  ele- 
ments in  every  religion. 

A  second  proposition  I  venture  to  make  is  that 
religion  is  universal  in  another  aspect;  namely,  it 
belongs  to  every  part  of  human  nature.  It  is  not 
a   matter   merely   of   the   reason,    nor   is   it   merely 

227 


228  THEISM 

based  on  feeling,  nor  is  it  only  directed  toward 
action.  It  appeals  to  the  whole  consciousness  of 
man,  and  to  every  mode  of  it.  It  is  rational,  emo- 
tional, and  volitional.  It  gives  truth  for  the  in- 
telligence, consolations  for  the  heart,  motive  and 
guidance  for  the  will.  It  is  necessary  to  insist  on 
these  commonplaces,  for  religion  has  been  identi- 
fied with  philosophy,  and  the  problem  of  the  one 
has  been  stated  as  if  it  were  the  problem  of  the 
other;  it  has  been  denuded  of  every  rational  ele- 
ment and  transformed  into  a  mere  matter  of  feel- 
ing; and  it  has  been  identified  with  ethics,  and  its 
commands  made  to  be  simply  ethical  injunctions. 
Now  my  contention  is  that  religion  is  a  philosophy. 
It  has  truth  to  proclaim,  but  it  is  more.  Religion 
is  emotional;  it  addresses  the  emotions,  quickens 
the  affections,  and  purifies  the  heart,  but  it  is 
more.  It  does  command  and  prescribe  a  certain 
kind  of  life,  but  it  does  more.  In  fact,  religion  is 
at  home  within  the  whole  complex  nature  of  man, 
and  makes  its  appeal  to  the  whole  man,  and  insists 
on  being  with  him  in  all  his  thinking,  feeling,  acting. 
Thus  addressing  the  whole  man,  and  thus  in- 
terested in  all  his  activity,  it  follows  that  no  effort 
and  no  work  of  man  is  indifferent  to  his  religion. 
It  is  sometimes  said  that  there  is  a  conflict  between 
religion  and  science,  between  religion  and  philoso- 
phy, but  such  a  conflict  is  not  necessary  nor  is  it 
reasonable.     It  might  as  well  be  said  that  there  is 


RELIGION  229 

a  conflict  between  religion  and  commerce,  between 
religion  and  architecture,  and  between  religion  and 
any  other  form  of  human  activity.  No  doubt  such 
conflicts  have  been,  and  books  have  been  written 
to  set  forth  the  history  of  the  conflict  between 
science  and  religion,  between  philosophy  and  re- 
ligion, just  as  books  have  been  written  to  describe 
conflicts  between  different  forms  of  religion.  It 
seems  to  me  that  such  conflicts  are  unnecessary ; 
and  it  would  be  well  to  say  broadly  that  religion 
has  its  rights,  and  these  have  to  be  recognized  in 
any  thoughtful  treatment  of  human  life,  thought, 
and  history.  It  is  happily  not  necessary  to  insist 
on  this  nowadays,  when  every  statement  as  to  the 
phenomena  of  religion  in  any  part  of  the  world  and 
from  any  age  of  history  is  eagerly  welcomed,  and 
forms  material  for  serious  study  to  the  most  thought- 
ful of  living  men.  They  eagerly  investigate  the  phe- 
nomena of  religion,  if  from  no  other  interest,  at 
least  from  the  point  of  view  that  here  are  real  be- 
liefs of  men,  and  it  is  important  for  men  to  know 
and  understand  them.  Thus  the  activity  of  thought 
in  this  department  is  immense,  and  books  by  the 
dozen  issue  from  the  press  dealing  with  the  philoso- 
phy of  religion,  the  making  of  reUgion,  the  history 
of  religions,  and  so  on.  We  cannot  complain  of  a 
want  of  interest  in  this  great  question,  even  though 
we  may  complain  of  the  inadequate  account  given 
of  the  origin,  the  nature,  and  the  truth  of  religion. 


230'  THEISM 

Of  religious  belief  Mr.  Spencer  says  truly,  "Thus 
the  universality  of  religious  ideas,  their  independent 
evolution  among  different  primitive  races,  and  their 
great  vitality  unite  in  showing  that  their  source  must 
be  deep-seated  instead  of  superficial.  In  other  words, 
we  are  obliged  to  admit  that  if  not  supernaturally  de- 
rived as  the  majority  contend,  they  must  be  derived 
out  of  human  experiences,  slowly  accumulated  and 
organized."  ("  First  Principles,"  pp.  i4-i5-)  Again, 
"  Considering  all  faculties,  as  we  must  do  on  this  sup- 
position, to  result  from  accumulated  modifications 
caused  by  the  intercourse  of  the  organism  with  its 
environment,  we  are  obliged  to  admit  that  there  exist 
in  the  environment  certain  phenomena  or  conditions 
which  have  determined  the  growth  of  the  feeling  in 
question,  and  so  are  obHged  to  admit  that  it  is  as 
normal  as  any  other  faculty."  (P.  i6.)  When  we  ask 
what  is  the  function  of  this  faculty,  admitted  by  Mr. 
Spencer  to  be  as  normal  as  any  other,  we  find  on  ex- 
amination of  his  voluminous  works  that  it  has  scarcely 
any  function  at  all.  It  has  the  strange  peculiarity, 
surely  very  strange  for  a  normal  faculty,  of  always 
being  in  the  wrong,  of  taking  illusions  for  realities, 
and  of  reaching  wrong  conclusions  during  all  the 
years  of  its  operation.  Mr.  Spencer  assigns  all  that 
is  knowable  to  science,  and  leaves  to  religion  all  that 
transcends  knowledge,  with  the  assurance  that  let 
religion  strive  as  it  may,  it  can  never  reach  reality, 
and  never  attain  to  knowledge.     It  seems  rather  hard 


RELIGION  231 

to  treat  at  the  outset  all  the  religious  strivings  of  reli- 
gion as  without  a  goal  or  a  legitimate  result,  and  all 
the  religious  experience  of  mankind  as  vain.  Yet 
this  is  what  Mr.  Spencer  does,  he  leaves  to  religion 
its  mystery,  but  he  leaves  it  nothing  else.  Still,  let 
us  take  his  admission  that  the  religious  faculty  is 
as  normal  as  any  other  faculty,  and  that  there  are 
conditions  and  phenomena  in  the  environment  cor- 
responding to  man's  religious  nature.  With  this 
concession  we  may  take  our  own  way  of  ascertaining 
what  in  the  environment  corresponds  to  the  religious 
needs  of  man,  and  what  man  has  discovered  that 
feature  of  the  environment  to  be. 

We  take  with  us  the  presupposition  that  there  is  a 
correspondence  between  experience  and  reality,  that 
as  room  has  been  found  in  the  world  for  human  ac- 
tivity, that  as  methods  corresponding  to  the  rational 
methods  of  human  reason  are  found  at  work  in  the 
world,  and  as  man  has  found  his  mathematics  and 
his  logic  at  work  in  the  world,  so  this  great  part  of 
human  experience  which  we  call  religion  has  its 
sphere  and  function,  its  place  and  its  truth,  in  the  uni- 
verse in  which  man  has  found  himself.  There  is  no 
reason  why  religion  should  be  limited  to  what  tran- 
scends knowledge,  or  why  its  function  should  be  to 
deal  only  with  the  unknowable.  We  submit  that  a 
philosophy  which  aspires  to  be  perfectly  unified  know- 
ledge, fails  if  it  does  not  deal  with  religious  experi- 
ence, or  take  into  account  the  action  of  this  faculty 


232  THEISM 


admitted  to  be  normal.  In  fact,  philosophy,  in  all  the 
forms  and  phases  of  it  in  vogue  at  the  present  hour, 
admits  the  obligation,  though  it  must  be  said  it  dis- 
charges the  function  most  imperfectly.  Religion  is 
for  it  a  special  form  of  the  philosophical  problem  as 
their  system  sets  it  forth.  For  the  HegeHan  idealist, 
it  is  only  the  last  and  highest  form  of  the  philosophi- 
cal thesis ;  for  the  positivist,  it  is  only  a  kind  of  after 
thought  added  by  the  founder  to  make  room  for  a 
new  experience  of  his  own.  For  the  agnostic,  religion 
represents,  so  far  as  it  has  ideas,  the  necessary  failure 
which  comes  to  man  when  he  tries  to  formulate  his 
notions  of  what  transcends  knowledge.  Thus,  while 
philosophy  seeks  to  have  its  philosophy  of  reUgion 
for  the  most  part,  the  religion  seems  to  escape,  and 
the  philosophy  alone  remains. 

It  is  not  my  purpose  to  dwell  on  the  history  of 
rehgion,  nor  on  the  various  modes  of  its  manifesta- 
tion ;  nor  do  I  mean  to  set  forth,  still  less  to  criticise, 
the  various  theories  of  the  origin,  nature,  and  function 
of  religion  in  vogue  at  the  present  hour;  nor  shall  I 
spend  my  time  endeavouring  to  set  forth  a  philosophy 
of  religion.  Any  of  these  would  be  a  worthy  work, 
were  there  time  for  it.  What  is  sought  to  be  done  in 
this  lecture  is,  simply,  the  sequel  of  what  has  been 
attempted  up  till  now.  We  say  that  as  the  thought  of 
man  has  widened  he  has  been  constrained  to  recog- 
nize the  existence  of  wider  and  wider  unities  in  the 
synthesis   of   his    knowledge   in  relation   to  reality. 


RELIGION  233 

From  physical  unities  held  together  by  pressure,  to 
organic  unity  of  the  organism,  to  the  higher  unity  of 
life,  to  the  unity  of  personal  life,  to  the  spiritual  unity 
of  the  social  organism,  we  found  ourselves  bound  to 
rise,  and  we  felt  that  each  higher  unity  made  a  larger 
demand  on  our  power  of  conception.  We  felt  tempted 
at  every  upward  turn  of  the  spiral  to  substitute  for 
the  concrete  reality  some  easier  conception,  something 
more  easily  grasped  and  handled.  Yet  we  found  that 
these  higher  unities  were  rational  unities  constituted, 
perhaps,  by  a  higher  reason  than  ours  ;  and  we  ought 
to  treat  them  as  the  goal  of  our  thinking.  Purposely, 
these  higher  unities  were  looked  at  from  various  points 
of  view,  and  the  question  of  religion  was  omitted  from 
the  treatment,  lest  it  would  complicate  it  unduly.  Of 
course,  religion  was  an  all-important  factor  in  personal 
and  social  experience  from  the  beginning,  and  the 
higher  unities  could  not  have  been  constituted  apart 
from  it.  But  the  consideration  of  religion  widens  the 
problem  immeasurably.  It  brings  with  it  an  eternal 
element,  it  widens  the  horizon  of  the  present  by  bring- 
ing into  our  life  the  relations  in  which  we  stand  not 
only  to  our  fellow-men,  but  the  relations  in  which  we 
stand  to  God.  It  widens  the  boundaries  of  the  past, 
for  it  compels  us  to  think  of  the  human  beings  who 
have  lived  and  died,  as  living  at  this  hour,  and  of  all 
the  dead  as  contemporaries,  all  existing  somehow  in 
the  eternal  present.  It  casts  our  thoughts  forward 
to  the  future,  and  compels  us  to  face  not  only  the  prob- 


234  THEISM 

lems  of  the  present  life,  but  to  face  them  with  the 
added  burden  of  the  bearing  they  have  on  the  eternal 
future  of  ourselves  and  others. 

Thus  religion  by  its  thought  of  God  and  immortal- 
ity widens  our  horizon  immeasurably,  and  transforms 
every  scientific  and  philosophic  problem  into  a  prob- 
lem of  much  wider  significance.  It  therefore  needs 
larger  resources  for  adequate  dealing  with  its  special 
problems  than  are  needed  by  science  and  philosophy. 
It  needs  a  deeper  than  philosophic  faith,  a  wider  than 
scientific  experiment.  For  from  the  nature  of  the 
case  many  of  its  beliefs  cannot  be  subjected  to  scien- 
tific verification.  None  of  us  know  yet  what  it  is  to 
die,  and  none  of  us  have  experience  of  what  comes 
after  death  ;  and  so  the  beliefs,  the  ineradicable  belief 
in  the  life  which  follows  after  death,  must  be  based  on 
hope,  or  on  our  belief  in  the  testimony  of  one  who 
knows.  The  belief  in  immortaUty  has  been  one  of 
the  most  persistent  beliefs  of  men,  and  it  has  all  the 
marks  of  a  rational  belief  worthy  of  a  rational  being ; 
but  from  the  nature  of  the  case  it  cannot  be  verified 
in  the  way  in  which  I  have  verified  for  myself  the 
existence  of  New  York.  We  may  expect  to  verify  it 
by  and  by,  but  the  time  is  not  yet. 

If  the  fact  corresponds  to  the  belief,  if  all  who  have 
lived  somewhere  in  the  eternal  present,  if  Moses, 
Isaiah,  Socrates,  Plato,  if  the  great  thinkers,  prophets, 
poets,  religious  guides  and  leaders  of  the  human  race 
are  living  at  this  hour,  surely  that  widens  our  thought 


RELIGION  235 

of  the  unity  of  men,  more  specially  if  we  believe,  as 
we  must,  that  they  are  still  in  some  sort  of  relation  to 
us  and  we  to  them.     It  shows  to  us  that  religion  with 
its  characteristic  beliefs  brings  into  the  problem  ele- 
ments which  philosophy   laid  little   stress  on,  which 
indeed  it  has  for  the  most  part  neglected.     The  en- 
vironment for  religious  people  becomes  much  wider 
and  deeper.     It  is  not  for  religion  what  it  is  for  phi- 
losophy, —  the  concourse  of  people  living  at  the  present 
hour,  with  all  the  inherited   influences,  transmitted 
tendencies,  and  accumulated  thought  and  experience 
of  the  past ;  it  means  also  that  these  living  forces  are 
still  living,  and  all  the  people  of  the  past  may  be- 
come the  living  environment  of  the  present  for  any 
one  of  us.     If  religion  has  this  as  a  living  belief,  it 
must  exercise  a  corresponding  influence  on  life  and 
conduct.     And   this   belief    widens   the   problem    of 
religion   beyond   the   range    of    philosophy.     It   be- 
comes the  highest  problem  that  man    can  grapple 
with,  for  it  has  brought  with  it  elements  which  have 
not  been  prominent  in  the  treatment  which  philoso- 
phy bestows  on  its  problems. 

Religion  teaches  us  to  look  at  the  social  environ- 
ment from  a  new  point  of  view.  We  saw  the  signifi- 
cance of  the  family,  the  city,  the  state,  and  other  in- 
stitutions in  the  training  of  men.  We  see,  also,  that 
heredity  does  not  exhaust  the  debt  we  owe  to  our 
ancestors,  nor  have  their  gifts  to  us  descended  alto- 
gether  by   the    line   of   direct   descent.     Men    have 


236  THEISM 

lived,  wrought,  felt,  acted,  and  they  have  written 
their  experience,  and  the  written  thoughts  and  deeds 
of  former  thinkers  and  workers  have  become  the  most 
effective  means  of  training  their  successors.  This  is 
a  commonplace.  But  the  commonplace  is  transfig- 
ured when  religion  grasps  it,  and  gives  it  the  colour 
of  its  own  faith  and  hope.  It  tells  us  that  no  one  of 
the  achievements  done  by  men  in  the  past  is  lost,  nor 
are  they  lost  who  did  them.  The  men  who  opened 
out  paths  into  strange  countries  of  thought  and  expe- 
rience, who  widened  the  bounds  of  knowledge,  and 
left  us  examples  of  what  human  life  and  thought  may 
be,  are  not  passed  into  oblivion  and  non-existence, 
they  are  somewhere  and  doing  some  worthy  work 
to-day.  Assume  this  hope  to  have  a  true  ground, 
and  we  add  immeasurably  to  the  worth  of  human  life 
and  endeavour.  Life  assumes  a  new  meaning,  hope 
takes  a  grander  sweep,  and  the  horizon  is  widened 
beyond  measure.  It  is  the  characteristic  way  of  re- 
ligion thus  to  introduce  grandeur  into  our  thoughts, 
and  a  deeper  worth  into  our  estimate  of  things. 

It  is  the  mark  of  religion,  in  particular,  to  introduce 
the  note  of  eternity  into  our  estimate  of  the  most 
common  of  our  experiences.  Philosophy  takes  note 
in  its  own  way  of  eternity,  but  it  grasps  it  with  a  fal- 
tering hand,  and  follows  the  clew  with  a  hesitating 
foot.  But  religion  neither  falters  nor  hesitates,  but 
boldly  places  all  the  objects  of  its  contemplation  in 
the  light  of  eternity.     In  particular,  it  places  persons 


RELIGION' 


ny 


in  this  light,  looks  at  them  as  beings  who  shall  live 
forever,  and  regards  all  actions,  feelings,  and  thoughts 
as  something  which  has  a  significance  that  will  never 
die.  Above  all  the  note  of  religion  in  its  estimate  of 
men  is  that  it  looks  at  this  life  and  this  world  as  the 
place  for  the  making  of  persons,  for  the  building  up 
of  character,  and  for  the  preparation  of  them  for  a 
place  and  a  work  in  the  kingdom  of  God.  Philosophy 
at  its  best  does  not  attempt  so  high  a  flight.  It  takes 
shorter  views.  Evolutionary  philosophy  limits  its 
view  to  the  lifetime  of  the  sun,  or,  if  it  takes  a  longer 
view,  it  contemplates  a  collision  with  some  other 
solar  system,  which  will  scatter  the  material  of  both 
systems  into  a  cosmic  cloud,  and  from  such  a  nebula 
a  process  of  evolution  may  again  emerge  to  run  a 
similar  course.  It  contemplates  with  as  much  com- 
posure as  is  possible  to  it  the  wreck  of  all  the  toil 
and  labour  of  the  world.  All  the  thoughts  and  work 
of  men,  even  that  thought  which  evolved  the  theory, 
vanish  and  leave  not  a  wreck  behind.  Even  Hege- 
lian evolution,  which  is  a  greater  and  higher  thing 
than  Darwinism,  leaves  us  without  a  future,  and  its 
outlook  is  bounded  by  the  life  that  now  is.  Indeed, 
the  highest  product  of  evolution  in  the  hands  of 
Hegel  seems  to  be  a  Prussian  at  the  beginning  of  the 
present  century  —  a  respectable  product  of  evolution 
certainly,  but  one  that  does  not  seem  to  have  ex- 
hausted the  resources  of  civilization. 

Where   philosophy    falters,   and   where    it    almor.t 


238  THEISM 

fears  to  tread,  religion  boldly  enters  in  and  makes  a 
home  for  itself.  In  virtue  of  this  assured  hope, 
which  it  may  be  said  has  been  ever  a  characteristic 
of  religion  in  every  form  of  it,  religion  has  trans- 
formed the  problem  of  life,  and  made  it  a  greater 
problem  than  ever.  It  has  given  to  man  a  new  en- 
vironment, by  the  very  fact  that  it  has  placed  him 
in  eternity.  It  has  given  a  new  meaning  to  our 
endeavour  by  showing  that  all  we  do  has  a  meaning 
that  time  cannot  exhaust.  If  I  learn  to  look  at  the 
man  in  the  street  as  a  man  who  shall  live  forever, 
then  I  dare  not  use  him  as  a  means  for  any  end  of 
mine.  I  dare  not  attenuate  him  to  an  aspect  as  I 
find  myself  in  constant  danger  of  doing,  for  he  has 
in  him  the  eternal  worth  of  personality.  Philosophy 
may  teach  us  of  the  worth  of  man,  it  may  tell  me 
that  as  a  person  I  must  treat  others  as  persons,  and 
always  use  the  humanity  in  my  own  person  and 
in  the  persons  of  others  as  an  end  and  never  as 
a  means;  but  religion  gives  a  new  sanction  to  this 
teaching  when  it  tells  me  of  the  worth  of  a  person  as 
a  being  of  eternity.  If  the  consequences  of  actions 
are  exhausted  here,  if  the  building  up  of  character 
has  a  meaning  only  within  time,  if  the  work  we  can 
do  can  live  only  in  the  memory  of  our  successors, 
then  clearly  the  motives  which  have  only  this  tem- 
poral sanction  are  of  less  strength  than  those  that 
religion  enforces  with  its  doctrine  of  immortality. 
As  the  advent  of  reason  has  transfigured  all  the 


RELIGION 


239 


feelings,  emotions,  desires,  thoughts,  and  volitions  of 
the  rational  being,  so  a  further  transfiguration  takes 
place  in  the  plastic  hand  of  religion.  We  may  not 
speak  of  the  advent  of  religion  as  if  the  appearance 
of  it  was  subsequent  to  that  of  rationality,  for  man 
has  always  been  a  religious  being.  But  religion  does 
transfigure  every  aspect  of  the  human  being,  gives  a 
new  character  to  his  affections,  a  new  stimulus  to  his 
action,  a  new  motive  to  his  endeavour,  and  a  new 
aim  to  his  aspiration.  It  brings  new  light  to  his  in- 
telligence, and  a  new  strength  to  his  will.  Only  one 
of  the  great  thoughts  of  religion  has  been  yet  looked 
at  by  us,  but  how  great  has  been  the  significance  of 
this  thought  for  man !  The  hope  of  immortality  has 
had  a  larger  influence  than  can  be  traced  here,  but 
let  what  has  been  indicated  suffice  for  the  present. 
The  particular  forms  in  which  this  hope  has  em- 
bodied itself  are  as  various  as  are  the  races  of  men. 
It  is  quite  true  that  these  embodiments  of  the  hope 
of  the  future  life  have  not  been  of  an  elevating  or  of 
a  purifying  kind.  True  that  the  peoples  thought 
of  the  future  life  in  colours  borrowed  from  the  scenery, 
the  occupations,  the  vicissitudes  of  the  present  life. 
The  happy  hunting  ground  of  the  Indian,  the  per- 
petual battle  of  Valhalla,  the  happy  halls  of  the  Egyp- 
tian, and  all  the  innumerable  forms  which  have  been 
drawn  by  the  imaginations  of  men  to  set  forth  the 
conditions  of  the  future  life,  do  not  convey  to  us  any 
real  conception  of  what  that  life  may  be.     In  truth, 


240  THEISM 

we  are  not  able  to  picture  to  ourselves  what  life  in 
these  new  conditions  may  be,  while  we  may  be  fully 
persuaded  of  the  reaHty  of  that  life,  and  the  belief  of 
it  may  have  the  largest  and  most  beneficial  influence 
on  our  conduct.  It  is  quite  legitimate  for  us  to  take 
our  conception  of  the  future  life  from  the  highest 
and  best  thought  of  it,  set  forth  in  the  highest  form 
of  rehgion  known  to  man,  and  to  use  all  the  other 
forms  of  it  simply  as  testimonies  to  the  universality 
and  influence  of  that  belief.  Life  and  immortality 
have  been  brought  to  light,  and  these  are  the  sure 
possession  of  the  highest  religion  at  this  present 
hour. 

The  belief  in  immortality  and  the  belief  in  a  divine 
being  or  beings  have  always  gone  together.  There 
is  no  tribe  without  its  God,  as  there  is  none  without 
a  religion.  At  all  events,  every  tribe  which  has  come 
within  our  knowledge  had  a  belief  in  beings  or  a 
being  superior  to  himself,  whom  he  had  to  please 
and  to  propitiate,  and  on  whose  favour  he  depended 
for  any  good  he  desired.  It  is  true  that  the  forms 
in  which  he  pictured  this  superior  being  vary  widely. 
Almost  all  things  on  earth,  under  the  earth,  and 
over  the  earth,  every  phenomenon  on  land  or  sea  or 
sky  has  been  taken  as  a  symbol  or  sign  of  the  divine. 
The  spirit  worshipped,  feared,  and  served  may  have 
had  its  home  in  the  sun,  moon,  or  stars,  on  the  moun- 
tains or  the  plains,  may  have  dwelt  in  anointed  stones 
or  sculptured  pillar,  in  fact,  there  is  nothing  which 


RELIGION  241 

may  not  be  or  become  a  dwelling  place  of  the  spirit 
in  which  man  believed.  Anything  might  assume  a 
sacred  form,  and  attain  to  a  sanctity  arising  from 
some  relation  to  the  divine  being.  Thus  there  were 
sacred  stones,  sacred  trees,  sacred  groves,  as  well  as 
sacred  places,  persons,  and  sacred  guilds.  So  also 
there  is  no  form  of  service  which  has  not  had  a  place 
in  the  observances  which  men  have  devoted  to  the 
worship  of  the  divine  beings  in  whom  men  believed. 
The  sacred  rites  were  innumerable,  and  the  sacri- 
fices offered  included  all  that  a  man  had  to  give, — 
goods,  possessions,  cattle,  slaves,  children,  wife,  even 
personal  honour  and  life  itself  were  offered,  if  in 
no  other  way  the  lost  fellowship  could  be  restored. 
Thus  the  beHef  in  a  superior  being  receives  illustra- 
tion from  all  the  religious  experience  of  the  race. 
The  intensity  of  the  belief,  and  the  reality  of  it,  are 
attested  by  the  earnestness  and  thoroughness  of  their 
religious  service.  It  was  a  belief  that  influenced 
conduct  in  the  most  practical  way.  It  was  no  half- 
hearted belief,  it  was  living  and  real. 

Whether  we  regard  religious  belief  as  rational  and 
one  that  is  in  correspondence  with  reality,  or  whether 
we  regard  it  as  superstitious  and  unjustified,  there 
can  be  no  difference  of  opinion  as  to  the  reality  and 
intensity  of  it,  and  the  powerful  influence  it  has  ex- 
erted on  the  thoughts  and  lives  of  men.  Whether 
true  or  false,  the  belief  in  a  divine  being  is  a  sign 
of  the  greatness  of  man.     It  reveals  a  power  in  man 


242  THEISM 

whereby  he  is  enabled  to  transcend  the  present  and 
the  visible,  to  pierce  through  the  veil  of  sense  and 
time,  and  to  think  of  himself  as  related  to  an  miseen 
power  to  whom  he  could  assign  no  limits.  How 
earnestly  he  strove  to  find  God,  how  eagerly  he 
sought  to  serve  Him,  let  the  records  of  the  religions 
of  the  world  testify.  Happily  the  labours  of  our 
numerous  scientific  workers  in  anthropology  have 
made  us  acquainted  with  the  forms  which  religion 
has  assumed  among  the  peoples  of  the  earth.  No 
doubt  the  facts  are  given  to  us  mostly  as  illustrations 
of  a  theory,  but  still  the  facts  are  there,  and  we  may 
separate  them  from  the  theory.  One  arranges  the 
facts  to  set  forth  the  theory  that  ancestor-worship 
is  the  root  of  every  religion,  another  finds  in  animism 
the  first  outline  of  religion,  and  traces  its  develop- 
ment upwards  through  polytheism  to  theism.  While 
others  start  with  the  worship  of  nature  and  natural 
phenomena,  and  then  strive  to  find  a  method  of  de- 
velopment which  will  give  the  phenomena  of  the 
higher  religions.  The  important  thing  for  us  is, 
not  the  various  theories,  but  the  universal  fact 
they  all  assume.  These  theories  I  do  not  criticise 
here. 

This,  however,  must  be  said,  that  no  theory  has 
as  yet  commanded  general  assent.  The  ghost  theory 
accounts  for  very  few  of  the  facts,  and  the  theory 
of  Tylor  is  met  by  the  array  of  facts  gathered  to- 
gether by  Mr.  Andrew  Lang,  and  these  facts  can- 


RELIGION  243 

not  be  explained  on  the  animistic  view.  How  did 
savage  tribes  come  to  believe  in  a  God,  of  great 
power,  of  an  ethical  character,  and  of  great  and 
high  attributes,  when  all  their  other  beUefs  were  on 
the  rudest  savage  level  ?  That  such  is  the  case  is 
abundantly  proved  by  Mr.  Lang,  and  also  by  your 
own  Dr.  Brinton.  To  these  writers  and  to  many 
others  I  refer  for  the  proof  of  this  statement,  as  my 
space  is  very  limited.  "Our  next  step,"  says  Mr. 
Lang,  retracing  the  steps  of  his  argument,  ''  was  to 
examine  in  detail  several  reUgions  of  the  most  re- 
mote and  backward  races,  of  races  least  contami- 
nated with  Christian  or  Islamite  teaching.  Our 
evidence,  when  possible,  was  derived  from  ancient 
and  secret  tribal  mysteries  and  sacred  native  hymns. 
We  found  a  relatively  Supreme  Being,  a  Creator, 
sanctioning  morality,  and  unpropitiated  by  sacrifice, 
among  peoples  who  go  in  dread  of  ghosts  and  wiz- 
ards, but  do  not  always  worship  ancestors.  We 
showed  that  the  anthropological  theory  of  the  evo- 
lution of  God  out  of  ghosts  in  no  way  explains  the 
facts  in  the  savage  conception  of  a  Supreme  Being." 
("The  Making  of  Religion,"  pp.  327-8.) 

The  evidence  attainable  as  to  the  belief  in  God 
among  early  men,  goes  to  prove  that,  be  the  source 
of  that  belief  what  it  may,  they  did  believe  in  a 
powerful,  moral,  eternal,  omniscient  Father  and 
Judge  of  men.  Religion  and  morality  were  not 
disjoined,  they   were    united,  and    served   the   same 


244  THEISM 

end.  "  We  see  that  even  in  its  rudest  forms  religion 
was  a  moral  force ;  the  powers  that  man  reveres  were 
the  side  of  social  order  and  tribal  law ;  and  the  fear 
of  the  gods  was  a  motive  to  enforce  the  laws  of 
society,  which  were  also  the  laws  of  morality." 
(Robertson  Smith,  ''Religion  of  the  Semites,"  p.  53.) 
Religion  in  alliance  with  ethics,  moral  conduct  en- 
forced by  the  commands  of  the  Supreme  Being,  this 
is  presented  to  us  in  the  evidence  gathered  even  by 
Spencer  in  his  ''  Sociology."  It  is  to  be  admitted  that 
the  conclusion  is  not  universal,  that  religion  is  often 
divorced  from  morality,  and  rites  and  ceremonies 
have  often  ceased  to  have  a  moral  reference.  It  is 
a  fact  that  meets  us  in  the  history  of  advancing 
peoples  that  their  religion  remains  conservative,  while 
their  intelligence,  their  morality,  and  their  civilization 
makes  progress.  This  conflict  is  often  symbolized 
in  the  fact  that  there  is  a  change  in  the  character 
and  names  of  the  gods  of  a  people.  A  change  of 
the  mind  of  the  people  may  have  left  no  trace  save 
in  a  revolution  among  the  gods.  When  Varuna 
ceased  to  be  the  chief  figure  among  the  Aryan  gods, 
and  Indra  took  his  place ;  when  Ahura  Mazda 
ceased  to  occupy  the  highest  place  in  the  thought 
of  Iran,  and  attention  was  concentrated  on  Mithra, 
—  the  change  indicated  a  profound  revolution  in  the 
mind  of  the  worshippers,  and  a  change  from  a  higher 
to  a  lower  ethical  platform. 

In  truth,  part  of  the  tragedy  of  the  ages  lies  in 


RELIGION  245 

the  fact  that  religion  tends  to  be  conservative,  while 
knowledge  has  grown  ;  the  very  sacredness  of  religion 
makes  it  averse  to  change.  Thus  a  rehgion  and  the 
gods  it  worships  may  no  longer  fitly  serve  the  higher 
needs  of  an  advancing  people.  And  religion  may 
become  hostile  to  morality.  The  rules  it  sanctioned 
fit  for  one  stage  of  culture  may  be  seen  to  be  quite 
unsuitable  for  a  higher  stage.  It  is  well  illustrated 
in  the  case  of  Greece,  Rome,  and  in  fact  in  all  the 
progressive  nations  of  antiquity,  in  which  we  find 
elaborate  explanations  of  the  myths  of  the  gods,  and 
allegorical  meanings  are  found  for  the  stories  of  the 
adventures  of  the  gods  which  had  become  incredible, 
as  well  as  revolting.  Thus  the  mind  of  the  more 
educated  was  led  away  from  religion ;  and  while  the 
rites  and  ceremonies  were  duly  observed,  the  feeling 
these  represented  had  passed  away.  It  is  to  be 
acknowledged  that  there  have  been  religions  which 
were  irrational,  childish,  and  immoral,  and  the  con- 
ception of  God  contained  in  them  was  altogether 
unworthy.  That  is  only  to  say  that  religious  concep- 
tions were  on  a  level  with  all  the  other  conceptions  in 
the  savage  mind  at  that  stage  of  culture.  But  there 
has  been  a  process  by  means  of  which  religion  has 
established  its  claim  on  man,  and  has  absorbed  all 
that  is  best  and  truest  in  his  being,  commending  it- 
self to  his  whole  nature,  to  his  conscience,  his  heart, 
and  his  reason  as  the  most  precious  endowment  of 
his  Hfe.     There  has  also  been  a  progressive  purifica- 


246  THEISM 

tion  of  the  idea  of  God  till  God  becomes  the  moral 
ideal,  and  the  Object  of  reverent  worship. 

It  has  been  a  long  process,  and  it  is  a  process 
which  will  task  the  powers  of  man  for  ages  yet  to 
come.  As  we  look  back  on  the  progress  of  religion, 
we  see  by  no  means  a  regular  and  orderly  develop- 
ment. We  see  in  some  cases  that  the  idea  of  the 
divine  had  scarcely  in  it  any  worthy  element.  The 
gods  were  often  thought  to  be  almost  non-moral, 
capricious,  selfish,  lustful,  hateful,  and  impure.  Yes, 
and  even  when  the  moral  sense  revolted  against  the 
kind  of  action  represented  as  divine,  reverence  con- 
strained silence.  For  a  time  the  sense  of  depen- 
dence and  the  feeling  of  awe  constrain  to  silence, 
and  the  commands  of  the  god  continue  to  be  obeyed 
until  the  moral  nature,  gathering  strength  and  cour- 
age, rises  in  revolt,  and  the  relation  between  religion 
and  morals  becomes  very  strained.  Sometimes,  in 
such  a  crisis,  many  things  may  happen.  Morality 
may  go  one  way  and  religion  another,  or  there  may 
be  a  reformation  of  the  religion,  and  a  conception 
of  God  and  His  character  may  arise  more  fit  and 
adequate  to  meet  the  higher  thoughts  of  the  wor- 
shipper, or  there  may  be  a  new  religion  introduced 
under  the  impulse  of  a  great  religious  leader.  Ex- 
amples of  each  may  readily  be  found  in  the  history  of 
religion.  The  beginning  of  morality  may  be  found 
in  a  criticism  of  the  prevalent  religion  of  the  hour. 
Anaxagoras,  in  the  history  of  Greek  thought,  began 


RELIGION  247 

the  criticism  of  the  religious  teaching  embodied  in 
the  poems  of  Homer  and  Hesiod,  Xenophanes  car- 
ried on  the  same  necessary  work,  and  Plato  from 
a  higher  platform  set  himself  to  purify  the  religious 
conceptions  of  his  time.  Plato's  criticism  was  not 
altogether  destructive,  rather  it  was  an  endeavour  to 
remove  from  the  character  of  the  divine  every  trace 
of  immorality,  and  to  set  forth  the  character  of  God 
as  righteous,  true,  and  good.  The  history  of  the 
strenuous  attempts  of  the  peoples  to  reach  some 
worthy  conception  of  the  unseen  power  on  whom 
they  felt  they  depended,  cannot  be  given  here.  It 
is  a  long  and  a  painful  story. 

It  may,  however,  be  said  that  we  do  find  in  the 
history  of  almost  every  people  times  when  there  is 
a  conflict  between  the  religion  and  the  moral  ele- 
ments of  character  they  had  come  to  reverence  and 
observe.  Sometimes,  too,  the  conflict  arises  because 
the  claims  of  religion  are  in  advance  of  the  moral 
power  of  obedience,  and  the  ethical  character  of  their 
god  is  far  above  their  thought  and  their  desires.  Not 
often  do  we  find  a  correspondence  between  the  mo- 
rality and  religion  of  the  people.  In  a  progressive 
people  the  morality  outgrows  the  religion,  in  a  people 
given  over  to  self-indulgence  the  religion  is  higher 
than  the  morality.  Only  once  in  history  do  I  find 
that  a  progressive  development  of  morals  was  also 
a  progressive  revelation  of  the  character  of  God. 
There  in  Israel  the  apprehension  of  the  character  of 


24^  THEISM 

God  was  the  signal  of  moral  progress.  The  religious 
and  the  moral  consciousness  of  that  people  was 
bound  in  a  real  unity,  just  because  God  was  an 
ethical  God. 

What  has  been  said  amounts  to  this,  that  the  re- 
ligious needs  of  mankind  were  deep,  wide,  and  abid- 
ing, and  that  satisfaction  for  these  needs  was  difficult 
of  attainment.  When  the  people  had  a  conception 
of  a  creator,  ethical  and  powerful,  it  often  happened 
that  they  were  not  able  to  use  that  thought  for  the 
practical  guidance  and  consolation  of  their  life. 
Either  the  thought  made  too  great  a  demand  on 
them,  or  they  thought  that  God  had  no  need  of  them 
and  their  service,  or  they  were  attracted  by  spiritual 
beings  nearer  to  them  who  demanded  service,  so  we 
find  that  among  many  tribes  the  worship  of  the 
creator  God  fell  into  the  background,  and  the 
thought  of  Him  had  no  practical  effect  on  them. 
Still  the  thought  and  the  fact  were  there,  ready  for 
use  when  the  need  for  such  a  thought  arose. 

The  religious  history  of  mankind  is,  without  doubt, 
a  record  of  high  and  lofty  endeavour,  begun  ever 
anew  after  many  a  disastrous  failure,  and  carried  on 
with  the  hope  that  man  will  one  day  attain  to  the 
knowledge  of  God,  the  knowledge  of  whom  is  eternal 
life.  Men  have  held  fast  to  the  belief  in  a  supreme 
power,  even  when  they  had  found  no  worthy  thought 
by  which  they  might  think  of  Him.  The  divorce 
between  religion  and  morality,  the  reverence  which 


RELIGION  249 

made  them  slow  to  change  the  traditional  thought  of 
the  unseen  power  whom  their  fathers  believed  in,  the 
passionate  seeking  after  a  true  thought  of  God  which 
drove  them  at  last  into  open   rebellion    and  revolt 
against   an   unworthy  and  untrue  religion,   are  ele- 
ments  in   that   age-long   striving   after    God   which 
assuredly     would     never     have     been     perpetuated 
throughout  the  generations  were  there  no    God   to 
seek.     It  is    also  true   that   these    perturbations   of 
spirit,    these   dissatisfactions    with   the    teaching    of 
almost  all  rehgions,  are  simply  testimonies   to   the 
belief  that  God  must  be  a  worthy  God  when  they 
have  found  Him.     Every  criticism  of  rehgion,  rightly 
viewed,  is  really  a  protest  against  an  unworthy  or 
inadequate  representation  of  the  divine.     God  must 
be  the  ideal  in  whom  all  ideals  meet.     In  Him  must 
be  the  ideal  of  power,  for  from  Him  all  power,  as 
known  to  man,  must  flow.     In  Him  is  the  ideal  of 
reason,   intelligence,   wisdom;    for   all   the    arrange- 
ments of  the  universe  are  His  appointments.     Noth- 
ing exists  beyond  His  power,  nothing  hidden  from 
His  omniscience.     Then   He  has  a  purpose  and   a 
meaning  in  all  His  working,   and  He  knows  what 
His  purpose  is.      He  is  righteous,   just,   holy,   good, 
the  ruler  of  the  nations,  and  the  judge  of  all. 

These  characteristics  of  God  are  drawn  from 
ancient  literature,  some  of  them  .from  the  Assyrian, 
Babylonian,  and  Egyptian  hymns,  and  some  of  them 
from  the  Rigveda  and  the  Zend-Avesta.      They  may 


250  THEISM 

also  be  paralleled,  at  least  in  the  ascription  of  power 
and  omniscience  to  the  divine  being,  in  many  things 
told  of  the  ruder  races  of  mankind.  These  stand  out 
from  the  common  beliefs  and  practices  of  the  ruder 
and  even  from  the  more  civilized  races  of  men,  and 
we  are  puzzled  to  find  an  explanation  of  them.  Be 
the  explanation  what  it  may,  it  was  certainly  a  strenu- 
ous task  to  find  an  adequate  conception  of  the  power 
on  whom  men  depended.  That  many  mistakes  would 
be  made  was  to  be  expected,  that  the  goal  would  be 
hard  to  reach  is  what  might  have  been  expected. 
That  there  should  be  many  revolutions  of  thought 
and  feeling,  and  many  revolts,  and  many  persecu- 
tions to  put  down  revolt,  may  almost  be  taken  for 
granted.  For  religion  is  the  most  precious  posses- 
sion of  man,  and  in  the  history  of  it  and  its  changes 
we  find  enlisted  the  deepest  feelings,  the  strongest 
passions,  the  brightest  and  the  darkest  aspects  of 
human  nature,  its  fiercest  bigotry  and  its  deepest 
love.  It  is  an  intensified  history  of  the  ordinary 
story  of  human  life,  and  the  usual  motives  which 
actuate  men  are  here  disclosed  with  every  tone 
accentuated.  The  object  sought  for  is  the  highest, 
and  the  search  is  the  most  strenuous,  of  all  human 
efforts. 

The  story  of  science  is,  also,  one  of  errors  and  mis- 
takes. In  fact,  it  is  not  so  long  ago  since  science  was 
in  its  infancy.  The  crudest  notions  of  man,  and  of 
the  world  in  which  he  lived,  abounded,  and  one  of 


RELIGION  251 

Rome's  foremost  poets,  who  felt  that  he  was  quite 
equal  to  the  making  of  a  world,  and  who  was  fierce 
in  his  criticism  of  the  gods,  believed  that  the  sun 
was  only  a  few  feet  in  diameter.  We  may  read  what 
passed  for  science  in  many  of  the  sciences ;  we  may 
read  of  the  Ptolemaic  theory  of  the  universe,  of  phlogis- 
ton, and  of  many  other  curiosities  of  the  history  of 
science,  and  yet  we  do  not  go  to  our  scientific  friends 
and  urge  these  mistakes  as  reasons  why  the  possi- 
bihty  of  scientific  truth  should  be  doubted.  In  truth, 
science  has  to  rewrite  itself  almost  every  generation. 
The  conceptions  of  chemistry  have  been  revolution- 
ized within  my  own  time.  But  the  mistakes  which 
science  has  made,  and  the  imperfections  which  still 
cHng  to  science,  do  not  interfere  with  our  behef  in 
the  existence  of  the  objects  with  which  science  deals. 
Why  should  the  mistakes  which  religion  has  made 
invalidate  our  persuasion  of  the  great  being  who  is 
the  main  object  of  religion  t  It  is  quite  true  that  she 
has  given  forth  in  the  course  of  time  many  partial, 
inadequate,  even  unworthy  representations  of  the 
divine,  but  has  not  science  given  forth  many  inade- 
quate and  unworthy  representations  of  nature  }  Has 
not  nature  been  regarded  as  lawless,  uncertain, 
capricious,  and  we  have  overcome  that  view,  and 
look  on  nature  now  as  an  ordered  system,  moving 
under  law.  But  have  we  not  corrected  the  first 
attempts  of  men  to  set  forth  the  idea  of  God,  and 
have  we  not  now  come  to  some  conception  of  the  idea 


252  THEISM 

of  God  not  altogether  unworthy  of  Him  who  is  the 
maker  of  heaven  and  earth  ?  It  does  not  seem  to  be 
a  profitable  exercise  for  science  or  religion  to  remem- 
ber the  sins  and  faults  of  youth,  each  of  the  other. 
Let  each  be  judged  by  the  achievements  of  their 
maturity,  and  by  the  promise  of  further  progress  of 
which  they  may  hold  out  a  reasonable  hope. 

Is  it  not  time  that  the  conflict  should  cease,  or,  at 
least,  take  another  form  }  Is  it  not  time  to  seek 
after  something  of  a  synthetic  view,  which  shall 
gather  together  the  elements  contributed  to  the  uni- 
fied knowledge  of  the  world  in  which  we  live  and  the 
power  manifested  in  it,  by  all  the  sciences  and  phi- 
losophies and  theologies,  which  represent  the  ripest 
achievement  of  human  thought.''  Conflict  and  con- 
troversy may  be  the  way,  or  one  way,  by  which  we 
attain  to  clearness  of  thought  and  lucidity  of  concep- 
tion. Truth  may  advance  in  circles  or  curves,  and 
advance  may  seem  to  be  only  retrogression,  while  it 
really  moves  in  an  upward  spiral,  toward  a  more 
complete  form.  Or  there  may  have  been  an  element 
neglected,  necessary  for  the  expression  of  the  unity 
of  truth,  and  that  element  may  have  to  struggle  for 
recognition,  and  its  advocates  may  press  it  to  the 
dislocation  of  the  symmetry  of  the  whole,  and  peace 
cannot  be  obtained  till  it  finds  due  recognition.  Look- 
ing back  over  the  history  of  the  struggle  between 
competing  ideals  of  life,  between  rival  systems  of 
philosophy,  and  opposing  views  of  ethics,  and  con- 


RELIGION  253 

trasted  systems  of  theology,  we  may  find  that  each 
system  has  some  elements  worthy  to  have  a  place 
in  the  hierarchy  of  truth,  fitted  to  represent  the  re- 
ality of  things  and  persons  in  its  adequate  form.  If 
our  thoughts  take  a  wider  view  and  we  look  at  the 
conflict  between  the  scientific  and  the  philosophic 
mind,  and  between  both  and  the  theological,  we  may 
ask  ourselves  whether  these  have  not  been  looking 
at  opposite  sides  of  the  shield  ?  A  mere  syncretic 
method  is  not  advocated  by  me.  I  do  not  wish  to 
shovel  together  all  the  contradictory  notions  that 
have  found  a  place  in  ethical,  philosophical,  and  theo- 
logical systems,  and  serve  them  up  as  the  concihation 
of  differences,  and  the  final  product  of  rational  in- 
vestigation. Eclecticism  and  syncretism  do  not  play 
an  important  part  in  the  history  of  human  thought. 
But  cross-fertilization  is  an  important  process  in 
biology,  and  has  beneficial  consequence. 

May  there  not  be  cross-fertilization  among  the 
various  organisms,  the  sum  of  which  make  up  the 
organism  of  human  knowledge,  won  by  the  pro- 
tracted labour  of  the  ages  t  May  we  not  take  from 
the  physical  sciences  what  they  can  tell  us  of  the 
laws  and  methods  of  the  working  of  the  physical 
world }  May  we  not  familiarize  our  minds  with  the 
stupendous  spectacle  of  the  physical  forces  keeping 
step  with  one  another,  each  in  the  service  of  the 
other,  and  all  working  in  long-drawn  harmony  as 
elements  in  one  system  t     Surely  the  service  of  these 


254  THEISM 

sciences  ought  to  be  recognized,  and  the  greatness 
of  the  order  made  plain  to  us  by  them,  the  coordi- 
nated harmony  of  all  the  parts,  and  the  order  of  the 
whole  should  give  us  some  thought  of  the  power 
manifested  in  and  through  them  all.  That  gives 
one  element  in  our  thought  of  God.  Our  thought 
of  Him  must  widen  itself  to  the  recognition  of  the 
stupendous  power  at  work  in  the  universe,  working 
by  methods  which  so  far  man  has  understood,  though 
much  is  still  beyond  his  conception.  Science  shows 
us  a  related  world  bound  in  a  system,  the  changes 
of  which  take  place  in  an  orderly  way,  the  rhythm 
of  which  may  be  understood.  This  vision  of  the 
order,  beauty,  and  harmony  of  the  world  is  the  con- 
tribution of  science  to  religion  and  theology.  It 
matters  not  that  once  rehgion  was  suspicious  of  law 
and  the  reign  of  law,  that  it  fondly  lingered  on  the 
thought  of  a  personal  government  of  the  world, 
which  seemed  also  a  capricious  government.  Re- 
ligion has  outgrown  that  mood,  and  it  does  not  look 
for  God  in  the  absence  of  law,  method,  and  order,  it 
finds  God  in  law,  and  rejoices  in  every  discovery  of 
science,  and  looks  at  such  as  a  new  discovery  of  the 
presence  and  the  working  of  God.  It  still  believes 
in  a  personal  government  of  the  world,  but  it  has 
learned  that  will  is  steadfast  and  intelligent,  not 
wilful  and  capricious. 

Science  has  helped  theology  to  purify  and  extend 
its  thought  of  God.     It  was  bound  to  do  so,  for  it 


RELIGION  255 

has  revealed  to  us  somewhat  of  the  magnificence  of 
the  world  in  which  we  live.  Lengthened  in  time  and 
widened  in  space,  filled  with  order  and  harmony  in  its 
onward  sweep  through  the  ages,  the  thought  of  all  that 
science  has  disclosed  must  have  widened  our  thought 
of  God.  Worlds  beyond  worlds  and  systems  within 
systems,  well  our  thoughts  of  the  maker  of  the  uni- 
verse ought  to  be  greater  than  the  thoughts  of  those 
who  beUeved  this  little  planet  was  the  centre  of  all  the 
universe.  But  the  main  achievement  of  science  is 
the  discovery  of  law,  at  least  this  is  its  main  achieve- 
ment from  the  theological  point  of  view.  But  science 
reveals  to  us  still  more  as  we  wait  and  watch  its  work 
in  the  higher  regions  of  its  great  endeavour.  Through 
the  ages  one  increasing  purpose  runs.  Life  prepared 
for,  life  appearing,  life  growing,  developing,  creatures 
appearing  who  are  made  to  make  themselves,  and 
rational  creaturehood  appearing  who  develops  the 
power  of  reading  the  story  of  the  making  of  the 
world,  all  revealing  a  patient  foreseeing  intelligence 
content  to  labour  and  to  wait  in  order  to  make  a 
world  fit  to  know,  understand,  and  serve  its  maker. 
Biology  makes  its  own  contribution  to  the  widening 
and  deepening  of  our  thought  of  God.  He  seems 
to  win  a  way  which  can  be  understood,  and,  having 
once  begun  to  work,  He  seems  to  keep  to  the  method 
with  which  He  began.  It  would  seem  as  if  the  in- 
telligent understanding  of  His  work  and  His  method 
was  an  object  to  Him.     He  worked  in  such  a  fashion 


256  THEISM 

as  would  disclose  itself  to  the  patient  inquiry  of 
finite  intelligence.  So  the  slow  process  of  the  evo- 
lution of  life  is  a  process  of  revelation,  or  a  dis- 
closure of  the  divine  method  of  work,  and  thus  a 
revelation  of  God. 

It  is,    however,  in  relation   to   the  character  and 
the   history   of   rational   being   that  we   come   to    a 
deeper  revelation  of  God;    or,  to  use  another  word 
which  has  not  so  technical  a  meaning,  it  is  in  con- 
nection with    history  that  we    have  a   deeper  mani- 
festation   of    God.      Here   we    have    larger   discords 
yet  a   deeper   harmony,  more  failures  yet  a  higher 
success,    mistakes   innumerable   in    all    departments 
of  human  action,  yet  each  generation  taking  up  the 
burden   of    the   effort   after   truth,    knowledge,    and 
life,   and   working   on    in   the    hope   of   finding   the 
kingdom  of  God.     We  need  not  again  refer  to  the 
mistakes,  failures,  and  sins  of  men  through  the  gen- 
erations,   for,  after   all,    too   much    may  be   said    of 
them.     Ethics    slowly    advanced,    morality    came   to 
some  consciousness  of  itself,  philosophy  came  with 
its  searching  questions  and  its  partial  answers,  criti- 
cism arose  to  try  all  that  could  be  tried,  and  through 
the  conflict  and   the  struggle,  the  still,   small   voice 
of   conscience  made  itself   increasingly  heard    until 
the   ripened   thought   of   men   came   to    have   some 
idea  of  what  a  worthy  conception  of  God  ought  to 
be.     It  was    stern   work  which    had   to   be    done  — 
not  merely  to  advance  from  age  to  age,  but  to  deal 


RELIGION  257 

with  the  attainments  of  former  generations,  to  criti- 
cise inadequate  conceptions  which  had  not  seemed 
inadequate  to  a  former  generation,  to  rise  above  the 
reluctance  and  unwilUngness  to  disturb  inherited  be- 
liefs, and  to  move  onwards  to  the  recognition  of  a 
moral  ruler,  judge,  and  loving  friend  of  men.  It 
was  stern,  and  hard  work,  and  it  would  not  have 
attained  the  success  it  did  attain  if  there  had  been 
no  voice  from  beyond  the  veil  and  no  pressure  of 
God  in  history. 

The  effort  of  philosophy  is  not  merely  man's 
work;  it  is  the  work  of  God  too.  Theology  owes 
a  large  debt  to  philosophy ;  it  has  always  used  the 
work  of  philosophy,  and  sometimes  without  due 
acknowledgment.  But  while  religion  and  theology 
owe  a  large  debt  to  science  and  philosophy,  and 
have  learned  from  them  to  deepen  and  v/iden  their 
thought  of  God  and  man,  they  still  have  their  own  work 
to  do,  their  own  problem  to  solve,  their  own  burden 
to  bear,  and  these  are  harder  than  any  other  problem. 
They  have  to  deal  with  the  ultimate  harmony  and 
unity  of  the  universe,  with  the  unity  of  all  things  in 
the  kingdom  of  God.  They  do  not  look  on  the  unity 
and  harmony  as  accomplished ;  rather,  it  is  the 
goal  to  be  reached  in  the  far  future,  when  the 
world  is  made  which  as  yet  is  only  in  the  making. 
Religion  and  theology  are  grateful  for  the  service 
of  science  and  philosophy,  which  have  been  of  un- 
speakable service ;  they  are  grateful,  too,  for  the  in- 


258  THEISM 

cessant  criticism  of  these  worthy  friends  —  a  criticism 
not  always  friendly,  sometimes  indeed  very  candid, 
bitter,  and  contemptuous,  but  they  are  thankful,  not- 
withstanding.    For  it  is  of   the  utmost   importance, 
in  so  high  an  endeavour,  to  have  every  behef  tested 
to  the  uttermost,  every  assumption  sifted,  every  argu- 
ment criticised,  that  nothing  weak  or  unworthy  may 
be    suffered    to    remain.     For    anything   weak,    un- 
worthy, or  unreasonable  may  have  issues  perilous  to 
the  success  of  the  highest  emprise  ever  undertaken 
by  man.     So  we  ask  the    help  of   science  and  phi- 
losophy for  this  great  end,  and  we  give  the  warning 
that  we  shall  use   their    help  for  our  own  purpose. 
We  do  not  seek  a  scientific  or  a  philosophic  solution 
of  the  problem,  we  have  a  deeper  purpose  than  that. 
We  will  not  accept  from  science  merely  an  infinite 
and  eternal  energy,  though  we  shall  receive  that  as 
an  element  in  our  solution,  nor  will  we  accept  from 
philosophy  merely  a  universal  substance,  or  a  uni- 
versal  self-consciousness  and  nothing  more,  or  any 
other  of  those  substitutes  for  God  which  philosophy 
is  fond  of   presenting   to    us,  though  we  take  their 
contributions  as  elements  in   our  construction.     We 
shall  not  rest  until  we  find  a  God  who  will  satisfy  our 
religious  needs,  as  well  as  our  scientific  and  rational 
aspirations.     It  is  not    enough  for   us   to    arrive    at 
infinite   power,  wisdom,   even   infinite   goodness,  we 
seek  a  God  who  can  speak  to  us  and  to  whom  we  can 
speak,  a  God  who  is  something  for  Himself,  as  well 


RELIGION  259 

as  something  for  us,  who  can  be  the  home  of  our 
life,  and  meet  every  aspiration,  desire,  and  longing 
of  the  whole  man.  It  is  because  we  believe  that  the 
being  whom  we  call  God  is  all  that  we  have  described, 
and  more  than  we  can  describe,  that  we  welcome  all 
the  help  of  science  and  philosophy;  for  we  need 
all  the  help  we  can  get  to  make  any  approximation 
to  the  work  which  man  most  sorely  needs. 


IX 


PHILOSOPHY  IN  ITS  AGNOSTIC  ASPECT: 
ITS  POSTULATES,  ITS  CHARACTER,  AND 
ITS  TRUTH 

The  philosophies  in  vogue  and  influence  at  present 
are  mainly  of  two  types,  and,  while  these  types  have 
many  subsidiary  forms,  they  are  mainly  two.  In 
both  the  idea  of  evolution  has  a  predominating  influ- 
ence, and  plays  a  great  part  as  an  instrument  for  the 
solution  of  difficulties  and  as  a  fruitful  point  of  view. 
True,  they  look  at  evolution  from  different  ends  of 
the  telescope.  The  one  philosophy  of  which  the 
synthetic  philosophy  of  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer  may 
be  taken  as  the  type,  looks  at  evolution  from  its 
simple  and  abstract  beginnings,  and  seeks  to  deduce 
the  actual  world  from  them,  by  the  use  of  such 
principles  as  "the  instability  of  the  homogeneous," 
*'the  multiplication  of  effects,"  and  so  on,  and  to 
some  observers  they  seem  to  be  engaged  in  the  task 
of  making  something  out  of  nothing.  Evolution 
becomes  the  universal  solvent,  and  in  the  last  resort 
we  must  make  any  particular  transition  which  is 
needed,  under  the  threat  that  to  suppose  otherwise 
is  to  suppose  that  force  does  not  persist.     The  other 

260 


AGNOSTIC  PHILOSOPHY  26 1 

type  of  philosophy  may  be  briefly  described  as 
idealism,  of  which  there  are  many  expositions,  and 
many  expositors  in  your  country  and  in  ours.  It  looks 
at  evolution  from  the  other  end,  and  judges  it  from 
the  point  of  view  of  the  goal  to  which  evolution 
tends.  In  fact,  idealism  rules  in  the  most  of  our 
universities  in  England  and  in  Scotland,  and  the 
philosophical  voices  of  America  set  forth  the  ideaUst 
view  with  great  eloquence  and  power  and  with  per- 
suasive force.  The  writers  do  not  echo  a  British 
note,  nor  do  they  speak  with  a  German  accent;  they 
have  really  done  the  work  over  again  and  have  added 
to  the  idealist  solution  of  the  problem  something 
distinctive  and  valuable.  The  typical  name  with  us 
is  that  of  Edward  Caird,  which  is  the  most  influential 
name  in  philosophy  in  Great  Britain,  and  has  been 
so  for  years. 

What  help  toward  a  solution  of  the  permanent 
religious  question  do  we  obtain  from  these  dominant 
types  of  philosophy.  Not  much  from  Mr.  Spencer. 
He  leaves  us  in  an  attitude  of  reverence  before 
an  unknowable,  and  presents  religion  as  a  mystery 
which  must  always  remain  a  mystery  and  nothing 
more.  Once  in  a  late  part  of  the  lengthened  ex- 
position of  his  system  he  seems  to  strike  a  more 
positive  note,  and  gives  an  account  of  the  object  of 
religious  veneration  which  is  not  merely  negative. 
We  have  tried  to  read  the  "  First  Principles  "  in  the 
light   of   the   more   recent   exposition,  and  the   last 


262  THEISM 

seems  to  go  much  farther  than  the  first  statement  by 
him  of  the  function  and  object  of  religion.  They  may 
be  the  same  to  Mr.  Spencer,  to  me  they  seem  to  differ 
to  the  extent  that  the  first  statement  is  wholly  nega- 
tive, while  the  last  is  partly  positive.  We  take  the 
more  positive  statement.  "  That  internal  energy 
which,  in  the  experience  of  the  primitive  man  was  al- 
ways the  immediate  antecedent  of  changes  wrought  by 
him  —  that  energy  which,  when  interpreting  external 
changes,  he  thought  of  along  with  those  attributes  of 
a  human  personality  connected  with  it  in  himself;  is 
the  same  energy  which,  freed  from  anthropomorphic 
accompaniments,  is  now  figured  as  the  cause  of  all 
external  phenomena.  The  last  stage  reached  is 
recognition  of  the  truth  that  force  as  it  exists  beyond 
consciousness,  cannot  be  like  what  we  know  as 
force  within  consciousness;  and  that  yet,  as  either 
is  capable  of  generating  the  other,  they  must  be 
different  modes  of  the  same.  Consequently,  the 
final  outcome  of  that  speculation  commenced  by  the 
primitive  man  is  that  the  Power  manifested  through- 
out the  Universe,  distinguished  and  material,  is 
the  same  Power  which  in  ourselves  wells  up  under 
the  form  of  consciousness."  (''  Ecclesiastical  Insti- 
tutions," p.  839.)  Another  passage  we  quote,  as 
it  seems  to  leave  us  the  hope  that  as  evolution 
advances  and  man  advances  with  it  a  knowledge  of 
God  may  be  within  the  reach  of  the  developed  man 
of  the  future.     "■  Occupied  with  one  or  other  division 


AGNOSTIC  PHILOSOPHY  263 

of  Nature,  the  man  of  science  usually  does  not 
know  enough  of  the  other  divisions  even  rudely  to 
conceive  the  extent  and  complexity  of  their  phenom- 
ena ;  and  supposing  him  to  have  adequate  know- 
ledge of  each,  yet  he  is  unable  to  think  of  them  as  a 
whole.  Wider  and  stronger  intellect  may  hereafter 
help  him  to  form  a  vague  consciousness  of  them 
in  their  totality.  We  may  say  that  just  as  an 
undeveloped  musical  faculty,  able  only  to  appre- 
ciate a  simple  melody,  cannot  grasp  the  variously 
entangled  passages  and  harmonies  of  a  symphony, 
which  in  the  mind  of  composers  and  conductor  are 
unified  into  involved  musical  effects  awakening  far 
greater  feeling  than  is  possible  to  the  musically  un- 
cultured ;  so,  by  further  more  evolved  intelligences, 
the  course  of  things  now  apprehensible  only  in  part 
may  be  apprehensible  altogether,  with  an  accom- 
panying feeling  as  much  beyond  that  of  the  present 
cultured  man  as  his  feeling  is  beyond  that  of  the 
savage. 

'*  And  this  feeling  is  not  likely  to  be  decreased  but 
to  be  increased  by  that  analysis  of  knowledge  which, 
while  forcing  him  to  agnosticism,  yet  continually 
prompts  him  to  imagine  some  solution  of  the  great 
enigma  which  he  knows  cannot  be  solved.  Espe- 
cially must  this  be  so  when  he  remembers  that  the 
very  notions,  origin,  cause,  and  purpose,  are  rela- 
tive notions  belonging  to  human  thought,  which  are 
probably  irrelevant  to  the  Ultimate  Reality  transcend- 


264  THEISM 

ing  human  thought ;  and  when,  though  suspecting 
that  explanation  is  a  word  without  meaning  when 
applied  to  this  ultimate  reality,  he  yet  feels  com- 
pelled to  think  there  must  be  an  explanation. 

"  But  one  truth  must  grow  ever  clearer,  — the  truth 
that  there  is  an  Inscrutable  Existence  everywhere 
manifested,  to  which  he  can  neither  find  nor  conceive 
either  beginning  or  end.  Amid  the  mysteries  which 
become  the  more  mysterious  the  more  they  are 
thought  about,  there  will  remain  the  one  absolute 
certainty,  that  he  is  ever  in  presence  of  an  Infinite 
and  Eternal  Energy,  from  which  all  things  proceed." 
(pp.  842,  843.) 

We  are  glad  to  receive  from  Mr.  Spencer  the 
assurance  of  one  "absolute  certainty,"  that  there  is 
an  infinite  and  eternal  energy,  and  that  it  stands  in 
relation  to  all  things,  namely,  that  all  things  proceed 
from  it.  There  is  also  something  to  be  thankful  for 
in  the  recognition  of  the  fact  that  the  power  that 
manifests  itself,  distinguished  as  material,  is  the  same 
power  which  in  ourselves  wells  up  under  the  form  of 
consciousness.  It  would  appear  that  agnosticism, 
even  in  the  presence  of  the  ultimate  reality,  is  not 
absolute.  It  can,  at  least  it  does,  make  some  asser- 
tions about  the  reality.  It  exists,  it  is  infinite  and 
eternal,  it  is  manifested  in  the  material  world,  it  is 
manifested  in  consciousness,  and  the  agnostic  knows 
these  two  to  be  the  same ;  and  the  agnostic  can  say 
that  from  this  infinite  and  eternal  energy  all  things 


AGNOSTIC  PHILOSOPHY  265 

proceed.  The  creed  of  agnosticism  as  set  forth  by 
Mr.  Spencer  is  considerable.  Far  be  it  from  us  to 
seek  to  attenuate  it,  while  we  may  wonder  how  on 
its  own  principles  it  came  to  make  such  assertions, — 
how  do  they  reach  the  infinite  and  eternal,  and  how 
do  they  affirm  the  relationship  between  the  ultimate 
reality  and  the  finite  manifestation  of  it  t  If  the 
power  is  manifested,  as  Mr.  Spencer  says  it  is,  is  it 
not  knowable,  at  least  as  far  as  it  is  manifested .?  If 
it  is  manifested  in  the  material  world  and  also  in  con- 
sciousness, can  we  not  put  these  manifestations  to- 
gether, and  say  something  true  and  adequate  about 
the  ultimate  reality  in  addition  to  the  propositions 
of  Mr.  Spencer }  What  is  manifested  is  revealed,  and 
the  character  of  the  thing  is  given  by  the  manifesta- 
tion, and  we  may  speak  about  that. 

In  these  passages  quoted  from  Mr.  Spencer,  and  in 
certain  obiter  dicta  of  his  elsewhere,  he  opens  out  for 
us  paths  into  the  unknowable  which  we  may  safely 
tread,  and  following  his  example  we  may  make  for 
ourselves  wider  and  longer  paths  than  he  would 
allow.  In  fact,  that  has  been  done  for  us  by  a  dis- 
tinguished follower  of  Mr.  Spencer  on  this  side.  I 
do  not  know  whether  Mr.  Fiske  will  allow  me  to 
call  him  a  follower  of  Spencer,  and  so  I  will  call  him 
a  distinguished  exponent  of  a  philosophy  in  many 
respects  identical  with  the  Spencerian  philosophy. 
He  has  brought  within  limits  the  whole  system  of 
Spencer,  and  expressed  it  in  clear  and  perspicuous 


266  THEISM 

language,  and  has  brought  within  the  reach  of  all,  the 
leading  principles  of  that  philosophy  which  has  many 
exponents  at  present,  the  greatest  of  whom  is  Mr. 
Fiske.  His  "Outlines  of  Cosmic  Philosophy"  has 
been  familiar  to  me  for  years,  and  I  read  it  yet.  In  the 
later  part  of  the  exposition  Mr.  Fiske  seems  to  have 
worked  at  the  subject  of  evolution  for  himself,  and  to 
have  come  to  conclusions  rather  more  positive  than 
those  of  Mr.  Spencer.  In  the  Preface  to  his  little 
book  on  the  ''Idea  of  God,"  Mr.  Fiske  says,  "Nothing 
of  fundamental  importance  in  '  Cosmic  Philosophy ' 
needed  changing,  but  a  new  chapter  needed  to  be 
written,  in  order  to  show  how  the  doctrine  of  evolu- 
tion, by  exhibiting  the  development  of  the  highest 
spiritual  human  qualities  as  the  goal  toward  which 
God's  creative  work  has  from  the  outset  been  tend- 
ing, replaces  man  in  his  old  position  of  headship  in 
the  universe,  even  as  in  the  days  of  Dante  and  Aqui- 
nas. (The  "  Idea  of  God,"  Preface,  p.  20.)  To  me  as 
to  other  readers  of  "  Cosmic  Philosophy  "  it  seemed 
that  Mr.  Fiske  had  left  little  room  for  theology  except 
in  the  Spencerian  sense,  and  he  had  certainly  disposed 
of  purpose  in  every  sense  of  the  term.  His  "Cosmic 
Philosophy  "  added  nothing  to  the  system  of  Spencer, 
and  left  us  in  the  presence  of  an  omnipresent  energy / 
Like  other  readers,  I  welcomed  that  teleological 
passage,  I  am  about  to  quote,  and  I  do  not  care  to 
inquire  how  much  of  "Cosmic  Philosophy"  would 
require  to  be  rewritten   to  make  it   consistent  with 


AGNOSTIC  PHILOSOPHY  267 

this  and  other  passages.  *'  The  teleological  instinct 
in  man  cannot  be  suppressed  or  ignored.  The 
human  soul  shrinks  from  the  thought  that  it  is  with- 
out kith  or  kin  in  all  this  wide  universe.  Our  reason 
demands  that  there  shall  be  a  reasonableness  in  the 
constitution  of  things.  This  demand  is  a  fact  in  our 
psychical  nature  as  positive  and  irrepressible  as  our 
acceptance  of  geometrical  axioms  and  our  rejection 
of  whatever  controverts  such  axioms.  No  ingenuity 
of  argument  can  bring  us  to  believe  that  the  infinite 
Sustainer  of  the  universe  will  "put  us  to  permanent 
intellectual  confusion."  There  is  in  every  earnest 
thinker  a  craving  after  a  final  cause ;  and  this  crav- 
ing can  no  more  be  extinguished  than  our  belief 
in  objective  reality.  Our  beUef  in  what  we  call 
the  evidence  of  our  senses  is  less  strong  than  our 
faith  that  in  the  orderly  sequence  of  events  there  is 
a  meaning  which  our  minds  could  fathom  were  they 
only  vast  enough."    (pp.  137-8.) 

It  would  appear,  therefore,  that  according  to  Mr. 
Spencer  and  to  Mr.  Fiske,  there  is  a  meaning  in 
the  universe,  were  our  minds  only  great  enough  to 
grasp  it.  Mr.  Spencer  holds  out  a  hope  that  in  the 
future,  whether  distant  or  near  he  does  not  say,  but 
in  the  future  there  may  appear  a  mind*  to  which 
the  secret  of  the  universe  may  be  open,  and  Mr. 
Fiske  has  restored  to  us  the  hope  of  learning  the 
meaning  of  the  universe  which  is  there  already. 
Agnosticism  is  thus  so  far  departed  from  by  two  of 


268  THEISM 

its  greatest  advocates.  The  unknowable  has  shrunk 
to  smaller  dimensions,  and  it  is  only  the  fear  of 
anthropomorphism  that  seems  to  keep  them  from 
attenuating  it  still  further.  If  a  wider  and  stronger 
intellect  may  yet  arise  which  may  have  a  vague  con- 
sciousness of  the  world  in  its  totality,  we  may  work 
on  with  the  assurance  that  there  is  nothing  in  the 
totality  considered  in  itself  which  makes  it  unknow- 
able. Even  human  intelligence  as  it  is,  may  come  to 
have  an  apprehension  of  the  meaning  of  the  universe 
and  its  cause. 

With  anthropomorphism  I  have  dealt  elsewhere, 
and  have  endeavoured  to  show  that  all  science  and 
philosophy  are  anthropomorphic,  and  it  is  not  possi- 
ble for  the  human  being  to  be  other  than  anthro- 
pomorphic. Those  who  think  they  get  beyond 
anthropomorphism  have  simply  interpreted  the  uni- 
verse in  terms  borrowed  from  the  lowest  parts  of 
human  experience.  (See  '*  Is  God  Knowable  1  " 
Chap.  III.)  It  is  largely  from  men  who  approach 
the  problem  from  the  scientific  side  that  we  hear 
the  charge  of  anthropomorphism.  For  example,  Mr. 
Graham  in  his  "Creed  of  Science"  puts  the  matter 
thus :  "  In  particular  this  conception  of  God  will  not 
suit  the  theology  that  insists  on  ascribing  to  Him  the 
attributes,  at  once  metaphysical  and  specially  human, 
of  personality  and  consciousness  ;  the  former  being 
the  precise  one  that  it  is  so  difficult  to  get  any  clear 
conception  of  even  in  ourselves,  and  both,  especially 


AGNOSTIC  PHILOSOPHY  269 

consciousness,  being  as  Fichte  and  other  philoso- 
phers have  irrefutably  demonstrated,  inapplicable 
and  directly  contradictory  to  the  notion  of  an  Abso- 
lute Being.  For  consciousness  and  personality,  what- 
ever else  they  imply,  clearly  imply  the  notion  of  limits 
and  conditions,  neither  of  which  can  without  contra- 
diction be  applied  to  an  absolute  and  unconditioned 
Being,  to  a  transcendent  tremendous  and  universal 
power,  the  chief  fact  in  our  knowledge  of  which  is 
precisely  its  freedom  from  the  limits  which  govern 
and  bind  our  finite  being."  (**  Creed  of  Science," 
p.  364.)  I  have  for  a  long  time  regarded  with 
wonder  and  admiration  sentences  like  the  one  now 
quoted,  and  many  such  may  be  culled  from  the 
pages  of  the  current  philosophies  of  this  type.  I 
have  wondered  that  the  writers  of  such  sentences 
have  not  seen  that  they  contradict  themselves.  At 
all  events  that  they  have  fallen  into  confusion  of 
thought,  when  they  speak  of  being  at  all.  Being  is 
a  determinate  phrase,  with  a  definite  meaning,  and 
that  is  a  limitation.  When  they  define  it  as  power, 
that,  on  their  own  terms,  is  also  a  limitation.  Still 
greater  are  the  limitations  set  forth  by  the  terms 
absolute,  unconditioned,  tremendous,  and  universal; 
from  their  point  of  view  all  these  predicates  involve 
limitations  just  as  much  as  or  more  than  is  implied 
by  consciousness  and  personality. 

They  proceed  on  the  assumption  that   predicates 
are  limitations,  as  in  one  sense   they  are,  but  from 


270  THEISM 

any  rational  point  of  view,  to  be  is  more  than  not  to 
be,  and  the  larger  the  number  of  predicates  ascribed 
to  a  subject  the  greater  is  that  subject.  Deferring 
for  a  time  the  discussion  of  whether  infinitude  and 
personaUty  are  inconsistent  with  each  other,  let  us 
ask  what  help  we  get  from  science  that  has  become 
a  metaphysic,  toward  an  intelligent  solution  of  the 
theistic  question.  From  Mr.  Spencer  and  Mr.  Fiske 
there  is  some  help,  as  we  have  pointed  out  already, 
in  the  insistence  by  them  of  the  existence  of  a  power 
to  whose  might  we  can  set  no  limit.  The  whole 
of  things  proceeds  from  that  infinitive  and  eternal 
energy.  We  are  afraid  that  Mr.  Spencer  would  go 
no  further,  and  while  he  denies  that  we  can  infer 
anything  of  the  power  and  the  character  of  it  from 
the  manifestations  within  and  beyond  consciousness, 
he  yet  seems  disposed  to  affirm  that  the  power  is 
immanent  in  the  manifestations,  and  that  the  force 
is  persistent  along  the  lines  of  its  manifestations, 
and  has  no  other  mode  of  persistence.  It  is,  indeed, 
difficult  to  be  sure  of  his  meaning,  and  one  can 
hardly  say  whether  he  has  thought  out  the  ques- 
tion. He  is  for  the  most  part  contented  with  the 
general  assertion  that  the  eternal  power  is  unknow- 
able. But  Mr.  Fiske  has  spoken  on  this  very  point 
and  spoken  to  the  purpose.  "  Hence  to  the  query 
suggested  at  the  beginning  of  this  chapter  whether 
the  Deity  can  be  identified  with  the  Cosmos,  we 
must  return  a  very  different   answer   from    that  re- 


AGNOSTIC  PHILOSOPHY  2/1 

turned  by  the  Pantheist.  The  'open  secret,'  in  so 
far  as  secret,  is  God  —  in  so  far  as  open,  is  the 
world ;  but  in  thus  regarding  the  ever  changing  uni- 
verse of  phenomena  as  the  multiform  revelation  of 
an  Omnipresent  Power,  we  can  in  no  wise  identify 
the  power  with  its  manifestations.  To  do  so  would 
reduce  the  entire  argument  to  nonsense.  From  first 
to  last  it  has  been  implied  that  while  the  universe 
is  the  manifestation  of  Deity,  yet  is  Deity  something 
more  than  the  universe.  The  doctrine  which  we 
have  here  expounded  is,  therefore,  neither  more  nor 
less  than  theism,  in  its  most  pronounced,  consistent, 
and  unqualified  form.  It  is  quite  true  that  the  word 
*  theism,'  as  ordinarily  employed,  connotes  the 
ascription  of  an  anthropomorphic  personality  to  the 
Deity."  ("Cosmic  Philosophy,"  Vol.  II.,  p.  424.)  Mr. 
Fiske,  like  Professor  Graham,  and  all  others  who 
approach  the  question  from  the  merely  scientific 
side,  will  not  allow  us  to  ascribe  the  attributes  of 
personality  and  consciousness  to  the  deity.  He  is 
quite  decided  on  that  head.  Again  and  again  he 
tells  us  that  "  personality  and  infinity  are  terms 
expressive  of  ideas  which  are  mutually  incompatible. 
The  pseud-idea,  'infinite  person,*  is  neither  more 
nor  less  than  the  pseud-idea  circular  triangle." 
(pp.  408-9.) 

Thus,  on  the  whole,  while  we  gain  something  from 
the  statement  of  Mr.  Fiske  that  the  deity  is  some- 
thing more  than  the  universe,  we  know  nothing  of 


2/2  THEISM 

what  the  ''more"  may  be.  We  do  not  know,  in- 
deed, we  may  never  know,  whether  we  can  ever 
come  mto  the  fellowship  of  the  divine,  or  whether 
the  divine  can  care  for  us ;  and  the  divine  becomes 
for  us  on  these  terms  a  term  from  the  meaning  of 
which  all  thoughts  of  providence,  guidance,  govern- 
ment of  the  world,  are  rigidly  excluded,  as  well  as 
other  notions  more  characteristic  of  religion.  We 
are  not  prepared  to  pay  so  great  a  price,  even  for 
the  doctrine  of  evolution,  though  we  are  persuaded 
that  the  doctrine  of  evolution  is  not  essentially  tied 
to  the  doctrine  of  the  unknowable.  That  it  is  so  is 
only  the  private  opinion  of  Mr.  Spencer  and  Mr. 
Fiske,  and  the  evolutionary  theory  in  its  essentials 
may  go  along  with  the  idea  of  a  God  who  may  be 
known  and  has  made  Himself  known.  The  doctrine 
of  the  "  unknowable "  is  the  fruit  of  a  theory  of 
knowledge,  and  after  that  theory  is  removed,  the 
gain  we  have  got  may  still  be  retained.  As  we  re- 
marked already,  the  theory  of  Mr.  Spencer  and  Mr. 
Fiske  is  refuted  by  their  own  practice.  They  define 
the  "unknowable,"  and  the  one  calls  it  an  infinite 
and  eternal  energy,  and  the  other  calls  it  a  power 
to  which  no  limit  in  time  and  space  is  conceivable. 
In  the  use  of  these  phrases  they  have  transgressed 
against  their  own  canons,  and  have  ventured  to 
speak  of  infinite  and  eternal  in  positive  terms  as 
if  they  had  a  real  content  which  could  be  known  as 
positive.     What,    then,   becomes   of   the   contention 


AGNOSTIC  PHILOSOPHY  273 

that  the  infinite  and  eternal  are  wholly  negative  ? 
Are  we  to  suppose  that  when  we  apply  the  words 
"  infinite  "  and  "•  eternal "  to  energy  they  negative  the 
positive  content  of  energy  ?  Nay,  for  they  merely 
negative  the  idea  of  any  limit  to  the  energy  and  the 
power.  We  have  simply  to  carry  out  this  statement 
of  theirs  in  all  directions  and  we  get  rid  of  a  great 
part,  of  in  fact  the  greatest  part,  of  the  agnostic 
argument.  What  right  have  they,  on  their  own 
terms,  to  speak  of  the  infinite  and  eternal  in  any 
way }  They  have  no  right  to  use  negative  terms  to 
enhance  a  positive  content. 

Further,  have  they  not  transcended  the  limits  of 
human  knowledge,  when  they  speak  after  this  fash- 
ion, that  is,  the  limits  set  by  themselves }  If  they 
transcend  the  Hmit  and  extend  our  finite  idea  of 
force  to  its  ideal,  why  find  fault  with  me  when  I 
use  the  same  privilege }  If  they  raise  power  to  its 
ideal  and  make  it  infinite,  I  am  going  to  do  the  same 
thing,  and  to  say  there  is  an  ideal  of  righteousness 
in  the  universe,  there  is  truth  eternal  and  beauty 
infinite  and  harmony  unspeakable ;  and  in  fact  I  am 
just  to  take  all  I  know  of  finite  qualities,  properties, 
and  relations,  and  I  am  to  raise  them  to  their  ideals, 
and  hold  them  to  be  realized  in  the  infinite  and 
eternal  being  from  which  all  things  proceed.  Why 
should  these  distinguished  men  be  allowed  to  raise 
one  property  to  its  ideal  because  it  suits  their  theory } 
and  why  should   all  others   be  characterized  as  an- 


274 


THEISM 


thropomorphic  if  they  use  the  same  privilege  ?  But 
I  do  not  press  the  argumentum  ad  hominem,  there 
is  something  better  to  do. 

Let  us  look  back  from  the  point  where  Mr. 
Spencer  leaves  us,  and  let  us  also  look  round  and 
up  to  find  what  worlds  he  has  taken  away.  Taking 
the  great  scientific  movement  of  thought  which  may 
be  represented  by  Mr.  Spencer,  let  us  observe 
how  far  it  has  brought  us  and  where  it  leaves  us. 
We  had  thought  that  we  had  stood  in  the  middle 
world  of  being,  with  God  above  us  and  the  world 
beneath  us,  and  in  most  intimate  relations  with  both, 
and  we  thought  that  the  full  interpretation  of  our 
own  experience  would  give  us  the  key  to  the  know- 
ledge of  what  is  beneath  us,  of  what  is  around  us,  and 
of  what  is  above  us.  Well,  but  with  the  advance  of 
science,  and  specially  with  the  coming  of  the  theory 
of  evolution,  we  are  left  in  the  sad  predicament  that, 
while  there  may  be  something  above  us,  we  can 
never  know  what  it  is.  Our  highest  and  our  best 
are  expressly  shut  out  from  the  exercise  of  any 
function  in  the  ultimate  interpretation  of  the  uni- 
verse. Our  kinship  with  what  is  beneath  us  is  fully 
brought  out,  and  great  stress  is  laid  on  it,  no  doubt 
to  our  advantage,  for  all  truth  is  beneficial.  A  vast 
body  of  truth  has  been  brought  home  to  us ;  we  are 
sharers  in  countless  structures,  organs,  and  functions 
with  the  grades  of  being  beneath  us.  The  world 
of   nature    cannot  be  regarded   as   alien   to  us,  and 


AGNOSTIC  PHILOSOPHY  2/5 

whether  we  were  moulded  out  of  the  dust  or  evolved 
by  slow  degrees  through  an  ascending  series  of  lower 
beings,  in  either  case  we  must  feel  a  true  kinship 
with  all  that  is  beneath  us,  and  a  true  reverence  for 
it.  Our  knowledge  of  all  that  is  beneath  us  has 
come  in  Hke  a  flood,  wave  upon  wave,  in  all  the 
sciences,  and  as  a  consequence  our  thoughts  in 
general  and  of  the  methods  by  which  truth  may  be 
known  are  dominated  by  the  methods  and  the  aims 
which  have  been  so  successful  in  this  single  region 
of  truth.  Thus  we  are  inclined  to  judge  of  ourselves 
and  of  all  that  is  above  us  by  methods  and  measures 
taken  from  things  below  us.  This  tendency  grows 
by  what  it  feeds  on,  and  the  explanation  of  the  uni- 
verse by  what  is  below  man  strives  to  become  com- 
plete, coherent,  and  exhaustive. 

The  most  complete  expression  of  this  tendency  is  to 
be  found  in  the  works  of  Mr.  Spencer  and  Mr.  Fiske. 
While  they  formally  protest  that  there  may  be 
something  higher  than  intelligence  at  work  in  the 
world,  as  a  matter  of  fact  every  principle  of  explana- 
tion found  in  their  works  has  been  drawn  from  the 
world  beneath  man.  The  persistence  of  force  is 
the  foundation  principle,  and  from  it  all  is  derived^ 
As  we  advance  in  the  process  of  explanation  there 
are  introduced  successive  simplicities,  which  form  the 
elements  which  by  differentiation  and  integration 
proceed  on  their  way  to  further  complications ;  and 
so  the  story  goes  on  until  we  come  to  the  perfectly 


2/6  THEISM 

evolved  society  of  Mr.  Spencer  as  set  forth  in  the 
**  Data  of  Ethics."  Here  is  an  evolution  up  to  man, 
and  no  further.  Measures  and  procedures  taken  ex- 
clusively from  the  world  below  us  are  held  sufficient 
for  the  explanation  of  things,  and  even  the  fruit  and 
flower  of  personal  and  social  life  are  derivatives  from 
what  is  below  us.  Man  is  left  with  no  higher,  with 
nothing  nobler  than  himself.  But  is  there  not  the 
infinite  and  eternal  energy  left  to  us,  and  the  blind 
and  blank  adoration  of  the  unknowable }  Yes,  but  is 
that  higher,  greater,  nobler  than  I  am }  No,  for  an 
infinite  that  does  not  know  itself,  that  has  no  purpose, 
no  aim,  no  way  of  making  itself  known,  is  not  higher 
than  man,  it  is  lower.  The  theory  of  Mr.  Spencer 
is  not  even  zoomorphic,  it  is  drawn  solely  from 
physics.  Or  rather  it  is  drawn  from  the  lowest 
aspect  of  human  experience,  that  of  our  simplest 
experience  of  resistance. 

Still  there  is  the  irresistible  belief  that  we  do  stand 
in  the  middle  between  what  is  below  and  what  is  above 
us,  and  the  knowledge  of  this  belief  must  lead  us 
upwards  or  downwards.  Man  always  has  found  it 
difficult  to  be  upright  when  he  has  disregarded  the 
knowledge  of  God.  Take  away  that  ideal  and  man 
immediately  becomes  retrogressive.  It  was  always  so, 
and  it  is  more  so  to-day.  Formerly  he  thought  he 
was  a  being  apart,  separate  from  the  other  beings  of 
the  earth,  separately  formed,  able  to  pursue  a  sepa- 
rate destiny.     But  now  he  finds  that  in  his  physical 


AGNOSTIC  PHILOSOPHY  277 

structure  he  is  not  widely  separate  from  what  is  lower, 
and  in  many  other  respects  he  is  closely  akin  to  the 
higher  animals,  and  the  full  force  of  these  scientific 
discoveries  press  upon  him  to  his  undoing,  if  he  can- 
not reenforce  his  conviction  of  his  uniqueness  by 
considerations  of  endowments  shared  by  none  of  the 
other  creatures.  To  restore  him  to  himself,  to  lift 
him  upwards,  and  to  enable  him  to  realize  that  better 
and  higher  self  after  which  he  aspires,  there  is  needed 
the  sure  hope  of  the  knowledge  of  an  actual  God  in 
whom  is  realized  the  ideal  of  truth,  life,  knowledge, 
and  action,  who  alone  can  raise  him  to  the  goal 
which  he  dimly  foresees  as  possible,  and  which  he 
longs  to  make  real. 

Thus  we  need  to  supplement  the  story  of  the 
evolution  up  to  man,  by  the  story  of  a  moral  evolu- 
tion of  man  up  to  the  ideal  he  has  attained,  and  to 
show  that  the  story  of  ethical  evolution  has  a 
method  and  law  of  its  own.  There  is  also  the  story 
of  spiritual  evolution  to  be  told,  whereby  man  has  so 
far  reached  the  stage  of  self-knowledge,  self-reverence, 
and  self-control.  There  is  still  more  the  story  of 
religious  evolution,  a  more  difficult  story  to  tell  though 
inextricably  interwoven  with  the  others,  —  the  story  of 
the  purification  and  elevation  of  man's  belief  in  God 
until  he  came  to  believe  in  the  living  God,  the  maker 
of  heaven  and  earth,  the  upholder  of  all  that  is,  the 
source,  the  guide,  and  the  goal  of  all  things,  of  whom, 
for  whom,  and  through  whom  are  all  things.     Nor  do 


2/8  THEISM 

I  believe  that  the  process  of  evokition  in  any  sphere 
has  taken  place  without  the  help  of  Him  Whom  they 
call  the  unknowable  Power  from  which  all  things 
proceed.  The  activity  of  the  Eternal,  call  Him  by 
what  name  you  may,  is  the  postulate  of  every  theory 
of  evolution.  It  is  so  when  you  have  attenuated  it 
to  the  idea  of  persistence.  And  it  is  much  more  so 
when  you  give  to  the  conception  of  God  its  full  value. 
Why,  I  ask,  forbid  us  to  find  the  realization  of  all  our 
ideals  in  the  infinite  and  the  eternal,  when  you  have 
permitted  yourselves  to  reahze  your  ideal  of  energy  in 
the  infinite  and  the  eternal  t  I  do  not  find  any  worthy 
answer  to  that  question,  and  no  answer  at  all  save  a 
reference  to  a  theory  of  knowledge  which  makes 
knowledge  impossible. 

In  the  experience  of  mankind,  so  far  back  as 
we  have  any  knowledge  of  that  experience,  there 
is  the  belief  in  a  higher  power,  on  whom  man  felt 
his  dependence,  and  that  power  was  believed  to  be  a 
power  making  for  righteousness,  interested  in  truth, 
working  for  the  growth  of  goodness,  taking  measures 
for  the  suppression  of  wrong-doing,  and  evil  of  all 
kinds.  There  is  a  belief  in  a  righteous  ruler  of  the 
world  who  had  the  right  and  the  authority  to  govern, 
and  the  right,  also,  to  enforce  his  will  by  the  most 
terrible  sanctions.  The  actual  government  of  the 
world  of  men,  as  it  can  be  traced  through  history, 
seemed  to  confirm  that  belief,  and  to  show  an  actual 
government  of  the  world  according  to  ethical  law. 


AGNOSTIC  PHILOSOPHY  2/9 

The  power  above  us  was  on  the  side  of  virtue,  good- 
ness, truth,  and  righteousness;  and  on  the  reading  of 
events,  through  a  lengthened  period,  it  seemed  to  hold 
true  that  where  the  ethical  qualities  of  self-restraint, 
self-government,  by  high  aims  and  purposes,  purity, 
goodness,  love,  and  other  ethical  qualities  have  be- 
come less  and  less,  there  followed  consequences  of 
a  grave  and  miserable  kind.  The  presages  of  con- 
science seemed  to  be  confirmed  by  the  actual  facts  of 
human  experience  as  these  are  recorded  in  history. 
Then  there  are  the  reflections  of  man  on  his  own  hfe 
in  its  intellectual,  ethical,  and  religious  aspects  as  these 
were  present  in  his  experience.  It  seemed  to  him 
that  intellectually  he  was  related  to  an  external  world, 
in  intercourse  with  which  his  life  of  feeling,  thinking, 
and  activity  came  to  fruition.  The  existence  of  an 
external  world,  in  connection  with  which  he  could 
realize  his  purpose  and  his  character,  became  one 
of  his  assured  beliefs,  and  in  acting  on  that  belief  his 
life  became  one  of  realized  activity.  However  we 
may  interpret  the  external  world,  it  is  confessedly 
there,  and  in  intercourse  with  it  life  realizes  itself. 
But  the  external  world  does  not  exhaust  the  beings 
with  whom  we  have  intercourse.  There  is  the  world 
of  our  fellow-men,  who  are  more  to  us,  and  who  play 
a  larger  part  in  the  evolution  of  our  personality,  than 
is  accomplished  by  our  fellowship  with  the  external 
world.  From  man  we  obtained  language  to  enable  us 
to  think  and  to  give  expression  to  our  thought,  lessons 


280  THEISM 

of  experience  not  transmitted  by  mere  hereditary  de- 
scent, but  handed  down  as  a  treasure  of  human  feel- 
ing, aspiration,  achievement,  a  record  of  noble  aims 
and  deeds  expressed  in  thoughts  that  breathe  and 
words  that  burn  ;  we  obtained  in  addition  the  love  that 
blessed  our  infancy,  the  care  that  guarded  our  youth, 
the  patient  forethought  that  planned  and  carried  out 
our  education,  the  wise  affection  that  looked  forward 
to  our  future  and  taught  us  the  habit  of  obedience  to 
what  was  wiser  and  better  than  we,  as  the  sure  way 
to  self-control  and  to  a  hfe  of  fruitful  endeavour  and 
assured  work,  the  atmosphere  charged  with  the  tra- 
dition of  the  ages,  which  we  breathed  in  our  home,  in 
the  school,  college,  university ;  these  and  many  other 
influences  played  on  us  and  helped  to  make  us  what 
we  are,  and  are  we  to  question  or  doubt  the  reality 
of  those  intellectual,  ethical,  and  spiritual  influences  ? 
No,  we  do  not  doubt  the  existence  and  validity  of 
these. 

But  pass  on  now  and  inquire  into  the  validity  of 
the  object  on  which  our  religious  life  is  fed,  and  you 
meet  with  a  different  mode  of  treatment  of  that  object. 
Nay,  it  is  not  our  reHgious  life  alone,  it  is  our  higher 
ethical  life  as  well  that  has  its  postulates  called  into 
question.  One  of  the  postulates  of  our  moral  life  is 
that  we  are  in  relation  to  an  objective  moral  authority 
of  perfect  holiness,  goodness,  righteousness,  and  love, 
who  has  the  right  to  control  us,  guide  us,  cherish  us, 
and  reward  us.     Without  this  postulate  the  infinite 


AGNOSTIC  PHILOSOPHY  28 1 

character  of  duty  is  never  adequately  realized.  With- 
out this  objective  authority  who  has  the  right  to 
command  our  conscience,  we  can  never  rise  to  the 
great  height  of  our  moral  caUing,  and  the  word 
''ought"  without  this  authority  will  never  reach  its 
transcendent  significance.  We  may  try  — it  has  been 
often  tried  —  to  attenuate  the  meaning  of  the  word 
"  ought,"  to  substitute  for  its  categorical  imperative 
some  lesser  derivative,  such  as,  if  you  desire  the  end 
you  must  use  the  means ;  or  it  may  be  contended  that 
the  oughtness  that  constrains  a  man  is  the  inherited 
custom  of  countless  generations ;  but  after  it  is  atten- 
uated so  it  comes  back  in  its  august  authoritative- 
ness,  and  confronts  us  with  its  awful  benignity  and 
says,  "You  ought."  And  we  bow  in  silence  before 
the  majesty  of  moral  law,  and  recognize  in  our  best 
moments  that  this  is  the  voice  of  the  supreme.  Duty 
is  itself  infinite.  I  appeal  to  the  voice  of  our  con- 
sciousness, and  I  ask  how  is  it  that  we  feel  that  we 
can  never  realize  our  ideal  of  duty,  how  is  it  that  we 
find  that  ideal  growing  as  we  cHmb  higher,  that  the 
more  we  attain  the  farther  removed  from  us  seems 
the  ideal  of  duty  which  is  our  ideal }  This  is  the  uni- 
versal testimony  of  the  human  consciousness,  that, 
no  matter  what  the  ideal  of  life  and  duty  is,  or  may 
be,  whether  it  be  that  of  the  cultured  or  the  uncul- 
tured, he  finds  himself  ever  baffled  in  his  striving 
to  attain  it. 

Is  not  this  one  of  the  pathways  that  lead  to  God, 


282  THEISM 

and  one  of  the  infinites  which  God  has  put  within 
the  human  heart  ?  What  is  this  ideal  of  duty,  this 
imperative  feehng  of  obligation,  this  conscious  con- 
straint that  bids  us  to  go  on  even  when  we  have 
found  our  most  earnest  strivings  baffled,  and  our 
best  efforts  ineffective,  unless  it  is  the  call  to  us  of 
an  infinite  perfection  that  really  cares  for  us,  and 
the  prompting  of  a  love  that  is  supreme,  that  we 
should  remember  our  eternity,  and  be  worthy  of 
bearing  the  responsibility  of  being  a  rational,  self- 
conscious,  ethical,  and  spiritual  being,  who  can  by 
divine  help  determine  himself  to  the  realization  of  his 
ideal  in  character  and  life.  It  is  a  great  position,  this 
of  a  rational  self-conscious,  ethical  being,  and  the 
risk  of  failure  in  the  trial  to  realize  the  personality  is 
great.  It  is  the  task  of  all  of  us.  To  live  is,  indeed, 
for  all  of  us,  to  form  ideals  and  to  fall  short  of  them, 
and  ever  to  realize  that  there  is  a  contrast  between 
what  is  and  what  ought  to  be.  In  all  spheres  of 
human  activity  this  is  so,  we  can  never  state  a  truth 
in  all  its  fulness  and  accuracy,  nor  put  into  form  the 
beauty  that  haunts  us ;  we  labour  to  make  our  prac- 
tical action  embody  our  ideal  of  what  a  perfect  action 
ought  to  be,  and  we  fail ;  we  cannot  even  write  as  we 
see  we  ought  to  do ;  and  in  our  moral  action  and  life 
the  good  that  we  would  we  do  not,  and  the  imper- 
fections and  defects  we  would  avoid,  if  we  could, 
cling  to  us  through  all  our  life. 

Yet  to  our  finite  and  baffled  existence  there  comes 


AGNOSTIC  PHILOSOPHY  283 

the  persuasion  that  there  is  a  complete  and  perfect 
hfe,  a  grander  world  than  the  present,  a  conviction 
that  this  world  and  this  life  is  not  the  whole.  Our 
ideals  imperatively  demand  realization.  Our  im- 
perfect knowledge  leads  us  to  the  hope  that  there 
is  a  knowledge  that  is  perfect,  an  explanation  that 
makes  the  rationality  of  the  whole  apparent  to  a 
mind  for  which  the  whole  is.  The  isolated  frag- 
ments of  our  existence,  even  in  their  isolation,  cause 
us  to  think  of  a  complete  and  perfect  beauty  and 
symmetry,  in  which  the  visions  of  harmony  and 
beauty  that  dimly  float  before  the  imaginations  of 
the  best  and  purest  of  the  sons  of  men  have  their 
complete  fulfilment.  Beauty  and  harmony,  grace 
of  outline  and  harmony  of  parts,  are  with  us  here, 
and  our  aesthetic  convictions  demand  a  sphere  in 
which  they  will  be  satisfied.  Above  all,  in  the  moral 
sphere  man  sees  a  hand  that  beckons,  a  vision  that 
invites,  an  ideal  that  draws  him  on,  and  on  the  reverse 
side  a  pure  and  holy  power  that  warns  and  sternly 
forbids  those  actions  and  incUnations  that  lead  men 
to  become  false  to  the  highest  moral  ideal  they  know. 
Thus  while  we  are  in  the  midst  of  the  perishing,  the 
transient,  and  fragmentary,  we  are  so  constituted 
as  to  demand  the  imperishable,  the  abiding,  and  the 
whole;  in  one  word,  man's  greatest  need  is  God,  in 
whom  all  ideals  meet  and  are  reahzed. 

We  need  God  on  all  sides  of  our  manifold  life,  — 
intellectually,  aesthetically,  morally,  reUgiously.    God 


284  THEISM 

alone  can  draw  forth  all  the  powers  of  man  into 
harmonious  action.  If  one  may  use  the  phrase,  God 
is  the  environment  of  man,  in  intercourse  with  whom 
man  can  attain  to  perfection.  Shall  the  need  of  man 
for  the  infinite  and  the  eternal  be  limited  merely  to 
one  aspect,  and  that  not  the  highest }  Shall  we  say 
that  there  is  energy,  and  declare  all  else  to  be  un- 
knowable .-^  Are  we  to  look  up  to  a  lonely  universe, 
and  in  all  the  higher  spheres  of  being  be  driven  to 
think  that  we  have  no  kith  and  kin  in  the  world 
above  us }  Is  the  world  above  and  beyond  us,  as 
Shelley  says,  "A  wide,  gray,  lampless,  dark,  un- 
peopled world  }  "  No,  the  history  of  humanity,  sad 
though  it  be,  proves  that  there  is  a  Being  who  is 
above  them,  interested  in  them,  caring  for  them, 
who  allowed  Himself  to  be  thought  of  by  them  in 
such  forms  and  terms  as  they  could  use  to  describe 
the  highest  and  the  best,  and  from  that  lowly  and 
inadequate  beginning  strove  to  lead  them  onwards 
and  upwards  to  higher,  truer,  and  more  adequate 
thoughts  and  conceptions  of  Him.  In  the  earHer 
days  men  sought  for  their  highest  and  best  in  the 
external  world  of  nature,  and  seemed  to  exhaust  the 
possibilities  of  earth  and  sea  and  sky,  in  order  to  find 
a  fitting  expression  for  the  Divine ;  and  they  were 
not  satisfied,  for  the  world-idea  could  not  adequately 
represent  the  Divine.  Then  they  turned  to  the  idea 
of  their  own  intelHgent,  social,  and  ethical  life,  and 
sought  for  the  highest  and  best  conceptions  wrought 


AGNOSTIC  PHILOSOPHY  285 

in  them  by  their  personal,  social,  and  civic  life,  and 
strove  to  think  of  the  Divine  in  terms  borrowed  from 
these  ideals.  It  did  not  satisfy,  though  it  led  them 
to  worthier  thoughts  of  God.  There  was  something 
gained  when  the  phenomena  of  personal,  social,  and 
state  life  were  taken  as  the  material  of  their  thought 
of  God,  for  it  led  them  to  think  of  God  as  the 
meaning  of  the  social  union,  its  source,  and  its  goal. 
The  actual  life  of  man  in  social  union  led  to  that 
thousfht  which  we  find  in  Greek  and  Roman  civiliza- 
tion,  that  gods  and  men  formed  one  community,  and 
were  in  relation  to  each  other. 

But  the  growing  intelligence  of  men,  and  their 
higher  organization,  and  their  advancing  morality, 
led  them  on  to  further  striving.  ReHgion  is  not  sat- 
isfied with  the  solutions  of  intelligence,  nor  with  the 
sanctions  of  ethics,  nor  with  that  conception  of  God 
which,  perhaps,  might  satisfy  our  speculative,  our 
aesthetic,  and  our  ethical  activity.  She  must  find  a 
God  who  realizes  her  own  ideal.  So  in  every  age 
reUgion,  while  taking  note  of  all  that  is  accomplished 
in  science,  philosophy,  and  ethics,  sets  men  to  work 
anew,  for  she  must  solve  the  problem  from  her  own 
point  of  view,  with  her  own  postulates,  and  from  her 
own  data.  The  work  must  be  done  over  again,  and 
she  is  not  satisfied  until  she  has  worked  up  the  ma- 
terial derived  from  the  sciences  and  philosophies 
into  a  new  and  higher  synthesis  which  is  all  her  own. 
She  is  not  contented  with  a  philosophy  of  religion. 


286  THEISM 

nor  will  she  consent  to  be  reduced  to  an  aspect  of 
philosophy ;  rather  her  imperious  and  imperative  de- 
mand is  that  science  and  philosophy  shall  toil  in  her 
service.  For  religion  is  highest  and  most  central, 
and  has,  or  ought  to  have,  the  controlling  position  in 
life.  Religion  is  the  sanction  of  morality;  yes,  but 
it  is  more  than  the  sanction  of  morality.  When  it 
becomes  a  mere  sanction  of  morality,  it  fares  ill  with 
religion  and  morality.  Philosophy  may  be  satisfied 
with  such  a  conception  of  God  as  will  help  her  to 
solve  the  problems  of  thought  and  life  which  are 
confessedly  philosophical ;  science  may  be  satisfied 
with  such  a  conception  of  God  as  will  help  her  to 
conceive  the  order  of  the  universe,  and  help  her  to 
think  of  the  realm  of  law  as  real ;  and  ethics  may  be 
contented  with  the  recognition  of  moral  law  as  issuing 
forth  from  a  sovereign,  of  infinite  power  and  wisdom, 
who  has  imposed  an  ethical  law  on  all  intelligent 
agents  as  the  condition  of  their  existence  in  a  realm  of 
rational  beings.  But  a  God  who  is  only  the  cause 
of  order,  the  presupposition  of  knowledge,  the  source 
of  moral  order,  is  utterly  insufficient  to  satisfy  the 
religious  demands  of  man. 

So  religion  ever  sets  men  to  toil  anew  in  order  to 
reach  God,  if  haply  they  can  find  Him.  Men  must 
find  God,  and  the  God  we  find  must  satisfy  all  our 
needs ;  the  craving  for  guidance,  the  thirst  for  right- 
eousness, the  striving  after  truth,  and  the  longing  for 
purity.     Specially  does  religion  demand  a  God  who 


AGNOSTIC  PHILOSOPHY  287 

is  something,  and  can  do  something,  who  can  come 
near  to  men  in  a  personal  way,  and  speak  to  them 
words  which  they  can  understand.  Here  we  come 
to  the  crux  of  the  whole  matter,  to  that  point  where 
reHgion  must  ever  take  her  stand,  and  absolutely 
refuse  to  accept  the  solutions  pressed  on  her  accept- 
ance by  science  and  philosophy.  What  some  of 
these  are  we  shall  see  in  the  concluding  chapter.  At 
present  our  aim  is  to  say  that  religion  can  never 
accept  a  solution  that  casts  the  world  into  the  life  of 
God,  and  makes  the  states  and  changes  of  the  world 
to  be  states  and  changes  of  Him.  God  is  for  religion 
more  than  the  universe,  and  He  has  ways  of  activity 
and  of  manifestation  not  measured  by  the  move- 
ments of  the  universe,  and  not  limited  by  its  ongoing. 
In  other  words,  a  postulate  of  religion  is  the  tran- 
scendence of  God. 

No  doubt  the  task  is  a  tremendous  one  that  re- 
ligion sets  to  man.  We  recognize,  also,  that  science 
and  philosophy  have  not  made  the  performance  of 
the  task  an  easy  one.  But  it  is  a  task  to  which 
we  must  gird  ourselves  generation  after  generation. 
We  try  to  think  it  is  possible  to  construct  a  thought 
of  God,  as  One  in  Whom  all  things  and  persons 
live  and  move  and  have  their  being,  and  yet  as  a 
God  who  has  a  life  in  Himself,  for  Himself,  and  to 
Himself.  It  is  comparatively  easy  to  reach  the 
immanence  of  God  in  the  world ;  in  fact,  that  con- 
ception has  been  reached  by  many  routes,  in  many 


288  THEISM 

ways.  That  mysterious  power  which  is  both  the 
path  and  the  path  goers,  which  is  everything  and 
nothing,  meets  us  in  the  speculations  of  Laotze,  in 
the  existence  without  a  predicate,  which  is  an  Ind- 
ian form  of  mysticism ;  and  on  the  subjective  side, 
meets  us  again  in  the  self  of  all  selves,  meets  us 
in  the  anima  miindi,  and  in  a  thousand  other  forms 
in  the  history  of  speculation,  ancient  and  modern. 
It  is  not  a  solution  hard  to  reach,  for  it  has  been 
reached  so  often,  and  reappears  so  frequently  in  the 
history  of  human  thought.  Religion  is  never  satis- 
fied with  a  pantheistic  solution,  let  it  take  whatso- 
ever form  it  may.  For  religion  must  have  a  God 
who  can  speak,  who  can  reveal  Himself,  not  only 
as  the  power  by  whom  planets  gravitate  and  stars 
shine,  by  whose  strength  the  worlds  are  maintained 
in  being,  and  living  things  have  their  life  and  activ- 
ity, but  religion  demands  a  Being,  who,  though  He 
is  not  an  object  among  other  objects,  yet  is  still  an 
object. 

Thus  religion  must  look  at  the  problems  and  so- 
lutions of  science  and  philosophy  from  its  own  point 
of  view,  and  in  the  light  of  its  own  imperative  needs. 
And  she  has  as  good  a  right  as  they ;  the  only  rele- 
vant question  is  can  she  make  her  contention  good } 
At  all  events,  religion  has  under  the  guidance  of  her 
own  postulates  entered  into  human  life,  transformed 
and  transfigured  it,  and  made  it  holy,  sacred,  and 
august.     She  has  made  every  man  feel,  as  nothing 


AGNOSTIC  PHILOSOPHY  289 

else  has  made  him  feel,  that  life  is  a  sacred  trust, 
given  to  him  for  eternal  ends ;  that  there  is  a  pur- 
pose for  every  man  which  every  individual  must 
realize  for  himself  and  in  himself,  or  otherwise  it 
will  never  be  realized.  No  one  else  can  take  the 
place  of  any  man,  no  one  can  do  his  work,  and  if 
he  be  a  failure,  the  wealth  of  the  universe  is  so  far 
lessened.  This  purpose  is  not  formed  by  the  man 
himself,  he  feels  that  it  is  formed  for  him  by  Another 
with  whom  he  has  to  do,  and  it  is  gradually  revealed 
to  him  as  he  faithfully  strives  to  follow  the  light  and 
do  the  work  which  he  recognizes  he  must  do.  In 
his  life  calling,  in  his  daily  work,  whatever  that  work 
may  be,  a  man  whom  religion  has  grasped,  feels  that 
he  is  in  the  presence  of  One  high,  pure,  holy,  to 
Whom  he  belongs,  Whose  authority  is  absolute, 
Whose  power  is  sovereign,  and  Whose  care  over 
him  is  most  minute,  and  Whose  interest  in  him  is 
unspeakable.  This  is  one  of  the  most  familiar  of 
human  experiences,  and  who  shall  say  that  it  has 
no  roots  in  reality } 

Suppose,  then,  we  take  this  as  an  actual  experience, 
and  ask  ourselves  how  religion  may  state  its  de- 
mands }  Let  us  think  of  one  omnipotent,  all-wise, 
all-loving,  who  in  power,  love,  and  wisdom  made 
the  worlds,  and  who  set  Himself  to  make  a  crea- 
tion to  which  He  could  communicate  Himself.  This 
is  the  central  thought  of  your  great  American  > 
thinker,  Jonathan  Edwards,  who  ever  strove  to  set 
u 


290  THEISM 

forth  God  as  a  Being  who  strives  to  communicate 
Himself  to  His  creation.  Looking  back  on  the 
history  of  the  creation  as  we  are  able  to  read  it,  it 
may  be  fruitfully  looked  at  as  the  story  of  the  mak- 
ing of  a  world,  which  could  receive  the  self-com- 
munication of  the  living  God.  God  gave  Himself 
to  the  universe  as  the  universe  was  able  to  receive 
Him.  To  the  inorganic  world  as  immanent  power 
and  order,  to  the  organic  world  as  life,  growth,  and 
purpose,  to  the  world  made  in  His  own  image,  He 
gave  Himself  as  intelligence,  self-consciousness,  self- 
guidance,  ethical  purpose  and  freedom,  and  above 
all  as  the  reHgious  spirit  of  truth  and  love  and  grace, 
so  that  when  they  attained  to  purity  of  heart  they 
might  see  God. 

Religion  is  thus  not  without  a  view  and  a  purpose 
and  a  goal.  For  it  looks  back  on  the  history  of  the 
past  as  a  story  of  divine  toil  and  striving  toward 
the  making  of  a  world  to  which  God  could  commu- 
nicate Himself  and  which  would  have  the  capacity 
of  receiving  Him.  This  is  a  kind  of  world  which 
could  not  be  produced  by  a  fiat,  if,  indeed,  any  world 
could  be.  It  is  a  kind  of  world  which  could  only 
be  made  by  its  own  cooperation.  To  take  it  in  its 
highest  reaches,  the  world  to  which  God  could  com- 
municate Himself,  is  a  world  of  ethical,  self-con- 
scious beings,  who  under  the  leading  of  a  divine 
training  and  education,  through  discipline  and  trial, 
would   build   themselves   to  a  character,  and  mould 


AGNOSTIC  PHILOSOPHY  291 

themselves  on  an  ideal  made  known  to  them,  and  who 
would  be  persuaded  that  they  were  made  for  God 
and  that  they  could  be  themselves  only  when  they 
found  themselves  in  God.  Thus  religion  regards  the 
unity  of  things  not  as  accomplished  or  real  in  the 
past  or  in  the  present ;  it  lies  before  her  vision  as  a 
goal  to  be  accomplished  in  the  future  when  the  mak- 
ing of  the  world  is  complete,  and  a  creation  is  formed 
that  can  be  filled  with  all  the  fulness  of  God.  Reli- 
gion must  find  a  way  of  conceiving  the  relation  of 
God  to  the  world  which  will  conserve  the  freedom  of 
God  and  leave  Him  free  to  enter  into  these  closer 
relations  with  a  people  fitted  to  receive  them,  which 
can  represent  that  fellowship  which  alone  deserves 
the  name  of  religion. 

We  do  not  in  any  way  interfere  with  the  work  of 
science,  which  is  based  on  the  intelligibility  and  ration- 
ality of  the  universe,  nor  do  we  say  anything  against 
the  striving  of  philosophy  to  think  the  universe  as 
one,  and  to  regard  it  as  a  related  system  existing  for 
thought.  We  simply  take  care  of  our  own  postu- 
lates, and  say  to  them  that  rehgion  cannot,  will  not, 
place  the  world-idea  in  the  position  of  the  idea  of 
God.  We  must  ever  hold  that  these  are  distinct. 
As  we  saw,  Mr.  Spencer,  finding  that  the  belief  in  im- 
mortality and  the  belief  in  God  have  ever  gone  to- 
gether in  human  history,  has  insisted  that  one  of  them 
should  be  derived  from  the  other,  so  science  and 
philosophy  have  insisted  that  the  idea  of   the  world 


292  THEISM 

and  the  idea  of  God  should  be  identified,  and  this 
has  in  fact  been  the  real  issue  of  the  age-long  contro- 
versy which  religion  has  had  to  wage  for  its  existence. 
It  is  the  issue  to-day.  Never  in  the  history  of  human 
thought  has  the  identification  of  the  world-idea  with 
the  idea  of  God  been  presented  in  so  alluring  and 
persuasive  a  form  as  at  the  present  hour.  Never  has 
philosophy  taken  so  fair  and  fascinating  a  form  as 
it  does  now,  and  never  has  it  given  so  generous  a 
recognition  to  the  moral,  social,  and  religious  ideals 
of  men.  Never  has  philosophy  insisted  so  strongly  on 
the  truth,  beauty,  and  worth  of  the  highest  ideals  of 
religion  as  under  the  inspiration  of  Hegel,  one  of  the 
greatest,  if  not  the  greatest,  of  philosophic  thinkers. 
But  while  we  gladly  admit  and,  indeed,  assert  this, 
and  much  more  than  this,  we  must  sadly  turn  to  our 
own  path  and  take  up  the  burden  of  our  own  work ; 
for  the  idealistic  philosophy  makes  reUgion  to  be 
simply  an  aspect  of  itself,  and  does  not  leave  us  a 
God  into  whose  fellowship  we  may  enter,  in  whose 
service  we  may  find  perfect  freedom.  For  we  can 
come  to  Him,  and  He  can  come  to  us,  only  by  the 
way  of  the  works  He  has  made,  by  the  institutions  He 
has  founded,  and  by  the  ways  of  the  universe  which 
is  His  only  manifestation.  We  need  a  God  who  can 
speak  to  us,  and  if  He  cannot  speak  directly  to  us, 
the  greater  and  better  part,  the  flower  and  fruit  of 
religion  will  wither  and  die. 


IDEALIST  PHILOSOPHY:  ITS  MERITS  AND 
ITS  DEFECTS  ;  THE  CONCEPTION  OF 
GOD  ;  HOW  SHALL  WE  CONCEIVE  THE 
SYNTHETIC  UNITY  OF  GOD,  MAN,  AND 
THE  WORLD?  — THE  KINGDOM  OF  GOD 

Religion  is  possible  only  if  man  feels  that  he  is  re- 
lated to  God.  A  God  above  us,  but  also  a  God  who 
is  within  us,  is  a  perennial  belief  of  man,  common  to 
all  rehgions.  It  has  obtained  the  most  complete  ex- 
pression in  the  highest  religion  known,  Christianity, 
yet  it  has  been  present  in  every  reHgion.  God  as  the 
universal  father  and  all  men  as  His  children,  this  is 
the  expression  of  the  relationship  between  God  and 
man.  It  is  the  general  expression  of  the  relationship 
that  we  take  at  present,  without  entering  on  the  par- 
ticular doctrines  that  articulate  it  into  a  scheme.  Nor 
at  this  stage  do  we  dwell  on  the  proof  of  the  state- 
ment that  this  appears  in  every  religion.  For  this  has 
received  proof  in  almost  every  book  dealing  with  the 
history  of  religions.     We  may  take  it  for  granted  here. 

The  relationship  between  God  and  man,  which  is 
a  postulate  of  the  rehgious  life,  has  found  various 
forms  of  expression,  and  has  demanded  many  means 

293 


294  THEISM 

for  its  satisfaction.     The  need  for  fellowship  is  im- 
perative.    Yet  as  religious  thought  advanced,  and  the 
conception  of  God  advanced  with  the  growth  of  hu- 
man inteUigence  and  character,  the  difficulty  of  fellow- 
ship appeared  to  become  greater  and  greater.     For 
God  seemed  to  become  farther  and  farther  removed 
from  man  in    proportion  as  man  conceived  Him  in 
higher    and   higher   terms.       He   became    in   man's 
conception  of    Him,  the    all-knowing,  almighty,  all- 
present  One,  in  Whom  all  things  lived  and  moved  and 
had  their  being,  and    His    ethical   attributes   became 
more  and  more  distinct  ;  justice,  holiness,  righteous- 
ness, truthfulness,  and  love  came  to  be  predicated  of 
Him,  and  these  conceptions  of  Him  grew  with  the 
religious  experience  of  men,  until  they  found  it  diffi- 
cult to  conceive  the  possibility  of    communion   with 
God.     The  higher  the  conception  of  God,  the  greater 
is  the  difficulty  of  conceiving  the  possibility  of  fellow- 
ship and  communion.     The  heavens  of  heavens  can- 
not contain  Him,  shall  He  indeed  dwell  with  man  on 
the  earth  }    This  is  an  ancient  expression  of  the  diffi- 
culty, and  yet  a  rehgious  solution  of  it  came  to  these 
old  thinkers.     He  whom  the  heaven  of  heavens  could 
not  contain,  became  a  dweller  in  the  human  heart. 
This  solution  was  reached  by  an  ancient  people,  who 
had  somehow  attained  to  the  highest  thought  of  God 
reached    by  the    ancient  world,  who  thought  of  the 
worlds  as  formed  by  the  word  of  God,  Who  spake  and 
it  was  done.  Who  commanded  and  it  stood  fast,  who 


IDEALISTIC  PHILOSOPHY  295 

held  fast  both  to  the  transcendence  of  God,  and  to 
His  dwelling  with  men,  and  His  indwelling  in  them. 
O  God,  thou  art  my  God,  though  at  the  same  time 
the  worshipper  knew  that  God  was  everywhere. 
Communion  with  God  a  necessity  of  the  worshipper, 
though  how  it  was  possible  to  think  out  the  possibihty 
of  such  fellowship  was  not  clear.  In  fact,  these  an- 
cient people  had  the  same  difficulty  which  weighs  on 
us  to-day,  namely,  to  think  of  fellowship  between  an 
eternal,  infinite  being,  and  man  the  creature  of  a  day. 
But  such  a  fellowship  is  necessary  if  reHgious  life  is 
not  to  die.  A  man  must  be  persuaded  that  he  is  near 
to  God,  and  that  God  is  near  to  him.  Men  have  had 
that  persuasion,  and  the  records  of  religious  expe- 
rience tell  us  that  they  have  had  a  conviction  of  fel- 
lowship with  God  of  so  vivid  and  real  a  kind  as  to 
change  their  conduct  and  purify  their  Hfe.  The 
record  of  such  experience  is  so  wide  and  so  common, 
that  it  is  as  well  attested  as  any  experience  can  be. 
There  must  have  been  a  way  whereby  God  could  have 
come  to  man,  for  the  records  prove  the  reality  of 
this  communion. 

Again,  the  religious  life  demands  that  the  living  God, 
with  Whom  man  has  fellowship,  shall  be  no  abstrac- 
tion. Who  has  no  power  or  movement  in  Himself,  with 
no  character  and  no  attributes,  but  a  real  living  power, 
Who  can  be  an  object  to  our  devotion,  our  affection, 
Who  can  call  forth  our  desires  and  reward  them  ;  and 
be  the  theoretical  difficulties  of  construing  such  an  ob- 


296  THEISM 

ject  what  they  may,  man  will  continue  to  act  on  this 
belief.  You  say  that  God  is  not  an  object  among 
other  objects,  but  He  is  the  subject  for  which  all 
objects  are.  Well,  religion,  with  imperturbable  con- 
viction, makes  reply,  and  says,  yes ;  God  is  the 
subject  for  which  all  objects  are,  but  He  is  also  an 
object  for  me  with  whom  I  have  come  into  com- 
munion, and  He  has  spoken  to  me.  Religion  makes 
the  further  request  to  science  and  philosophy,  had 
you  not  better  try  to  conceive  a  kind  of  unity  which 
will  enable  me  to  look  at  all  things  in  God,  and  God 
in  all  things,  and  yet  maintain  that  God  is  something 
for  Himself,  and  something  directly  for  me.?  Have 
you  exhausted  the  possible  kinds  of  unity  1 

Still  more  imperative  becomes  the  need  of  religion, 
when  we  come  face  to  face,  not  merely  with  the  facts 
of  human  weakness  and  finitude,  but  face  to  face 
with  the  awful  fact  of  the  consciousness  of  sin  and 
guilt,  the  most  inexplicable  and  the  saddest  of  human 
experiences,  if  there  is  no  fellowship  with  God.  It 
does  not  help  me  much  to  be  told  that  error  is  only 
one  side  of  truth,  and  is  done  away  with  by  being 
included  in  a  wider  truth,  nor  that  sin  is  merely 
defect,  because,  in  my  consciousness  of  guilt,  there 
is  the  persuasion  that  I  have  broken  that  personal 
bond  which  subsisted  between  the  holy  God  and  me, 
and  I  can  have  no  abiding  peace  till  the  fellowship 
is  restored.  Guilt  arises  from  the  consciousness  of 
kinship  with  God,  and  from  the  feeling  that  I  have 


IDEALISTIC  PHILOSOPHY  297 

proven  untrue  to  that  kinship.  This  is  also  a  uni- 
versal human  experience,  and  must,  therefore,  have 
its  roots  in  reality. 

I  do  not  dwell  further  on  the  demands  which  re- 
ligion makes  on  our  thinking ;  these  are  named  just 
to  show  that  any  philosophical  construction  of  the 
unity  of  things  must  be  widened  in  order  to  do  jus- 
tice to  the  religious  experience  of  man.  It  was  in 
this  relation  that  the  great  system  of  Hegel  came  to 
grief,  broke  up  into  a  right  and  a  left  and  a  centre 
party.  Hegel  did  really  try  to  do  justice  to  the 
religious  experience  of  man.  He  did  believe  that 
his  system  was  theorized  Christianity,  and  he  spoke 
beautifully  of  the  synthetic  unity  which  religion 
brought  to  the  life  of  the  common  man.  His  sys- 
tem did  for  the  thinker  what  religion  had  already 
done  for  the  man  in  the  street.  But  alas!  the  ex- 
perience of  the  common  man  refused  to  be  theorized 
in  the  Hegelian  way.  The  position  set  forth  was 
that  religion  and  philosophy  were  different  in  form, 
but  in  matter  and  aim  they  were  one.  Philosophy 
was  religion  in  the  form  of  thought,  reasoned,  artic- 
ulated, set  forth  in  such  a  way  as  to  be  wholly 
explicated,  and  understood.  ReUgion  is  philosophy 
as  the  Vorstellung,  and  its  truth  is  set  forth  in  in- 
stitutions, customs,  rites,  and  it  is  always  embodied 
in  some  symbolical  way.  The  history  of  rehgions 
is  the  description  of  the  way  in  which  religion  was 
able  to  embody  in  partial  forms,  more  or  less  com- 


298  THEISM 

plete,  the  truth  that  it  was  able  to  grasp.  Finally 
the  absolute  religion  was  reached,  and  Christianity 
was  able  to  grasp  on  its  own  side  and  embody  in  its 
own  way  that  absolute  truth  which  on  its  side  philos- 
ophy, in  the  hands  of  Hegel,  had  also  accompHshed. 
Hegel  set  to  work  on  these  lines,  and  made  a  man- 
ful attempt  to  translate  the  facts  and  doctrines  of 
Christianity  into  the  language  of  the  Hegelian  sys- 
tem. The  Christian  doctrine  of  the  Trinity  became 
the  whole  of  philosophy  and  the  essence  of  religion. 
Thesis,  antithesis,  synthesis,  the  tripartite  movement, 
which  expressed  the  dialectic  evolution  of  the  uni- 
verse, easily  applied  itself  to  the  doctrine  of  Father, 
Son,  and  Spirit,  and  immediately  there  arose  schemes 
which  dealt  with  the  kingdom  of  the  Father,  the 
kingdom  of  the  Son,  and  the  kingdom  of  the  Spirit ; 
for  the  Father  is  God  as  He  exists  in  and  for  Him- 
self, in  eternity,  and  the  Son  is  God  as  He  exists 
as  other,  in  time,  and  the  Spirit  is  the  other  return- 
ing to  oneness,  bearing  with  it  the  reconciliation 
accomplished  in  the  process.  The  Hegelian  dialectic 
movement  entailed  immense  labour  on  its  advocates. 
It  was  necessary  for  them  to  apply  the  dialectic 
movement  to  nature,  to  history,  to  religion,  and  to 
show  that  the  facts  of  nature,  the  world  of  Hfe,  the 
phenomena  of  human  history,  and  the  world  of  re- 
ligion could  be  read  in  that  way.  The  attempt  to  do 
so  led  to  many  luminous  and  instructive  and  sug- 
gestive views  ;  but  the  facts  were  somewhat  stubborn 


IDEALISTIC  PHILOSOPHY  299 

and  refractory,  and  the  Hegelian  philosopher  was 
sometimes  not  well  acquainted  with  science,  or  his- 
tory, or  religion,  and  to  the  reader  of  their  works  the 
facts  and  events  seemed  to  be  on  a  bed  of  Procrustes. 
On  all  sides  there  was  a  revolt  against  this  idealism. 
Men  of  science  neglected  the  theory  and  turned  to 
other  work,  philosophy  also  turned  away,  and  re- 
ligion, in  particular,  found  that  its  most  important 
interests  were  in  danger.  It  was  in  this  relation  that 
the  matter  came  to  a  crisis.  Strauss  applied  the 
Hegehan  method  to  the  facts  on  which  Christianity 
based  her  belief.  No  doubt  Hegel  had  himself  done 
so,  but  cautiously  and  generally ;  but  Strauss,  per- 
suaded at  that  time  of  the  truth  and  adequacy  of  the 
Hegelian  philosophy,  sought  to  translate  the  doc- 
trine of  Christianity  into  Hegelian  formulae.  The 
outcome  of  the  transformation  is  found  in  the  '*  Leben 
Jesu  "  and  in  the  "  Domatik  "  of  Strauss,  which  I  shall 
not  describe,  as  they  are  familiar  to  every  student. 
But  the  publication  of  the  "  Leben  Jesu  "  was  the 
signal  for  the  outburst  of  the  storm,  and  the  signal 
for  the  separation  of  the  Hegehan  school  into  the 
three  parties  of  the  right,  the  centre,  and  the  left. 
A  full  account  of  the  separation  and  its  results  for 
modern  thought  and  life,  will  be  found  in  Siebert's 
*'  Geschichte  de  neueren  Deutschen  Philosophic  seit 
Hegel,"  an  able  and  candid  work.  See  also  Fair- 
bairn's  '*  Christ  in  Modern  Theology." 

My  limits  will  not  permit  me  to  enter  on  the  his- 


300  THEISM 

tory  of  the  modern  tendencies  toward  idealism.  The 
modern  idealists  in  our  country  and  in  yours  agree  in 
saying  that  the  work  has  all  to  be  done  over  again, 
and  with  fuller  knowledge  of  science  in  all  its  depart- 
ments, and  of  the  facts  and  events  of  history,  and  of 
the  meaning  and  worth  of  religion.  To  myself  their 
efforts  have  been  very  significant,  and  they  have  been 
able  to  fertilize  all  modern  inquiry,  and  to  set  every 
problem  in  a  new  light.  There  is  no  sphere  in  which 
their  influence  is  not  to  be  traced.  They  have  helped 
us  to  place  evolution,  which  seems  to  be  in  the  air,  in 
a  light  which  enables  us  to  accept  it  without  accept- 
ing the  evolution  of  something  out  of  nothing.  They 
have  enabled  us  to  look  with  fresh  interest  on  the 
history  of  habits,  customs,  institutions,  from  the 
rudest  to  the  most  complex,  and  they  encourage  us 
to  look  forward  to  a  goal  not  yet  reached,  a  goal 
which  will  conserve  the  gain  won  by  the  toil  of  all 
the  ages.  Why,  then,  not  accept  ideahsm  as  the 
crown  and  the  hope  of  theology  and  philosophy.  In 
some  respects  I  do  accept  it.  I  accept  it  in  so  far 
as  they  tell  me  that  mind  is  first  in  the  universe,  and 
that  the  universe  has  a  meaning.  I  accept  it  when 
they  tell  me  of  experience  and  the  rise  within  experi- 
ence of  the  distinction  of  subject  and  object,  and  of 
the  truth  that  all  objects  are  for  the  subject.  I 
follow  gladly,  as  they  take  this  living,  breathing, 
concrete  self  of  mine,  and  show  me  that  the  analysis 
of   this  real  self  and  of  the  conditions   of  its  life, 


IDEALISTIC  PHILOSOPHY  3OI 

thought,  and  action,  gives,  or  imperatively  demands, 
the  cosmos,  that  is  to  say,  they  show  me  that  my 
experience  is  possible  only  if  I  am  in  a  rational 
world,  to  which  I  am  related,  and  which  is  related  to 
me.  The  world  they  show  me  is  not  a  huge  con- 
temporaneity, but  an  ordered  world,  each  part  related 
to  each,  and  all  bound  together  in  relations  which 
can  be  thought.  I  follow  on  as  they  lead  me  into 
the  ethical  world,  and  watch  with  admiration  their 
theoretical  construction  of  the  possibility  of  moral 
experience,  and  obey  as  they  tell  me  how  the  self  is 
to  be  realized.  Nor  do  I  dissent,  though  I  hesitate, 
as  they  proceed  to  show  that  as  from  the  side  of  the 
finite  self  a  cosmos  is  needed  and  is  given  as  the  pre- 
supposition of  experience,  so  on  the  other  side  a  cos- 
mos demands  a  mind  for  which  it  is.  But  here  I 
falter  and  tread  with  a  hesitating  step.  For  I  look 
at  the  representations  of  the  subject,  for  which  all 
subjects  are,  and  I  do  not  find  that  the  conceptions 
set  forth  by  recent  idealists  meet  the  conditions  of 
the  case. 

To  begin  with  Mr.  Bradley  :  "  The  absolute  has  no 
history  of  its  own,  though  it  contains  histories  with- 
out number.  These,  with  their  tale  of  progress  or 
decline,  are  constructions  starting  from  and  based 
on  some  one  given  piece  of  finitude.  They  are 
but  partial  aspects  in  the  region  of  temporal  ap- 
pearance. Their  truth  and  reality  may  vary  much 
in    extent   and    in   importance,    but    in   the   end   it 


302  THEISM 

can  never  be  more  than  relative."  ("Appearance 
and  Reality,"  p.  499.)  Again,  "  The  absolute  is  not 
personal,  nor  is  it  moral,  nor  is  it  beautiful  or  true." 
(p-  533-)  I^  2.  rather  condescending  tone  he  says: 
*'  Religion  prefers  to  put  forth  statements  which  it 
feels  are  untenable,  and  to  correct  them  at  once  by 
counter-statements,  which  it  finds  are  no  better.  It  is 
then  driven  forwards  and  backwards  between  both, 
like  a  dog  which  seeks  to  follow  two  masters.  A 
discrepancy  worth  our  notice  is  the  position  of  God 
in  the  universe.  We  may  say  that  in  religion  God 
tends  always  to  pass  beyond  Himself.  He  is  neces- 
sarily led  to  end  in  the  absolute,  which  for  religion  is 
not  God."  (p.  466.)  The  climax  of  this  argument  is 
found  in  a  footnote  to  page  450.  It  leads  to  the  di- 
lemma :  "  If  God  is,  I  am  not,  and  if  I  am,  God  is  not. 
We  have  not  reached  a  true  view  until  the  opposite  of 
this  becomes  self-evident.  Then,  without  hesitation,  we 
answer  that  God  is  not  Himself,  unless  I  also  am,  and 
that,  if  God  were  not,  I  certainly  should  be  nothing." 
It  is  somewhat  difficult  to  follow  the  reasoning 
of  Mr.  Bradley,  and  exceedingly  difficult  to  know 
what  God  stands  for  in  the  sentence  we  have  quoted. 
For  him  the  reality  is  experience ;  so  he  calls  it 
frequently.  It  has  no  history,  though  it  contains 
histories  without  number.  Changes  are  ever  going 
on  within  that  "  experience,"  and  yet  that  experience 
knows  no  changes.  But  the  main  difficulty  I  feel  in 
dealing  with  the  ideahstic  solution  in  all  its  forms  is 


IDEALISTIC  PHILOSOPHY  303 

that  the  unity  they  reach  is  a  quantitative  one.  It 
is  so  with  Mr.  Bradley,  it  is  so  with  the  Master  of 
Balliol,  with  Professor  Wallace,  with  Green,  and  with 
all  who  work  under  their  influence.  The  experience 
of  Mr.  Bradley  is  the  union  of  subject  and  object  in 
the  underlying  unity  set  forth  in  the  ''  Gifford  Lec- 
tures "  of  Edward  Caird,  or  it  is  the  all-inclusive 
self-consciousness  of  Green  which  realizes  itself  in 
finite  consciousness.  The  objection  to  all  of  these 
representations  is  just  that  they  are  quantitative,  and 
that  they  cannot  do  justice  to  the  reality  of  finite 
experience. 

To  do  justice  to  the  work  of  Edward  Caird,  we 
quote  the  following  :  "  If,  in  accordance  with  the 
principles  of  Idealism,  we  regard  the  infinite  not  as 
an  abstraction,  but  as  a  self-determining  principle ;  if 
we  follow  out  the  doctrine  of  the  correlation  of  inner 
and  outer  experience,  and  if  we  interpret  that  doctrine 
in  the  light  of  the  idea  of  evolution  and  the  conse- 
quences which  have  been  drawn  from  it,  viz.  that 
nature  comes  to  self-consciousness  in  man,  and  that, 
therefore,  the  process  of  man's  life  is  a  continuation  of 
the  self-revelation  of  the  Absolute  Being  which  begins 
in  nature,  —  it  then  becomes  possible  to  think  of  God 
as  the  principle  of  unity  in  all  things,  and  yet  as  a 
living  God  in  whose  image  man  is  made.  And,  on 
the  same  view,  it  becomes  possible  to  think  of  Man 
as  'a  partaker  in  the  divine  nature,'  and,  therefore, 
as  a  self-conscious  and  self-determining  spirit,  with- 


304  THEISM 

out  gifting  him  with  an  absolute  individuaUty,  which 
would  cut  him  off  from  all  union  and  communion 
with  his  fellow-creatures  and  with  God.  I  do  not 
deny  that  there  are  many  difficulties  in  this  view, 
difficulties  with  which  I  have  not  attempted  to 
deal.  But  it  seems  to  me  this  is  the  only  line  of 
thought  which  makes  it  possible  to  escape  the  oppo- 
site absurdities  of  an  individualism  which  dissolves 
the  unity  of  the  universe  into  atoms,  and  an  abstract 
monism  which  leaves  no  room  for  any  real  individ- 
uality either  in  God  or  in  man ;  not  to  speak  of  the 
still  greater  absurdity  of  holding  botJi  of  these  one- 
sided views  at  once."  ("The  Evolution  of  Religion," 
Vol.  II.,  p.  84.) 

The  problem  is  to  obtain  such  a  conception  of 
God,  the  cosmos,  and  man  as  will  enable  us  to  think 
them  in  their  relations  each  to  each,  the  relative 
reality  of  each,  and  how  to  construe  the  reality  as  a 
unity.  What  kind  of  unity  is  it  to  be  t  For  some 
kind  of  unity  must  be  reached,  or  we  shall  be  driven 
to  despair  of  knowledge  and  of  Hfe.  An  abstract 
unity  is  not  sufficient,  it  dissolves  in  our  hands  on 
a  moment's  serious  examination.  Neither  force, 
energy,  nor  substance  can  stand  the  strain  of  criti- 
cism, for  it  is  impossible  to  get  these  to  move,  or 
to  translate  themselves  into  the  concrete  reality  of 
experience.  Nor  does  any  other  simpUcity  I  have 
been  able  to  meet  in  the  history  of  philosophy  help 
me  to  think  of  the  unity  in  variety  which  makes  up 


IDEALISTIC  PHILOSOPHY  30$ 

the  universe.  A  universal  self-consciousness,  or  the 
unity  of  subject  and  object,  is  no  more  an  adequate 
conception  than  the  persistence  of  force.  Nor  will 
the  experience  of  Mr.  Bradley  meet  the  case.  In 
truth,  we  must  arrive  at  a  conception  which  leaves 
room  for  real  individuality,  that  will  recognize  the 
uniqueness  of  every  person,  and  yet  place  every  per- 
son in  relation  to  every  other  person  and  thing,  that 
is,  has  been,  or  will  be.  It  must  allow  reality  to 
history,  and  permit  a  real  progress  and  real  events 
in  it.  It  must  recognize  human  activity  as  a  fac- 
tor in  the  world's  history,  and  recognize  somehow 
that  good  and  evil,  happiness  and  misery,  righteous- 
ness and  sin,  are  not  appearance,  but  stern  realities 
which  philosophy  and  theology  must  deal  with.  The 
cosmos  is  not  appearance,  man  is  real,  and  God  is  no 
abstraction. 

The  great  question  of  theism  to-day  is  not  con- 
tained in  a  discussion  of  the  various  proofs  elabo- 
rated by  the  diligence  of  former  thinkers,  nor  in  the 
criticism  of  these,  which  is  so  commonplace  ever 
since  the  epoch-making  work  of  Kant.  The  proofs 
and  the  criticism  can  be  found  in  many  vokunes, 
and  on  both  not  much  that  is  new  or  profitable  can 
now  be  said.  The  problem  to-day  is  to  reach  or  find 
a  conception  of  God  adequate  to  the  wider  know- 
ledge placed  within  the  grasp  of  man  in  the  present 
age.  If  we  obtain  such  a  conception,  how  shall  we 
define  the  relation  of  God  to  the  world,  and  to  man  ? 

X 


306  THEISM 

Negatively,  we  may  say  that  a  solution  which  in  any 
way  makes  the  world  to  be  the  other  of  God,  or 
which  makes  the  world  to  be  the  evolution  of  the 
divine  life,  or  makes  God  and  the  world  to  be  aspects 
of  one  reality,  will  not  suffice.  For  any  solution  that 
will  satisfy  the  speculative  and  the  practical  inter- 
ests of  man,  and  meet  his  moral  and  religious  needs, 
must  recognize  the  freedom,  the  worth,  and  the  inde- 
pendence of  God.  Any  solution  that  falls  short  of 
that  or  confuses  it  must  be  rejected ;  and  even  if  we 
can  find  no  solution,  we  must  hold  fast  to  the  belief 
that  a  solution  is  possible,  though  we  may  not  be 
able  to  find  it.  Any  solution  that  makes  it  impos- 
sible for  man  to  draw  near  to  God,  or  for  God  to 
draw  near  to  man,  refuses  to  recognize  patent  facts 
of  experience,  and  must  be  rejected  as  inadequate. 
The  ideahstic  solution  may  be  accepted  as  an  ele- 
ment in  the  case,  but  it  must  be  supplemented.  We 
may  say  that  for  God  the  world  is,  and  add  that  God 
is  not  the  world.  We  say  that  in  God  all  things  and 
persons  live,  and  move,  and  have  their  being,  and 
yet  maintain  the  richness,  the  fulness  of  the  divine 
life  apart  from  the  world.  In  fact,  we  must  do  so,  if 
we  are  to  do  justice  to  all  the  elements  involved  in 
the  case. 

Thus  we  approach  the  question,  not  by  the  process 
which  gives  us  such  terms  as  being,  substance,  the 
unknowable,  the  unconditioned,  the  absolute,  which 
are   terms   so   familiar   to   readers   of    metaphysical 


IDEALISTIC  PHILOSOPHY  307 

discussions,  and  lead  to  no  result.  For  to  us  in  the 
very  nature  of  the  case  all  being  is  determinate 
being.  It  is  characterized  so  and  so,  and  every 
predicate  is  a  definition  of  being.  To  speak  of  the 
absolute  and  unconditioned  as  synonymous  with  God, 
is  simply  to  alter  the  conception  of  God.  For  God 
exists  as  a  determinate  Being,  and  His  attributes  are 
simply  expressive  of  the  determinate  Being  that  He 
is.  If  we  take  the  religious  consciousness  as  our 
guide  and  as  our  means  of  interpretation,  and  take  it 
in  its  highest  reach  as  given  in  the  New  Testament, 
then  we  shall  no  longer  speak  of  God  as  absolute, 
and  so  on,  but  we  shall  borrow  the  grand  words, 
God  is  spirit,  God  is  life,  God  is  love.  In  other 
words  we  shall  think  of  God  as  a  determinate  Being 
existing  in  relations,  and  these  relations  are  abiding 
distinctions  within  the  circle  of  the  divine  life.  God 
is  not  an  abstract  unity,  nor  an  absolute  and  inclusive 
self-consciousness,  God  is  a  living,  concrete,  complex 
Being,  and  in  the  Godhead  there  are  relations  and 
activities  always  in  relations  and  always  in  action. 
The  relations  within  the  Godhead  come  to  our  help 
and  rescue  us  from  the  paralysis  of  thought  wrought 
by  the  abstractions  of  metaphysics,  and  we  are  not 
compelled  to  think  in  terms  of  an  abstract  order, 
nor  driven  to  the  necessity  of  deriving  a  manifold 
universe  from  a  simpUcity  in  which  there  are  no 
relations. 

In  the  Godhead,  then,  we  already  have  a  kind  of 


3o8  THEISM 

unity  which  does  full  justice  to  all  the  facts;  it  con- 
serves the  unity  and  makes  room  for  all  the  inter- 
relations in  which  the  Godhead  consists.  The  God- 
head is  not  abstract  identity ;  infinite  differences  are 
within  God,  and  infinite  manifoldness  are  embraced 
within  one  unity.  The  relations  become  more  appre- 
hensible to  us  when  they  are  looked  at  from  the 
ethical  side.  Then  they  become  vivid,  real,  and 
intelligible.  The  ethical  terms  in  which  we  set  forth 
these  determinations  of  the  divine  are  Father,  Son, 
and  Spirit.  Before  fatherhood  and  sonship  had  any 
existence  among  men  the  fact  in  all  its  glory,  in  all 
its  fulness,  in  all  its  meaning,  was  in  eternal  existence, 
and  love  has  always  been,  for  it  has  its  native  home 
in  God.     God  is  the  eternal  actuality  of  love. 

Thus  in  the  very  conception  of  the  Godhead  as 
given  us  in  the  highest  expression  of  the  religious 
consciousness,  we  find  a  type  of  unity  such  as  we 
have  been  in  search  of.  Infinite  differences  held 
together  in  living  relation,  the  self-surrender  of  one 
to  another,  measureless  love  abiding  in  all  the  move- 
ments within  the  divine  Hfe,  and  endless  oppor- 
tunities of  self-communication.  It  may  be  possible 
to  call  this  "  experience,"  to  use  the  words  of  Mr. 
Bradley,  but  it  is  no  lonely  experience  of  one  in  mere 
relation  with  a  world,  it  is  already  and  has  always 
been  a  social  experience.  In  the  divine  life  as  it 
is  disclosed  to  us,  or  as  it  is  set  forth  in  the  highest 
form  of  the  religious  consciousness,  we  have,  not  a 


IDEALISTIC  PHILOSOPHY  309 

simple  type,  but  a  manifold  in  unity,  not  an  absolute, 
unlimited,  but  a  determinate  being  existing  in  rela- 
tions, and  in  reciprocal  relation  of  intelligent,  rational, 
and  spiritual  movement.  Not  in  quantitative  sim- 
plicity nor  in  metaphysical  abstraction  are  we  to 
think  of  the  Godhead,  but  the  highest  conception  we 
can  form  is  that  of  love  unbeginning,  unending,  love 
at  its  highest  ideal.  Such  a  conception  helps  us  to 
make  intelligible  the  train  of  thought  contained  in 
the  passage  quoted  from  the  Master  of  Balliol  on  a 
former  page.  It  makes  it  possible  to  think  of  "  God 
as  the  principle  of  unity  in  all  things,  and  yet  as  a 
living  God  in  whose  image  man  is  made." 

We  may  invert  the  sentence  of  Mr.  Bradley  and 
say  that  the  absolute,  if  we  may  call  God  by  that 
name,  is  personal,  is  moral,  is  beautiful,  is  good,  is 
true.  It  would  indeed  be  difficult  to  make  these  or 
any  other  propositions  of  the  absolute  as  the  abso- 
lute is  construed  by  him.  For  in  that  experience 
which  has  no  history,  though  it  contains  all  histories 
in  it,  there  can  be  no  reciprocity,  no  communion,  no 
love.  Indeed,  the  descriptions  of  the  absolute,  con- 
tained in  the  book  of  Mr.  Bradley,  are  mainly  nega- 
tive. Almost  every  proposition  is  negatived  by  some 
other  proposition.  But  on  the  view  stated  above,  it 
is  possible  to  find  our  highest  and  our  best  realized 
without  imperfection  and  without  any  drawback. 
In  the  divine  life  our  ideals  are  already  realized, 
whatever    these    ideals    may   be.     Every   power   of 


310  THEISM 

man,  every  faculty,  every  ethical  virtue,  every  spirit- 
ual quality,  has  its  ideal;  our  imperfect  knowledge 
has  perfect  knowledge  as  its  ideal ;  reason  as  insight 
and  as  power  leads  on  to  perfect  reason  as  its  ideal ; 
Fatherhood  and  sonship,  imperfectly  realized  here, 
have  always  been  in  their  perfect  form.  The  in- 
finite is  the  realized  ideal  of  the  finite  forms  which 
our  ideals  take.  In  the  Christian  conception  of  the 
Godhead,  we  have  the  joy  of  recognizing  the  realiza- 
tion of  the  ideals  which  haunt  us  with  their  shadowy 
forms  as  the  perfection  of  what  we  know  and  ex- 
perience here.  Whatever  personal  life  foreshadows, 
whatever  social  relations  may  indicate  as  to  their 
perfect  form,  all  beauty,  all  righteousness,  all  truth, 
have  their  home  and  their  perfection  in  God. 

But  what  of  the  cosmos,  and  what  of  man }  In 
connection  with  the  Christian  conception  of  God  how 
are  we  to  think  of  a  material  world,  and  of  the  pos- 
sibility of  individual  selves  living  together  in  one 
cosmos  }  How  can  we  think  the  cosmos  along  with 
the  Christian  conception  of  God  1  Are  we  to  think 
the  cosmos  as  the  other  of  God  .'*  Idealism  says  we 
must  so  think  if  we  are  to  think  at  all.  Such  a 
necessity  of  thought  lies  on  all  who  lead  up  to  a 
universal  self-consciousness,  or  to  any  representation 
which  leaves  God  without  an  other.  From  that 
point  of  view  an  other  is  imperatively  needed,  the 
universal  subject  must  have  an  object;  without  an 
object  it  could  not  realize  itself.     But  the  Christian 


IDEALISTIC  PHILOSOPHY  3II 

conception  postulates  otherness  in  the  very  divine 
life,  and  in  that  determinate  Being,  who  we  rever- 
ently name  God,  there  is  the  otherness  which  is 
the  actualization  of  all  possibilities  of  perfection. 
For  the  Christian  conception  the  stress  is  laid  on 
another  side,  and  the  solution  of  the  problem  takes 
another  form.  We  do  not  try  to  find  God  from  the 
world  merely,  or  to  argue  from  the  articulated  system 
to  the  thought  which  makes  it  a  system,  though  that 
way  is  open  to  us  too,  nor  do  we  merely  look  for  a 
subject  for  which  all  objects  are,  for  we  have  recog- 
nized in  the  manifoldness  of  the  Divine,  character- 
istics which  lay  no  imperative  of  thought  on  us  why 
we  should  demand  a  datum  objective  to  God.  God 
is ;  and  ideals  are  realized  in  the  Godhead,  and  would 
be  so  if  there  were  no  cosmos. 

If  so,  why  should  there  be  a  cosmos .''  Perhaps 
we  cannot  say.  But  this  may  be  said,  that  we  must 
find  a  reason  in  some  other  direction  than  that  which 
makes  a  cosmos  necessary  for  the  realization  of  God. 
May  we  not  find  a  sufficient  reason  for  the  existence 
of  a  world  in  the  ethical  character  of  God  .?  Suppose 
we  take  the  great  word  "  God  is  love,"  and  take  it 
as  the  essential  meaning  of  God,  may  we  not  find 
in  it  the  explanation  of  the  cosmos  and  of  man .? 
Love  is  transitive,  passes  out  beyond  itself,  gives 
itself  to  its  object,  and  strives  to  make  that  object 
blessed.  Eternal  love  had  its  home  in  God,  but 
love  abounds  more  and  more ;  may  we  not  conceive 


312  THEISM 

this  love  as  the  creative  impulse  to  the  making  of 
a  cosmos  ?  Love  can  be  satisfied  only  by  giving, 
may  it  not  explain,  or  make  conceivable  to  us,  a 
noble  necessity  that  led  to  the  making  of  a  world? 
To  us  there  is  a  necessity  which  is  the  meaning  of 
freedom,  we  speak  it  every  time  we  use  the  word 
"ought."  There  is  a  service  which  is  perfect  free- 
dom. We  may  say  in  a  higher  sphere  that  there 
was  an  ethical  necessity  for  creation  on  the  part  of 
God  to  satisfy  His  need  of  loving  and  of  communi- 
cating Himself  to  the  beings  who  could  receive 
Him.  "  Creation  is  due  to  the  moral  perfection  of 
the  Creator,  who  is  so  essentially  love  that  He  could 
not  but  create  a  world  that  He  might  create  beati- 
tude."    (Fairbairn's  '*  Christ  in  Modern  Theology," 

P-4I3-) 

Looking  at  the  cosmos  as  the  outcome  of  the 
creative  love  of  God,  just  as  we  looked  at  the  God- 
head as  the  synthesis  of  transcendence  and  imma- 
nence, how  are  we  to  think  the  relation  of  God  to 
the  world  t  Has  there  ever  been  a  deeper,  truer  word 
spoken  on  this  than  the  ancient  word,  "  He  spake 
and  it  was  done,  He  commanded  and  it  stood  fast "  } 
In  our  measure  we  also  have  an  activity  that  makes 
things  to  be  which  once  were  not.  All  around  us 
are  the  works  of  man.  At  his  command  cities, 
states,  empires,  poems,  histories,  philosophies,  arise, 
and  man's  activity  under  conditions  and  under  limi- 
tations may  enable  us  to  think  of  an  activity  through 


IDEALISTIC  PHILOSOPHY  313 

the  exercise  of  which  the  cosmos  may  have  arisen. 
In  the  service  of  love,  the  power,  wisdom  of  God, 
set  to  work  and  the  cosmos  began  to  be  made.  The 
material  world  is  for  us  a  means  of  effecting  our 
purpose  and  realizing  our  aim.  But  before  we  can 
use  it  we  must  understand  its  nature,  its  law,  and 
its  method  of  working.  But  its  nature,  law,  and 
method  of  working  is  on  the  other  side  a  revelation 
to  us  of  a  mode  of  thought  higher  than  our  thought, 
and  of  a  purpose  greater  than  we  have  yet  learned 
to  know.  May  not  nature  be  simply  a  mode  of 
communion  between  beings  who  can  think,  reason, 
and  feel }  The  story  of  nature  is  a  story  that  we 
are  learning  to  read  more  clearly  as  the  years  pass 
on,  and  every  new  page  which  we  slowly  spell  out 
is  a  fresh  testimony  to  the  depth  and  breadth  of  the 
thought  that  is  embodied  in  the  universe.  I  have 
said  something  of  the  wondrous  story  in  former  lec- 
tures, here  I  lay  stress  on  the  conception  that  what 
we  call  the  material  world  is,  after  all,  only  a  system 
of  embodied  thought,  a  language  conveying  a  mean- 
ing which  may  be  understood,  and  is  so  far  under- 
stood. May  not  this  material  universe  be  simply  a 
vehicle  for  the  expression  of  a  divine  meaning,  and 
may  not  it  be  there  for  a  purpose  beyond  itself } 

One  thing  we  know,  that  the  material  universe 
is  there  for  the  expression  of  our  meaning,  and  it 
will  take  up  what  we  mean,  preserve  it  for  a  millen- 
nium or  two,  and  the  record  can  be  read  by  those 


314  THEISM 

who  can  wrest  the  secret  from  it.  The  bricks  of 
Babylon,  the  pyramids  and  the  papyri  of  Egypt, 
and  remains  of  antiquity  from  many  countries  and 
ages,  have  lent  themselves  first  to  take  the  meanings 
read  into  them,  have  kept  that  meaning,  and  have 
yielded  up  that  meaning  to  the  judicious  questioning 
of  the  men  of  this  century.  If  matter  can  thus 
serve  intellectual  and  moral  ends  impressed  on  them 
by  finite  intelHgence,  what  is  to  hinder  us  from 
thinking  that  in  its  very  nature  and  in  all  the  history 
of  its  movement,  it  is  intended  to  convey  to  finite 
thinkers  a  meaning  put  into  it  by  a  Thinker  and  a 
Maker  who  is  the  source  of  it  and  of  them  }  Science 
is  just  the  meaning  which  man  has  found  in  nature, 
and  it  presupposes  that  there  is  such  a  meaning. 
The  world  of  nature  is  a  determinate  world,  existing 
not  in  vague  possibility,  but  constituted  so  and  so, 
in  definite  relations,  and  in  defined  modes  of  action 
which  we  call  laws ;  that  is,  it  has  a  meaning. 

Out  of  infinitely  possible  worlds  there  is  this 
actual  world  in  which  we  are,  and  the  nature  and 
history  and  evolution  of  it  are  all  definite  and  in- 
telligible. What  is  that  but  to  say  that  the  Maker 
of  the  world  proceeded  in  the  making  of  the  world 
as  if  He  had  the  aim  of  enabling  intelHgent  beings 
of  a  finite  order  so  far  to  read  and  understand  the 
method  of  His  working.  He  bound  Himself,  having 
begun  to  make  a  world,  to  proceed  on  the  lines 
which  He   first  laid   down,  and   to  make  each  step 


IDEALISTIC  PHILOSOPHY  315 

presuppose  what  had  gone  before,  and  make  the 
next  step  a  consequence  of  all  that  had  been  accom- 
plished. Permanence  and  progression  are  notes  of 
the  history  of  this  universe,  and  the  method  of  evolu- 
tion has  established  this  conclnsion  on  a  firmer  basis 
than  ever.  From  the  point  of  view  of  Christian 
Theism  nature  is  the  middle  term  between  God  and 
man,  an  instrument  in  the  hand  of  both  for  com- 
munion and  knowledge.  May  we  ask  what  is  the 
relation  of  God  to  the  material  universe }  Can  we 
find  an  answer  1  We  have  already  expressed  our 
dissatisfaction  with  the  idealistic  answer,  may  we 
keep  what  they  have  gained,  and  still  have  an  an- 
swer of  our  own  .''  They  have  helped  us  to  conceive 
the  real  as  rational,  and  to  think  of  the  world  as  a 
rational  world.  Is  not  the  rationality  of  the  world 
conserved  when  we  regard  it  as  the  embodiment  of 
a  divine  thought,  the  fulfilment  of  a  divine  purpose, 
even  though  we  refuse  to  regard  it  as  the  other  of 
God,  or  as  necessary  to  the  realization  of  God  }  We 
may  go  still  farther  and  say  that  God  is  immanent 
in  the  material  universe  so  far  as  that  universe  is 
able  to  receive  Him.  He  is  present  in  the  atoms  of 
matter  as  the  power  which  holds  them  in  being,  He 
is  present  in  the  chemical  world  as  the  power  that 
shapes  the  laws  of  its  working,  present  in  the  world 
of  life  as  the  sustaining  power  that  upholds  and 
guides  them  onward  and  upward.  He  is  the  God 
who  ever   strives  to   communicate    Himself   to    His 


3l6  THEISM 

creation,  and  to  make  a  creation  which  can  receive 
His  self-communication. 

The  making  of  a  world  which  can  receive  the 
fulness  of  God  is  a  long,  slow,  and  painful  process. 
The  process  is  not  yet  complete.  We  may,  however, 
see  something  of  the  divine  patience  and  love  that 
has  toiled  at  the  making  of  such  a  world.  We  see 
that  it  is  a  work  of  patient  and  infinite  toil,  and  we 
set  aside  the  notion  of  a  fiat  as  altogether  unsuitable 
to  the  making  of  an  ethical  world.  Such  a  world 
cannot  be  so  made,  for  it  can  be  made  only  by  its 
own  cooperation.  Even  in  the  lowest  reach  of  life 
living  things  move,  act,  grow,  only  by  their  own 
exertions,  and  every  quality  they  possess  must,  if  not 
acquired,  at  least  be  used  by  them.  The  upward 
striving  of  life  is  the  commonplace  of  evolution. 
Though  this  may  be  stated  in  terms  that  are  merely 
mechanical,  and  may  be  reduced  to  terms  of  an 
abstract  struggle,  yet  it  is  true  that  life  makes 
progress  only  by  effort,  and  living  beings  can  main- 
tain themselves  and  make  progress  only  by  sustained 
and  well-directed  effort.  They  have  to  help  to  make 
themselves.  If  this  be  true  of  all  life,  even  of  life 
which  is  guided  by  pressure,  and  not  by  foreseen 
ends,  how  much  more  true  is  it  of  life  self-conscious, 
rational,  and  ethical,  life  which  is  ruled  by  ideals 
presented  as  motives  and  acted  on  for  the  accom- 
plishment of  foreseen  ends.  Emphatically  here  is  a 
life   that   cannot  be   made   by   mere   power,    or   by 


IDEALISTIC  PHILOSOPHY  317 

pressure,  or  by  instinct,  or  by  the  exercise  of 
terror  or  fear.  It  must  be  won  by  rational  motives 
and  ideal  ends  set  forth  in  such  a  way  as  win  the 
desires  and  inform  the  motives,  and  to  persuade  the 
conscious  being  that  this  is  the  ideal  which  he  is 
bound  to  realize. 

If  a  world  is  to  be  made  in  this  way,  — and  it  is  the 
only  way  in  which  such  a  world  can  be  made,  —  clearly 
it  is  a  process  that  must  be  slow.  The  education  of 
the  human  race  has  been  slow,  painful,  and  laborious, 
but  there  has  been  an  education  of  the  human  race. 
Progress  has  been  made,  ideals  have  been  formed, 
and  men  have  been  trained  to  understand  and  love 
these  ideals.  It  has  been  a  real  history  to  which  all 
the  races  have  made  their  contribution,  and  the  end 
is  not  yet.  It  is  a  history  from  which  we  have  yet 
much  to  learn,  and  when  we  read  it,  we  ought  to  take 
heed  lest  we  bring  it  down  to  the  level  of  our  own 
ideahsm,  and  reduce  it  to  a  formula  of  our  own. 
Idealism  has  manifested  that  tendency  many  a  time, 
notably  in  the  case  of  Strauss  and  Green.  But  the 
trend  of  history  is  the  exhibition  of  a  larger  idealism 
than  ours,  it  is  the  idealism  of  God,  worked  out  in 
the  making  of  a  world,  to  which  He  can  communicate 
Himself.  As  the  world  of  nature  is  larger  than  our 
science,  and  is  the  most  constant  and  stringent  critic 
of  our  science,  so  is  history  the  greatest  critic  of  our 
theories.  On  all  sides  nature  and  history  remind  us 
that  we  do  not  rule  even  this  planet,  and  that  there 


3l8  THEISM 

are  larger  meanings  in  the  world  than  we  have  yet 
seen. 

But  we  have  read  the  story  so  far  as  to  get  a 
glimpse  of  the  larger  meaning.  If  we  read  it  as  the 
story  of  the  making  of  a  world  which  is  to  have  a 
diviner  issue  than  is  yet  seen,  may  we  not  hope  that 
the  apparent  failures,  the  woes,  the  miseries,  the 
mistakes,  and  the  evil  that  stand  written  in  lurid 
colours  all  over  the  pages  of  history  may  have  a 
meaning.?  At  all  events,  the  making  of  an  ethical 
and  spiritual  world,  in  which  ethical  ideals  will  be 
universally  acted  on,  is  a  stupendous  task.  As  I 
glance  at  the  histories,  philosophies,  and  religions 
of  the  world,  I  must  say  that  I  have  not  found  much 
light  cast  on  the  awfulness  of  human  history  by  any 
one  of  them,  one  only  excepted.  Not  much  help 
can  be  had  from  a  philosophy  which  minimizes  the 
sin  and  misery  of  the  world,  nor  from  one  that  ex- 
aggerates these  until  the  other  side  is  lost  sight  of 
altogether.  But  in  one  place  and  among  a  certain 
people  there  arose  a  way  of  thinking  of  man  and 
his  history  and  destiny  which  relieves  the  darkness 
of  the  outlook,  and  that  without  doing  violence  to 
the  facts  whether  these  are  optimistic  or  pessimistic. 
That  view  teaches  me  to  look  at  the  world  of  nature 
and  of  man  as  the  work  of  God,  and  it  represents 
God  as  a  living  God,  of  Whom,  to  Whom,  and 
through  Whom  are  all  things,  and  it  represents  God 
as   not  indifferent  to   the  world   of   men.     But   the 


IDEALISTIC  PHILOSOPHY  319 

main  thing  at  present  for  us  is,  that  this  God  is 
represented  as  working  and  toiling  through  the  ages 
in  order  to  make  man,  and  to  raise  man  to  that 
divine  ideal  formed  for  each  man  and  for  all  men  in 
the  kingdom  of  God. 

We  are  coming  to  understand  that  wondrous 
story,  and  the  light  which  it  casts  on  the  character 
of  God  and  the  course  of  history.  A  living  God 
striving  to  persuade  an  intelligent,  rational  creature 
to  whom  freedom  has  been  given,  of  the  kind  of  life 
he  ought  to  live,  and  of  the  aims  he  ought  to  have,  and 
to  win  him  to  surrender  himself  to  the  higher  guid- 
ance, and  to  realize  the  chief  end  of  his  being.  That  is 
the  vision  disclosed  to  us  in  that  literature.  It  is  a 
story  of  the  mistakes  which  man  has  made,  a  story 
of  the  way  in  which  he  has  perpetually  chosen  lower 
ideals  and  has  striven  to  realize  them.  A  story  on 
man's  side  of  baffled  aims  and  thwarted  desires,  of 
defeat  and  misery  because  he  had  made  mistakes, 
and  on  the  side  of  God,  a  constant,  patient  love,  striv- 
ing to  raise  man  to  the  recognition  of  the  higher 
ideals  and  of  the  life  which  a  man  ought  to  live.  God 
bearing  with  men,  striving,  toiling,  working,  loving, 
shall  I  not  say  suffering  }  in  order  to  make  men  who 
might  receive  Him,  and  striving  to  satisfy  His  desire  to 
love  and  impart  Himself  to  a  people  who  could  receive 
Him.  So  the  course  of  history  may  be  read,  as  the 
striving  of  God  to  educate  men,  and  to  raise  them 
to  the  recognition  of  that  ideal  He  has  formed  for 


320  THEISM 

man.  May  we  not  thus  read  the  discipline  of  law, 
the  connection  between  wrong-doing  and  misery,  the 
pain  of  thwarted  desire,  and  the  pang  of  deferred 
hope  ?  All  these  and  the  other  phenomena  of  human 
life  and  history  become  luminous  when  read  in  the 
light  of  the  purpose  of  God  to  make  a  kingdom 
of  finite  spirits  to  whom  He  could  communicate 
Himself,  and  to  whom  He  might  give  blessedness 
unspeakable. 

This  ethical  world  is  making,  it  is  not  yet  made. 
It  is  being  made  now  by  all  the  agencies  at  work  in 
the  world  we  know,  and  in  the  making  of  it  a 
mother's  love,  a  father's  care,  the  answering  love  of 
children,  the  pity  and  piety  that  are  in  the  world, 
loyalty  to  ideals,  devotion  to  duty,  the  grandeur  of 
science,  the  splendour  of  philosophy,  the  vision  of 
beauty  realized  in  art  and  poetry,  the  might  of  re- 
ligion, and  the  magnificence  of  Christian  effort  are 
factors  in  the  hand  of  God  for  the  making  of  that 
kingdom  of  God  which  is  to  crown  the  cosmos  and 
justify  the  toil  of  the  ages.  Unless  we  can  have  such 
a  hope  as  the  outcome  of  all  the  travail  of  the  ages 
human  effort  would  be  paralyzed.  Even  with  that 
hope  clouds  and  darkness  remain,  and  the  difficulty 
of  a  speculative  adjustment  of  all  elements  abide. 
That  is  simply  to  say  that  we  are  finite,  and  cannot 
look  at  all  things  from  the  centre. 

At  the  same  time,  it  is  to  be  observed  that  the 
world  to  which  the  present  state  leads  is  a  world  of 


IDEALISTIC  PHILOSOPHY  321 

persons,  intelligent,  self-conscious,  ethical,  spiritual, 
and  the   unity  of    such  a  world    presupposes  a  plu- 
rality   of    such    persons,   bound    together   by   bonds 
which  are  not  quantitative,  but  ethical  and  spiritual. 
The  bond  is  constituted  freely  through  self-surrender, 
and  the  recognition  of  the  bond  of  service  is  the  way 
of  self-realization.     In  any  ultimate  unity  there  must 
be  a  recognition  of    the  worth  of  each  person,  and 
each  person  must  be  conceived  as  ready  to  see  that 
for   the   realization  of   his    personality  the  whole  is 
needed.     "  Be  a  person  and  recognize  others  as  per- 
sons," it  seems  to  me  that  no  scheme  of  monism  can 
give  a  real  meaning  to  this  ethical  precept.     We  are 
in  search  of  a  unity,  and  the  unity  we  require  is  of 
the  most  complex   kind.     For  it  must  include  in  it 
God,  man,  and   the  world.     No   unity    of   the   kind 
proposed  by  monism  meets  the  necessity  of  the  case. 
In  fact,  monism  does  injustice  to  the  conception  of 
God,  for  it  makes  Him  to  be  nothing  for  Himself,  it 
destroys  the  reality  of   finite   life,  and  leaves  it  no 
room  for  self-development    and    self-surrender   to    a 
higher,  and  it  makes  the  cosmos  to  be  really  acosmic. 
We  must  widen  the  meaning  of  unity,  and  follow  on 
from  the  unity  of  abstract  identity  to  the  wider  unity 
which  meets  us  in  scientific  investigations,  up  to  the 
unity  of   self-conscious  life,  up  to  the  higher   unity 
of  many  self-conscious  lives  in  an  organism  which  is 
spiritually  held  together,  not  by  physical  bonds  in  any 
way,  but  none  the  less  held  together  in  a  real  unity. 

Y 


322  THEISM 

The  history  of  the  universe  must  be  construed  as 
a  real  history,  and  the  events  in  it  must  have  real 
validity.  How  shall  this  be  accomplished?  It  seems 
to  me  that  it  has  so  far  been  accomplished  by  the 
recognition  of  the  unity  of  many  persons  in  a  social 
unity.  There  is,  if  anywhere,  the  type  of  unity  of 
which  we  are  in  search.  A  social  unity  constituted 
by  God,  to  God,  and  for  God,  in  which  a  finite  world 
can  come  to  its  ideal  in  God,  and  be  a  world  to  which 
God  can  communicate  Himself,  and  in  which  the 
world  will  gladly  surrender  itself  to  God,  this  is  the 
unity  we  need,  and  we  have  it  in  the  kingdom  of 
God.  But  can  we  have  such  a  unity  of  God,  man, 
and  the  world  ">  Not  if  we  make  it  a  quantitative  one. 
To  such  a  unity  Strauss's  objection  would  be  fatal. 
"  If  reality  is  ascribed  to  the  idea  of  the  divine  and 
human  natures,  is  this  equivalent  to  the  admission  that 
this  unity  must  have  actually  been  once  manifested, 
as  it  never  had  been,  and  never  more  will  be,  in  one 
individual.'^  This  is,  indeed,  not  the  mode  in  which 
the  Idea  realizes  itself ;  it  is  not  wont  to  lavish  all 
its  fulness  on  one  exemplar,  and  be  niggardly  to  all 
others  —  to  express  itself  fully  in  that  one  individual, 
and  imperfectly  in  all  the  rest ;  it  rather  loves  to 
distribute  its  riches  among  a  multiplicity  of  exemplars 
which  reciprocally  complete  each  other — in  the  alter- 
nate appearance  and  suppression  of  a  series  of  indi- 
viduals." (Strauss's  "  Life  of  Jesus,"  George  Eliot's 
*' Translation,"  pp.  779-80.) 


IDEALISTIC  PHILOSOPHY  323 

The  objection  reveals  the  character  of  the  unity 
which  is  in  his  mind.  It  is  simply  a  quantitative 
unity,  and  the  riches  of  the  idea  are  of  a  quantitative 
kind.  Now  there  is  a  kind  of  wealth  which  is 
quantitative.  If  you  have  it,  I  have  it  not.  If  it 
is  yours,  it  is  not  mine.  This  kind  of  wealth  has 
nothing  personal  or  distinctive  about  it,  and  it  is 
equally  at  home  in  every  pocket.  There  is  another 
kind  of  wealth  which  is  kept  by  giving  it  away. 
Intellectual  wealth,  moral  wealth,  spiritual  wealth,  is 
increased  by  imparting  it  to  others.  If  the  wealth 
of  the  idea  could  be  lavished  on  one  exemplar,  that 
would  be  the  shortest  and  surest  way  of  enriching 
all  the  individuals  in  the  world.  It  enriches  me  to 
think  of  Sir  Isaac  Newton,  and  the  wealth  of  the 
"  Principia "  is  mine  when  I  can  receive  it.  The 
thoughts  of  Plato  and  Aristotle,  the  poetry  of  Homer 
and  Dante,  the  achievements  of  any  man,  the  meas- 
ure of  perfection  maintained  by  any  man,  —  these  are 
not  an  impoverishment  of  me,  but  a  way  of  enrich- 
ing me.  The  wealth  of  human  thought,  the  great- 
ness of  human  achievement,  the  grandeur  of  moral 
life  realized  in  any  life,  are  mine,  if  I  can  take  them. 
And  if  I  take  them  I  do  not  make  any  man  the 
poorer.  Suppose  all  perfections  realized  in  one  man, 
suppose  the  wealth  of  the  idea  to  be  fully  realized  in 
one  individual,  then  that  would  be  a  way  of  revealing 
to  all  men  the  greatness  of  humanity,  and  of  inspir- 
ing them  to  follow  and  to  imitate.     The  fulness  of 


324  THEISM 

realized  and  manifested  human  life  is  the  heritage  of 
man,  and  it  is  of  a  kind  to  which  the  measure  of 
quantity  does  not  apply.  Think  of  what  Washington 
and  Lincoln  have  been  to  this  great  land,  and  to  the 
people  in  it. 

Moral,  intellectual,  and  spiritual  wealth  are  qualita- 
tive, not  quantitative.  The  criticism  of  Strauss  be- 
comes inept  as  soon  as  this  is  seen.  The  relations 
in  the  kingdom  of  God  are  qualitative,  not  quantitative. 
What  is  given  and  taken  in  that  kingdom  grows  with 
the  giving  and  taking,  just  as  the  intellectual,  moral, 
and  spiritual  wealth  of  humanity  increases  from  age 
to  age ;  but  the  growth  of  such  wealth  here  is  but 
a  shadow  of  the  growth  of  that  wealth  in  the  per- 
fected kingdom  of  God.  God  can  give  Himself  in 
love,  grace,  and  truth,  and  the  giving  does  not  lessen 
the  fulness  of  God.  Man  can  surrender  himself  to 
God,  and  in  that  surrender  find  perfect  freedom  and 
fulness  of  being.  We  have  exemplars  of  that  fact 
in  human  life  here,  and  we  can  see  it  realized  in  part 
in  the  family,  the  state,  and  the  church.  Of  course 
neither  the  person  who  surrenders  himself  nor  the 
object  to  whom  he  surrenders  himself  is  perfect,  and 
the  full  ethical  meaning  of  such  a  relationship  is  not 
disclosed  here  and  now.  But  it  is  so  far  disclosed  as 
to  reveal  to  us  the  ideal  of  such  a  relationship  under 
other  conditions.  Nay,  there  is  one  phase  of  such  a 
possibility  set  forth  even  here,  but  it  is  one  on  which 
I  do  not  dwell.     Let  me  say  that  in  the  surrender  of 


IDEALISTIC  PHILOSOPHY  325 

a  man  to  Christ,  and  in  the  giving  of  Himself  by 
Christ  to  man,  we  find  a  fact  of  religious  experience 
in  which  an  ideal  is  reached,  and  the  man  who  sur- 
renders himself  to  Christ  finds  himself  in  Christ. 

Full  scope  for  individual  life,  thought,  and  action, 
full  realization  of  the  individual  in  all  his  individual- 
ity, perfected  character  of  each  according  to  the  ideal 
of  the  individual,  and  on  the  other  side  the  wealth  of 
the  whole  poured  into  each  person,  and  returned  by 
each  person  to  the  whole,  and  all  in  God,  who  gives 
himself  in  immeasurable  fulness  to  His  creation,  such 
is  the  ideal  of  the  kingdom  of  God.  That  unity  is 
not  the  starting-point,  it  is  the  goal.  It  is  not  yet, 
but  it  will  be.  It  will  be  the  outcome  of  infinite  striv- 
ing, it  will  be  the  result  of  age-long  divine  endeavour, 
the  fruit  of  eternal  toil,  work,  and  suffering,  for  it  is 
the  effort  of  God  to  make  a  world,  which  also  makes 
itself,  and  must  be  persuaded  to  do  so. 

Much  more  might  be  said,  had  I  more  time.  But 
I  have  already  far  exceeded  my  limits.  In  this  last 
lecture  I  have  been  only  able  to  give  an  outline  of 
what  I  mean,  but  the  outline  I  hope  is  intelligible, 
and,  in  the  future,  it  may  be  worked  out  in  more  de- 
tail. But  I  am  persuaded  that  it  is  on  these  lines 
that  the  philosophy  and  theology  of  the  future  may 
most  hopefully  proceed.  Philosophically,  we  must 
retrace  our  steps  somewhat,  and  try  to  make  the 
metaphysic  of  Kant  agree  with  his  ethic,  and  give  a 
rational  meaning  to  the  thing  in  itself,  which  is  an 


326  THEISM 

irrational  element  in  his  system.  Theologically,  too, 
we  have  a  great  deal  to  do,  and  we  must  overhaul 
our  abstract  doctrines,  rescue  them  from  the  dominion 
of  abstractions,  and  make  them  to  be  a  fuller  repre- 
sentation of  the  reality  of  the  concrete  personal, 
religious  life  of  the  individual,  and  of  individuals 
constituted  into  a  society  of  redeemed  men.  The 
outlook  is  not  dark,  it  is  hopeful.  Many  are  at  work, 
many  run  to  and  fro,  and  knowledge  is  increased, 
and  every  increase  of  knowledge  is  available  for  the 
service  of  theology,  and  theology  is  giving  itself  to 
the  mighty  task  of  using  it.  For  theology  is  in  the 
central  position,  and  has  the  widest  command  of  the 
requisite  resources ;  it  can  alone  adequately  deal  with 
the  postulates  and  the  fulness  of  the  religious  life; 
and  if  unity  is  to  be  attained,  it  must  be  attained 
through  theology. 


INDEX 


Agnosticism,  see  Synthetic  Philoso- 
phy. 
Anaxagoras,  246. 

Animism,  Tylor  on,  112,  242;  122. 
Anthropomorphism,  268. 
Atomic  theory,  2iseq. 
Aufklarung,  143,  163-5,  174, 190-1. 

Bain  (Dr.  Alex.),  201. 

Balfour  (A.  J.),  his  thesis,  188;  and 
a  criterion  of  belief,  188-9;  ^^is 
antithesis  between  authority  and 
reason,  igoseg. ;  that  antithesis  mis- 
leading, 193-4. 

Bastian  (Dr.  H.  C),  his  experiments, 
44. 

Bradley  (F.  H.),  on  the  content  of 
the  absolute,  301-2;    54,  158,  303, 

305.  309- 
Brinton  (Dr.),  243. 
Buckle  (H.  T.),  and  Mr.  Benjamin 

Kidd,  164. 

Caird  (Edward),  on  development, 
95  seq. ;  on  God  as  the  principle  of 
unity,  303-4 ;  261,  309. 

Causality,  science  and  the  concep- 
tion of,  39,  91. 

Cayley,  3. 

Cell,  structure,  56 ;  differentiation  of, 
60;  Marshallow,  57. 

Conservation  of  energy,  8. 

Darwin,  on  the  limits  to  the  increase 

of  a  species,  77  ;  89,  99. 
Definitions,  the  inadequacy  of,  12. 
Descartes,  142. 


Environment,  correspondence  be- 
tween life  and,  102 ;  man  and  his, 
I02seq.;  organism  relative  to,  112; 
modifications,  of  —  toolmaking, 
104 ;  speech,  108,  see  Man. 

Ether,  Maxwell  on  the  properties  and 
functions  of  the,  26  seq. 

Evolution,  theory  of,  factors  undis- 
covered, 71 ;  value  of,  81 ;  special 
difficulties  of,  88,  94 ;  arrested  de- 
velopment, 88  seq.  ;  and  the  con- 
ception of  causality,  91 ;  and 
philosophy,  z6o  seq. 

Evolution,  ethical,  spiritual,  and  re- 
ligious, 277. 

Existence,  the  struggle  for,  75  seq. 

Fairbairn  (Dr.  A.  M.),  on  the  ethical 
necessity  for  creation,  312;  299. 

Feeling,  psychology  of,  63. 

Fichte  (J.  G.),  269. 

Fiske  (John),  on  evolution  and  man, 
266;  on  causality,  267;  on  the 
identification  of  the  deity  with  the 
cosmos,  270-1 ;  272,  275. 

"  Foundations  of  Belief,"  see  Balfour. 

Geddes  (Prof.  P.),  on  the  organism, 
69;  89. 

Generalization,  the  process  of,  objec- 
tions to,  and  limitations  of,  8  seq., 
14,  24  seq. 

Graham  (Prof.  W.),  on  the  divine 
consciousness  and  personality, 
268-9;  271. 

Greece,  and  the  emancipation  of  the 
individual,  141. 

Green  (T.  H.),  303,  317. 


Edwards  (Jonathan),  i,  289. 


Hamilton  (Sir  W.),  63. 
327 


328 


INDEX 


Hebrews,  and  the  emancipation  of 
the  individual,  141. 

Hegel,  126-7,  '^Zly  292,  297-9. 

Hesiod,  247. 

Hoffding  (Prof.  H.),  on  conscious- 
ness, 203-4. 

Homer,  247. 

Hume,  on  personal  identity,  1995^^. 

Huxley  (Prof.  T.  H.),  on  the  physi- 
cal processes  and  basis  of  life, 
46  seq. ;  on  the  organism,  68 ;  201. 

Hyde  (Prof.  T.  DeW.),  150. 

Idealism,  see  Philosophy. 
Individualism,  Xdftseq. 
Isomerism,  54. 

James  (Prof.  W.),  149-52,  157,  201. 

Kant,  305,  325. 

Kidd  (Benjamin),  his  thesis,  163; 
and  Mr.  H.  T.  Buckle  —  a  compari- 
son, 164-5;  and  the  Aufklarung, 
165 ;  on  the  struggle  for  existence, 
166 seq.;  on  selection,  169;  and 
Weismann,  161:) seq.;  and  degener- 
ation, 171 ;  and  rationality,  173-4, 
176  seq. ;  and  religion,  181  seq. ; 
and  altruism,  186-7 ;  his  theory 
and  its  defects,  168  j-^^.;  105,  162. 

Kinetic  theory  of  gases,  13. 

Kropotkin  (Prince),  89. 

Lang  (Andrew) ,  on  the  origin  of  re- 
ligion, 243. 

Laotze,  288. 

Law,  mechanical,  10;  insufficiency 
of,  24  seq. ;  and  purpose,  40. 

Law,  the  periodic,  14,  22. 

Life,  conditions  of,  37  ;  origin  of,  43 ; 
Watson  on  origin  of,  44 ;  growth, 
83  seq.;  embryonic,  85;  arrested 
development,  88  j^^.;  rational,  and 
its  implications,  98  seq. ;  relations, 
50  seq.;  see  Environment  and 
World. 

Lockyer  (Sir  N.),  78. 

Lotze,  225. 


MacBride  (Prof.),  on  zoological 
classification,  83. 

Mackenzie  (Prof.  J.  S.),  on  the 
family,  127. 

Man,  primitive,  environment,  102  seq.; 
toolmaking,  104 ;  speech,  108 ; 
reason  and  retrogression,  113-4; 
taboo,  115 ;  a  standard  of  conduct, 
115  seq.;  his  family  or  tribe  the 
unit,  119;  mythology,  120;  science, 
121-2;  animism,  122,  242-3;  mar- 
riage and  the  family,  123  seq. 

Man,  the  making  of,  world  empires, 
132;  war,  133;  citizenship,  135; 
conflict  between  the  individual  and 
society,  132;  the  emancipation  of 
the  individual,  140  seq. ;  organi- 
zation for  a  common  end,  136  seq. 

Man,  and  the  knowledge  of  God, 
276;  moral,  spiritual,  and  religious 
evolution  of,  277;  the  God  of  his 
experience,  278 ;  objective  sanc- 
tions for  morality,  280  seq.;  God 
in  history,  284 ;  humanity  a  unity, 
144,  147. 

Marshall  (A.   M.),  on  cell  structure, 

57- 
Master  of  Balliol,  see  Caird. 
Materialism,  146. 
Matter,  definitions  of,  12 ;  pre-atomic 

state  of,   21;  properties   of  living, 

46   seq.;    interrelation   of  organic 

and  inorganic,  48,  59. 
Maxwell  (clerk) ,  on  the  properties  and 

functions  of  the  ether,  26 ;  29,  154. 
Mill  (James),  201. 
Mill  (J.  S.),20i. 

Natural   selection,   sub-terms  of,  73 

seq.,    170-1. 
Nebular  theory,  35. 
Ne^\•ton,  3,  7,  29. 

Organism,  unity  of  the,  51  seq.,  (yj 
seq.;  relation  to  environment,  62; 
variations,  71 ;  is  more  than  a  sum, 
71 ;  Huxley  on,  68  ;  Sedgwick  and 
Wilson  on,  67;   Geddes,   Stirling, 


INDEX 


329 


and  Virchow  on,  69;   the  social, 
■L^\seq. 

Paley,  91. 

Personality,  Hume  on,  iggseq.;  con- 
sciousness, 202  scq.;  Hoffding  on, 
203-4 ;  conception  of  self,  209  seq.  ; 
realization  of  self,  212-3;  individu- 
ality and,  ■zi^tseq. ;  development  of, 
a  condition  of  social  union  ,217  seq.; 
irrelation  and  independence  of,22o ; 
ideals  and  their  reality,  2.2.1  seq,; 
Lotze  and,  225;  influences  affect- 
ing, 279-80. 

Philosophy,  ideaUst,  its  basis,  261; 
debt  of  theology  to,  257  seq,; 
and  Christianity,  — Hegel,  297  seq., 
Strauss,  299 ;  its  unity  quantitative, 
303,  322;  its  value  and  influence, 
300-1;  Bradley's,  301  j^^^.,  309; 
Caird's,  303-4;  the  problem  of, 
304  seq. 

Philosophy,  the  S}Tithetic,  its  basis, 
260,  275 ;  and  the  normality  of  the 
religious  faculty,  230-1 ;  debt  of 
theology  to,  257  seq.;  and  a  know- 
ledge of  God,  262  seq.;  and  the 
ultimate  reality,  26^  seq.;  and  an- 
thropomorphism, 268  seq.;  its  af- 
firmations, 270;  its  conclusions 
extended,  272  seq.,  278  ;  its  results 
and  tendencies,  2.j^seq. 

Plato,  247. 

Poulton  (Prof.  E.  B.),  on  physiologi- 
cal selections,  79  seq. 

Power,  manifest  and  therefore  known, 
91  seq. 

Preadaptation,  86. 

Quantities,  transmission  of,  acquired, 
90. 

Ramsay  (Prof.  W.),  13-4. 

Rayleigh  (Lord),  13. 

Religion,  universal,  227-8,240;  and 

human    life,   228,  288-9,   293  seq.; 

and   science,   228-9,  250  j^^.,  286; 

Spencer  and,  230,  260-7,  270,  272- 

6,  291 ;  and  the  race,  240-2,  248  j^jj'., 


278  seq. ;  origins  of,  242  seq. ;  Lang 
and  Smith  on  origins  of,  243-4; 
conservatism  of,  244-5  !  Plato  and, 
247 ;  and  morals  in  crisis,  246-7 ; 
and  Israel,  247-8;  evolution  of, 
277  seq. ;  and  God  in  history,  284 ; 
the  conception  of  God,  285  seq., 
294-5  ■.  Edwards  and,  289-90 ;  Kidd 
and,  181  j<?^./  see  Philosophy. 

Romanes  (G.  J.),  79,  99. 

Rome,  and  the  emancipation  of  the 
individual,  141. 

Science,  attitude  to,  2;  presupposi- 
tions of,  3;  need  of  a  concrete 
universal  in,  8  seq. ;  methods  of,  24  ; 
and  the  conception  of  causality,  39, 
91 ;  conservatism  of,  43  ;  the  chang- 
ing order  of,  153-4;  and  religion, 
228-9,  z^oseq.,  286. 

Sedgwick  and  Wilson,  on  the  unity 
of  the  organism,  67. 

Shakespeare,  217. 

Siebert,  299. 

Smith  (W.  Robertson) ,  on  primitive 
religion,  244. 

"  Social  Evolution,"  see  Kidd. 

Spencer  (Herbert),  32,  47,  51,  86,  94^ 
122,  150,  169,  171,  201,  204,  222-3, 
230-1,  244,  260-7,  270,  272-6,  291. 

Spinoza,  15  seq. 

Stirling  (J.  Hutchison),  on  the  unity 
of  the  organism,  69. 

Strauss,  on  a  quantitative  unity,  322; 

299-  317.  324- 
Struggle  for  existence,  75  seq. ;  Kidd 

on,  166  j^^. 
Survival  of  the  fittest,  73. 
Sylvester,  3. 

Taboo,  115. 

Theism,  intelligibility  of  the  world 

a  postulate  of,  21 ;  origins  and  the 

theistic  argument,  42. 
Tylor,  on  animism,  112;  242. 

Unity,  in  things,  11,  36,  155;  of  the 
cell,  58;   of  the  organism,  siseq., 


330 


INDEX 


67, 70 ;  of  the  race,  144, 147, 195-^  I 
extra  mundane,  161 ;  difficulty  of 
thinking  a,  157  seq.,  304-5 ;  the 
Godhead  the  type  of,  308  seq.; 
idealism  and  a,  — Bradley,  302, 
Caird,  303-4,  309;  Strauss  and  a 
quantitative,  322. 

Variation,  71,  75 ;  demand  for  indefi- 
nite, 78;  171- 
Virchow,  on  the  organism,  69. 

Wallace  (Prof.  W.),  149.  303. 

Ward  (Dr.  James) ,  201. 

Watson  (Prof.),  on  the  origin  of  life, 


Weismann,  90,  167, 169-71. 

World,  rational,  21,  \c^\seq.,  314-5; 
conditions  which  have  made  life 
possible  in,  37 ;  preparation  for  life, 
34  seq. ;  evolution  of  the  inorganic, 
36 ;  entry  of  life  into,  49,  60 ;  pur- 
pose evident  in,  40  seq.;  power, 
manifest  and  therefore  known,  in, 
91  seq. ;  subjective  aspect  of,  198 
seq. ;  ethical  necessity  for  creation, 
311-2;  extra  mundane  unity,  161. 

Worlds,  the  making  of,  18  seq. 

Xenophanes,  247. 


The  Gospel  for  an  Age  of  Doubt 

BY 

REV.   HENRY  VAN   DYKE,   D.D.,  LL.D. 

Pastor  of  the  Brick  Church,  New   York  City 

Cloth.     12mo.     Price,  $1.25 

A   REVISED   EDITION   WITH  A  NEW   PREFACE 

"  Dr.  Van  Dyke's  '  Gospel  for  an  Age  of  Doubt,'  which  is  often  called  the  finest 
apologetic  of  modern  times,  is  constantly  coming  out  in  new  editions.  It  is  a  book 
that  ought  to  be  in  the  hands  —  and  heart  —  of  every  thoughtful  Christian  of  the 
day." —  The  Interior,  Chicago. 

"  Dr.  Van  Dyke's  lectures  form  one  of  the  most  eloquent  defences  of  Christianity 
that  we  have  yet  met  with." —  The  Academy,  London. 

"  The  most  vital,  suggestive,  helpful  book  we  know  in  the  whole  range  of  theo- 
logical writing  at  this  period." —  The  New  York  Times. 

"  The  book  can  be  heartily  recommended  as  a  sincere  and  thoughtful  attempt  to 
show  the  consistency  of  Christianity  with  truth."  —  The  Pall  Mall  Gazette,  London. 


The  Gospel  for  a  World  of  Sin 

BY 

REV.    HENRY  VAN   DYKE,   D.D.,   LL.D. 

Pastor  of  the  Brick  Church,  New   York  City 

Cloth.     12mo.     Price,  $1.25 

"  His  fornier  volume,  '  The  Gospel  for  an  Age  of  Doubt,'  was  but  a  preparation 
for  the  discussion  of  this  larger  and  more  profoundly  interesting  subject.  .  .  .  Just 
the  book  we  need."  —Dr.  S.  B.  Rossiter,  N.  Y.  Observer. 

"  A  book  for  the  times."  —  Christian  Intelligencer. 

"  Sure  to  prove  of  immense  value  in  leading  the  thought  of  the  day." 

—  Congrcgationalist. 

"  The  work  is  one  to  charm  and  satisfy."  —  Plain  Dealer,  Cleveland. 

"  One  of  the  basic  books  of  true  Christian  thought  of  to-day  and  of  all  times." 

—  Boston  Cotirier. 

"  Experimental,  vital,  real." —  The  Outlook. 

"  A  book  so  thoughtful,  earnest,  and  at  the  same  time  so  interesting,  should,  and 
will,  have  many  readers."  —  Dr.  George  P.  Fisher,  Yale. 

"Quotable  .  .  .  full  of  pithy  thought."  —  Home  yournal, '^e-w  Yor\i. 

"  I  have  read  it  with  the  keenest  interest,  and  have  been  greatly  helped  by  it." 

—  Hev.  John  Balcolm  Shaw. 

"  Sure  to  be  widely  read."—  Tribune,  Chicago. 


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Ethics  and  Revelation 

BY 

HENRY   S.    NASH 

Professor  in  the  Episcopal  Theological  School  at  Cambridge,  Author 
of  "  Genesis  of  the  Social  Conscience"  etc. 

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ecclesiastical  fundamentals.  The  author  is  a  rare  rhetorician  and  guides  one  through 
gardens  of  beauty,  but  they  are  gardens  among  the  mountains.  One  is  in  danger  of 
marring  the  margins  of  the  pages  by  marking  brilliant,  strong,  and  epigrammatic 
passages  for  re-reading.  There  is  a  tendency  to  repetition,  but  it  is  in  such  varied 
forms  and  is  always  so  fresh  that  it  serves  the  ends  of  emphasis.  I  wish  I  could 
induce  every  young  minister  to  read  the  opening  chapter,  and  then  to  read  and  re- 
read pages  154,  155, 166, 167,  175-178.  But  it  will  never  do  to  cull  or  indicate.  Every 
word  of  the  six  lectures  should  be  read  by  thoughtful  men  of  the  day,  ministers  and 
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be  read  by  many  clergymen  and  laymen  with  \i\\.^x&'=x."  ~  Boston  Transcript. 


Genesis  of  the  Social  Conscience 

THE  RELATION   BETWEEN  THE  ESTABLISHMENT  OF  CHRIS- 
TIANITY IN  EUROPE  AND  THE  SOCIAL  QUESTION 
BY 

HENRY  S.  NASH 

Professor  in  the  Episcopal  Theological  School  i?i  Cambridge,  Author 
of  "Ethics  and  Revelation,"  etc. 

Cloth.     8vo.     Price,  $1 50 

"  The  reader's  interest  in  the  subject  never  falters,  and  the  book  is  worthy  of 
thoughtful  reading  from  cover  to  cover."  —  Lz'viftg  Church. 

"  The  volume  is  most  decidedly  to  be  commended.  ...  It  is  packed  with  mate- 
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"  We  have  here  brilliant  forms  of  statement,  a  powerful  defence  of  Christianized 
democracy,  and  an  apologetic  argument  of  high  value." 

—  A  merican  Journal  of  Theology. 

"  Professor  Nash  writes  with  spirit,  he  is  above  all  things  interesting;  and  his 
work,  besides  being  an  important  contribution  to  the  histor^^  and  science  of  sociology, 
is  an  invaluable  apologetic  for  the  Christian  faith."  —  Epworth  Herald. 

"  It  is  saturated  with  the  true  spirit  of  Christianity.  It  is  rich  in  lofty  ideals.  It 
is  a  thought-provoking  book."  —  Our  Bible  Teacher. 


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